



INTERVIEW OF THE EMPEROR AND THE EMPRESS AT FRANCE

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN MDCCCLXXXIX

TO THE

RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN MDCCCXV



BY

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN TO THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR. JAN.—OCT. 1805.

1. "THE world," said Napoleon, "believe me the enemy of peace; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them, whoever ceases to advance is lost." Continual progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that, the moment these failed, his authority would begin to decline. With him, therefore, constant wars and evident advances towards universal domination, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose inevitably from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation, when it was heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or individuals, the principles of its own

destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to, the evil spirit of his times; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition converted by his genius into that of military conquest; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him in the end upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

2. But although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, that he held the throne, no man knew better than Napoleon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled, on every occasion, to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the Empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had

taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made pacific overtures to the English government. His letter on this subject, addressed, according to his custom, to the King of England in person, was of the following tenor:—

3. "Sire, my brother.—Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity: they may continue their strife for ages; but will their governments, in so doing, fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people? And how will they answer to their consciences for so much blood uselessly shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have, I flatter myself, sufficiently proved to the world that I fear none of the chances of war. It presents no thing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart; but war has never been adverse to my glory. I conjure your Majesty, therefore, not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions, and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate? Your Majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory: your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity: what can you expect from a war? To form a coalition of the Continental powers? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French empire. To renew our intestine divisions? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies? They are to her only a secondary consideration; and your Majesty has already

enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion, that the war is maintained without an object; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting! The world is surely large enough for both to live in; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not wanting. I have now at least discharged a duty dear to my heart. May your Majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it!"

4. The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person; but Lord Mulgrave, the minister for foreign affairs, on the 14th January, addressed the following answer to M. Talleyrand:—"His Britannic Majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the chief of the French government. There is nothing which his Majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that that object cannot be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his Majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received, until he has had time to communicate with the Continental powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of the sentiments by which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe."

5. This reply, which in a manner

disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoleon. It both revealed to the subjects of his empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the Emperor with the projects of ambition which were entertained by the coalesced sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as it invariably does in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular, had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war—the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland—were studiously kept out of view; the encroachments of the Allies, the ambition of kings, the lust of the coalition, alone were referred to. Public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the ruler of France, in the firm belief that in so doing they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence.

6. This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoleon addressed himself to the legislative body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804. "Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens!" said he, "we have all but one object in our several departments—the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier, or First Consul, I have but one thought: Emperor, I have no other object—the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe; but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our empire; but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us*

to other states." Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event showed, for the incorporation of the Ligurian republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the Ecclesiastical States and the whole Italian peninsula. No man ever knew so well as Napoleon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection, and exclusive attention to present objects, which have ever characterised that volatile people; and none ever so successfully practised the great art of revolutions, to rouse effort by the language of generosity, and apply it to the purposes of selfishness.

7. This session of the legislative body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom, and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect taxation*, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amidst all the declamations of the revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people. It has been already mentioned, that the territorial burdens of France, during the progress of the Revolution, had become enormous; the land-tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, fifty, and even eighty per cent on their incomes. The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the Emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a particular class of society. Under his aus-

pieces, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organised, under the name of *Droits Reunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue.* In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled the government to diminish the territorial impost by 1,200,000 francs, or £48,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the Emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year. On the 31st December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the Empire was laid before the chambers by M. Champagny, the minister of the interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Batavian republics, similar to that recently completed in the French empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoleon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time:—"The first place was vacant: the most worthy was called to fill it: he has only dethroned anarchy."

8. Events of still greater moment were announced to the British parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the ground then taken Great Britain, amid all the subsequent

vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the speech from the throne, the King of England observed:—"I have received pacific overtures from the chief of the French government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connection with a view to that important object, and especially the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe."

9. It was not without foundation that Mr Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connections which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made, not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but in obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success—the cabinet of Vienna. Assured at length of the friendly disposition of the Austrian government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situation, they were compelled to adopt, Mr Pitt, four days after the meeting of parliament, presented a confidential communication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed—1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution. 2. To make, in

* The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions of francs higher than in 1803, and was as follows:—

| | France. | £ |
|---------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| Direct taxes, . . . | 318,749,000 | or 12,550,000 |
| Registers, . . . | 198,384,000 " | 7,950,000 |
| Customs, . . . | 41,485,000 " | 1,700,000 |
| Excise, first year, . . . | 3,895,000 " | 156,000 |
| Post-office, . . . | 10,471,000 " | 420,000 |
| Lottery, . . . | 16,658,000 " | 660,000 |
| Salt-tax, . . . | 3,220,000 " | 130,000 |

538,062,000 or 23,568,000

—DUC DE GANTA, l. 304.

regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as; while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future, and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia; 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont; 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. "The first of these objects," continues the note, "is certainly the one which the views of his Majesty and of the Emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document; for it goes on to state—"His Majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your Excellency has transmitted, that the views of the court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even carried farther with advantage to the common cause."

10. But it is worthy of especial notice, that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France, or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants; an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely from the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years

afterwards, effected the deliverance of Europe; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his successors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and no severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of the enemy's elevation.*

11. Diplomatic relations of a friendly character had already taken place between the cabinet of St Petersburg and that of Berlin. So early as 24th May 1804, the latter, alarmed at the rapid strides of France in the north of Germany, had concluded a secret convention with the former, by which it was stipulated that so long as the First Consul limited himself to 30,000 men in the north of Germany, the two courts should remain quiescent; but if other states in the neighbourhood should be invaded, they should unite their forces and act in concert for the common defence. But the death of the Duke d'Enghien produced warmer feelings, and rapidly led to a disposition towards a coalition in the northern courts, though the long-established jealousy of Prussia still marred the conclusion of a lasting alliance. A treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian cabinet, and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Winzingerode was in consequence despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but notwithstanding

* See Appendix A, Chap. xxxix.

ing the leaning of Baron Harvenberg, its chief minister, and the influence of the Queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit.

12. The supplies voted in the British parliament for the service of the year amounted to no less than £44,559,521 of war taxes, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, exclusive of £4,534,000, as separate charges, for England, besides £28,632,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of £77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of £20,000,000, amounted to £43,992,000 for Great Britain, and £3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of £32,381,000; in all, £79,873,000.* The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the loan were no less than £1,560,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt-duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to those levied on horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations.

13. The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a mournful conviction, which subsequent events have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilisation, requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants, and desolate its surface. But though these views were beginning to spread among the thoughtful few, they took no root among the thoughtless many; party-spirit fastened on Ireland as the best field whereon to achieve its triumphs; all the chief attacks on the ministry

began to be directed through its concerns; and, like the Debatable Land between England and Scotland in former days, it was in consequence subjected to a species of government distracted by passions utterly fatal to lasting prosperity. In this session of parliament also, the report of the select committee upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the management of Lord Melville—proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory.

14. The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st, That he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express act of parliament; and, 2d, That he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses; in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. These charges were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterwards assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Mr Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the house to the real import of what was established in evidence—viz. that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of

* See Appendix B, Chap. xxxix.

the bankers; and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of personal advantage from that irregularity.* After an animated debate, Mr Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting vote of the Speaker, the numbers being two hundred and sixteen on each side.

15. This was too important a blow against the administration of Mr Pitt, not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party, and was felt most keenly by that minister. It led to various subsequent proceedings; and so vehement did the opinion of the public become, in consequence of the incessant efforts made by the press in the interest of the Whigs, to keep it in a state of agitation, that, on the 6th May, Mr Pitt announced in parliament, that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of privy councillors: and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude, with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the House of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality; and in the interim, the nation, from whose service he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as First Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar.

16. This session of parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland,

which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the legislature for five-and-twenty years. The question was argued with the utmost ability in both houses of parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then viewed, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age. On the one hand, as was argued by Mr Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr Grattan, "That, in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three-fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions of its inhabitants. It would indeed be a happy thing if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions; but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for, and the question is, what is to be done under existing circumstances? That parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain; but, in justice to the memory of King William, it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with his measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent, that the Roman Catholics were their irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant establishment of Ireland, and the Protestant government of England; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the step was taken of excluding them from all share in the constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

17. "Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present Majesty; and under his government the measures

* "I never," said Mr Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb* iv. 611.

pursued have indeed been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of progressive amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system. You have given them full toleration, and the benefits of education; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunion of families; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in the fruits of the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, withholding from them only the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people have rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, commerce, and general civilisation: the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent government, and at length, in 1792, they were admitted, by being permitted to vote at elections for members of parliament, to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced; and here, for a time, a stand was made: not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any further concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish parliament. That parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the defined object of making the legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three-fourths of the population. In these circumstances it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that legislature, founded as it would have been on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connection with this country.

18. "But that obstacle is now removed; the Irish members no longer form

a separate assembly, but are merged in the general parliament of the empire; and the same prudential considerations which forbade the admission of Catholics into the Irish parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the British, where they can never exceed a small minority. It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes, that by the operation of the Union they would be relieved of their disabilities. No authorised assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them, that such a measure would result from that step: but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic emancipation would be more favourably considered than it had hitherto been; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand, that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the united parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem: you are required not to concede Catholic emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

19. "Every government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects: but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities? We are not now to go back, in the nineteenth century, to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted: it lies with the opponents of emancipation to make out the exception of their case from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result, that you must undo all that you have done; recall every concession you have made,

and begins a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected? And have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion: from the heartburnings consequent on the unhappy system of middle-men, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state. And the tranquil condition of three-fourths of the Catholic population for years past, may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents could militate against them.

20. "The period has now arrived when one of two things must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics, by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force; too little to be won by affection. They have got everything, excepting the right to seats in parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions: to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heartburnings than serious personal injuries. If they came into this house, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the hierarchy of the country? What could five or six,

or indeed fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object, in the midst of a Protestant legislature tenfold more numerous? Similar arguments were urged against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility to the English establishment? and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment, under circumstances which left little, if any, hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted.

21. On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, Mr Perceval, and Lord Chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British empire can boast; but their present claims in Ireland do not relate to their condition as subjects, but to their title to political power. No system, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must everywhere exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state according as circumstances may render this necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed *non tangenda non movenda*, except on the ground of the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement,

have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and of experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the crown, were the greater calamity; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now, is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the crown to persons of the Protestant faith, that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than in a government, where the law is above the crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the ministers, the chancellor, the judges of the land, to be of the religion most hostile of all to the establishment?

22. "What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the constitution? There are many classes of Dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital difference is, that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is in a peculiar manner of importance to consider, in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio*, only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis, which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood interfere in a great part of

the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not, whether Catholics may be loyal subjects—whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty,—for all that they already have,—but whether they are to obtain political power of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

23. "The practical effect of the extension of the elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been, to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants; and thus the influence of property would be operating on the one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it could not fail to operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests. The present condition of the Continent renders it in an especial manner inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the late extensions of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman See is substantially under the power of Napoleon. The Pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard-of for ten centuries, to place a revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return for so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence upon the French government in which he is placed? and would it not be the

height of madness in us, knowing Napoleon's inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control!

24. "Mr Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, 'that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation; neither did they care for parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.' It is evident, therefore, from their testimony, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is unfortunately contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has invariably been found that yielding has induced disturbance and anarchy; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century, and that since its relaxation it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and has constantly been more or less the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands: kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay; but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our destruction, and recollect that it is only by a steady adherence to that system which we have received

from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour.

The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both houses: in the Peers by one hundred and seventy-eight to forty-nine: in the Commons by three hundred and thirty-six to one hundred and twenty-four.

25. In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquency alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has, hitherto at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried; but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realised many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change; and melancholy experience has taught us that Mr Perceval's and Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland has never been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted: the total suspension of the constitution has in consequence repeatedly since been forced as a measure of absolute necessity upon government; and, without stilling the waves of discontent in the island, that long-debated change has fixed the firebrand of discord in the

• **British empire.** Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of toleration. Many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose: others have settled into the belief that, however just in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles: and that, in the attempt to draw a decayed beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.

26. In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote: and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction; it shows that nations which commit injustice cannot escape punishment: and in its present wretchedness may be

* The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed:—

| | Committals. | Convictions. |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| 1828, Catholic disabilities in force, | 14,683 | 9,269 |
| 1829, Relief Bill passed in March, | 15,271 | 9,449 |
| 1830, | 15,794 | 9,902 |
| 1831, Reform agitation, | 16,192 | 9,605 |
| 1832, Ditto, | 16,636 | 9,759 |
| 1833, Title agitation begun, | 17,819 | 11,444 |
| 1834, Coercion Act in force, | 21,381* | 14,523 |

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or trial, it may safely be concluded from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—*Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, the enforcement of which constitutes the great moral of the present times.

27. I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it in the whole British empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without referring to historical details, it is sufficient to observe, that at least four-fifths, probably five-sixths, of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the unjust forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of oppression, because it extends to distant generations the injury done to the present, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed—between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France—a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created; therefore, by both countries retribution must be endured.

28. II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of

middle-men and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland; and they soon found that, without middle-men interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realise anything whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed in close and rapid succession the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a long term of years, between the landlords and the peasantry; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining out of the produce of their labour such a multitude of superiors; and the ruinous right of the landlord to distraint the effects of the sub-tenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal,—a privilege which, in its application to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realising any rents out of the tenantry—a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of anything like general freedom in their country; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with insatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

29. III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of government and national representation for the two countries, however different their character and state of social advancement, has contributed still further to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent pe-

santry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom, and an extensive distribution of property, alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement of, or disregarding the passions consequent on, a popular constitution. The state of civilisation, to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial: the passions consequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions. Could the wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is a wise and humane, but despotic government, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every

* The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a-year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act, they were, over the whole country, reduced three-fifths; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from one thousand five hundred and sixty-one to three hundred and thirty a-year.—*Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. "The disturbances of Ireland," said Marquis Wellesley, while viceroy of that country in 1834, "have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes, and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solicitude that his Majesty's government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connection marked by the strongest characters in all these transactions, between the system of agitation and its inevitable consequences, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect: nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connection." So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr Littleton, the Irish Secretary under Earl Grey's administration, stated in parliament, that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wished for its renewal.—*Mirror of Parliament*, 19th July 1834.

opening to employment, should, at the same time, rigorously punish crimes in every rank, close every avenue to democratic ambition, terminate the exercise of all ruinous privileges, and extinguish every hope of revolutionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation, be laid in the growth of an opulent middle class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

30. IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who arrogate to themselves any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority.* The distinction which he

draws between toleration to those who merely differ from government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire to regain the lost possessions or ascendancy of the Catholic Church, is in the highest degree important, and throws a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastical ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its tiara, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient

* Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows:—"Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is, when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a precious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be dethroned by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eyes and hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is, forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion are heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated

with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these *have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate*, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects, and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the court and the church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it them, on the pain of eternal fire."—*First Letter on Toleration; Works*, vi 46, 47.

part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom.

31. Unlimited toleration the Irish Papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted, on their shores, an armed and fortified settlement of Romans; or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoleon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. The unjust spoliation of the church at the Reformation, has introduced an apple of discord between England and Ireland, which can never be removed. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number, at first, of such an organised band of aliens, any reason for despising its ultimate dangers; for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malcontents in the bosom of the state, can almost always in the end attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

32 While the British parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, and the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoleon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up by the tenth report of the Naval Commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated republics his newly-acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the former of these objects, and

disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the latter, he introduced change into the government of all the states dependent upon France; placed on his head the iron crown of Lombardy; and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration. But during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel; and the minutest movements of the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to co-operate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command, were regulated by his indefatigable activity, while he was to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress.

33. Holland was the first of the independent republics which underwent the change consequent on the assumption of the crown by Napoleon. The continuance of the republican rule in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states subjected to his control; but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the Emperor. The whole powers of the constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new constitution, organised at Paris, the great manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French government with the aid of M. Schimmelpenninck, the Dutch ambassador at that capital,—a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the Emperor, and was rewarded with the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this as they had done to all the preceding changes. The democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a

and conferred on their revolutionary senate, and assured better things of the constitution than they had done of any which had before been forced upon this country. The new constitution, accepted on the 22d March by the legislative body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants.

More important changes soon followed in the Italian states. The original design of Napoleon was to have created the Italian republic into a separate kingdom, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne; and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines; but that prince declared he would not accept it, unless the Emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist—a tract of sea coast and a harbour in the Mediterranean—and relieve it from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) yearly paid to the French government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoleon, and therefore he changed his design, and resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugene Beauharnais, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in the character of viceroy. This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation from the Italian republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French senate, called upon Napoleon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the act of settlement, by which Napoleon, Emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs.

On the following day the Emperor appeared in great pomp in the senate,

and conferred on his sister, Elisa, the principality of Piombino. The act of settlement of the Italian crown was then read; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new sovereign, and he declared, "That he accepted, and would defend, the iron crown; and that even during his lifetime he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the 31st of March, when Eugene Beauharnais, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities. On the same day the new constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom; but in every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French empire.*

86 The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bring-

* Napoleon on this occasion made the following speech in the senate.—"Powerful and great is the French empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany, but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest of India and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain some thing, but we keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory, if we had united to them the Italian republic, but we gave it independence at Lyons, and now we proceed a step further, and solemnly recognise its ultimate separation from the crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."—*EUROPA*, iv. 167.

ing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces for the invasion of Great Britain, Napoleon resolved to proceed to Italy, and to make the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the iron crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose he set out for Turin, by the route of Fontainebleau and Lyons, corresponding daily with the minister of marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from the Texel to Cadiz, and from Toulon to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing leaves so strong an impression of the great ability and indefatigable activity of his mind, as the study of the numerous, minute, and lucid orders which he addressed during every day of this journey to the minister of marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for by his all seeing intellect.* But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which to external appearance he was engaged. At Lyons he inspected the rising manufactures of that city, in which the five pacific years of his government, and the exclusion of British manufactures from the Continent in consequence of the war, had already induced an extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mont Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the Pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stu-

* This correspondence is to be found entire in General Mathieu Dumas's work having been put in his hands by the Duchess Decrès widow of the minister of marine, to whom it was addressed.—DUMAS, xi 195 286—*Pages Just*. It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoleon's designs for the invasion of this country and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented them from being carried into effect.

dingi, a country settlement of the Duke of Sardinia, which was then made up fitted up for his reception. He then received accounts of the successful passage of the Straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and the junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Ganteaux at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given. Overjoyed at this intelligence, he moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alexandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest strongholds in the world.

37. Splendid pageants had for some time been in preparation on the field of Castiglione, and on that of Marengo, where the destinies of Italy had so recently been fixed. Twenty-five thousand men on the first of these fields, under Augereau and Lannes, represented the battle of which it had been the theatre. Thirty-four battalions and seven squadrons were assembled on the latter, to imitate the manoeuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the Emperor and Empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes which once had occurred upon it. The day was bright and clear, the soldiers, when daybreak had been on their ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero, and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the Empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the Empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manoeuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers in an especial manner distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialist attack in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the Emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amidst the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour.

The splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the minds of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoleon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching.

38. On the day following, the Emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mészana Capta amidst the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which the learned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amidst the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and have consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues, pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue heaven; the chaste design of the arch of the Simplon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoleon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among which were in an especial manner noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia—two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great struggle which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the Emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent

to him, on the occasion by Frederick-William.

39. Napoleon had in the first instance, as has been mentioned, offered the crown of the kingdom of Italy to his brother Joseph; but he, divining the secret wishes of the Emperor regarding it, had the prudence to decline the hazardous offer. He now proceeded to his own coronation. After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the iron crown of Charlemagne was brought forth to encircle the brows of Napoleon. On the 26th May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted with the utmost magnificence, in the cathedral of Milan. The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, splendid as it was, at Paris. First came forth from a side entrance the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations. But the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the Emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the Pope on the occasion: Napoleon placed the iron crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the historical words, *Dio me la died! guai a chi la tocca** He afterwards, as at Paris, himself crowned Josephine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. *Te Deum* was afterwards sung, according to the ancient custom of the kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramonane authority ceased for ever.

40. Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the Emperor, not the least re-

* "God has given it me: beware of touching it." 6

markable, was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms ofattery and adulation. At this very time, however, Napoleon had intercepted secret correspondence of Queen Caroline with the Imperial cabinets of Vienna and St Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France; and he, in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the Doge addressed the Emperor left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place. "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your Majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy: but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your Majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for a union with that France which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your Majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation."

41. Napoleon replied in words, memorable as containing the death-warrant of one of the oldest and most distinguished republics of modern Europe. "Circumstances have frequently compelled me, within the last ten years, to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish

by yourselves anything worthy of your ancient renown. Everything has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognise, the right which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which in effect is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary: all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation." The secret motive of Napoleon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.

42. A few days afterwards a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian republic with the French empire, and dividing its territory into three departments,—of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. Shortly after, the ancient standard of the republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. Thus was the French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of sea-coast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Apennines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan states; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sank unheeded into the arms of death. Napoleon's secret motive for this act of rapacity, like most of the actions of his life, was the unextinguishable desire with which he was animated of subverting the power of Great Britain. This distinctly appeared from his letter to the Arch-Chancellor of that republic, an

the advantages to be derived from this acquisition.

43. Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoleon presided at the opening of its legislative assembly, and laid the foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory sovereignty of their author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at a hundred million francs, or £4,000,000, the military establishment cost thirty millions, the civil only six; and a very

"My sole reason for uniting Genoa to the empire was the obtaining the command of the naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port contains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that, in matters of state, *justice means force* as well as virtue? Do you think I am so sunk in depravity as to entertain any fears of the upbraids of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is, *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnishing sailors is expressed with sufficient force."—BIGNON, v. 78.

So tenacious was Napoleon on this subject, and so provident was he of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly after to the same minister, when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine: "To secure victories we must think only of defeat. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alessandria—nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenals, the magazines there, be in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strassburg, on 1st October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least three hundred thousand quintals of wheat. My war-projects are vast, but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly on all occasions that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the posts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of the coalition, when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany."—BIGNON, v. 79, 80.

considerable portion of the revenue was allotted to the departments to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoleon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law, notwithstanding the change of government; the order of the Iron Crown was instituted, and the authority and powers of the viceroy, Eugene Beauharnais, were defined by an express statute. Napoleon, after having received as king the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as viceroy, pronounced a discourse which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so anxious to give to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to further, by every means in my power, the happiness of the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy in reality the place which they have already obtained in my mind; and they will never do so till they are persuaded that military virtue is the chief bulwark of nations. The time has now come when the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war."

44. Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the government of Napoleon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration, and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence. Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the presence of the Vice-regal court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoleon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugene's internal administration, and the admirable principles of government which he received from the sagacity and experience of Napoleon. In the

management of the kingdom of Italy, he followed the maxima which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all were reserved for Italians: hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Every-where great and useful undertakings were set on foot; splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields: if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of their produce was reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they had rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million sterling yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which even a temporary revival of the military spirit can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace, and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilisation.

45. Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his minister of marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoleon visited the other towns of the north of Italy. Verona, Mantua, Parma, successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation from the republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion

of the oligarchy, under whose influence they had fallen; and to whom he promised a government, in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in northern Italy: veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of regard for the national welfare; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence, either in the election of their government or in the administration of affairs.

46. At length, on the 30th June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of unparalleled magnificence. He there met, and had a long secret conference with, the Abbé, now Cardinal Maury, who joyfully accepted his offer to return to Paris, where he became high in favour at court. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates, with the keys. "Genoa, named the Superb from its situation," said they, "is now still more so from its destiny: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero. Jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory; and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amidst the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and the vessels in the harbour; and then commenced the fêtes, which, in splendour and variety, exceeded anything seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied, all that poetic genius had ascribed to fairy power, seemed realised on this memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city; its blue sea and cloudless skies; its streets of marble and lofty palaces; its embattled shores and overhanging forts; its proud domes, surmounting one another in gay theatric pride; and its lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable

barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night—spreading from the Lanterne on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amidst the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amidst the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination that this venerable republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism!

47. The same period witnessed the extinction of the republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoleon were fulfilled. It was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Such was the comment on the saying of Napoleon nine years before, that the days were passed in which republics could be swallowed up by monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organisation at this time of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendancy in Italy was now complete. Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the Empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of king; and in Lucca and Tuscany, through the ephemeral governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria.

48. These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but Mr Pitt had no small difficulty in the outset in bringing the views of the cabinet of St Petersburg to a practical bearing. The ideas of the Emperor Alexander, moulded by the philanthropic dreams of his preceptor Laharpe, and afterwards by the visions of Czartorinski and the Abbé Piscolli, were strongly turned

towards the coercion of the Revolution by a moral influence of which Russia was to be the head. He contemplated the adjustment of the differences of France and England by a congress of European powers, somewhat similar to those which afterwards arose out of the Grand Alliance. He proposed that both parties should abate somewhat of their pretensions; that France should withdraw from Italy and Germany, but retain the frontier of the Rhine and the Alps; and that England should evacuate Malta. He strongly urged the construction of two frontier kingdoms, to be a check on France—one in the Low Countries, one to the south of the Alps—the reconstruction upon a sure footing of the Germanic Empire, and the establishment of such a code of public law for Europe as might supersede the sad necessity of warfare between separate states. With great address Mr Pitt adopted whatever was capable of immediate application in these projects, and adjourned to a more tranquil period what appeared impracticable. At length, though not without considerable difficulty, he brought the Russian cabinet to see that the great thing at present was to provide a barrier against the encroachments of France, leaving the reconstruction of society for a period when security had been attained. But although Russia was thus in the end brought to take her proper part in the European alliance, it was not so easy a matter to get the other powers to engage in the contest. The temporising policy of the cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The utmost that could be done, in the first instance, was to procure the conclusion of a secret convention, signed at Vienna on the 6th November 1804, of a defensive and precautionary nature. By this treaty Austria agreed, in the event of France making farther strides in Italy, to bring 235,000 men into the field to co-operate with 115,000

Russians said, in the event of success, her frontier was to be advanced to the Adda, and she was to obtain Salzburg and the Brigau. But nothing was done under this treaty; and it is only very recently it has been brought to light. The rapid advances of Napoleon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of government. The illustrious president of the council, M. Cobentzel, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, resigned, and was succeeded by Count Baillet Latour; and Prince Schwartzemberg received the situation of vice-president of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive; the war party was now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.

49. Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th April a treaty was signed at St Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth, "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands immediate remedy, their majesties have mutually determined to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French government. They have agreed, in consequence, to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at five

hundred thousand men; and the objects of the league are declared to be—

1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover, and of the north of Germany.
2. The establishment of the independence of the republics of Holland and Switzerland.
3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit.
4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces.
5. The introduction of an order of things into Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations. To enable the different powers who may accede to the coalition to bring forward the forces respectively required of them, England engages to furnish subsidies, in the proportion of £1,250,000 sterling for every 100,000 of regular troops sent into the field."

50. By separate articles, signed between England and Russia only, it was agreed that the objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as 400,000 men could be ready for active service; of which Austria was expected to furnish 250,000, Russia 115,000, and the remaining 35,000 were to be supplied by Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples. By another separate article, Russia engaged to march forthwith an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria, and 80,000 to those of Prussia, "to be able to co-operate with the said courts in the proportions established by the treaty, and to support them respectively, in case they should be attacked by France;" and that, independently of the 115,000 men to be engaged in active operations, the Emperor of Russia should keep bodies of reserve and of observation upon his frontier. The advantages of the treaty, so far as subsidies were concerned, were to be extended to Austria and Sweden, if in the course of the year 1805 they brought their forces into action; the Emperor of Russia agreed, if necessary, to bring 180,000 men into the field, on the same conditions as to supplies as the original

115,000; and the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against any power which should unite with France in the contest which was approaching. Finally, a separate article of great importance settled the ultimate objects of the coalition, and the intentions of the Allies in regard to the states which they might rescue from the dominion of France, in a manner alike consistent with good faith, justice, and moderation.*

51. Notwithstanding the definite terms of this treaty, considerable difficulty existed, and delay was incurred, in arranging the terms of the Austrian co-operation. Not that the cabinet of Vienna was backward in their disposition to promote the objects of the coalition, but that the deplorable state of their finances rendered it impossible for them to bring any considerable forces into the field till they had received large subsidies from Great Britain, and that it was highly inexpedient to commence hostilities till these had arrived, as the exposed situation of their territories rendered it certain that they would be the first objects of attack. In the midst, however, by the indefatigable efforts of Mr Pitt on the part of England, and M. Novosiltzoff

on that of Russia, these difficulties were overcome, and the cordial co-operation of Austria to the alliance was obtained. The Austrian minister at St. Petersburg, Count Stadion, forcibly represented the dilapidated state of the Imperial finances, and insisted on a subsidy of £3,000,000, one-half to be immediately paid, in order to bring the troops into the field, and the other by monthly instalments after the campaign had commenced. These terms were at length agreed to by the British ambassador, it being stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should forthwith embody a force of not less than three hundred and twenty thousand men, and that the advance to be made by Great Britain, under the name of *première mise en campagne*, or preliminary payment, should be made on this calculation. On the same day a treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria; and active negotiations ensued between the Aulic Council and the Russian war-minister relative to the measures to be pursued in the prosecution of their joint hostilities.

52. Much less difficulty was experienced in arranging the terms of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Sweden, which had already, by the treaty of 3d December 1804, evinced a desire to range itself under the banners of England. By a convention, concluded at Helsingborg on the 31st August 1805, it was provided that England should pay monthly £1800 for every 1000 men who co-operated in the common cause; and as the garrison of Stralsund was taken at 4000 men, who were not included in the subsidy, the periodical payment for them amounted to £7200. By a subsequent convention, signed at Bekkarsög, 3d October 1805, the number of Swedish troops to be employed in Pomerania was fixed at 12,000 men, for whom England was to pay at the rate of £12, 10s. per annum for each man, besides five months' subsidy in advance, as outfit for the campaign, and £50,000 to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence. Thus, by the effects of the incessant advances of Napoleon towards universal dominion, and the genius and in-

* "The Emperor and King being disposed to form an energetic concert, with the sole view of insuring to Europe a solid and lasting peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations, are aware of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time with regard to those principles on which they will act as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. These principles are, in no degree to control public opinion in France, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on their operations, with respect to the form of government which it may be proper to adopt; nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties; to take possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the common enemy, in the name of the country or state to which they of right belong; and in all other cases in the name of all the members of the league; and, finally, to assemble at the termination of the war a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more definite basis than has been possible heretofore, and to insure their observance by a federative system founded upon the situation of the different states of Europe."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. App. 6, 7.

fluence of Mr Pitt, were the discordant elements of European strength again arrayed, notwithstanding the terror inspired by former defeats, in a firm coalition against France, and a force was assembled amply sufficient, as the event has proved, to have accomplished the deliverance of Europe, if ignorance or infatuation had not misdirected them when in the field. Diplomacy had done its part; War was now required to complete the undertaking. Mr Pitt might then have said with Wallace, when he had assembled the Scottish peers and the forces of his country in the war of independence on the field of Falkirk—"Now, gallants! I have brought you to the ring: dance as you may."

53. It was still, however, a great object, if possible, to engage Prussia in the alliance; and, for this purpose, M. Novossiltzoff was despatched to Berlin, and the successive annexations of Genoa, Parma, and Placentia, to France, gave him great advantages in the representations which he made as to the necessity of opposing a barrier to its future progress. Fearful of the strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and, for this purpose, the cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zastrow, aide-de-camp to the King, to St Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India; and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason,

that recent events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers—a fact of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence.*

54. Notwithstanding all the efforts of Britain and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was, not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, or its able director Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize

* The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the *Moniteur* at this period, than it can be from the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. "What have France and Russia to enbroil them? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a greater influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland: it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you wish a general congress in Europe? Let every power begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Mahratta states to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian states, the states of Holland, and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Sala and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoleon in these able remarks.—*Moniteur*, 18th July 1805; and *Dumas*, xii. 90, 97.

which her ministers had long coveted in the electorate of Hanover. The Prussian government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving their interposition for the decisive moment, they might, without danger add that important acquisition to their dominions. In effect, Napoleon, well aware of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, twelve thousand men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian ministers then dropped hints as to "the revival of the King's wishes as to Hanover," and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, "as the union of the Continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acquisition, provided it can be done without compromising the character of his Majesty." There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power, at the very moment when that power was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe.

55. The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The King at length put the question to his ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian cabinet intimated to the French minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions. Napoleon eagerly closed with so advantageous an offer, and joyfully agreed to rid himself of a dangerous

enemy at the expense of England. Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris to conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act of cupidity and infatuation; but in the meanwhile the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions, upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French Emperor. By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoleon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all its powers long prevented, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress! *

* The Prussian ministers having demanded a frank statement of the intentions of Napoleon in the event of such an alliance, the following note was presented by the French minister to Baron Hardenberg:—"The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say, that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the Emperor engages to support it with eighty thousand men against the Russians—when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the Emperor engaging to obtain for the King the possession of Hanover, while his ally will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The Emperor offers Hanover, absolutely and without any condition; and the King may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian minister replied:—"It is with the most lively gratitude that the King has received the proposition made by the intervention of the French minister. He experiences the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made to exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy, in order to avert a war on the Continent, and lead towards peace with England. His Majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland, and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. If on these subjects his Imperial Majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the King will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."—BIGNON, *iv.* 271, 272.

56. Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoleon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; he being well aware that if England was destroyed, the Continental coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either in the basin of the Danube, or on the shores of the Vistula. For this purpose, in the midst of the splendid pageants in Italy, on which their magnificence had caused the eyes of all Europe to be fixed, the Emperor, accompanied by Josephine, set out late on the evening of the 8th July from Turin, and travelled with such extraordinary rapidity, that, outstripping all his escorts, he reached Fontainebleau on the morning of the 11th, having accomplished the journey of above five hundred miles in less than sixty hours. Cambacérès and all his ministers were there, with full details of the armament both by land and sea. Scarcely had he completed the necessary examination, when, devoured with anxiety for the return of the combined fleet from the West Indies, which he daily expected, he continued his journey to the coast, there to peril his crown and life on the most gigantic undertaking ever projected by man since the invasion of Greece by the arms of Xerxes. For this purpose, shortly after his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets, by which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking that mighty host within a few days' march of London. Shortly after his arrival, he reviewed 100,000 men on the sands of Boulogne. The line was three leagues long; never had he seen himself at the head of such a force, and rarely, if ever, had the world seen so splendid a military spectacle. The

Emperor was in the highest spirits, as well he might, at the splendid appearance of his troops, and was confident of success the moment the fleet appeared, which he hotly expected. To Admiral Decrès he wrote on the 4th August—"The English do not know what awaits them. If we are masters of the Channel for two hours, *England has lived its time*." To Cambacérès he said at the same time, who was representing the preparations of Austria—"A few days will suffice to cross the strait, and when the sea is passed, the coalition is struck at the heart. The arm of Austria is struck down, the moment London is taken. Trust to me and my activity: I will astonish the world by the grandeur and rapidity of my strokes."

57. The army which Napoleon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organisation, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions.* It amounted to 114,000 effective combatants, the total on the rolls being 132,000; 432 pieces of cannon, and 14,054 horses,

* The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: it is one of the most curious records of the age of Napoleon:—

| | |
|--|------------|
| Infantry, | 76,798 |
| Cavalry, | 11,640 |
| Cannoniers, | 3,780 |
| Waggoners, | 3,780 |
| Non-combatants, | 17,476 |
| Total, | 113,474 |
| Gun-boats, | 1,839 |
| Transport vessels, | 954 |
| Which would carry (men), | 161,215 |
| and horses, | 6,059 |
| Guns mounted on armed vessels, | 3,500 |
| Horses, | 7,394 |
| Fusils (spare), | 52,837 |
| Cartridges, | 13,000,000 |
| Flints, | 1,203,400 |
| Biscuits (rations), | 1,434,800 |
| Bottles of brandy, | 236,230 |
| Tools, | 30,375 |
| Saddles, | 10,560 |
| Field-pieces, | 432 |
| Rounds of ammunition, | 86,400 |
| Loads of hay, | 70,270 |
| Do. oats, | 70,270 |
| Sheep, | 4,924 |

—DUMAS, xii.; *Tables*, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

assembled in the camps at St Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 24,000 at the Texel and Helvoetsluis, 10,000 on board the combined fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark in the squadron of Admiral Gantheaume; in all, 153,000 men, in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the Emperor had in view. Each cannon had 200 rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 13,000,000; the flints, 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected; the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2293 vessels—capable of transporting 160,000 men and 6000 horses—of which 1339 were armed with above 3500 pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited, in the harbours of Boulogne, Étaples, Ambleteuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea.

58. During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organised in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe. It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoleon, aided by all the experience of the revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organisation, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution, the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was

a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to insure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoleon adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which was intrusted to a marshal of the Empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general.

59. The organisation of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only—that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the Emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying in strength from five to seven thousand men, commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity, arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only among the members of the same regiment, but among those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care. Next to the Imperial Guard, and noways inferior to it

in the splendid appearance which it presented, was the *Corps d'Elite* of grenadiers which Junot had formed at Arras. It consisted of ten battalions of 800 men each, selected from the grenadier companies of regiments not intended to form part of the expedition. Their appearance and martial air were in the highest degree magnificent; and Napoleon, by whom these qualities were highly appreciated, destined them for the perilous honour of being first landed on the British shores.

60. The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were characterised by the same admirable systematic organisation. They were laid out, according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on a uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were composed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Wimereux, of sharp stakes cut in the forest of Guenis, supported by masonry. These field-barracks were extremely healthy: the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp-blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits. Neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle. When not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or leveling down eminences, draining marshes, or filling up hollows, to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations, and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions vied with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornament; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of nature was sensibly improved.

61. Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-fights, or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting anything defective in the discipline of the men; and the soldiers, from constant exercises, and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale, which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced everything that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick.

62. No man knew better than Napoleon, from his own experience, as well as from the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had inflicted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief, especially if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received *general* instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed; but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained. And although Napoleon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances; inasmuch that a commander, in his estimation, would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom

a certain discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted; a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of these officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoleon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état major*, or general staff, by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be abolished; an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and degraded what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers.

63. But though Napoleon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active watchfulness over every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders. Nothing escaped his vigilance. Continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted; and if anything was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier informed the person in fault that the attention of the Emperor had been attracted to his delinquency. Incessant and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all, the attention of the Emperor was habitually turned to

the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops; a branch of service which, from the prodigious increase of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the Emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had anything of importance to perform imagined that the imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself: while, in fact, it was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament.* By this unexampled vigilance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organisation, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions.

64. The arrangements connected with the flotilla were as extraordinary and perfect as those of the land forces. It was organised in as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery, were already on board: so that nothing remained but the embarkation of the

* Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the Emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the appendices to General Mathieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain, on the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon, contained in Napier's *History of the Peninsular War*, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of the man who, amidst all the cares of empire, and all the distraction of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely printed volumes; and his letters to his generals during that time must have been at least twice as voluminous. e

men. The French genius, adapted beyond that of any other people in Europe for the organisation of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment had a section of the flotilla allotted to it, consisting of nine gun-boats for each battalion; the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array; and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes.

65. The chances of success with this immense force and flotilla was anxiously discussed in Napoleon's presence by Admirals Decrès and Bruix, who deservedly stood highest in his confidence. "In a narrow sea, or near the shore," said the former, "when it can bring its thousands of guns to bear on a few vessels, the flotilla is exceedingly formidable; that is like attacking an army in a defile with a cloud of intrepid sharpshooters. But suppose them in the open sea with a fresh gale, which would facilitate the movements of the English vessels as much as it would impede those of your small craft, would they not run the greatest risk of being run down or sunk by the giants whom they would have to combat?" "We might lose," answered Bruix, "perhaps a hundred vessels out of two thousand; but with the remaining nineteen hundred you would get clear over, and that is enough for the ruin of England."—"Yes," replied Decrès, "if the destruction of that hundred did not produce discouragement to the nineteen hundred, which would induce confusion and ruin, especially if, as is not unlikely, the naval officers lost their presence of mind at the sight of so vast and awful a disaster." Napoleon took a deep interest in their discussion, but with his usual intrepidity, he inclined to the bolder side. "Let us," said he, "but be masters of the

straits for six hours, and we are the masters of the world."*

66. The object of Napoleon, in this immense accumulation of gun-boats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was, to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent; and no man knew better than Napoleon that to engage in such an enterprise, while the English were masters of the sea, was a vain, or, in the most favourable view, a perilous attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English government from adopting the

* "The Rochefort squadron, consisting of five vessels, a three-decker, and four frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; it has only five hostile ships to face. There are twenty-one vessels in the Brest squadron. These have weighed anchor in order to harass Admiral Cornwallis, and compel the English to maintain a large number of ships in that quarter. The enemy have also six vessels before Texel, to blockade the Dutch squadron, consisting of five ships, four of them frigates. General Marmont has got his army on board. Between Etaples, Boulogne, Vimpreux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports which I have caused to be constructed, we have 270 sloops carrying guns, 634 gun-boats, 396 small transports, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men and 10,000 horses. Let us only command the strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world. By the return courier, let me know when you will be able to weigh anchor, inform me as to the movements of the enemy, and where Nelson is. Consider well the mighty enterprise with which you are charged, and before I affix my signature to your final orders, let me know how you propose to carry these out."—*Napoleon à l'Amiral Latouche-Tréville, à Toulon, 2d July 1805* THIRIAU, *Consulat et l'Empire*, v. 189.

means by which they might have been frustrated. For this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing above two thousand warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil: the real covering force was to assemble at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably conceived, was completely successful. Not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design. The French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks' sail in the rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne, in August 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force.*

67. Towards the success of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prose-

* The following valuable note, written by Napoleon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project:—

“What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne?”

“I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadix, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have one hundred and fifty thousand men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment that the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.”

“To succeed in this object, it was necessary to assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men at Boulogne; to have there four thousand transports, and immense matériel,

acquisition of this object, many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast. They answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. The vigour and boldness of the British cruisers knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents, when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries by which the coast was guarded. But notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counterbalanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels under the command of Sir Sidney Smith, and Captain Owen in the *Immortalité* frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their

to embark all that, and nevertheless to prevent the enemy from dividing my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I had succeeded, it would have been by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport-vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gun-boats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand unarmed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage, but by constructing praams and gun-boats, I appeared to be opposing cannon to cannon, and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the passage by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadron, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the council of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin.”—See the original in DUMAS, xii. 315, 316; and Napoleon in MONTMOLON, ii. App. 354.

broadside with great effect into the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point, but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs under Marshal Davoust, that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore and the English cruisers, and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France.

68. While the Emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in reviewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his Empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two countries. Early in the year, Napoleon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain, to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with, Napoleon long before the capture of the treasure-frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated the junction of the Spanish forces, already calculated on by Napoleon for the execution of his great design. By this convention it was stipulated that the Emperor should provide at the Texel an army of thirty thousand men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, one hundred and twenty thousand men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, twenty-one ships of the line, with frigates and smaller vessels capable of embarking thirty thousand men; at Rochefort, six ships of the line and four frigates, with four thousand

men; at Toulon, eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, having nine thousand land troops on board; and Spain, in return, bound herself to have thirty ships of the line and five thousand men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Cartagena—in all, thirty-eight French ships of the line and thirty Spanish, and one hundred and seventy thousand men, all to be employed in the invasion of England.

69. But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided "that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his Majesty reserves the explanations for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect." When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoleon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right. The English government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures to meet the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz; Cartagena also was watched; and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy's force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile fleet which might approach; and thus, if one division got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined armament for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what in effect soon happened.

70. Napoleon, anxious for the ex-

cution of his designs, sent orders for the Rochefort and Toulon squadrons to put to sea. On the 11th January the former of these, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squadron put to sea about the same time; but having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon considerably shattered in four days after its departure.* The Rochefort fleet was more fortunate; it arrived at Martinique on the 5th February, and after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the admiral landed four thousand men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only five hundred regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, not having leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked, and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St Kitt's and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any further stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santo Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochefort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons.

* "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."—*BOUTNEY'S Life of Nelson*, ii. 214.

71. The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoleon, who had prescribed to his admiral a much more extensive set of operations; viz. to throw succours into Martinique and Guadaloupe, take possession of St Lucia and Dominica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the Emperor from Strassburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for life!

72. More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th March, from Toulon. On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates — while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the Gulf of Palma — and made straight for Carthage, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour. But, finding them not ready for sea, the French fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish ships in that harbour, and one French sail of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail next day, April 9, for "the West Indies. About the

same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Gantheaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line, put to sea, and remained three days off the Isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen. Napoleon, however, reiterated his orders to Gantheaume to put to sea; and that gallant admiral made the utmost efforts to do so, but an extraordinary calm, which continued almost without interruption through the whole of April and May, rendered it impossible for him to obey his instructions, without engaging the English fleet, which lay off the harbour, which he deemed it too hazardous to encounter. Finding that the vigilance of the blockading squadron could not be eluded, Napoleon relinquished the plan of effecting a junction between the Toulon and Brest squadrons at sea, and enjoined Gantheaume to remain at Brest, and await there the arrival of the combined fleet from the West Indies, which he hoped would raise the blockade.

73. Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was bearing up from the Gulf of Palma for his old position off Toulon, when, on the 4th April, he met the Phoebe brig with the long-wished-for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but, feeling assured by the 11th, from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken

that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds, to Gibraltar, devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest before he could reach them, the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion, he could not reach the Straits till the 30th April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and was compelled to anchor in Mazari bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days.* At length, on the 5th May, he received certain information that the combined fleet had made for the West Indies, and amounted to eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind, that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England indispensable to its recovery. In these circumstances, this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman a-piece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then."†

74 The combined fleet had four weeks the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact, Villeneuve reached Martinique on the 14th May, while

* On this occasion, Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta,—"My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill-luck will go far to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel!"—SOUTHEY, ii. 217.

† The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoleon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the momentous events now in progress, with

the utmost disquietude. On the 9th June 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the minister of marine:—"We cannot discover what has become of Nelson: it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica; but I am of opinion that he is still in the European sea. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to re-victual, and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—DUMAS, xi. 169.

Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th June; but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing except capturing the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant resistance on the part of the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet had gone to attempt the reduction of that colony; and so far was he misled by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th June, hoping, on the following day, to render the mouths of the Orinoco as famous in history as those of the Nile. But when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Graasse five-and-twenty years before. But as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas. The activity of Nelson in this voyage was unparalleled, and has called forth the generous eulogium even of the French historians. "Nelson," says Thiers, "displayed the most astonishing activity. Arrived at Barbadoes in the beginning of June, he continued the pursuit, without a moment's hesitation, with nine ships of the line only, and not finding the enemy, instantly returned to England with eleven. What activity! what energy! This affords another proof that in war, and war at sea as well as at land, the quality of forces is of far more moment than their quantity. Nelson with eleven ships of the line confidently pursued Villeneuve,

who trampled with twenty, manned by gallant sailors."

75. In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 25th May, and instantly steered for the north; having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line-of-battle ships. This reinforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoleon, dated Pavia, 8th May 1805, which were to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line, and ten Spanish, which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochefort, join the five ships of the line under Missiessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. Napoleon at first thought of making the combined fleet, on its return from the West Indies, make for the west of Ireland, and, sailing round that island the reverse order of the Spanish armada, enter the Channel by the Straits of Dover. But on consideration he abandoned that plan as too circuitous and dilatory, and adopted the shorter and more direct one of uniting the whole fleets in the Bay of Biscay, raising the blockade of Brest, and entering the Channel with the whole combined armament. This final plan was formed during a fête at Pavia. With this formidable combined fleet, amounting to fifty sail of the line, which would have greatly overmatched any force the British government could muster in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle unless it was unavoidable; and if it was so, to bring it on as near as possible to Brest in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in the engagement. "The grand object of the whole operations," said Napoleon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne. Masters of the Channel for a few days, a hundred and fifty thousand men will embark in the two thousand vessels which are

there assembled, and the expedition is concluded." Every contingency was provided for; the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen; and stores of provisions were collected both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours.

76. Hitherto everything had not only fully answered, but even exceeded Napoleon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British government. On the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent; while the British squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and Rochefort seemed totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours. Villeneuve had sailed on the 28th May from Martinique; and on the 13th June, Nelson, on arriving at Antigua, for the first time received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth, in order to warn the British government of the probable return of the whole fleet of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing his sailors a moment's rest, set sail the very same day for Europe, and on the 18th July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the Leeward Islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days,*

* From April 30th to July 18th.

an instance of vigour and rapidity of naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world.†

77. Great was the despondency in the British Islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found. But the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering to sea every man and ship that could be got in readiness, and despatching Admiral Collingwood, with a squadron of five ships of the line, to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoleon; and on the 21st July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British Islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoleon, at that time in the possession of Villeneuve.‡

† On the day following, Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

‡ His words are—"July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear Lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the bay, and, taking the Rochefort people with them, appear off Usant perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to a chance of loss, which I do not believe Buonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French government never aims at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."—*Collingwood's Mem.* 146, 146.—The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

78. Meanwhile Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d June he had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoleon, who by this time had returned to St Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochefort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from the West Indies—the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The *Curieux* brig, sent on this important errand, arrived at London on the 9th July, having made the passage from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the Admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochefort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest. These orders reached Admiral Stirling on the 13th July. On the 15th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station and wait for the enemy.

79. The event soon showed of what vital importance it was that the *Curieux* had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the Admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information communicated by Lord Nelson. Hardly had Sir Robert Calder, with his squadron united to that of Admiral Stirling, reached the place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and Spain hove in sight, on 22d July, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty-gun ship, and seven

frigates. The weather was so hazy, that the two fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity. But as soon as the British admiral descried the enemy, he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy; and Villeneuve,

* Yet, strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital importance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochefort and Ferrol. Mr James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which at the time were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in search of. The policy of this measure does not seem very clear. If the squadron did not, like the Rochefort one, take advantage of the circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders." Is it not evident, that unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th July 1805, he wrote in these terms to the minister of marine:—"The English squadron before Rochefort has disappeared on the 12th July. It was only on the 9th July that the brig *Curieux* arrived in England. The Admiralty could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before Rochefort in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised, therefore, by orders received before the arrival of the *Curieux*. On the 15th July that squadron effected its junction with that before Ferrol; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of Nelson, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet; and that it is these fourteen vessels before Ferrol which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look-out or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long-hidden designs of the French Emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets from Rochefort and Ferrol under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the Admiralty, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—DUMAS, xii. 19, 20.

perceiving the enemy's intention of cutting off his headmost vessels, and enveloping them by a superior force, skilfully met it by the counter-movement of tacking himself, luffing, and thus meeting the head of the British column by the head of his own. This brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; the *Hero*, which headed the English line, coming first in contact with the *Argonaute*, which bore the flag of Admiral Gravina; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the *St Raphael* and *Firme*, were compelled to strike their colours; while the *Windsor Castle*, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the *Dragon*. A thick fog, which came on just as the action began, rendered it impossible to see farther than a cable's length from any object in either fleet, and rendered the battle a series of separate engagements between detached vessels, rather than a regular battle. At length darkness separated the combatants; and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day.

80. The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to thirty-nine killed, and one hundred and fifty-nine wounded; that of the French and Spaniards to four hundred and seventy-six; and no ship, except the *Windsor Castle*, was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet showed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day. At noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and a half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle; but Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as the British—that is, to decline the engagement for the present—as

soon as he saw that the English fleet stood firm: and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the *Rocheport* and *Ferrol* squadrons, the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or that of Lord Nelson; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and, after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d August.

81. Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action ever fought by the navy of England, no further proof is required than is furnished by the conduct of Napoleon, narrated by the unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the Emperor into his cabinet. The scene which followed must be given in his own words:—"Daru found him transported with rage; walking up and down the room with hurried steps, and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. 'What a navy!—what sacrifices for nothing!—what an admiral! All hope is gone. That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol! It is all over; he will be blockaded there.—Daru, sit down and write.' The fact was, that on that morning the Emperor had received intelligence of the arrival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour: he at once saw that the English expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever! Then, in the transports of a fury which would have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a

moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once, the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and the west of France; their order of march, duration, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous; the surprises and hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers movements of the enemy. Everything was foreseen: victory was rendered secure on every supposition. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of departure two hundred leagues in extent, and a line of operations three hundred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital, the periods only underwent a slight alteration; but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan as originally conceived, carried into complete execution."

82. Nothing can portray the character of Napoleon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage. He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming; and that, unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be encountered on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria, on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals to anticipate his being assailed in his own. Finding this first project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line; adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first; and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

83. While such immense consequences were resulting from the action

of the 22d July, the gallant officer who, with a force so far inferior, had achieved so much success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation was wound up to the very highest pitch by an expression in the admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement everywhere made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place.* When, therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met, that the British admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an

* The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was in a great degree owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the accounts published by the Admiralty. The passage published was in these words:—"The enemy are now in sight to windward; and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any further opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this:—"At the same time, it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron." Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of eighteen, hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when its character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

encounter, and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoleon, in the official accounts published in his admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms.*

84. The consequence was, that, after having continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th December, severely reprimanded him for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th July; though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection. Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the Admiralty the statesman whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best arranged project ever conceived by Napoleon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fits, is public opinion! History would indeed be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees.†

85. Meanwhile Nelson, having taken in water and other necessary supplies

at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th July; and having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland; and finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant on the 15th August. No news had been obtained of the enemy; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at length heard of the action of 22d July, and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England; the public having followed with intense anxiety his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements.

86. Napoleon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly he resumed his designs of invasion; on the 12th August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the minister of marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, where Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning;‡ and in two days afterwards he wrote a second letter, in still more

* The accounts, published by Napoleon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the action, were entirely fabricated by the Emperor himself. In his despatch to the minister of marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers which claimed the victory, Napoleon said, "The arrival of Villeneuve at Corunna will overturn all their gasconades, and in the eyes of Europe will give us the victory; that is no small matter. Instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. Here is my idea of what it should be;" and then follows the fabricated account.—DUMAS, xii. 348; *Pièces Just.*

† Let us hear what the French writers say

of this proceeding:—"Admiral Calder," says Dupin, "with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet, and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour?"—Dupin's *Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, li. 17.

‡ "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoleon, on the 12th August to M. Decrès, "a mes-

pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet.* Sir Robert Calder had by this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th August, however, he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off Cape Finisterre. On the 11th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a north-westerly direction; but having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder's) was approaching, Villeneuve tacked about and made sail for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Collingwood, with four sail of the line, who lay before the former port, was obliged to retire on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had the enemy entered than he resumed his station,

senger to Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects—that the enemy's squadron has suffered much—and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th August:—"With thirty vessels my admirals would learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hope of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces; had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of-battle ships before him—I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—Dumas, xii. 59, 67.

* "I hope Villeneuve will not allow himself to be blockaded by a squadron smaller than his own. Assist and push on the Admiral as much as possible. Arrange with him about the troops you have ready, and send me a statement of their position. We are ready everywhere; and showing ourselves for twenty-four hours will suffice."—*Napoleon au Général Lauriston, aide-de-camp de Villeneuve, 14th Aug. 1805. THIERS, v. 448.*

add with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled.

87. Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Napoleon, on the 22d August, wrote both to Villeneuve and Ganteaume in the most pressing terms to stand out to sea, unite their forces, and make straight for Boulogne, where he was in readiness to receive them. His words are very remarkable, and singularly characteristic of the solemn feelings with which he was animated on the eve of this, the most important event of his life.† In obedience to the orders he received, Ganteaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron, after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets. But the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed over without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of desecring the long-wished-for reinforcement—in vain Ganteaume counted the hours for the arrival of Villeneuve with thirty ships of the line,

† He wrote to Villeneuve on 22d August:—"Vice-admiral, I hope you have reached Brest. Go, and with my united fleets enter the Channel. *England is ours!* We are all ready; everything is on board. Show for twenty-four hours, and all is accomplished.—*NAPOLEON*" To Ganteaume he wrote on the same day, "I have already given you to understand by telegraph that my wish is, that you do not allow Villeneuve to lose a single day, in order to take advantage of the superiority which my fifty ships of the line give me. Get to sea immediately, and enter the Channel with all your force. I rely upon your ability, firmness, and character, in a crisis so important. Depart, and come here. We shall avenge six centuries of insult and disgrace. Never have my soldiers by sea and land risked their lives for so grand a purpose."—*THIERS, Consulat et l'Empire, v. 454.*

chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed—the remembrance of the late battle had paralysed the enemy. The action of the 22d July 'I saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour. The combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour.

88. The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoleon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation against Villeneuve for not continuing his route for Brest, where all was in readiness for his reception, knew no bounds. "Your Villeneuve," said he to Decrès, "is a coward, a traitor;" and in the first transports of his fury, he made out orders for the combined fleet instantly to set sail from Cadiz for Brest, where the whole armament was to be put under the command of Admiral Ganteaume. But a little reflection convinced him that, supposing this done, the time for the projected invasion of Britain would be past, and the empire of Europe might, during his absence, be lost in Germany. He determined, therefore, to abandon his enterprise against England, and direct all his forces to the centre of Germany. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of 22d July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterwards steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest. But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be concealed, the preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time when the Emperor was directing the contemplated movement across

France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 23d August and 1st September, the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in these difficult operations. The cavalry and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the Emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board; when suddenly, on the 1st September, the Emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to follow by different routes towards the Rhine.

89. The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution, were not merely the destruction of all the

* The following passage from Marshal Ney's Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject:—"The instructions of the Emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out specifically. To ascertain the time required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, caissons, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he formed that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company, received the boats destined for its use. Every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprised of the boat, and the place in the boat, where he was to set himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery, were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field-officers dismounted, and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers in perfect order hastened on board, each to his appointed place; in ten minutes and a half twenty-five thousand men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds: they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The re-landing was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in fifteen minutes from the time the soldiers were on board, they were drawn up in battle array on shore."—*Ney*, ii. 260, 261.

projects for the naval cam- the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz. Matters had also come to a crisis on the continent of Europe; and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube. From the moment that Napoleon put on his head the iron crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Lunéville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end; and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the Emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces, having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength

of the Empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists to commence operations. General Chastellier, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered the Tyrol, and began to organise the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venetian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the cabinet of the Tuilleries and that of Vienna; and in several articles in the *Moniteur*, evidently flowing from the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible amid the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence.*

* The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two cabinets:—

"Let us come at once," said Talleyrand, "to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different quarter that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria, united, will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilisation itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she will be fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not undergo the rudest strokes of fortune.

"What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The Emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it; and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great

design, and to enter into no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two empires."

It was replied on the part of Austria on the 3d September—"That the cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put an end to the dangers which threatened Europe by a sincere and earnest mediation; but that, to do this with any prospect of success, it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Lunéville carefully stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it, no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French government, which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its aggressions. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect with the internal affairs of France; to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany; and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French empire."

90. At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the Imperial dominions, left no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoleon were unknown to Austria, converging, over the whole line from the Elbe to the Pyrenees, towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would in all probability be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich, accordingly, was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest; and the Elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connections with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours, and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria—that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory; that there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the Elector had therefore everything to hope from an alliance with Napoleon, and as much to fear from exposure to the rapacity of the Emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party,—at the head of which was the Princess of Baden, the Elector's daughter-in-law, who was a woman of uncommon talent and vigour of mind,—that all these advantages were merely apparent; that the alliance with France was a connection with a revolutionary state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society, and that, when menaced by such a catastrophe, the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would

always be opposed to such innovations.

91. It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the Elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoleon; the fate of the Duke d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French Emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such opposite dangers, the Elector, on the 24th August, agreed to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d September, at Würzburg. Meanwhile the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the Elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the Elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the Emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Würzburg; the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn.

92. The preparations of Napoleon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the Allies were preparing to employ against him. Mr Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability; every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened; Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained, that if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in

support of the freedom of Europe. In Italy and Germany, no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men were preparing to act against France, among whom were one hundred and sixteen thousand Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at least two months to come; and in the mean time, the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, eighty thousand strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoleon. Thirty thousand Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were assembled in the Tyrol; and the Archduke Charles, at the head of fifty-five thousand of the best troops of the Empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains.* Four attacks were projected by the Allies: one in the north of Germany by a united force of Russians, Swedes, and English; the second in the valley of the Danube, by the grand armies of Russia and Austria; a third in Lombardy, which was intrusted to the Austrians alone; the fourth in the south of Italy by a united force of Russians, English, and Neapolitans. It was evident that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior; and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the Empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. But in the outset, the armies of Napoleon had greatly the advantage both in the number and composition of the troops. Everything, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and

celerity of movement; and in both these qualities Napoleon was unrivalled.

93. To meet this immense force, and destroy part before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoleon, and in its prosecution he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The Army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of as many marshals of the Empire: their united numbers amounted to one hundred and ninety thousand men; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if the whole could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to the support of the former. The Army of Italy was thirty-five thousand strong, besides fifteen thousand in the Neapolitan territories; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to twenty-four thousand; so that France could open the campaign with two hundred and seventy thousand men.†

94. But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but a part of the preparations of the Emperor. On the 23d September, he repaired to the senate, and submitted two propositions to the legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of eighty thousand conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806—a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating her military resources; the second, the reorganisation of the national guard, throughout the whole extent of the Empire. But in thus reviving this republican institution, the Emperor was careful to organise it on a different footing from that on which it had been

* The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn:—

| | |
|---|---------|
| In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand, | 90,000 |
| Reserve under the Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna, | 30,000 |
| First Russian army crossing Poland, | 56,000 |
| Second Russian army, under the Emperor Alexander, | 60,000 |
| Austrians in the Tyrol, | 30,000 |
| Austrians in Italy, under the Archduke Charles, | 55,000 |
| Russians and Swedes in Pomerania, | 30,000 |
| | 351,000 |

—DUMAS, xii. 138.

† The French forces were thus disposed:—

| | |
|---|---------|
| Grand army, divided into seven corps, under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and the Guard under Mortier, | 190,472 |
| Army of Italy, | 34,674 |
| Army of Naples, | 15,000 |
| Electoral troops, | 29,815 |

—DUMAS, xii. 136.

269,960

based during the days of democratic equality. "It is important," said he, "that the officers of the national guard should be named by the Emperor; every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme authority: all our institutions should be in harmony; and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens." Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this re-organisation. Every man in good health was required to serve, from the age of twenty-one to that of sixty; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Lefebvre, Marshal Kellermann, and General d'Abbeville.

95. The Emperor adjourned the meeting of the senate by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent state, in his estimation, of public affairs, and announced that he had no alternative but to conquer or die:—"The eternal objects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago, I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed; menaces and grounds of umbrage alike found me immovable; but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn; Munich is invaded; the elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital; all my hopes have vanished. Senators! when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the Imperial crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people: they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen! your Emperor will

do his duty; the soldiers will do theirs; you will do yours."

96. Previous to setting out for Boulogne, Napoleon issued several decrees for the disarming of the flotilla, and the laying up in ordinary what was kept for future and distant operations. The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion; and soon, of all that vast assemblage of vessels, hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport thirty thousand men. A reserve of twenty thousand men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, designed at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances, and the intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than from any inadequacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view.

97. Determined, however, not entirely to lose the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoleon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosily to the command of the combined fleet in lieu of Villeneuve, who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival. Rosily, however, was in Paris at the time, and some time must elapse before he could

reach Cadiz. M. Decrès intimated the appointment to Villeneuve, with information of the vehement indignation of the Emperor on account of his return to Cadiz.* He did not direct him to set sail from Cadiz, but he hoped he would; and, in truth, left no alternative to a man of honour but to do so. Though of a desponding temperament, Villeneuve was a brave man; and as soon as he received the despatch of Decrès he determined to hazard all on the issue of a battle. This led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But, after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising squadrons, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St Helena! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death! Villeneuve, on receiving the crushing despatch of M. Decrès, replied to him, "The naval men of Paris and the departments are unworthy of their name if they cast the first stone at me. Let them come on board, and they will see with what elements they are exposed to fight. As to the rest, if, as is pretended, the French marine is only wanting in boldness, as is pretended, the Emperor shall be speedily satisfied, and he may reckon on the most decisive success."

98. An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilised life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France—a change prescribed by the Emperor in

* "Your friend Villeneuve," said Napoleon to Decrès, "will probably be too cowardly to venture forth from Cadiz. Despatch Admiral Rosily to take command of the fleet, if it is not already gone; and order Admiral Villeneuve to come to me at Paris to render account of his conduct."—*THIERS*, vi. 135.

a decree issued shortly before he set out for Strassburg.

99. Meanwhile the British government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independent of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis, and the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the Isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth; and Nelson, who had retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Portsmouth, and hoisted his flag on board the *Victory* of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea, that they were destined to receive their death-blow from his hand.† In these generous sentiments he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty. He was vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching; and before he

† When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety became so excessive, that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances, when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes.—"Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons."—*SOUTHEY*, li. 232.

left London, he called at the upholsterer's where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the *Orient*, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, as it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which formed the leading features of his character.* With difficulty he tore himself, on the beach at Portsmouth on the following morning, from the crowd who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes towards his vessel till it vanished from their sight.

100. Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England. The yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the ships when he was seen on the quarterdeck of the *Victory* shaking hands with his old captains, who in transports of joy hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed, if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name, that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, Villeneuve hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival; and in a council of war it was resolved not to venture out unless they

were at least one-third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents—stationing his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy; while, at the same time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that ere long they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoleon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had formed no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochefort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt.

101. Still, however, the council of war which Villeneuve had summoned to his assistance declined to undertake the responsibility of an engagement, and even came to a solemn resolution to avoid it, as attended with certain destruction to the fleet. Villeneuve sent this resolution to Paris, accompanied by his own opinion to the same effect, but with a declaration, that he was nevertheless prepared to sail with the first wind, and devote himself for his country. Nelson, to overcome their irresolution, had recourse to a stratagem, which was crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly equipped, and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Carthagenas or Rochefort squadrons should join the enemy and increase

* "Friday night, Sept. 13, half-past ten.—I drove from dear, dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country; and if it is his good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of his mercy. If it is his good Providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that he will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—*SOUTHEY*, ii. 235.

their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own sixty-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately the promised reinforcements arrived, and in single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line.

102. Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy—aware that Napoleon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean, and apprehensive that, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosily might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the south-east. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in the same direction; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest, upon seeing the number of his vessels, they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at day-break on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semicircle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles ahead; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet, made signal to bear down in two lines perpendicularly upon the enemy. He

had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates—they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, four of the former being three-deckers; and four thousand soldiers were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed.*

103. Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in two columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was most likely that each ship would be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the British lay to windward, were to lie in close order and await the attack. The fleet was drawn up in two lines, and so arranged on the whole, that at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line the broadside of one in the second presented itself—a combination as well imagined as can be conceived, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Villeneuve's instructions to his captains were general, to obey the

* In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote—"I send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll., have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies, and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "that knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action would supply any deficiency of signals; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—SOUTHEY, *ii.* 243, 244.

signals he might make during the action, and to use their utmost efforts to come to close action with their opponents. "EVERY CAPTAIN IS AT HIS POST IF HE IS IN FIRE." Such was his last order, and it was worthy of the brave nation whose armament he commanded. Collingwood, in the Royal Sovereign, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the *Belleisle* and *Mars*; Nelson himself, in the *Victory*, headed the second, immediately after whom came the *Temeraire* and the *Neptune*. When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer:—"May the great God whom I worship grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to Him that made me, and may His blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is intrusted me to defend." Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power!

104. Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st October, a few leagues to the north-west of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvasses, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the north-west. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close-set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amidst the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded.

The British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other, "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarter-deck, wore his admiral's frock-coat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested; the officers on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them; and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen: it seemed as if he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory? That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day; and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting. After musing awhile, he fixed what it should be; and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the *Victory*, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the Great Disposer of all events, and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty."

105. Nelson led thirteen ships of the

line in the Victory; Collingwood fourteen in the Royal Sovereign; but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood, in order to cut off the enemy from retreat to Cadiz, the other column was first engaged.* Considerably ahead of all the rest of the fleet was the Royal Sovereign, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still nearly a mile in the rear. Collingwood's guns were all double-shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought the training of his men to such perfection, that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now, gentlemen," said he, "let us do something to-day, which the world may talk of hereafter." "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action!" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed, "What would Nelson give to be here!"† When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hos-

tile fleet was bearing down upon his line, he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the Santa Anna, the Royal Sovereign gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down and killing and wounding four hundred of her men. Fourteen guns were disabled by that single discharge. Then wheeling rapidly round, she lay alongside of her so close, that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other.

106. The Spanish admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of the Royal Sovereign to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the Royal Sovereign heel two streaks out of the water. A furious combat now ensued between the two first-rates; but such was the rapidity and precision of the Royal Sovereign's fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. This disgrace, however, was prevented by the San Justo, Indomptable, Fougueux, and San Leandro, which grouped round the Royal Sovereign when they saw their admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross-fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring his broadsides into his first-rate antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other. Still, with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character, the admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet. The sailors in the other British vessels coming up, watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length showed the British flag waving unconquered in the midst of the nume-

* Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their canvases, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly £200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of the early success was owing.

† The classical reader will recollect the last words of Hector in his combat with the heaven-defended Achilles:—

"Νῦν αὖτις με μάχῃσι κτεάνει.
Μή μιν ἀνταυτοῖσι γὰρ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἀπολείμω,
Ἄλλὰ μάχα βίβας κ' καὶ ἰσοκυβερτοῖσι μὴ
βίβωμαι." *Iliad*, X. 505.

"Thy true I perish, yet I perish great:
Yet in a mighty deed I shall expire:
Let future ages hear it, and admire!"
POPE.

How identical is the heroic spirit in similar circumstances in all ages of the world!—
FASIO, *Ger. Lib.* xi. 118.

rous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded. Meanwhile the English vessels, as they successively came up, engaged the enemy with the utmost vigour. The *Fougueux*, *Pluton*, and *Algeiras*—the last of which bore Admiral Magon's flag—and the *Prince des Asturies*, which bore that of the Spanish admiral Gravina, combated bravely the *Belleisle*, *Polyphe-mus*, *Neptune*, *Mars*, and *Tonnant*, which successively bore up, without any decided advantage being for long perceptible on either side.

107. Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger; and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance, single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the Victory's main-topgallant-sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the Victory continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this perilous moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the Victory advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands, stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment, Nelson's secretary, Mr Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amidst the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the *Santisima Trinidad*, which he imagined bore the French admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted: but as the Victory approached, the enemy closed up, and presented

so compact a front that it was impossible to find an entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the *Redoutable* and *Bucentaure*.

108. At one o'clock the Victory, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble-shotted, into the *Bucentaure*, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the Victory's port-holes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbling woodworks of the *Bucentaure*'s stern. In advancing, the Victory received a dreadful broadside from the French *Neptune*; but, without returning a shot, passed off to the *Redoutable*, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while with her other guns she engaged the *Bucentaure* and *Santis-sima Trinidad*. Captain Harvey, in the *Temeraire*, fell on board the *Redoutable* on the other side, so that these three ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants of the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge, lest the shot should pass through and injure the *Temeraire*; and as every shot from the Victory set the *Redoutable* on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands, and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

109. After the first discharge, the *Redoutable* closed her lower-deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. Seeing this, and thinking she had struck, Nelson twice ordered the firing into her to cease; but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops: and to this he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's fore-castle, each loaded with five hundred musket-balls,

soon cleared the Redoutable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and main tops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarter-deck, he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards distant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied; "my backbone is shot through." He was immediately carried below; but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been cut away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief, covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should leave him and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. So great a calamity as the mortal wound of Nelson necessarily occasioned some confusion on board the Victory; and the French officers in the Redoutable, perceiving this, though without being aware of its cause, were preparing to board the Victory, when a dreadful broadside from the Temeraire, which struck down two hundred men, at once destroyed the boarders, and nearly disabled the Redoutable for the remainder of the action.

110. Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the Santa Anna struck to the Royal Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her gigantic opponent. During the latter part of the action, Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarter-deck, he visited the sailors, enjoining them not to waste a shot; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commend-

ing particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite port-hole of the Santa Anna. Captain Harvey of the Temeraire, when engaged in close combat with the Redoutable, perceived the Pongueur of seventy-four guns preparing to lay his ship aboard on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within a hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance, by boarding. Out of seven hundred men of which her crew consisted at the commencement of the action, four hundred were killed or wounded.* The other British vessels, as they successively came into action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the column had reduced the great odds against which the leading line of battleships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent.

111. Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. By degrees the musketeers in the tops of the Redoutable were picked off by the Victory's marines; and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the Temeraire's bows, which forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Seldom had a ship been more gallantly defended; out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, three hundred had been killed, and two hundred and twenty wounded, before she struck.* Equally dreadful was the carnage on board the Bucentaure, which

* The marksman who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after the latter fell, the storm of balls was so severe that the old quartermaster, who had seen the main fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the Victory's poop. The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock. Both midshipmen then fired, and the man fell.—*SOUTHEY*, ii. 269, 270.

had, received Nelson's first broadside. Its poop was demolished, its masts down, and its sides stove in by the English fire. "My part on board the Bucentaure is done," exclaimed Villeneuve; and he endeavoured to hail the Santissima Trinidad to be taken on board, but no voice could be heard in that awful cannonade. Shortly after, the Bucentaure struck her colours, with Villeneuve on board; and the masts of the Santissima Trinidad, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the Victory, Neptune, Leviathan, and Conqueror, fell with a fearful crash, and she was taken possession of, when wholly disabled, by a boat from the Prince.

112. While victory was thus everywhere declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed: he is surely dead." At length he came down; they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?"—"Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing."—"I hope," said Nelson, "none of our ships have struck?"—"There is no fear of that," replied Hardy.—"I am a dead man," then said Nelson; "I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon." Meanwhile loud cheers from the crew of the Victory announced every successive ship of the enemy that struck, and at every renewal of the joyous sounds the countenance of the dying hero was illuminated by a passing light. Soon after Hardy went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were

taken. "That's well," replied Nelson, "but I bargained for twenty;" and then, in a stronger voice, added, "Anchor, Hardy, anchor! Do you make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy," said he. Hardy knelt down and kissed his cheek. "Now, I am satisfied!" said Nelson; "thank God, I have done my duty!" His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, "Thank God I have done my duty!" He often prayed with the chaplain, Dr Scott, and frequently said, "Pray for me, Doctor." He continued in great pain for three hours and a half, and expired at half-past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled even in the glorious annals of the English navy.

113. The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only floating wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides; and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. The Algésiras, with Admiral Magon on board, combated to the last with the utmost resolution; and the crew were preparing to board the Tonnant, when they were torn in pieces by a broadside from an English vessel on the other side. Though wounded both in the arm and thigh, and all but fainting from loss of blood, the heroic Magon still continued to animate his men, when he was struck by a grapeshot in the breast, and instantly expired. The Algésiras now surrendered: out of a crew of 640 men, 330 had been struck down. Ere long nineteen ships of the line had struck, with Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish admirals Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the Achille, of seventy-four guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but eighteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the Santissima Trinidad, of a hundred and thirty guns, and Santa Anna, of a hundred and twelve, were in the hands of the British, and lay in

mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz, after having combated with the most heroic courage the now greatly superior force of the British, directed against his surviving vessels of the wreck. He was mortally wounded, however, and soon after died. Less honourable was the conduct of Admiral Dumanoir, who, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides,

as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours; a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations, which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, how-

* The comparative strength of the two fleets was as follows:—

| | | BRITISH. | |
|---------------------|---|----------|------------------------------------|
| | | GUNS. | CAPTAINS. |
| 1. Victory, | . | 100 | Hardy; Admiral Nelson. |
| 2. Royal Sovereign, | . | 100 | Rotherham; Admiral Collingwood. |
| 3. Britannia, | . | 100 | Bullen; Admiral, Earl of Northesk. |
| 4. Temeraire, | . | 98 | Harvey. |
| 5. Prince, | . | 98 | Grindall. |
| 6. Neptune, | . | 98 | Freemantle. |
| 7. Dreadnought, | . | 98 | Conn. |
| 8. Tonnant, | . | 80 | Tyler. |
| 9. Belleisle, | . | 74 | Hargood. |
| 10. Revenge, | . | 74 | Mooroom. |
| 11. Mars, | . | 74 | Duff. |
| 12. Spartiate, | . | 74 | Sir Francis Laforey. |
| 13. Defiance, | . | 74 | Durham. |
| 14. Conqueror, | . | 74 | Pellew. |
| 15. Defence, | . | 74 | Hope. |
| 16. Colossus, | . | 74 | Morris. |
| 17. Leviathan, | . | 74 | Bayntun. |
| 18. Achilles, | . | 74 | King. |
| 19. Bellerophon, | . | 74 | Cooke. |
| 20. Minotaur, | . | 74 | Mansfield. |
| 21. Orion, | . | 74 | Codrington. |
| 22. Swiftsure, | . | 74 | Rutherford. |
| 23. Ajax, | . | 74 | Pilford. |
| 24. Thunderer, | . | 74 | Stockham. |
| 25. Polyphemus, | . | 64 | Redmill. |
| 26. Africa, | . | 64 | Digby. |
| 27. Agamemnon, | . | 64 | Berry. |

27

Frigates, 4

2,148

FRENCH.

| | | HOW DISPOSED OF. | |
|--------------------|---|------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | GUNS. | |
| 1. Bucentaure, | . | 80 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 2. Formidable, | . | 80 | Escaped, taken by Sir R. Strachan. |
| 3. Neptune, | . | 80 | Escaped, uninjured. |
| 4. Indomptable, | . | 80 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 5. Algésiras, | . | 74 | Taken, but got into Cadiz dismasted. |
| 6. Phuton, | . | 74 | Escaped in a sinking state. |
| 7. Mont Blanc, | . | 74 | Escaped, taken by Sir R. Strachan. |
| 8. Intrépide, | . | 74 | Burnt. |
| 9. Swiftsure, | . | 74 | Taken, and sent to Gibraltar. |
| 10. Aigle, | . | 74 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 11. Scipion, | . | 74 | Escaped, taken by Sir R. Strachan. |
| 12. Duguay Trouin, | . | 74 | Escaped, taken by Sir R. Strachan. |
| 13. Warwick, | . | 74 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 14. Argonaute, | . | 74 | Wrecked near Cadiz. |
| 15. Achille, | . | 74 | Burnt. |
| 16. Redoutable, | . | 74 | Taken and sunk. |
| 17. Poursuiv., | . | 74 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 18. Héron, | . | 74 | Escaped to Cadiz. |

ever, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour.

114. It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well could this advice have been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead.* As it was, he deemed it an unnecessary precaution, or was not practicable, till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous.† Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides, to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was, that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered

at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the *Algeiras* rose upon the slender British guard which had her in possession, and escaped with her into Cadiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English prize crew to return on their parole to their own fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance, Captain Cosmao-Kirjulien, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismasted hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly formed in line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the *Santa Anna* and Spanish *Neptune*, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many mel-

| | SPANISH. | |
|----------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------|
| | GUNS. | HOW DISPOSED OF. |
| 19. Santissima Trinidad, . . . | 130 | Taken and sunk. |
| 20. Prince des Asturies, . . . | 112 | Escaped dismasted. |
| 21. Santa Anna, . . . | 112 | Taken, but escaped dismasted. |
| 22. Rayo, . . . | 100 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 23. Neptune, . . . | 84 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 24. Argonauta, . . . | 84 | Taken and sunk. |
| 25. Bahama, . . . | 74 | Taken and sent to Gibraltar. |
| 26. Montanez, . . . | 74 | Escaped to Cadiz. |
| 27. San Augustino, . . . | 74 | Taken and burnt. |
| 28. San Ildefonso, . . . | 74 | Taken and sent to Gibraltar. |
| 29. San Juan Nepomuceno, . . . | 74 | Taken and sent to Gibraltar. |
| 30. Monarca, . . . | 74 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 31. San Francisco de Asis, . . . | 74 | Taken and wrecked. |
| 32. San Justo, . . . | 74 | Escaped to Cadiz dismasted. |
| 33. San Leandro, . . . | 64 | Escaped to Cadiz dismasted. |
| 33 of line . . . | 2,634 | |
| Frigates 5 . . . | | |

ABSTRACT.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|----|
| Taken at Trafalgar, . . . | 19 |
| Taken by Sir R. Strachan, . . . | 4 |
| Sunk, . . . | 1 |
| Escaped to Cadiz, wrecks, . . . | 6 |
| Escaped to Cadiz uninjured, . . . | 3 |

—NELSON'S *Despatches*, vii. 141, 142; and vii. 220, 222.

33

* A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes, from attending to Nelson's dying instructions, was afforded by the Defence. This vessel, with its prize, the *San Ildefonso*, anchored and rode out the gale in safety. The *Swiftsure* and *Bahama* prizes also anchored, and were saved.—JAMES, iv. 180.

† In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated, that many high naval authorities are of opinion that if he had anchored immediately after the battle, the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that, when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night, many vessels, including the *Victory* itself, were incapable of obeying.—COLLINGWOOD, i. 191, 192, note.

anchely catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest, the *Indomptable* was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the *Effraïme*'s crew, and above a thousand persons perished. Some of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Admirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides twenty thousand prisoners, including the land forces on board,* and the combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only sixteen hundred and ninety men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Mathieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal,† were compelled to strike their colours. It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which two months before had filled England with alarm;"‡

115. An interchange of courteous deeds took place between the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to

the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded, and the numerous prizes in its hands. In return, the Marquis of Solano, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies; and it was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse.

116. No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoleon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshalled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the

* This number may appear large, and the whole loss, including prisoners, is stated by M. Thiers to have been only 7000 men.—*THIERS*, vii. 172. This number, however, is exclusive of those who fell into the hands of the victors, but escaped during the storm. The English took nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad* and *Santa Anna*. In three of the seventy-four taken, the prisoners were 800 each.—*Nelson Desp.* vii. 226. Applying this to the whole nineteen ships taken, the crews of these ships would be 16,200, and as there were two first-rates taken, and 4000 troops on board, under General Contarini.—(*COLLINGWOOD to MOLLARDEN*, 24th Oct. 1805; *Nelson Desp.* vii. 217)—the number of persons on board the prizes could not be less than 20,000. Lord Collingwood accordingly says, "In the captured ships we took 20,000 prisoners, including the troops."—*LORD COLLINGWOOD to J. E. BLACKETT, Esq.*, 2d Nov. 1805; *Nelson Desp.* vii. 236.

† The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan. ‡ In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle, the following general order was issued to the fleet: "The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general thanksgiving before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are naught."—*COLLINGWOOD*, i. 179.

result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these blessings were, they yet seemed an inadequate compensation for the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unsoothed enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

117. Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of £6000 a-year; £10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St Paul's cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of £2000 a-year; a grant which first raised that noble officer from the state of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of sorrowing spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful,

that of the martyred patriot; the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory; and if the chariot and horses of life had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory."

118. Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country, constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but intrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the capacity for skilful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the license of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself as an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius on the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly

virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders.* If a veil could be drawn over the deeds perpetrated at Naples, his public character might be deemed without a fault: but no human being was ever yet perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness.*

119. The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admiral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochefort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which, the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible; until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to, and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the

enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours; when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships, but not till they were almost totally dismantled, and had sustained a loss of seven hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only twenty-four killed and a hundred and eleven wounded.

120. It is observed by Mr Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land—a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II., but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalising from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect further, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history have been fought at sea. The battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion; that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world; that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan invasion in the south of Europe; and that of La Hogue checked for nearly a century the maritime efforts of the house of Bourbon. As important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England, and destroyed all Napoleon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months; even the terrible overthrow of Leipzig was almost forgotten in the host which was mar-

* The ultimate fate of the celebrated and bewitching Lady Hamilton, whose influence led Nelson into the cruel executions at Naples, which forms the only blot on his public character, was a remarkable instance of moral retribution. She died in France, many years afterwards, alone and unloved, in want of the common necessities of life.

shall round the imperial eagles at Waterloo. But from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered; and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon, no considerable fleet, with the tricolor flag, was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

121. It is stated by Napoleon that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men at land. Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which rendered useless fully twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where ninety thousand men out of one hundred and twenty thousand were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoleon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above forty thousand men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased, on the side of the British alone, was nearly nine thousand; on that of the Allies, above twenty thousand; whereas the total loss of the English at Trafalgar was only sixteen hundred and ninety men; a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain.* This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea: and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of propor-

tion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands:" while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoleon.

122. The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill-understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary successes of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors are alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or, if attempted, succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and fully a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot: and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained.† So far from the French and Spanish fleets being doubled upon and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was thus situated; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior, to their antagonists, they must have been

* The loss at Talavera, out of 30,000 British, was 5000: that at Albuera, 4500 out of 7500; and out of 16,000 who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress.

† "The total loss was 1600, of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."—JAMES, iv. 111

taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the column was getting into action. Would any but an enemy of superior courage have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Anna and the Bucentaure, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, while three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support?

123. In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if, from accidental causes, their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard, by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique—quite the reverse; they did perfectly right: but that it is the manoeuvre suited only to the braver and more skillful party, and never can prove successful except in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force until the centre and rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being overpowered, if not able to bear up against superior forces, before support arrive from the rear; and an an-

tagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did, with British troops; and, accordingly, Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoleon's system of bringing an overwhelming force against one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms or retired the moment they saw an enemy on their flank; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops among whom it had penetrated; and the surrender of Vandamme, with seven thousand men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

124. It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the parties to whom Napoleon remitted to report on Mr Fulton's proposal for the navigation of vessels by steam had given a different opinion from what they did, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so far to outstrip the march of time, as to give to one generation the general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle; the

mighty engine would have yielded its powers in a corresponding degree to both sides, and their relative situations would have remained the same as before. If steamers would have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel, they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into the crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steamship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, carried flames and explosion into its forest of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not less decisive than that of Edward III. at Sluys. In the altered species of warfare to which steam navigation would unquestionably have given rise, success in the end would have remained with the people of the greater resources and resolution. The land of coal and of iron had no reason to dread a contest carried on by the powers of fire. The last gun, the last guinea, the last steam engine, would carry the day. The countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action, and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

125. But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoleon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days; and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the con-

fiscation of the property of the church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the revolutionary parties in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterwards, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy; and that, if he could once have roused the multitude against their rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France. "I would not," said he, "have attempted to subject England to France: I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of republicanism in their morale. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform."*

* "I would have hurried over my flotilla," said Napoleon, "with two hundred thousand men," [it was only one hundred and thirty-eight thousand.] "landed as near Chatham as possible, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing. I would have proclaimed a republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution among my partisans of the property of such of the latter as opposed me; liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would have introduced a great reform. I would have published a proclamation, declaring that we came as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy; all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been

126. That the French Emperor would have been worsted in his attempt, if England had remained true to herself, can be doubtful to no one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, with-out exception, from Vimiera to Waterloo, and that Napoleon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained a doubt till within these few years. But the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior

joined by a formidable body; and I would at the same time have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have burned your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruins of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully amongst the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen everything which would have made a great impression on their minds. The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an obnoxious and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families through the blood of the people; together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and the division of their possessions amongst the partisans of the revolution, with a general equalisation of property, would have gained us the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and dissipated, in the kingdom." Thus far the Emperor Napoleon; to which it may be added, that amidst the divisions and democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and sailed at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, further than spoliating some of the higher orders; and if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the chapel of St Stephen.—O'MEARA, i. 349, 352.

stimulants since 1830, and the strong partiality to French alliance which grew up when popular passion was powerfully excited by that change, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoleon did not know us better than we knew, ourselves, and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which had proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people. The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented existed among the British people: but strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and whether the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people.

127. No man can say how he would keep his senses under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant, as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth suddenly open beneath his feet. Even the warmest friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounces upon the stability of the English mind, under the influence of the prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoleon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage indeed would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger. Thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory; at Trafalgar for existence.

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

1. THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE, which had long taken an active part in the European confederacy, and was now destined to stand in the front rank of the fight of nations, is a power which has glowingly risen to greatness, without the aid of any extraordinary ability either in its sovereigns or its cabinet, by a succession of fortunate alliances on the part of its princes, and a constant adherence to prudent counsels on that of its government. The dukes of the house of Hapsburg, in former times, possessed merely the inconsiderable provinces of Upper and Lower Austria; they were surrounded by the more powerful kingdoms of Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia; and so far from it being probable that they would ever rise to the rank of a first-rate power, nothing presaged that they would be able to maintain their independence amidst those formidable potentates by whom they were environed. Austria has seldom been distinguished by extraordinary talent, either in her statesmen or generals, until the glorious eras of Maria Theresa and the French Revolution. She was remarkable chiefly for the prudence of her counsels and the good fortune of her enterprises; and her institutions were not such as to call forth talent in the middle or lower classes of the state. Nevertheless she has steadily advanced in population, wealth, and political importance, and now stood forth as a first-rate power, alike formidable to the independence of the adjoining states, and valuable as a bulwark against the encroachments of French usurpation or Russian ambition.

2. Unlike France or England, the Austrian monarchy has owed nothing to the homogeneous descent of its inhabitants.

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No one dominant race has in its provinces acquired a decided preponderance over the others, or communicated to the whole the impress of its character and the lustre of its name. Though the appellation of Austria has, from Vienna being the residence of its sovereigns, been generally applied to the whole empire, yet the inhabitants of the inconsiderable provinces which properly bear that name have neither conquered by force of arms, like the Romans, nor swayed by intellectual superiority, like the Greeks, the more distant, but larger and more powerful provinces of the empire. The state has grown up to greatness, as the monarchy has added provinces to its crown, by the voluntary marriage of their sovereigns, not the forced submission or gradual amalgamation of their inhabitants. Styria was acquired by legacy from Otho IV. VI. to Leopold I., hereditary archduke of Austria in 1192; Carniola by purchase, by Leopold II. in 1199. The crown of Bohemia was won for the dukes of Austria by marriage in 1527; that of Hungary, which became the brightest jewel in their diadem, by the same means at the same period; the duchy of the Tyrol, which was the inheritance of the heiress of the Tyrol, who married an archduke of the same fortunate house; the Flemish provinces, with Lorraine and Alsace, which became united to the Austrian crown by the marriage of Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, to Maximilian, archduke of Austria, grandfather of Charles V.—formed fully three-fourths of the magnificent Austrian dominions at this time. Galicia, acquired by the iniquitous partition—*"Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube."*

tion of Poland in 1772 and 1794, and Lombardy and Venice, which fell to their lot in the division of the spoils of conquest in 1797 and 1816, are the only considerable provinces of the monarchy which have been won by force of arms. They do not constitute a fourth part of its extent or population; and contribute a still less proportion to its warlike or financial resources. The strength of the monarchy has been the result of marriage, and of marriage alone.

3. When the extraordinary embarrassment is considered which has been experienced by Great Britain in all periods of its history, from the alien blood and hostile passions of Ireland—one only foreign portion of an otherwise compact and homogeneous empire—it becomes an interesting subject of inquiry, how the Austrian government has succeeded, through so many ages, in holding together the various provinces and multifarious races which compose its widespread empire. The fact of its being a military monarchy, maintained by the sword, and the Emperor's ruling, ostensibly at least, by his own will, will not explain the difficulty: for the sword itself is held by men of many races, provinces, and former separated dominions; many of whom were animated, at one period at least, by the fiercest religious passions; who have more than once revolted against the central government; and all of whom retain to this hour the strongest attachment to their national traditions. In reality, also, the government of Austria is not a despotism but an aristocracy, in which the practical direction of affairs is vested in a body of nobles, hardly three hundred in number, drawn from all the provinces of its vast dominions. How, then, has it happened, that while England, with its free government and representative institutions, has experienced such difficulty in restraining the national and religious passions of a single neighbouring island, Austria, with none of these advantages, has succeeded in stilling the rivalry of so many independent states, and attaching such ancient, powerful, and various nations in willing subjection to a foreign central government?

• 4. This circumstance will appear still more extraordinary when the striking vicissitudes of fortune which the Imperial dominions have undergone at various times are considered, and the numerous opportunities which successful external hostility or internal revolt have afforded to dismember and overturn the empire. No state in modern times has sustained such terrible reverses: none has been so frequently pierced to the heart by wounds apparently mortal: none has been so frequently driven to rest, as a last resource, on the patriotic spirit of its distant provinces. The dreadful insurrection of the Hungarian peasants in the sixteenth century, combined the horrors of the Jacquerie in France with the brutal atrocities of the insurrection of the boors in Germany. In the very infancy of its fortunes, the revolt of the Hussites in Bohemia brought into the vitals of the state the terrible scourge of religious warfare; nor was it soon appeased, for so strong was the party of the Protestants shortly after the Reformation, that nearly a half of the inhabitants of the Hereditary States were at one period numbered among the followers of Luther. In the close of the seventeenth century, Vienna was besieged by three hundred thousand Turks, and owed its salvation only to the heroism of John Sobieski and the lances of the Poles. Fifty years afterwards, the same capital fell into the hands of the victorious French and Bavarians, and the unconquerable Maria Theresa sought refuge and found support only in the fidelity of the Hungarian nobility. In 1757, the steeples of Vienna were desecrated by the outposts of the Great Frederick from the plain of the Marchfeld; in 1797, they were seen by the videttes of Napoleon from the heights of the Simmering. Twice during the revolutionary war the Austrian capital was taken by the French forces; the defeats the Imperial arms sustained during that terrible contest were so frequent as almost to defy enumeration. Yet from all these reverses the state in the end has emerged, not only unscathed, but victorious: and in the fidelity of her subjects, and

the persevering character of her government, Austria, during four centuries, has found the means of rising superior to all the storms of fortune, and steadily advancing, until she has attained the very first rank among the powers of Europe.

5. What is, in an especial manner, worthy of notice—the secret of this strong principle of vitality and unbroken progress is to be found in the patriotic spirit of the Austrian people, and the strength of the bonds which unite the inhabitants of so many different, and once independent, provinces and kingdoms, to the Imperial government. It was in the attachment of the Hungarians that Maria Theresa found the means of defeating the formidable invader of the French and Bavarians; the steadiness of the Bohemians enabled Marshal Daun to repel the invasion of the Prussians, when the standards of the Great Frederick were seen from the steeples of Vienna. But for the gallant spirit of the Hungarians, Austria would have sunk in 1805 under the shock of Austerlitz; the devoted loyalty of the Tyrolese partly rescued it from destruction after the disaster of Wagram in 1809. No country contains so great a variety of races, nations, and religions; none has found in them all such steady support in such terrible reverses.

6. This observation affords ample subject for serious reflection to the inhabitants of the British empire. Though vexed with incomparably less diversity of race or national rivalry, and enjoying a constitution which boasts, in a peculiar manner, the advantage of communicating to government the wishes of distant dependencies, and the impress of public opinion, England could hardly hope, if London and Portsmouth were taken by the victorious arms of the French or Russians, to find the means of reinstating its affairs, and regaining the empire of the waves, in the loyalty of the Irish Catholics, the fidelity of the Canadian habitants, the attachment of the West Indian planters, or the steadiness of the East Indian rajahs. It is in vain to

shut our eyes to these considerations: they are fortified on facts of such long continuance, and so momentous in their consequences, as to point evidently to some general law of nature, which will ere long force itself upon the observation of mankind. If they are at variance with our preconceived ideas, the candid inquirer after truth will rather suspect that these ideas are in part erroneous, than that results so opposite to the inferences from them should so long have taken place on so great a scale. And the conclusion which posterity will probably deduce from them is, that the inherent corruption of human nature is felt even more severely in popular than in aristocratic communities; that the government of the many by the many is often more selfish than that of the many by the few; that the tenacity to interest when one people rules another, is generally greater than when one sovereign governs both; and that the effect of free institutions is rather to communicate a mighty impulse to human exertion, than to eradicate the seeds of evil in the multitude who constitute the ruling power.

7. Austria contains a surface of 33,802 square marine leagues, or above 300,000 square miles, being twice and a half the superficies of the British islands, which embrace 122,000. It is thinly peopled as a whole, as appears from the census of 1834, by 35,047,533 inhabitants; and at the period of the French invasion in 1805, it could only boast of 27,500,000. Its revenue now amounts to 150,000,000 florins, or 315,000,000 francs, (£12,600,000), a sum, however, at least equivalent, if the difference in the value of money and in habit of living is considered, to eighteen million sterling of British money. Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 florins, (£7,500,000), had risen, by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere, to 100,000,000, or £8,800,000. During the war its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes; and it sustained no diminution by the peace of

Campo Formio, the Venetian States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries.*

8. At the peace of Lunéville, the income of government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or £9,500,000 sterling—a sum equal, at that time, to at least fifteen millions sterling in England; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled, during the difficulties of former years, to have recourse to a paper currency; and the bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twenty-five florins, or two pounds sterling. During the course of the war, silver and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation, and paper billets for two or three shillings assumed their place. A considerable portion of the smaller currency was in brass,

which was issued at double its intrinsic value; and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts of the government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states. The debt in all was 200,000,000 florins (£18,000,000) in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it amounted to triple that sum! The treasury had been reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own subjects.

9. The diversity of surface and natural features in this, as in all other countries through which the great stony girdle of the globe passes, proves an inexhaustible source at once of natural beauty, agricultural riches, and variety of productions. The Alps of the Tyrol and Styria, gradually branching off to those of Carinthia and Dalmatia on the one hand, and to the Carpathian range on the other, traverse nearly its whole extent, separated only by the valley of the Danube, which cuts, as it were, through this vast natural barrier, and rolls its volume of waters, swelled on either hand by the numerous torrents which descend from the mountain sides, to the Hungarian plains. This noble river is thirteen hundred miles in length, and receives the waters of sixty navigable streams. The clefts and hollows of this immense mountain range exhibit on either side

* The population and superficial area of the several provinces of the Austrian empire stood thus, according to the census of 1834:—

| | Superficial Area. sq. geog. leagues. | Population. | Population per square league. |
|-----------------------------------|---|-------------|----------------------------------|
| Hungary, | 11,620 | 11,404,330 | 878 |
| Galicia, | 4,304 | 4,397,339 | 1,087 |
| Bohemia, | 2,642 | 4,001,852 | 1,533 |
| Lombardy, | 1,017 | 2,495,929 | 2,478 |
| Moravia and Silesia, | 1,839 | 2,110,141 | 1,582 |
| Venetian provinces, | 2,132 | 2,079,588 | 979 |
| Transylvania, | 8,026 | 1,963,435 | 681 |
| Austria Lower, | 1,970 | 1,348,652 | } 1,150 |
| Austria Upper, | | 846,982 | |
| Styria, | 1,114 | 925,882 | 798 |
| Tyrol, | 1,435 | 827,635 | 568 |
| Carinthia, Carniola, | | 1,553,527 | 960 |
| Dalmatia, and Littoral, | 1,445 | 1,101,581 | 553 |
| Military Frontier, | 1,695 | | |
| | 83,802 | 35,047,573 | |

Of this population the military, on full or half pay, amount to 518,950—leaving a civil population of 34,528,623; the annual increase is 811,612, or somewhat more than in the British Islands.—*See Census of 1834 for Austria*; MALTE BRUN, v. 796, 787; and vii. 252, 253; and vi. 392, 752; and TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 7.

scenes of exquisite beauty, combining often the grandeur of Swiss or Tyrolean scenery, with the close-cut pastures, rich vineyards, and golden harvests of Upper and Lower Austria. Immense woods of pine on all the elevated mountains at once adorn the landscape, and furnish inexhaustible supplies of fuel for the inhabitants; vast and fertile meadows on the banks of the Danube nourish innumerable herds of cattle, and maintain admirable horses for the great establishments by which the Imperial cavalry are mounted. The sunny slopes are covered by vines of uncommon luxuriance, and their fruit of the richest flavour; while the spacious plains which stretch from the neighbourhood of the river to the foot of the mountains on either hand, bring to maturity noble crops of grain, rye, and potatoes, which maintain in rustic plenty the numerous and happy inhabitants.*

10. These are the imposing and captivating features of Upper and Lower Austria, forming the strength and heart of the empire, and comprising by far the richest, best cultivated, and most prosperous part of the imperial dominions in Germany. But besides the valley of the Danube, and its range of adjacent mountains, the Austrian sway stretches into Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and Italy, and, surmounting the crest of the mountains, has extended far on either side of their reverse slopes the domination of the Ostrogoths, Bo-

* Upper and Lower Austria contain—

| | ARPENTS. |
|--------------------------|-----------|
| Arable land, . . . | 2,120,000 |
| Gardens, . . . | 81,000 |
| Vineyards, . . . | 79,000 |
| Meadows, . . . | 753,000 |
| Mountain pastures, . . . | 1,064,000 |
| Forests, . . . | 1,830,000 |
| Waste lands, . . . | 683,500 |

6,750,000

POPULATION BY RACES.

| | |
|-------------------|-----------|
| Germans, . . . | 2,109,180 |
| Slavonians, . . . | 7,050 |
| Greeks, . . . | 368 |
| Armenians, . . . | 210 |
| Jews, . . . | 2,575 |

2,118,381

The Austrian arpent or joch is about two English acres.—MALTE BRUN, v. 731, 732.

hemian. It is a vast natural basin encircled by mountains, which at a remote period appears to have enclosed a great lake, before the Elbe burst through the barriers of the Erzgebirge, and opened through the precipices of the Saxon Switzerland a passage for the cooped-up waters to the German ocean. Its plains, peopled now by four millions of inhabitants, are entirely agricultural; but though the produce is great, the system of cultivation is rude, and human skill has done little to aid the beneficence of nature. The plains of Galicia, containing four million three hundred and ninety-five thousand inhabitants, to the north of the Carpathian mountains, exhibit the rude agriculture, boundless forests, and general misery, which in every age have formed the characteristic of the Polish provinces. Silesia and Moravia, three-fourths of the inhabitants of which are of Slavonic origin,† exhibit the same

† Bohemia contains—

| | ARPENTS. |
|--------------------|-----------|
| Arable land, . . . | 3, |
| Gardens, . . . | 86,000 |
| Vineyards, . . . | 44,000 |
| Meadows, . . . | 799,000 |
| Pastures, . . . | 610,000 |
| Forests, . . . | 2,310,000 |
| Fish-ponds, . . . | 153,700 |

7,810,200

POPULATION BY RACES.

| | |
|-------------------|-----------|
| Slavonians, . . . | 2,477,000 |
| Germans, . . . | 1,358,000 |
| Jews, . . . | 60,000 |

3,895,000

—MALTE BRUN, v. 728.

‡ Silesia and Moravia contain—

| | ARPENTS. |
|--------------------|-----------|
| Arable land, . . . | 2,200,400 |
| Gardens, . . . | 58,000 |
| Vineyards, . . . | 51,000 |
| Meadows, . . . | 325,000 |
| Pastures, . . . | 429,000 |
| Forests, . . . | 1,120,000 |
| Fish-ponds, . . . | 41,800 |
| Waste lands, . . . | 596,300 |

4,821,500

POPULATION BY RACES.

| | |
|-------------------|-----------|
| Slavonians, . . . | 1,566,500 |
| Germans, . . . | 477,000 |
| Jews, . . . | 34,000 |
| Gipsies, . . . | 1,000 |

2,078,500

—MALTE BRUN, v. 729.

features of the Slavonic race, modified in some degree, in many places, especially Silesia, by the industry and perseverance of the Germans. Hungary, containing upwards of ten millions of inhabitants, presents an immense level surface interspersed with vast morasses, but abounding with natural agricultural riches, and capable of nourishing, in ease and affluence, at least four times its present population.* Transylvania, Illyria, and Dalmatia, separated from Austria and Hungary by great ranges of wooded mountains, belong to a different region of the globe; they have borrowed the character of the Turkish provinces which they adjoin; while the Tyrol, Styria, and Carniola, bedded in the valley of the Alps, recall to the enchanted traveller the sublimest features of Swiss scenery; and the plain of Lombardy transports him to the delicious sun, watered meadows, and golden harvests of Italy.

11. An empire of such extent, embracing so great a variety of climates and geographical features, could hardly be expected to possess any uniform and well-defined national character, like the comparatively compact and homogeneous empires of France and England. But this diversity is rendered still more striking by the extraordinary difference in the character and disposition of the races who, at successive periods, have settled in these various provinces. The Ostrogoths, who have given their name, like the Anglo-Saxons in Britain, to the whole empire, settled in Upper and Lower Austria, and spread themselves on either bank of the Danube to the crest of the mountains, and in their blue-

* Hungary contains—

| | ARPENTS |
|---------------------------------|-----------|
| Arable land, | 4,307,218 |
| Gardens, | 638,767 |
| Vineyards, | 911,76 |
| Meadows and pastures, | 7,713,225 |
| Forests and marshes, | 8,942,740 |
| Fish-ponds, | 860,000 |

23,965,126

POPULATION BY RACES IN 1823.

| | |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| Magyars, | 3,800,000 |
| Slavonians, | 4,760,300 |
| Germans, Jews, &c. | 2,028,701 |

10,584,001

—MALTE BRUN, vi. 761.

eyed, fair-haired, slow but honest and persevering inhabitants, are to be seen at this day the genuine characteristics of the Gothic race. The Bohemians, Moravians, and Galicians are of a totally different character. In their swarthy visages, dark hair, fiery temperament, and comparatively volatile disposition, are to be traced the indelible features of the Slavonic family of mankind.* Daring in war, ardent in disposition, impatient of control, attached to freedom, but averse to labour, and with little industry, the Hungarians have in every age betrayed the fierce disposition and warlike passions which made the Huns in former days the scourge of Europe. They have ever been the bulwark of the empire, and have been found combating with equal heroism, in different ages, their ancient enemies the Turks, seeking to subvert their religion, and their modern foes the French, striving to overturn the independence of their country. In the fiery spirit, admirable horsemanship, roving disposition, and predatory inclination of the Croats, Illyrians, and Transylvanians, it is easy to recognise the influence of Asiatic blood, and the prevalence of those habits which the children of Ishmael have communicated, in an apparently indelible manner, to all their descendants. The handsome countenances, dark hair, and piercing eyes of the Lombards, bespeak their Italian descent, and the predominance of ancient blood; but in their unwarlike habits, pacific enjoyments, and ready submission to conquest, we seek in vain for the traces of the fierce settlers in Cisalpine Gaul, or the indomitable spirit of Roman virtue.

12. Drawn from so vast and varied a population, the Austrian army possesses within itself, if properly directed, the elements of almost every species of military virtue. In the steady valour and unconquerable energy of the Hungarians, the monarchy has in every age found the precious reserve to be brought forth, like the Old Guard of Napoleon, at the decisive crisis, and which has often, in circumstances apparently desperate, recalled victory to its standards. The Croats, Pandours, and other

warriors, from the military colonies on the Turkish frontier, furnish an inexhaustible supply of admirable light horse, scarcely inferior to the Cossacks in activity and enterprise. The Tyrolese are unrivalled for their skill as marksmen, and their constant habit of shooting at targets, and in the mountains, qualifies them in a peculiar manner for the duty of tirailleurs. The native Austrian foot is respectable, and when well led, will fight bravely, though they have not the fire or heroism of the Hungarian grenadiers. But their heavy cavalry, magnificently mounted, and having its officers drawn almost entirely from the nobility, contains some of the most brilliant corps in Europe. Bohemia, Moravia, and Galicia furnish their proportion of hardy and zealous foot-soldiers for the ordinary regiments of the line. Thus the national character of the various provinces of the empire is adapted, in a remarkable manner, for the different services of the army; and, beyond all question, Austria has the means of raising within its own dominions an array of combatants second to none in Europe in martial vigour and efficiency. Yet the imperial armies, down to the year 1813, were almost uniformly unfortunate; and although, on many occasions, they displayed devoted gallantry in the field, and on all evinced extraordinary patriotic spirit in preparation, yet this appeared rather in the perseverance with which reverses were surmounted, than in the ardour with which success was sought or followed up. No nation ever sustained so many and such dreadful defeats; none has in the end emerged so often victorious from their shock. In the perseverance of the aristocratic body which directs the national councils, joined to the steady patriotic spirit of the people, is to be found the explanation of this remarkable circumstance.

13. The Austrian army consists of sixty-three regiments of the line: twenty battalions of grenadiers, the corps of jagers of, thirteen battalions, and the marine battalion on the Danube, numbering in all two hundred and ninety thousand combatants. The cavalry

consists of eight regiments of cuirassiers, six of dragoons, seven of light horse, twelve of hussars, and four of hussars; in all, thirty-eight thousand men. The artillery, divided into five regiments of field-artillery, one corps of bombardiers, and the garrison artillery, embraces twenty thousand more. In addition to this, the engineers, sappers, miners, &c. and waggon-train, amount to thirty-two thousand five hundred:—in all, three hundred and eighty thousand combatants, nearly the whole of whom are in an excellent state of discipline and equipment. But this is by no means the whole military strength of the nation. The landwehr, established in all the provinces except Hungary, and the "Hungarian Insurrection of Nobles," which corresponds to it in that extensive kingdom, constitute an armed force of equal amount, which, when called out, gives the state a mass in all of seven hundred and forty thousand combatants. In the year 1814, when the patriotic spirit of the nation was drawn forth to the highest pitch, and its resources strained to the uttermost, nine hundred and seventy thousand men received pay in the armed force, regular and landwehr, of the nation—an astonishing number for an empire not at that period containing six-and-twenty millions of inhabitants, though not so great, in proportion, as in the same year was raised by the British islands, with a population only of eighteen millions.*

14. The military force which Hungary is required to furnish to the general support of the empire, is sixty-four thousand men, including seventeen thousand horse—a force very inconsiderable for a kingdom containing eleven millions of inhabitants, and which demonstrates that, in this respect at least, it has been very leniently dealt with. But on the frontiers of the whole monarchy, towards Turkey, the military colonies are placed, the organisation of which is entirely warlike, for the pur-

* Great Britain, in that year, had 1,053,000 men in arms; of whom 813,000 were drawn from the population of the British isles, not numbering then above 18,000,000 inhabitants.

pose of defence against the perpetual of the Osmanlis, and which give rise to one of the most singular and interesting spectacles in Europe. The whole surface of this strip of land is divided into seventy districts, each of which is termed a regiment, and in which the whole land is held by military tenure. The inhabitants of each holding are generally related by blood or marriage, and form what is called a "House communal," which is subject to the rural and domestic control of one chief, usually the oldest of the family. Every male is trained to military service, and liable, from the age of eighteen to sixty, to be at any time called out for the public defence. When doing duty within the confines of their own regiment or district, they receive no pay, and feed themselves; the moment they pass that limit, their whole expenses fall on the crown. About fifty thousand of these hardy borderers are constantly embodied and in arms; but the total number liable to serve, and who may be called out on an emergency, exceeds two hundred thousand. Night and day, five thousand of them are constantly patrolling on guard along the Turkish frontier; and so closely do these videttes approach each other, and so perfect is the system of signals established by firing guns during the day, or lighting beacons at night, that upon the smallest incursion on any point of this immense frontier, above a thousand miles in length, the whole fifty thousand can be almost instantly assembled at their respective points of rendezvous, and in twenty-four hours two hundred thousand warriors are in arms! These military colonies embrace, at this time, above a million of souls, and their numbers are increasing so rapidly as to double in forty years; while in Upper Austria, the duplication is once in a hundred and four years; and, on an average of the whole empire, once in fifty-one. The inhabitants on the military frontier, like the Gauchos of the Pampas in South America, are for the most part indolent and unruly in peace, negligent in their persons, and addicted to intemperance; but in war they are active and enterprising, and being

accustomed to a rigid discipline, they make excellent soldiers when removed from home.

15. The mode of obtaining men for the army varies in different parts of the empire. In the Italian provinces all persons, noble or common, at the age of eighteen, are registered for military service, with a very few professional exemptions; and the quatum is selected from that list by the ballot. Substitutes, however, are allowed: the period of service is only for eight years; and there is no landwehr or army of reserve. In the Tyrol the same system prevails. In the German provinces, all males, not noble or clerical, from eighteen to forty-five, are liable to be called on to serve either in the line or landwehr. Those in the first class, which embraces the young men from eighteen to twenty-eight, are liable to be balloted for the first service; those in the second, from twenty-eight to forty-five for the landwehr. It is very rarely, however, that the ballot is resorted to for supplying vacancies in the line: in general, they are obtained with ease by voluntary enlistment, or selection of candidates by the local authorities or feudal lords—care being taken, as much as possible, to choose single men and younger sons, to whom it is usually an object of ambition to get into the service.* The period of service is fourteen years, after which the soldier is inscribed on the list of the landwehr, which is never called out except on urgent occasions; and if balloted for there, he is entitled to his discharge at the age of forty years. The articles of war and mili-

* So patriotic is the spirit of the people, that when danger threatens the monarchy, no difficulty is ever experienced, even on the shortest notice, in obtaining, by voluntary enrolment, the requisite number of recruits for the public service. In the year 1805, on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, orders were sent to Prague for the immediate levy of fifty thousand men in Bohemia. Before the evening of the day on which the order was received, summonses for the requisite numbers were despatched to each district and lordship; the levy was forthwith made; and, in seventeen days from the receipt of the orders, the whole fifty thousand were ready armed, clothed, and equipped; at the depots in Bohemia and Moravia.—*TRAVELLER'S Austria*, ii. 301, 302.

tary code have remained the same since the days of Maria Theresa, when they were framed in the most enlightened spirit; but practical abuses frequently creep in from the aristocratic influence pervading the service, which, as is generally the case in such governments, all the efforts of those at the head of affairs are unable to eradicate. Every regiment has its "inhaber" or colonel proprietor, distinct from the colonel commandant, with whom the granting of all commissions of the first rank rests; but all subsequent promotions are made by the crown. Nobility is not a requisite to obtaining commissions, any more than in the English army; but as the spirit of the nation is essentially aristocratic, the officers are generally taken from that class; and the sons of the burghers and middle rank seek, in preference, situations in the innumerable civil offices under government, where they find themselves more comfortable, in contact only with persons in their own station of life, and often rise by good conduct to the highest eminence.

16. The great breeding establishments kept up by the Emperor for providing horses for the cavalry are peculiar to Austria, and highly characteristic of the provident system of its administration. One of the most remarkable is that of Mezohegyes in Transylvania. An immense plain, fifteen leagues in circumference, containing eighty thousand acres of the finest grass, is there surrounded by a broad belt of wood, fenced in on the outside by a deep ditch. Two thousand acres in the interior are covered with thriving plantations for shelter and warmth to the horses, and the whole remainder of the surface is devoted to the nourishment of the studs or their attendants. Three hundred and sixty ploughs are employed in the interior in raising grain and cultivating the land for the use of the horses. Formerly twenty thousand horses were assembled in this great establishment, which was one of the principal depots for mounting the cavalry; but contagious diseases were found to be prevalent in such an assemblage of ani-

mals, and it is now kept up only to furnish stallions and mares of the finest breeds for the use of the government and the country. One hundred and fifty of these noble animals are annually sent forth by this establishment, and serve to keep up the government stallions at the number of two thousand, which is deemed necessary to the public service. The arrangement is all military, and the attention paid to every department is so extreme, that the whole expense of the establishment is defrayed by the price obtained for the young horses, which are sold by auction after those for government and the public service have been selected. The military exchequer pays a hundred and twenty florins (£10) for the dragoon horses, and a hundred and forty florins for those of the cuirassiers; and much of the vigour and efficiency of the Imperial cavalry is to be ascribed to these noble establishments, in which the greatest care has been taken to combine the celerity and hardihood of Arab blood with the strength and bone of the Norman breed.

17. Taxation in Austria is far from being oppressive; although the revenue of the state, if the value of money is taken into account, is very considerable. The total revenue at this time is 129,746,000 florins, equivalent to 322,000,000 francs, or £12,900,000 sterling. The expenditure, exclusive of the war department, is 87,000,000 florins, or £8,700,000; but the army is understood to cost 80,000,000 florins—making the total expenditure nearly 20,000,000 florins (£2,000,000) above the income. The exchequer has always been a matter of great difficulty with the Austrian government, as it is with all powers maintaining a costly military establishment, without the aid of any extensive commerce to enlarge its credit or increase its receipts. In 1808 the revenues were only £9,000,000; and they were in such a state of confusion at the close of the war, that, but for the subsidies of England, which, from the difference in the value of money in the two countries, told with twofold efficacy, its armies never could have been brought

into the field to combat for European independence.*

18. Foreign commerce has been little cultivated in Austria till of late years, owing to its inland situation, and the restrictions, long almost amounting to a prohibition, which the jealousy of Russia and Turkey imposed on the navigation of the Danube. Yet is there no country which, from its vast internal resources, and the possession of so noble a natural estuary for exporta-

* In 1834 the income and expenditure of the empire were as follows:—

| | Florins. | £ |
|------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Interest of public debt, | 40,000,000 | or 4,000,000 |
| Finance department, | 14,619,220 | .. 1,462,000 |
| Chancery and diplomacy, | 1,801,108 | .. 180,168 |
| Police, | 1,643,504 | .. 164,350 |
| Civil cost of the army, | 2,686,306 | .. 268,000 |
| Public audit, | 2,708,723 | .. 270,872 |
| Justice, | 7,708,734 | .. 470,874 |
| The courts, | 1,461,139 | .. 146,113 |
| Public works in | | |
| Germany, | 8,774,066 | .. 877,406 |
| Lombardy, | 2,987,935 | .. 298,793 |
| Venice, | 2,680,169 | .. 268,000 |
| Lesser charges, | 351,626 | .. 35,000 |
| War, | 60,000,000 | .. 6,000,000 |
| | 144,217,590 | 14,421,076 |

The receipts of the Imperial treasury, in 1834, were as follows:—

| | Florins. | £ |
|---------------------------------|------------|--------------|
| Land tax, | 38,987,954 | or 3,898,700 |
| House tax, | 3,859,178 | .. 385,900 |
| Income tax on trades, | 2,498,234 | .. 249,800 |
| Personal tax, | 1,367,451 | .. 136,700 |
| Legacy tax, | 879,160 | .. 87,900 |

| | | |
|------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Total direct, | 47,531,977 | 4,753,000 |
| Indirect:— | Florins | £ |
| Excise, | 17,841,347 | .. 1,784,000 |
| Stamps, | 3,232,048 | .. 323,000 |
| Customs, | 12,037,692 | .. 1,203,000 |
| Law tax, | 1,882,700 | .. 188,000 |
| Lottery, | 3,363,682 | .. 336,000 |
| Post Office, | 1,417,362 | .. 141,000 |
| Post-horses, | 379,952 | .. 37,000 |
| Monopolies, viz:— | | |
| Salt, | 19,404,807 | .. 1,940,000 |
| Tobacco, | 784,376 | .. 78,000 |
| Gunpowder, | 9,329 | .. 900 |
| Domains, | 3,460,656 | .. 346,000 |
| Mines, | 1,952,419 | .. 195,000 |
| Hungarian Revenue, | 5,330,000 | .. 533,000 |
| | 136,223,598 | 13,623,000 |

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 325, 327, 328.
 THORNBOROUGH'S *Finances de l'Autriche*, ii. 374, 410.

tion, is calculated to furnish materials for a greater foreign traffic, or with which a more extensive and lucrative trade is destined one day to be carried on between the owners of the rude produce of the soil and the manufacturing industry of other states. The silks, oils, and dairy produce of Lombardy and Venice; the fleeces of Hungary and Bohemia; the mineral riches of Austria and Hungary; the inexhaustible agricultural wealth of the whole empire, must ere long find a vent in an immense foreign commerce. The exports in 1834, according to the official value, were 111,092,941 florins, or £11,109,000, and the imports 107,781,409 florins, or £10,778,000; but these numbers are taken from the official entries, which are much below the real value.† If the wise and judicious measures now in the course of adoption by the Austrian government, to facilitate their foreign exports by the great arteries of the Po and the Danube, and the noble harbour of Trieste, are fully carried into execution, there can be no doubt that their commerce is destined at no distant period to exhibit an amount double or triple what is now presented. And nothing can be more certain than that Austria is a country with which, perhaps beyond any other, it is for the interest of Great Britain to cultivate commercial relations, and with which treaties on the footing of *real reciprocity* might be concluded; for her productions are those which Britain wants, and can never emulate, and the manu-

† The proportions of the several parts of the empire were, in 1834—

| | Imports. | £ |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| | Florins. | |
| German Provinces, | 61,981,390 | or 6,198,130 |
| Italian Provinces, | 84,288,855 | .. 8,428,855 |
| Hungary and Transylvania, | 11,511,164 | .. 1,151,164 |
| | 107,781,409 | 10,778,138 |
| | Exports. | |
| German Provinces, | 68,633,685 | .. 6,863,685 |
| Italian Provinces, | 84,960,722 | .. 8,496,972 |
| Hungary and Transylvania, | 7,598,584 | .. 759,853 |
| | 111,092,941 | 11,109,294 |

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 361.

factures of Britain are what Austria wants, and can never rival.

19. One remarkable feature which strikes the most superficial traveller in every part of Austria Proper, the Tyrol, and Styria, is the extraordinary and general wellbeing of the peasantry. Without many of the luxuries which habit and a long command of the commerce of the world have rendered necessities to the English labourer; clothed in comparatively coarse garments, often without either tea or coffee, the Austrian peasant enjoys a much greater and more permanent share of the necessities and comforts of life than the great bulk of the working-classes, at least in the manufacturing districts, of Great Britain. Contentment and happiness reign in all their dwellings. Their furniture and clothing, their carts and horses, their stables and offices, their well-fed flocks and teams, their trim hedges and ditches, indicate the influence of long-established wellbeing. In the beautiful valleys of Upper Austria, the eye of the traveller is gladdened, as in Switzerland and England, by that sure mark of general prosperity—the extension of separate dwellings and well-defined properties over the whole surface of the country. Small green enclosures, neat fences, hedgerows of lofty timber, clean and cheerful white cottages, with their little gardens and trellises of roses, are to be seen on all sides peeping out of the dark band of the circumjacent forest. Though universally educated, they have no pretensions to an intellectual character, and are far inferior to the peasants of Saxony or Scotland in general information; but, on the other hand, they have escaped the vices which elsewhere have followed the unrestrained tasting of the tree of knowledge.

20. Passionately fond of enjoyment, easy in their circumstances, joyous and good-humoured, not disquieted about the future, having no desires beyond their condition, they lead in general a prosperous and happy life, which many nations might envy, who, by straining after ideal and unattainable objects, lose, like the dog in the fable,

the real blessings which Heaven has placed within their reach. Their pleasures, of which they are so fond, are chiefly of the physical kind. They do not feel the ardent desire for elevation which in free communities elevates a few to greatness, and consigns many to disappointment; and they must be changed indeed before a Burns, a Watt, or a Telford arises among them. Yet are these physical enjoyments in a great degree divested of the revolting excesses so common in northern latitudes. They drink amply of their own beer or provincial wine;* but intoxication is rare, quarrelling almost unknown amongst them: rural games, dancing, and social festivity constitute their great delight; and the kindness of their disposition renders these rustic assemblages a scene of equal enjoyment to the spectator as to the persons engaged in them. The vast number of cattle in the monarchy—fully double, in proportion to the population, of those which exist in France—demonstrates in a decisive manner the general wellbeing of the rural population; for a wretched people can never keep animals of comfort.† Nor are more spiritual and ennobling feelings wanting among them: hardly any people in Europe are more generally and passionately fond of music; the graves of the dead are the object of universal and touching attachment; and in no part of the world is patriotic spirit more strongly felt, or have more strenuous and persevering efforts been made in the hour of danger in behalf of their country.‡

* The wine raised in Upper and Lower Austria is worth 10,000,000 florins, or £1,000,000 yearly. About a sixth of the whole surface of Lower Austria is devoted to the cultivation of the vine.—RAYMOND and ROTH, *Statistique de toute la Monarchie Autrichienne*, 1. 254.

† The horned cattle in the Austrian empire are 13,400,000 to a population of 35,000,000: in France they are 6,000,000 among 32,000,000, or just one-half.—HUMBOLDT, *Amérique Méridionale*, vi. 96, 97; and LICHTENSTEIN, *Statistique de l'Autriche*, 180, 181.

‡ These observations apply to Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, the Tyrol, and Carinthia. In Bohemia, Hungary, and Galicia, feudal institutions prevail; the power of the nobles is more considerable, and the condition of the people much less prosperous.

21. The secret of this remarkable wellbeing of the peasantry of Austria, is to be found in the tenure by which land is held, joined to the just and equitable principles on which government has long been administered. Though the holding of landed property is exceedingly various, yet generally the Austrian cultivator is not a tenant in the English sense of the word—that is, a farmer holding at will, or in virtue of a lease; he is a *feuar* in the sense of Scotch law—that is, he has his land for ever on paying the fixed duties to the feudal superior. The lord of the manor retains several considerable privileges, particularly those of hunting, fishing, and holding certain manorial courts, and he receives also certain fines on succession or transmission; but the real right of property remains with the *coloni* as long as they discharge their feudal duties, which are generally commuted on favourable terms into payments in money. Where lands are held by tenants proper, who also are very numerous, the leases are generally for six, eight, or twelve years; and the rules of law in relation to these tenants, or their subtenants, are extremely just towards the cultivator. Though the whole goods brought on the farm are liable to the overlord or principal tenant, the person of the subtenant is only liable to his immediate superior, and the goods can only be attached by execution after judgment obtained, not by previous sequestration or mesne process, as in the British Islands.

22. Humane and ample provision is made for the relief of the destitute; in nothing have the benevolence and justice of the German character been more strikingly evinced than in this particular. No part of Europe, perhaps, abounds so much in charitable endowments as the southern and richer provinces of the Austrian empire; and since the reduction of the monasteries under Joseph II., between 1782 and 1786, rendered unavoidable a system of poor-laws, as was the case in Great Britain from a similar cause in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the attention of government has been strongly and beneficially di-

rected to that object. In every rural community or parish, and in every district of the towns, an institution for the poor, or "*Armen Institut*," is established under the direction of the clergyman of the parish, and an officer termed the "*Armen Vater*," or "*Father of the Poor*." The funds for the distributions made by these functionaries, which are very liberal, are derived from duties on articles of import in burghs, and voluntary contributions in kind or money; and the latter source, as in other agricultural communities, is generally sufficient without any direct assessment on property. Let not philosophy despise, in these humble details, the "short and simple annals of the poor;" in them, more than in the spread of popular power and passions, is the true secret of general prosperity and national attachment to be found. If we desire a proof, contrast the uniform and steadfast loyalty amidst every disaster of the Austrian people, with the turbulent passions and furious hostility of the Irish democracy.

23. Education, as is now well known, is not merely generally, but almost universally, diffused in the German provinces of Austria. Her government has organised a system, in this important particular, different from that which obtains in any other country. Aiming at the gradual and peaceful amelioration of the internal condition of the people, the equalisation of rights in the eye of the law, and the general wellbeing, combined with the tranquillity of the inhabitants, the Austrian statesmen have viewed education as a mighty engine to mould the public mind, and on the due regulation of which the national safety is dependent. In conformity with this view, two fundamental principles have been adopted, which are at the root of their whole system of instruction. The first is, that all education, in whatever rank or grade, whether public or private, from that of the prince in the university to that of the peasant at the parish school, is to be placed under the guidance of the state, and liable to the direction and control of its functionaries; the second, that all education

should be blended with, and mainly founded on, religion. Under this condition, however, the most ample latitude is permitted in regard to the religious creed which is taught. It is only provided that every child shall be registered as belonging to *some* religious persuasion, and that, in his education, the principles of *that religion* are to form a material part of his instruction: but it is immaterial what that religion is; it may be the faith of the Jew or the Protestant, the Greek or the Romanist. The charge of supervision is committed to the clergy of the different persuasions; but they are rigidly compelled to teach those doctrines only which have been put forth by their ruling consistories, and sanctioned by the supreme authority of the state. Thus the difficulty so sorely felt in England, and other free countries, as to what creed is to be taught at schools, is entirely avoided: and, like the Roman Pantheon, the Austrian institutions for education admit within their ample portals all known modifications of religious belief. Education is sedulously recommended by government and its subordinate officers, and a complete system maintained at the public expense, or by extensive funds set apart for that purpose, from the humble grammar-school, through the various lyceums and gymnasiums, to the eight universities which form the highest branch of the establishment.* But it is not compulsory as in Prussia; and hence, though the number of scholars in every part of the country is great, and rapidly increasing, yet it

does not, as it does in some of the provinces of Prussia, embrace all the children capable of receiving tuition.† On the whole, the system of education in Austria is extensive and judicious, and founded on liberal principles; but it is easy to be wise and liberal in the administration of a despotic state. How long would such a system coexist with a free press, democratic legislation, and popular institutions? It is there, and there only, that the real tendency, for good and for evil, of the fruit of the tree of knowledge is to be perceived.

24. The religion of Austria is the Roman Catholic, and the great majority of the people are of that persuasion:‡ but persons of every variety of religious creed are alike eligible to all offices, in the army, law, or civil service; and practically there is no distinction made between them, either in government appointments or the Imperial alliances. The Archdukes Charles and Joseph have both married out of the pale of the Romish church: the former having espoused a Lutheran princess; the latter, first a lady of the Greek church, then one of the Lutheran persuasion. Nine-tenths of the ample estates belonging, in former days, to the Romish church, were confiscated by the Emperor Joseph between 1784 and 1789; and the monastic orders now embrace only nine thousand members instead of eighty thousand, who formerly were maintained by their possessions. But there was this vital distinction between the proceedings of this philosophic reformer and those of our Henry VIII.—he did not bestow the confiscated lands

* These universities are those of Vienna, Prague, Pavia, Lemberg, Gratz, Olmutz, Innsbruck, and Pesth.

† In the whole empire, exclusive of Hungary, Transylvania, and the military frontiers, there are—

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Capable of going to school— | |
| Males, | 1,807,777 |
| Females, | 1,221,894 |
| | 2,528,171 |
| Actually at school— | |
| Males, | 874,840 |
| Females, | 661,284 |
| | 1,536,104 |

That is, about two-thirds of the children capable of being at school are actually at it.—

TURNBULL, ii. 143.—In Transylvania the proportion is still greater: there are 52,698 children at school, out of 64,227 capable of going to it—a proportion greater than in any equal part of the British empire.

‡ In the Austrian empire there are, exclusive of the military class,

| | |
|---------------------------------|------------|
| Roman Catholics, | 24,431,440 |
| Greek Church, United, | 3,375,840 |
| Greek, not United, | 2,722,083 |
| Lutherans, | 1,189,817 |
| Calvinists, † | 2,150,721 |
| Unitarians, | 45,390 |
| Jews, | 613,283 |

24,828,563

—Census of 1834; and TURNBULL, ii. 11; and MALTE BRUN, v. 727, 738.

on rapacious courtiers, or reforming barons, but, with a few trifling exceptions, they were all accumulated into a religious fund (*religionscasse*) in the different provinces, from which provision was thereafter to be made for the spiritual wants and education of the people. So ample were the resources thus acquired, that no difficulty has since been experienced in providing funds for the religious and secular instruction of the rapidly increasing population. The same emperor introduced the equally important change of causing, in defiance of all the remonstrances of the Pope, the prayers and litanies in the churches to be performed in the German tongue, though mass is still celebrated in Latin. Alarmed at so portentous an innovation, the holy father hastened in person to Vienna, to protest against it. He was received with every possible demonstration of respect; but the new system continued, and all classes now enjoy the inexpressible comfort of joining in the tribute of prayer and praise in a language which they can understand. Gentleness and toleration pervade every department of the Austrian church. Though the spiritual authority of the Supreme Pontiff is respectfully admitted, the least attempt at interference with temporal power is steadily resisted; the patronage of livings, as in England, is vested in the crown, the bishops, clerical and lay incorporations, and private individuals; and in no part of Europe is the authority of the crown more perseveringly exerted to correct clerical abuses, or extend spiritual instruction, by ordinances altogether independent of the court of Rome.

25. The Austrian system of government, which has succeeded in so surprising a manner in stilling the jealousies and lulling to sleep the rivalries of so many different nations, is founded on the same principles as the British government in India, and in both countries it has been brought about by the same necessity. It was the weakness of the central power, when compared with the strength of the subject provinces, which compelled the governments of both, in despair at effecting

the subjugation of such extensive possessions by force, or their amalgamation by settlement, to govern them all by an attention to their interests, and a respect for their feelings. The extraordinary spectacle of the Hindoo, the Mussulman, the Parsee, and the followers of Buddha, all uniting in willing civil and military obedience to the sway of the Christian stranger, has its exact counterpart in the Imperial dominions, where the Austrian Catholics, the Bohemian Lutherans, the Polish Jews, and the Hungarian or Transylvanian Greeks, rival each other in devotion and attachment to the Imperial government. One cause alone can explain in either instance such a prodigy, and that is—attention to remote interests on the part of the central authority. Unhappily, such is the selfishness of human nature, that such attention is hardly ever to be looked for except in the weak, with whom it is a matter of necessity. Had Hungary been the ruling power and the seat of government, the Bohemians, the Tyrolese, the Austrians, might have been subdued by force, but they would never have united in willing and cheerful obedience to its sway. The rule of the dominant Hungarians in Hungary, in Bohemia, and Austria, would not have been that of the English in India, but of the English in the West Indies, or, till recent times, in Ireland.

26. Under the influence of this paternal system of government, industry and cultivation have made very considerable progress in the Imperial dominions; but nothing to that of which they are susceptible, and which, to all appearance, they will one day attain. Fully a fourth part of the whole superficial extent of the state is still waste, a large portion of which is susceptible of cultivation; and even that which is under the plough, does not, if Lombardy be excepted, yield on an average a fourth of what the soil could produce. Supposing that two hundred million acres of the Austrian territory, out of the two hundred and fifty-two million of which it consists, are capable of profitable cultivation, this would, at

the rate of an inhabitant to every two acres, maintain a hundred millions of inhabitants, or above three times its present population.* Great as this number is, it is less than is to be found in some parts of Switzerland, where large parts of the territory are sterile and rocky, and there are nevertheless one inhabitant to every acre and a quarter, all living in a degree of ease and affluence almost unparalleled elsewhere in the world.

27. Austria is now not a uniform homogeneous empire, subject to one law, descended of one race, inspired by one national feeling; it is a *confederation of monarchies* united by accident or consent under one common head, but each governed by its own constitution, laws, and customs. The sovereign is emperor of Austria, but he is king of Hungary and Bohemia; and it is in the latter character, and in it only, that he gives his commands to these mighty dependencies. No attempt to alter the constitution, or force changes on the subjects of any of its provinces, is ever made, at least in modern times, by the government of Vienna. Satisfied if they remain peaceable, and contribute their fixed quota to the general defence of the empire, they willingly allow them to enjoy their national institutions, and sedulously attend to every circumstance, even in form, which tends to maintain their national feelings, or diffuse the illusion of real independence. The Emperor can issue orders which are obeyed both in Hungary and Bohemia, but he does so as king of these monarchies; his orders are addressed to their respective chanceries, into which none but natives are

admitted, and they are always in strict conformity with their existing constitutions and laws. Improvements in local legislation or institutions are only introduced when recommended by their established parliaments or legislature, and enforced when sanctioned by their authority. The great secret of government consists in ascertaining, from correct sources, the wants of the various subjects of the empire, and anticipating their complaints by being beforehand with the requisite reforms. "Everything for the people, nothing by them," which Napoleon described as the real secret of good government, has long been the ruling principle of the Austrian administration: their maxim is to prevent the growth of political passion by carefully conserving political and individual interests. Whether such a system is equally advantageous as the popular institutions which make such changes emanate from the direct will of the people, this is not the place to discuss; but it may safely be affirmed that it is the only system of government adapted for a people in the circumstances of the great bulk of the subjects of Austria, or by which its various provinces could be retained in willing obedience to the central government.

28. Although the popular principle enters very little into the general system of the Austrian administration in any of its provinces, yet it is a mistake to suppose, as is frequently done in Great Britain, that the power of the crown is entirely uncontrolled, and that the government is a pure despotism. In every part of the empire there is a provincial State or "*Stande*," composed of the principal inhabitants. Their composition varies in different provinces: but, generally speaking, they are the notables or chief men of the district, not the representatives of any large body in the community. They consist in all cases of four classes: the clergy, the higher nobility, the ordinary landholders, and the burghers. The latter are deputies of cities, but elected by a limited class. They have no legislative power, but they have important powers of administration with-

* Total superficies of the Austrian dominions—

| | Jochs. | Acres. |
|---------------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| 12,167 square German miles, or | 126,878,241 | or 252,000,000 |
| Of which arable, | 33,366,680 | .. 66,733,360 |
| Vineyards, | 2,864,760 | .. 7,709,520 |
| Meadows, orchards, and gardens, | 13,811,708 | .. 27,623,416 |
| Pastures, | 11,014,707 | .. 22,029,414 |
| Forests, | 33,385,015 | .. 66,770,030 |

Total productive surface, 95,432,870 .. 190,865,740

—SPRUNGER'S *Stat. de l'Autriche*; and TCHONBORSKI, *Sur les Finances de l'Autriche*, t. 114.

in their own bounds, and nearly the entire direction of the collection of the revenue, and levying of men within those limits. They make representations also, or remonstrances, on all matters of local concern; and in a government founded on the principle of preventing discontent by anticipating all the reasonable wants of their subjects, these representations are often as effectual as actual legislation, emanating from themselves, would have been. In Hungary, a more thorough representative system prevails, if that system can be called representative which, framed mainly for the interests of the aristocratic body, is entirely rested on their suffrage. In Lombardy, the provincial estates are elected in a still more popular manner—the deputies being proper representatives of the whole inhabitants who pay taxes to a certain amount, and the suffrage being conducted through a double, and sometimes a triple election. But in all the provinces, the duties and powers of these assemblies are the same, and very nearly resemble those which, in ancient times, belonged to the English parliament—viz. the raising and collecting the revenue and levies of men, and representing their wants to the government. The power of taxation and legislation belongs to the crown, to be exercised, however, by and through these local assemblies.

29. The public debt of Austria is very considerable, and will hereafter weigh heavily, like that of England, on the energy and resources of the empire. Great pains have been taken by the Imperial authorities to conceal the magnitude of this burden, and mystify the details published regarding it; but enough exists to show that it is a very serious burden. Part of it is of old standing, but by far the greater proportion was contracted during the disastrous wars of the French Revolution. The addition made during that long and dreadful contest was so considerable, that in 1841 it amounted to little short of 1,000,000,000 florins, (£100,000,000), and the total interest which required to be provided for was no less than 42,817,000 florins, or

£4,287,700 sterling. This, it must be admitted, is a heavy burden upon a nation little abounding in commercial wealth, and the revenue of which has not yet reached £14,000,000 a-year. Yet it is inconsiderable, both in point of absolute and relative amount, to that of Great Britain, which, of a revenue which does not now exceed, from ordinary sources, £50,000,000 sterling, absorbs annually £28,000,000.* And if the resources which ultimately may be rendered available to the two countries be taken into consideration; the balance will incline still more decisively in favour of the Austrian empire. Certainly, to a country possessing a fine climate, thirty-five millions of inhabitants, and more than double the whole area of the British Islands, a public debt of a hundred millions sterling cannot be considered as a very crushing burden, when Great Britain, with half these natural resources, exists and flourishes under eight hundred millions.

30. This national debt of Austria was, as we have said, for the most part contracted during the Revolutionary war: two-thirds of its amount grew up

* Public debt of Austria in 1841.—

| | INTEREST. | |
|---|-------------|------------|
| Paper money, (florins) | 4,343,785 | |
| Old debt from 1792, . | 245,815,000 | 2,458,150 |
| Old debt not covered, . | 2,660,000 | 50,000 |
| Debt to bankers, . | 42,000,000 | 1,850,000 |
| Debt of the Tyrol, Vorarlberg, &c. | 16,295,000 | 675,350 |
| Debt of Lombardy, . | 74,000,000 | 2,980,000 |
| New debt since 1792, . | 444,327,596 | 18,841,514 |
| Debts on lottery, . | 51,273,000 | |
| Due to the bank, . | 89,250,000 | 2,030,000 |
| Floating debt, . | 50,000,000 | 900,000 |
| | 999,964,881 | 29,465,014 |
| To the interest must be added annually— | | |
| For Sinking-fund, (florins) | 8,170,320 | |
| Do. in Lombardy, . | 730,000 | |
| Do. for lottery do., . | 2,873,340 | |
| Annual rents applied to Sinking-fund, . | 1,888,150 | |
| Total Sinking-fund, . | 13,661,810 | |
| Repayment of old debt drawn by lot, . | 4,000,000 | |
| Total in discharge of debt, . | 17,661,810 | |
| Add interest of debt, . | 29,465,014 | |
| Total annual charges of debt, . | 47,126,824 | |

—TCHORBORSKI, l. 48, 49.

during or since that terrible convulsion. Great part of it was contracted in paper money, bearing a forced circulation—the most easy method for the moment, and the most burdensome in the end, which a state can possibly adopt. The difficulty of comprehending the complicated details of Austrian finance arises, in a great degree, from this circumstance, as a considerable part of the debt is due to the holders of this paper money, which government is obliged to recognise as at par to the holders. Its depreciation was often very great during the war; but the regular and stable administration of the Imperial government has uniformly made it resume its proper value on the return of peace. And, notwithstanding the difficulty which the public exchequer has experienced in discharging the interest of their public debt since the peace, they have had the fortitude to keep up a sinking-fund of 10,000,000 florins, (£1,000,000), nearly equal to a third of the interest of the debt; a fact which, contrasted with the ruinous abandonment of the same admirable institution during the same period by Great Britain, illustrates the vital distinction between the foresight of an aristocratic, and the recklessness of a popular government.

31. The foreign policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy of equal extent is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is not required either to uphold the influence of the crown, or to overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army, and those in the civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of government irresistible, and enables the archdukes and Imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of princes of the blood in

other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of government more gentle and paternal than in the Hereditary States; but in the recently-acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint, arising from the exorbitant power of the nobles, and the feudal restrictions on the people, have long existed in the Hungarian and Bohemian dominions. The population of the empire, at the peace of Lunéville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable.

32. Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Lunéville, the leading principle of the Austrian cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the Great Frederick, and had been much increased by the impolitic and ungenerous advantage which the court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the north of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and short-sighted policy on the part of the Prussian government, which, in their rivalry of the Emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition, till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they themselves were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, the Austrian government never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the cabinet of London on every occasion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the Imperial government was to lean for Continental support on the Russian power; and

although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the cabinet of St Petersburg took with Prussia in arranging the matter of German indemnities, yet this temporary estrangement soon ceased upon the arrival of more pressing dangers, and the two nations were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.

33. The leading persons in the administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobentzel, vice-chancellor of state, and Count Colloredo, a cabinet minister, and intimate friend of the Emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him a European reputation, was at the head of the war department; but the powers of government were really in the hands of Cobentzel and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterwards celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe, that in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part.

34. Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth, and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before him, in the improvement,

instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very commencement of his reign, his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit: the punishment of the knout, the use of torture, had been abolished; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code; slavery banished from the royal domains; and the first germ of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, the conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements, which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe. The policy of the cabinet of St Petersburg was unchangeable and unchangeable. Domineering ascendancy over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition; and in the contests and divisions of other powers, too many opportunities occurred of carrying its designs into execution. For above a century past, Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory. Unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoleon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilisation marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made: its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states; and its extension, to all human appearance, is not destined to be arrested till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem.

35. At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great, in 1725, the population of the empire was about 20,000,000, and its revenue 18,000,000 silver rubles, or £3,200,000 sterling: in 1787, its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000,

and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or 20,000,000 *l.* in 1804; its inhabitants were no less than 38,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or £12,000,000; a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain.* The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation tax—a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilisation, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It amounted to five rubles for each freeman, and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors—the object of universal desire in cold climates—produced a large sum: the duties on these articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or £3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that comparatively infant state, the expenses of government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great that its finances were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory; and experience has demonstrated that, without large foreign subsidies, Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe.

36. The army, raised by conscription at the rate of so many in each hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above three hundred thousand men. But, from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above seventy thousand

men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper, and the actual force which it can bring into the field; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amidst loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched; the hospital service still miserably defective: but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents on the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half-a-guinea, that of the Cossacks to eight-and-sixpence a year; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Bennigsen retired towards Königsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although ninety thousand men thundered in

* The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles; but from the great emission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half-a-crown English money.—BIGNON, ii. 282.

close pursuit, that the general was compelled to soothe the dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased; and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amidst the icy lakes and drifted snow of Eylau.

37. Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had, immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of decorum, and remained throughout an attached friend to that princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence, joined to that of Prince Czartorinski, his early friend and adviser, a distinguished noble of the same nation, his marked regard for the Sarmatian race through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there, and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzoff were his first advisers. But though attached from the outset to England, to whose

* "Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment: "the enemy are already in possession."—"Prince Potemkin must look to that, for he gave us the order: come on, Russians!" was the reply, and the whole marched forward and perished, the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—SIR ROBERT WILSON'S *Polish War*, p. 2.

influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his admiration for the First Consul; and, still influenced by the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the French project of elevating Prussia at the expense of Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederick-William, who had ascended the throne about the same age, and only shortly before himself; and this was soon ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a little to determine the subsequent course of events on the great theatre of Europe.

38. In proportion as the time approached when his great projects against Austria were to be carried into execution, Napoleon redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that admiral to Ferrol, had been received, completely produced the desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of the Emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment come when she could safely commence hostilities, even before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn and invading the Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard, and appear before the arrival of Napoleon, with the whole forces of the empire, on the banks of the Rhine. But she grievously miscalculated, in so doing, the activity and resources of the French Emperor, and soon found to her cost that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played

his game as effectually as if he had intentionally prostrated his resources before his ambition.

39. The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were eighty thousand men; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. Precipitance in forcing on hostilities before their troops were all arrived, was the ruin of this campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the Elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite scale. Public spirit, in the Imperial dominions was strongly roused, and the people were prepared to make any sacrifices in defence of their country; but they had little of the self-confidence or hope which, even more than physical power, constitutes the strength of an army. The soldiers went into the field resolute and devoted, but rather with the resignation of martyrs than the step of conquerors. Their repeated defeats had rendered them nearly desperate of success. The army was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience. What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standards of Napoleon? In vain the British government

* Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for a commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility, in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign; and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr Pitt, that he wrote to the cabinet of Vienna, recommending that officer to the command of the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations; and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoleon.—*NAPOLÉON IN MOSCOW*, II. 432.

transmitted to the cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement, obtained from the imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march; and asked, whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act? With ill-founded self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine.

40. From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoleon had been indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his envoy at Berlin, were, to represent to the Prussian government, "that there was not a moment to lose; that it was indispensable an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that, during the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an open declaration against Austria, or at least a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the Emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might turn their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the Emperor offered the aid of eighty thousand men, amply provided with everything necessary for a campaign."† The answer of the Prussian cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable. They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone provide against the rest of the Continent

† Instructions to Duroc, 24th August 1805.—*BICKON*, §. 334. These instructions, written the very day on which Napoleon received accounts of the retreat of Villeneuve to Cadiz, and when he dictated to Duroc the march of the grand army from Boulogne across Germany (*ante*, Chap. XXXIX. § 80), are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

such a barrier as would insure the maintenance of general tranquillity.

41. The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended, immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian government, their temporising policy reappeared; they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amidst all their anxiety for the acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoleon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his own account, and that the Empire of France and kingdom of Italy should receive no addition." But the terrors of the Prussian cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities. Matters were in this doubtful state, when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor Alexander, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian Majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for the Russian troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederick William instantly took fire; and he replied by a decided negative against the passage of the Muscovites through any part of his dominions; but expressed his willingness to meet his angust neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war; a proposition to which Napoleon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit."

42. While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French

troops were in full march from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoleon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combinations of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment, were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses were provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck.* The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope: the exercise and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years, in their camps on the shores of the ocean, having enabled them to overcome, with ease, fatigues which would have been deemed insurmountable at that period by any other soldiers of Europe.† Such was the vigour with which the soldiers were animated, that out of fifteen thousand native French who were in Marmont's corps, only nine men were left behind, in a march of twenty days from Holland to Würzburg; a fact unparalleled.

* See the orders, addressed by Napoleon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in DUMAS, xiii. 300, 302. *Pièces Just.*—Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven, at eight, at midnight; but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

† The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

leled, perhaps, in modern war. The troops of the other corps arrived at the places assigned them in the heart of Germany, after twenty-five or thirty days' journey from the coasts of the Channel, a distance of one hundred and fifty leagues, without the rest of a day, and with scarcely any sick or stragglers falling off from their array.

43. The army which Napoleon thus directed against the Imperialists was the most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. It was divided into eight corps under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the Empire. Then for the first time Napoleon gave it the name of the **GRAND ARMY**: a name like that of the Old Guard, which will be immortal in history. It consisted of 212,000 men, of whom 187,000 were French, and included 38,000 cavalry and 340 guns; and far exceeded, in discipline, efficiency, and equipment, any armament ever seen in modern times.* The plan of Napoleon was to direct the corps of Ney, Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guard and the cavalry under Murat, to Donauwörth and Dillingen; Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neuburg; and Bernadotte, joined to the Bavarians, upon Ingolstadt; while Augereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest, received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of the Tyrol and the Grisons.

* The composition of this army was as follows:—

| | COMMANDERS. | MEN. |
|--------------|--------------------------|--------|
| 1st Corps, | Bernadotte, . . . | 17,000 |
| 2d .. | Marmont, . . . | 20,000 |
| 3d .. | Davoust, . . . | 26,000 |
| 4th .. | Soult, . . . | 40,000 |
| 5th .. | Lannes, . . . | 18,000 |
| 6th .. | Ney, . . . | 24,000 |
| 7th .. | Augereau, . . . | 14,000 |
| 8th .. | Murat (cavalry), . . . | 22,000 |
| 9th, Guards, | Mortier and Bessières, . | 7,000 |
| 10th, Bava- | rians, Wrede, . . . | 25,000 |

212,000

Besides 50,000 in Italy, under Massena, and 20,000 in reserve under St Cyr.—JOMINI, ii. 104; DUMAS, xiii. 17, 18; THIERS, vi. 70, 71.

This far-famed forest consists of a ridge of rocky hills, and plateaus with precipitous sides, which lie between the valley of the Rhine and the sources of the Danube. They are for the most part covered with firs, the sombre hue of which has given its name to the region; and the roads which traverse it lie in the bottom of deep ravines, shut in generally between precipices of considerable elevation. The Black Forest, as it lies directly between France and Austria, has, in all wars between the two countries, occupied a conspicuous place in military operations; but on this occasion its importance was in a great measure superseded by more extended operations. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to show that Napoleon's movements were calculated to envelop altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm; for while the bulk of the French, under Napoleon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donauwörth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Augereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible, be concealed; and the despotic power of the French Emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately imposed on all parts of the empire; the post was everywhere stopped; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne.

44. The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march; but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoleon was not a man to be restrained by such an ob-

stacle; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. "You will traverse its territories," said he; "avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions were punctually obeyed; and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory, and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced guard on the Danube, between Neuburg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The masterstroke was delivered; the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm.

45. Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage upon their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian cabinet, that the alliance with France was based neither on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage; that it had been contracted by Napoleon only for purposes of ambition; that he neither respected nor feared their power: and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning their own independence. The weight of these considerations was much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation who, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in her power; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories had been sufficient to

avert the march of the Russian troops, although the cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance with the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian cabinet; while the more generous and warlike party of the capital, at the head of which were the Queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation, and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circumstance which had at length opened the eyes of government to the ruinous consequences of the temporising policy which they had so long pursued.

46. All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoleon: the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded; and three powerful armies of observation were formed,—one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower Saxony of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick; and one in Westphalia of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse. This impolitic step of Napoleon is linked with many important consequences. It produced that burst of angry feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806. It is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which, in their ultimate results, produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French Empire.

47. While the precipitance of Napoleon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of twelve thousand men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of double that amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be further reinforced by the German Legion in the service of England; an addition which would raise it to nearly forty thousand men; an army, it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in a united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders. Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities might have been spared to itself and to Europe! More fortunate in the south than the north of Europe, Napoleon at this period concluded a convention with the court of Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona; but the Pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession; and both parties protracted the discussions with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations. These negotiations at either extremity of the line of operations might have been attended with important effects upon the final issue of the war, if the crisis had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoleon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany, which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combination formed by the English and Russian cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.

48. The Emperor arrived at Strassburg on the 27th September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced: Austria has passed the Rhine, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced guard of the great people. You may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure; but whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself:—"Bavarian soldiers! I come to put myself at your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The house of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors, who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour; and feel assured that after the first battle I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people—You are worthy to combat in the ranks of the Grand Army."

49. The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually, in a defensive position around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in a previous campaign. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoleon in turning his flank with the French left wing, and

interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by means of a whole French corps diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Bavarians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed the river at Donauwörth, Neuburg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the Austrian line of communication with Vienna; and by the middle of October, Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsburg, directly on the road from the Imperial headquarters to the Hereditary States; while Napoleon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon their right flank.

50. Struck as by a thunderbolt by this formidable apparition in his rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian general had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, hastily threw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and, grouping his masses round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffenberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Inn-

spruck, to join him by forced marches, and, as soon as he arrived, despatched him to support the corps of Keimayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donauwörth.

51. The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Wertingen, four leagues from Donauwörth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffenberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly waited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the Imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mount Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate; in vain Nansouty with the heavy dragoons charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down rank after rank of their assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square; the Austrians, worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffenberg succeeded in forming a smaller square, which effected its retreat into some

marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse: but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery, remained in the hands of the enemy.

52. Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion, appeared to the reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French, as it was depressing to the Imperial soldiers. Napoleon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action, he repaired in person to Zusmarshausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving; and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Exelmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer, who, attended by only two dragoons, had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists, the night after the action, as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the Imperial Guard. Never did sovereign in modern times understand so completely the art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers, by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in whatever rank of the army; and it was as much owing to this circumstance, as to the greatness of his military genius, that the superior successes of the grand army, which he commanded in person, compared with those at a distance under the orders of his lieutenants, were owing.*

53. While the powerful advanced

* Generosity, as well as excellence of military conduct, attracted the notice of the Emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer on the point of perishing in the waves of the river. Forget-

guards of the grand army—viz. the corps of Ney on the left bank of the Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus engaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg; the Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the same place; Davoust, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived at Aichach, all directly in the rear of the Imperialists: while the corps of Keimigayer, almost enveloped in such immense masses, deemed itself fortunate in being able to effect its retreat, by the bridge of Neuburg, into Bavaria and the city of Munich. Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital, while the troops of Marmont and Davoust were moved in the same direction, with the view of forming a powerful army of observation, which might repel any attempt on the part of the Russians, or the Austrian reserves from the Hereditary States, to disengage the army of Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces. But information soon arrived that the Russians were at such a distance as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and therefore Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced guards on the left bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him, and regain Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army.

54. Mack, instead of falling back to

ting what he had suffered at his hand, the brave man plunged in and saved him. The Emperor caused him to be brought into his presence, and after publicly eulogising his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of the Legion of Honour.—Buxton, iv. 365, 366.

the Tyrol, which was the only way of retreat that now really remained to him, and where he might have formed a junction with the troops in that province, and in the north of Italy, and formed a mass fully 180,000 strong in all, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the north-east, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier, and thus preserve the communication with the Russians, which was of such importance to ulterior operations. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsburg. Meanwhile the defence of Ulm was intrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but with the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants from the vicinity, in strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed: it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Günzburg. The latter post being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They were there attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces, and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of the town with the loss of above two thousand men. Disconcerted by this check, and despairing from the vast accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm; and Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle on the north and east, within which the Austrians in that city were enveloped.

55. At this time Murat, under whose orders the corps of Ney had been placed, expecting an attack upon his

position on the right bank of the Danube, directed Ney to cross over by Günzburg and Elchingen to his support. That marshal did so, leaving, however, on the left bank his advanced guard, consisting of Dupont's division at Albeck, and that of Barragray d'Hilliers at Langenau. In their advance towards Ulm, Dupont's division encountered a body of Austrians, twenty thousand strong, posted in an admirable situation at Hasslach, and supported by a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far advanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy, which was more than double their own, that retreat was impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these circumstances, Dupont took the most audacious, often in such situations the most prudent course. He vigorously assailed the enemy, and, in the evening, the arrival of successive reinforcements in some degree restored the equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and retaken six times during the course of the day. But although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired to Albeck, leaving, indeed, a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him, as a set-off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners, taken, during the terrible strife in the village, from the Imperial infantry. This glorious combat was of the most vital importance to Napoleon's operations, and, in fact, was the immediate cause of their extraordinary success; for, by barring the road to Bohemia, it threw the Austrians back on the beleaguered position of Ulm, round which the French

forces were now drawing in every direction.

56. The honour of the Austrian arms was in some degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmingen. The following day, Mack ordered Werneck to follow up Dupont with his division, while Laudon, to cover Werneck's right flank, was pushed on to Elchingen. At the same time he directed Jellachich to march with his division in all haste to Memmingen, to reinforce the garrison of that place, and keep open his communications with the Tyrol. That general, however, arrived too late, and, finding the town already in the hands of the enemy, and fearing that, if he retreated towards Ulm, he would be cut off, he threw himself into the mountains of the Tyrol. On the 11th October, Soult was detached by Napoleon, with his whole corps, from Augsburg, against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combats which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons; and then began that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large bodies which, during this campaign, more even than their numerous disasters, tarnished the honour of the Imperial armies. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper Suabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while the fourth took post on the south-east, before the ramparts of Ulm, where they were shortly after joined by the corps of Marmont and Lannes. On the same day, Napoleon, with the Imperial Guard, advanced from the neighbourhood of Augsburg to Burgau, and established his headquarters there for the night; while

Ney, on the north, completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed: a hundred thousand French were grouped around the ramparts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep dejection, were accumulated together.

57. In advancing to Burgau, at the head of his Guards, Napoleon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful; the snow already fell in heavy flakes; the cold was intense; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but with provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furrowed its surface. Insensible to the severity of the weather, Napoleon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight, as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory, if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which as much resemble the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions, as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the peculiar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention. No sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides; and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own

exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them.

58. While the formidable legions of Napoleon were thus closing round the Imperial array, the most stormy debates were taking place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only chance of safety which was left, was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage towards either Bohemia or the Tyrol: on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted. But the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the Imperial house, overpowered every other consideration: and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the Archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains. In a military point of view, there could be no doubt that the only plan left was to have retired to the Tyrol, where, by drawing together all his forces, Mack might still have assembled 170,000 combatants; but such a measure would have been an entire departure from the orders of the Aulic Council, which contemplated nothing of the kind, and would have required for its adoption a general wielding the despotic powers of Frederick or Napoleon.

59. At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoleon was preparing for a general attack, on the following day, on the position which they

occupied. He ordered Ney to proceed to Elchingen, and there cross the Danube, so as to regain his original position on the left bank, and advance along it towards Ulm; and he was to be supported, if necessary, by Lannes and Murat. His army would thus form a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were everywhere in presence of each other. Early on the following morning, Napoleon himself ascended to the chateau of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who, at the head of sixteen thousand men, was commencing an attack on the bridge and abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, fifteen thousand strong, with forty pieces of cannon, under Landon, had there established themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a large convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the Austrians on the preceding day; but the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered; and they still had a strong advanced guard on the southern bank of the river.

60. Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. He had, on several late occasions, had warm altercations with Murat, whose temper, naturally warm, had been rendered doubly arrogant by his recent elevations. On one of these occasions, when Ney had been explaining to him his plan of attack, he had replied that he

could not be troubled with such long designs, and that for his part he never formed his plan but in presence of the enemy. Stung by the undeserved reproach, Ney resolved to outdo even that fearless cavalier in personal daring. Dressed in full uniform, he was everywhere to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the Imperial outposts on the south bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and, hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements; while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on their right, from whence they enfiladed the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery, made good their ground, and, though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable. The French, now in full possession of the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over.* Already their cavalry were sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing

* It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen, was taken. He exposed his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death; but fate reserved him for greater destinies, and a more melancholy death.—*JOURNAL*, &c. 118.

their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of fifteen hundred killed and wounded, and two thousand prisoners.

61. The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of themselves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the house of Hapsburg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at Elchingen, the Archduke disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which, consisting of five thousand cavalry, he set out on the road to Geislingen and Aalen, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim: the two were to unite at Nördlingen. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed between Albeck and Langenan, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach; and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously possessed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred prisoners from their weary columns; but having been joined by the Archduke, at the head of the cavalry, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy.

62. With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose safety depended on the celerity of its movements, with five hundred waggons, heavily laden. These were speedily charged by the French horse, and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied. Despairing, after these disas-

ters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the Archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donauwörth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a-day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers, the Archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmühl, and, by Riedenburg and Ratisbon, gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers. But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety, were surrounded in the neighbourhood of Nördlingen, at Trochtelfingen, by the cavalry of Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.

63. While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoleon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, which has since become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and La Tuileries, which command it in every part. These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the eva-

uation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack, after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign: but the ramparts were incomplete; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the Emperor, who had established his headquarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amidst torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack. Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of La Tuileries; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and death into every part of the city.

64. Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoleon beheld Ulm, crowded with troops, stretched out within half cannon-shot at his feet, while the positions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little more than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Wernau, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to capitulate, and, returning himself to his headquarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by his allies. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. If you do not grant them eight days. I

can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place." "Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur. "Ah! Marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource!" Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoleon's headquarters, to give an account of his unsuccessful mission.

65. Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoleon sent back Ségur, with a written ultimatum, granting the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days, or death!" replied the Austrian general, and at the same time he published a proclamation,* in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who should mention the word "surrender!" Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme, when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the Emperor and his brilliant staff. The Emperor began the conversation, by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the ex-

ample of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison, four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would involve the Imperial army in the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not reached the Bohemian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen.† The prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack, fallen, suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender. On the 19th the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up, and the whole army to lay down its arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian armies.

66. These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms; but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation. Napoleon, to whom every hour was precious, and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters, at

* The proclamation was in these terms:—"In the name of his Majesty, I render responsible, on their honour, and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word 'surrender,' or who should think of anything but the most obstinate defence—a defence which cannot require to be prolonged for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced guards of an Imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days; and as to trying an assault, it could only be done by little detachments: our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; nothing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time."—Dum. xiii. 87.

† "You expect the Russians?" said Napoleon: "Do you really, then, not know that they have not yet reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not fully informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers at least will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have too often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war: after the conduct of your government, I have no measures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me; I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand were here, I could trust him; but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube; but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your general; I will grant him no other: the officers alone can be allowed to return into Austria: the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer his delays, the worse will be his ultimate fate."—Bour. vii. 31, 32.

Eichingen, and there so completely bewildered him, by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops in the blockade, amounting to nearly seventy thousand men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations.

67. In consequence of this new article in the capitulation, a spectacle took place on the 20th unparalleled in modern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoleon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence, forming part of the heights on the north of the city. For five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay, Lichtenstein, were there—names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones which followed. Napoleon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: “Gentlemen,” said he, “war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother the Emperor of Germany,—let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember that there

are limits to all empires, however powerful. The idea that the house of Loorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is ships, colonies, and commerce which I desire; and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me.” Thus spoke Napoleon on the 20th October 1805: on the day following, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France, sustained on the field of Leipsic.*

68. Little anticipating these calamities, the Emperor enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him. The Imperial soldiers, amidst all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been overcome: as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero who filled the world with his renown. But when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them.

* As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoleon said to the Austrian generals,—“It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war; but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Their present alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed.” At this moment, a general officer repented aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. “You must have little respect for yourselves,” said Napoleon to his troops, with an air of marked displeasure, “to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune.”—SAYARY, I. 101, 102.

and without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen: never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never their devotion to the Emperor so unbounded; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets."*

69. Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital, Napoleon sent to the conservative senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he said:—"Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the Grand Army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without further effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the Emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say,

* During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the Emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he hardly ever undressed, and was almost incessantly on horseback; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsburg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception; he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants."—BIGNON, iv. 376.

"The people have done theirs." Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Würtemberg, and twenty-five thousand muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after, he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated, and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies.†

70. The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian government, on General Mack; he was in

† "Soldiers of the Grand Army! In fifteen days we have concluded a campaign! We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. The army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; of that whole army not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers! I announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained those great advantages without incurring any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, this great result has not weakened us by the loss of fifteen hundred men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your Emperor—to your patience in undergoing fatigues—to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amidst his customary exaggeration, there was much truth in this proclamation.—RAPP, 47, 48.

consequence subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years! Upon the conclusion of the war, Napoleon interceded for him, but in vain. Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoleon; and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful surrender of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the Imperial government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the army; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the Imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed. In the memoir in his own vindication, which he laid before the council of war by which he was tried, he ascribed all the misfortunes which followed to this sad necessity, and positively asserted that the division of his forces, from which such disastrous results followed, was imposed on him by the council of war at Ulm against his will.* It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoleon's legions were closing around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in afterwards capitulating without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoleon; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared

with an assembly of officers, which, it is proverbially known, never adopts a bold resolution; and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the creditable custom of laying down their arms, on the first reverse, in large bodies.

71. While these stupendous events were paralysing the Imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and was already fiercely contested on the Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two principal armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men, with no enemy whatever to combat, in the Tyrol, which might on several occasions have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and south of its mountains. While Mack, with eighty thousand men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the Grand Army, of double that strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above ninety thousand, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige, in presence of Massena, who had only fifty thousand; and twenty thousand more were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front than the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.

72. No sooner was the cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoleon's troops across Germany, and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Suabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince, accordingly, restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions

* *Thiers, Consulat et l'Empire*, vi. 118.

on the Adige, retained his forces on the left bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Massena in his front—to depress the spirits of his soldiers, by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes; and all this for no good purpose, as, before his reinforcements could emerge from the gorges of the Tyrol, the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had died as captives before the French Emperor.

73. The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself—the town properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs on the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river; and the Archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Suabia to a melancholy defensive, was strengthening with field-works the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt, in former campaigns, when Massena, stimulated by the orders of the Emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations. He accordingly denounced the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th October, and in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire command of the river at that point.

74. At midnight, on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, the French attacked a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent

cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists. But this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers. Some cast themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks, and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced; and, under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *île-de-pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution, on the part of the French general: it cost the Austrians two thousand men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number.

75. Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the Archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts, intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoleon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the further advance of the French troops. Massena remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th October; but, having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoleon in the plains of Suabia, he re-

solved to resume the offensive. But how to assail seventy thousand men, strongly intrenched, with a force not amounting to fifty thousand, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless he resolved upon making the attempt. The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening of the 28th, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he made his dispositions for attack. To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived that, by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it. Massena himself, with two divisions, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn the Austrian left, and Molitor, with the left, was to gain the mountains and threaten their right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Massena, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona, while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige.

76. On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre, issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the Imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all the endeavours of the latter were unsuccessful; and though his movements and threaten-

ing aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the lower Adige, the contest was almost confined to the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the Imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery; while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took place round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Massena and the Archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the French left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit; but they were there instantly cut to pieces by the point-blank discharge of the Imperial cannon, rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage; for if the French had broken several columns of Imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners, they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists.

77. On the following morning, Massena renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river; but at daybreak they

were reinforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dikes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Seen a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chiavico del Christo, which in this quarter formed the key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General Nordmann, who commanded the Austrians, saw all the cannoners killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterwards one of the most distinguished of the Imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the Archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige.*

78. But notwithstanding this success, the Archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the intelligence regarding the disasters in Germany, which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the empire was laid open, and it was necessary to hasten to the protection of the menaced capital. The

better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward into the mountains toward the French host, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the lake of Garda. Alarmed at this movement, Massena stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the Archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to defile towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments which had been so obstinately contested, they found them stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rearguard.

79. Massena's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rearguard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of the troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, the Archduke resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bacchiglione, the stream of which was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rearguard, in battle array, the whole of the 3d November, and, on the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rearguard, with heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Massena, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river,

* We have the best possible evidence, that at Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated upon the whole to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had gained considerable advantages over Massena at Caldiero;" in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The Archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches.—*NAPOLEON IN MONTH. li. 108 and 116, and Mass. viii. 492.*

having afforded, by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march, on the other troops and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in the presence of a pursuing enemy, commanded by such an officer as Massena, secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration.

80. From Vicenza the Archduke retired by forced marches through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach, to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Salzburg, or to proceed by the direct route through Laybach toward Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army, rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skillfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen waters of that stream, as well as the Piave and the Isonzo, could afford, he conducted his march with such ability, that though it lay through narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor were the spirits of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams which make their way to the great artery of the Danube.

81. Meanwhile Napoleon, whose genius never appeared more strongly than

in the vigour with which, by separate columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian troops, without neglecting any of the precautions which he never failed to adopt to insure his communications and provide for his supplies. Great magazines were formed at Ulm, Augsburg, and on the Lech, and troops stationed in positions so fortified as to be beyond the reach of a *coup-de-main*. On the 24th of October he arrived at Munich, where he was received with every imaginable demonstration of joy and a general illumination attested the universal transports. Augsburg was made the grand dépôt of the army; while the leading corps, under Bernadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in ceaseless march towards the Hereditary States. Speedily the Isar was passed: the French eagles were borne in exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Braunau. At the same time, Marshal Ney, who had remained at Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th October, received orders to move with his whole corps upon the Tyrol, in order to clear the vast natural fortress which that district composes of the enemy's forces; while Augereau's corps, which, having broken up from Brest, had latest come to the scene of action, and had recently crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was pushed forward by forced marches to menace the western frontier of that romantic province.

82. While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides upon the Austrian monarchy, the cabinet of Vienna did their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles, to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacu-

ate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the Emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna,* set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at the headquarters of the latter, the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Keimnayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such inconsiderable forces, to withstand Napoleon at the head of a hundred and fifty thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across the

line of march, so as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching under Bennigsen and the Grand-duke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.

83. But while everything seemed thus to smile upon Napoleon in the south of Germany, a storm was arising in the north which menaced him with destruction. The cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of a French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation; it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved, which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that, by keeping aloof, she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her terri-

* "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms. To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to concentrate in his own hands all the interests upon which depends the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace, which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new constitution which Germany received after the peace of Lunéville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our counsels. But the sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, whilst his secret ally, the Elector Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the

King of Prussia at the very moment that he had given the most solemn promises to respect it. and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy has arisen from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undecayed. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare everything to save what must be saved,—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From the spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects, I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, everything that is great and good; but above all things unanimity, and a quick, firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered, to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe, and the security of thrones and of nations."—*Ann. Reg.* 1805, 713.

tory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Germany; and hitherto success had, in a surprising manner, attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already been discreditable. So far from having increased the respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the Great Frederick, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers: they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submissions; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the cabinet was violently shaken. The King openly inclined to hostile measures, while the indignation of the nation knew no bounds. Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehement and generous, character could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the Queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the great maintainer of the temporising system, rapidly sank, and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs.

84. Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the King to embrace a more manly and courageous policy. Under the action of so many concurring causes, the French influence

rapidly declined. Duroc left the capital on the 2d November, without having been able to obtain an audience for some days previously, either from the King or Emperor; and on the day following, a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier against the ambition of the French Emperor. By this convention it was stipulated, that the treaty of Lunéville was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all the acquisitions which France had since made were to be wrested from it; Switzerland and Holland were to be restored to their independence, and, without overturning the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely agreed that its throne and that of France were never to be occupied by the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted with the notification of this convention to Napoleon, with authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation, but in case of refusal, to declare war, with an intimation that hostilities would be commenced on the 15th December.

85. The conclusion of this tion was followed by a scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was ultimately attended by consequences of the highest importance to the destinies of Europe. When they signed it, both the potentates were fully aware of the perilous nature of the enterprise on which they were adventuring; as the Archduke Anthony had arrived two days before with detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats around Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the Queen conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a bond more likely to be durable than the mere alliances of cabinets with each other. This was to bring them together at the tomb of the Great Frederick, where it was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The Emperor, who was desirous of visiting

the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torchlight to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the Emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were embarked. A few hours after, Alexander departed for Galicia, to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune, and deeply checkered by disaster, was yet destined to be brought to so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe.

86. It would have been well for the common cause, if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But after the departure of the Emperor, the old habit of temporising returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to elapse without any operations being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from Potsdam till the 14th November; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue, without interruption, his advance to Vienna; while eighty thousand disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank—a force amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr Pitt, could not prevail

on the government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently the cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities, forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken—that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the Emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoleon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction.

87. There were not wanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from continuing longer their adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam, soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tömmelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are in presence of each other," said he, "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoleon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the Allies, and that a strong body should threaten Napoleon's communications with the Rhine, in order to compel him to divide his forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Rüchel, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council without having come to any determination.

88. But though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoleon was not without very serious cause for anxiety in the north of Germany. A combined force of

British, Russians, and Swedes, thirty thousand strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover, and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance—a sure proof of a secret understanding between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the British government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the house of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoleon contrived to paralyse the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the *Moniteur* of the formation of a powerful army of the north, of which his brother Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the Emperor himself.

89. On his right flank, Marshal Ney was more successful in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him from all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterwards the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered.* The imperious necessity to which the Austrian government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from the Tyrol for the protection of the capital, prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the Imperial troops, Napoleon ordered

* See *infra*, Chap. LVIII.

Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn right upon Innspruck; while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzburg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenenthal, by the same capital, and menaced Kufstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Deroy, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzburg from that of the Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amidst a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kufstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the Imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolese levies were shut up under the cannon of Kufstein, which was soon blockaded.

90. Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia*, a celebrated mountain intrenchment which commands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innspruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could to all appearance be assailed. An attack in front, though supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was repulsed with very heavy loss. Success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions,

he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in making himself master of the fort of Leutasch, in the rear of the intrenchments; from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them* on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful: securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops, who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and of their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders: in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once; as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable: a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which the Tyrolese had no defence, rendered it impossible either to gain the works or stand to the guns. A panic seized the garrison; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides that of a mountain barrier hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of fifteen hundred prisoners.

91. The immediate trophy of this victory was the capture of Innspruck, with sixteen thousand stand of arms.*

* An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had, in the campaign of 1798, lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal of that town, one of its officers beheld them among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolese. Instantly the intelligence spread that their lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans, hasting in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the former companions of their glory. — BIGNON, iv. 391.

The whole northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned; General Jellachich, who commanded in the western part of the Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch; while the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the valley of the Inn and took post upon the Brenner, in the hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the Hereditary States. It was too late, however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with five thousand men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumph of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Klagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince de Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with six thousand men near Nauders and Fingsternunz, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of the Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surrounded, and joining the garrison left in Venice.

92. Considerable success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he surprised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared; Bassano was passed; and the wearied troops were joyfully wending their way across the level fields to the shores of the Laguna, when they were met by St Cyr, who commanded the forces stationed to observe Venice, and completely defeated at Castel Franco. Dispirited by this disaster, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still five thousand strong, was obliged to lay

down its arms. At the same time the fortress of Kufstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to march back to the Hereditary States, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, garrisoned by twenty-five thousand regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzbouurg to co-operate with Massena, who was approaching the same quarter, against the Archduke Charles; while Augereau withdrew to Ulm, to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.

93. It was not inability to defend its passes which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the House of Austria had long been conspicuous. It was the pressing danger of the heart of the empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoleon's progress down the valley of the Danube became every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up; forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Mühldorf, the ramparts of Braunau, armed as they were with artillery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn was crossed by the French battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable, that the French Emperor gave immediate orders for its conver-

sion into the grand depot of the army. Meanwhile Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the advanced guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach, a more stubborn resistance near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the enemy with whom they had now to contend, hardly retarded the march of the invaders an hour: the determined opposition of the Austrians near the foot of the mountains, at the bridge of Steyer over the Enns, only delayed Marshal Davoust with the right wing of the army a day; and at length the French headquarters were established on the shores of the blue waters of the Traun at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.

94. The Emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops, occasioned, to give a new organisation to his army, with a view to the surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Launes, which moved in advance of him on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube; and such directions were given to the numerous corps on its right bank, as were best calculated to insure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles, and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that the Emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the north, under the command of his brother Louis, composed

of six divisions: a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany. At the same time a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times, the Marquis LA ROMANA, which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow toward the same direction.*

95. At Linz the Emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice with a view to a general peace. The ruined condition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were placed, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian cabinet over their long-continued jealousy of France. Napoleon received the envoy courteously; but, after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that proposals should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the Emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and the Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions. If these terms were not agreed to, he declared he would continue, without an hour's intermission, his march towards Vienna.

96. These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the Allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of

their reserves; while a strong rear-guard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rear-guard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat; in which, although the Allies were ultimately forced to retreat before the increasing multitude of the enemy,* they long stood their ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St. Pölten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the French left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right; while the Emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the Imperial Guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the Allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to withstand such formidable forces; either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that, by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would

* A remarkable instance of courage occurred here on the part of a French cannoneer. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high-road, had seized a battery of horse-artillery which was firing grape at them, within half musket-shot, and saved most of the gunners. One of them, however, though wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and putting the match to the touch-hole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen, with such decisive effect that the whole squadron turned and fled.—DUMAS, xiii. 303, 304.

both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements, advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality.

97. Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Lintz and Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded for some days at least in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St Polten, the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced. No force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry, eagerly pushing forward, on the following day reached Burkersdorf, within four leagues of the capital.* About the same time Davoust, while toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and wooded Alpine ridges which form the romantic southern valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rear-guard of Meerfeld, which, unsuspecting of evil, was pursuing its course in a southerly direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of Marmont. Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through

the centre, and thrown into such confusion, that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring woods and mountains, leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces of cannon in the hands of the enemy. Napoleon himself took up his headquarters at the magnificent abbey of Molk, the romantic domes of which, overhanging the river, form so striking a feature in the landscape, and where he found great supplies of provisions and resources for the wounded.

98. But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoleon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befell his forces on the left. Murat, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French Emperor; who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger attended those on the left bank from any unguarded movement, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which he had received, which were to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind, the columns on the right bank, was intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops, which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia. As he was eagerly emerging from the defiles of Dürrenstein, between the Danube and the rocky hills which there approach the river, beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur-de-Lion was once immured, he came upon the Russian rear-guard under Miloradovich, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery. The French general instantly commenced the attack at break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the

* When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chasseurs, which he commonly wore, Napoleon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped and inquired into the cause of her lamentations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the Emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged, and my gardener killed, by his soldiers."—"Your name?" replied he—"De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marbeuff, formerly governor of Corsica."—"I am charmed," rejoined Napoleon, "to have the means of serving you. I am the Emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chasseurs of the Guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with.—*RAPP*, 54, 55.

formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm; fresh troops arrived on both sides: the grenadiers fought man to man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff was approaching. This force, ably conducted by the Austrian general, Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had, by a circuitous march through the hills, reached Mortier's rear, and already occupied Dürrenstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal was fully engaged in front, his retreat was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army.

99. Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten its march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division of Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant can-

nonade from the further extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. It proved to be the division of Dupont, which, fully aware of the imminent danger of the general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them.

100. This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants, in the dark or by the light of the moon, continued the strife; the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of fire-arms, while the ancient Gothic towers which once held in chains the hero of the crusades, were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upwards of two-thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded his sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to get on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave marshal refused to leave his comrades.* This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with dauntless courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, while the latter now in his turn found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grape-shot, at the mo-

* "No," said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to command such brave soldiers should esteem himself too happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grape-shot; we are almost at Dürrenstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—DUMAS, xiv. 14.

ment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's division. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amidst the cries of "France! France! you have saved us!" the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades.

101. This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoleon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men, which in so mighty a host was of little consequence; that of the Allies had amounted to two-thirds of that number; and his could easily be repaired. It was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source of his annoyance. Mortier on the day after the battle esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutusoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated, but out-generaled; and the Muscovites, in their first serious engagement during the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle

of Magnano. He paused, therefore, a day at St Polten, and wrote a very indignant letter* to Murat, to whose inconsiderate advance on Vienna, on the right bank, ahead of Mortier, he ascribed the whole misfortune which had been incurred. Abandoning, for the present, all thoughts of harassing any further the retreat of Kutusoff, he turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would prevent the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces.

102. Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition on Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not.† Meanwhile the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it at this eventful crisis to Count Wurbna, the grand-chamberlain, who executed with fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when they found themselves deserted by the government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts. But it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoleon's headquarters to treat for a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to the terms on which an armistice could be granted; but the French Emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded,

* "Cousin, I cannot approve of the mode in which you advance. You proceed like a madman, and do not consider rightly the orders I send you. The Russians, instead of covering Vienna, have recrossed the Danube at Krems. This extraordinary fact ought to have made you sensible of the propriety of not acting without new instructions. You have only been looking to the little triumph of an entry into Vienna. There can be no glory where there is no danger. There is none in entering a defenceless capital. *Molt.* 11th Nov. 1805."—*THIERS, Cons. et l'Emp.* vi. 258.

† "As soon as ten o'clock on the 12th has arrived, you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Gálai, before ten o'clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but notwithstanding use all your efforts to secure the passage of the river."—*See Orders to Murat*, 12th November 1805, in *Dumas*, xiv. 20.

and the Tyrol, with the duchy of Vénice, be immediately ceded to France.

103. Built in the superb basin bounded on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. * Anciently the frontier station of the Roman empire upon the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the outskirts of civilisation has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century; but the inhabitants hardly regarded as a conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to a vast army of Turks in 1688, gave time for Sobieski to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe, from a barbarian yoke. The old city was surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions; but it contains only a hundred thousand souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs, which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glacis, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments, but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decorations, though it is not without objects of deep historic interest. The church of St Stephens, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, surmounts in lone magnificence every other edifice

in the capital, and commands a noble view of the whole mountain-bound valley in which it stands. The Emperor's palace in Vienna is not worthy of the residence of so great a monarch; but the neighbouring one of Schönbrunn, and that of the Archduke Charles, are splendid structures, and the Imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. In a military point of view, the capture of this city was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only remaining bridge below Lintz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon, and above a hundred thousand stand of arms.

104. The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he urged on the organising of the Hungarian insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the further prosecution of the war. Meanwhile the French forces in great strength approached the capital, and Napoleon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat, to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge, which led across the river to the northern provinces of the empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the outposts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfeldt, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridge over the Danube to Count Auersberg, who, with a strong rear-guard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the Imperial dominions. At daybreak on the 13th November, General Sebastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely followed by Murat and Lannes, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Leopold on its opposite

side, and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced guard of the Austrians. Everything was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge would be wrapt in flames, and all communication with the left bank cut off.

105. The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops. Everything bore a friendly appearance: the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers as in time of profound peace; so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that, for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances. Murat advanced with Lannes with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter; they called out to the Imperial officers not to fire, as the armistice was concluded; and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge; for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French troops were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible; the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grape-shot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying with a loud voice,—"What are you about? do you not see?" (At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward; the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that the armistice was signed; while the column advanced with a rapid step along the

bridge, covering by its mass a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillerymen on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forbore to fire; the critical moment passed; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge, and, suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoneers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by a stratagem conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would have been worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can palliate or excuse.

106. This surprise of the bridge of Vienna, which he would have condemned as a disgraceful breach of faith if achieved by his enemies, gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon, and it was in truth one of the most important events of the campaign. He was now enabled, from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force against either the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased: the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. He had now realised what, he often said to his lieutenants, contained in a few words the great secret of war—"The art of dividing to live, and concentrating to combat." Impatient to profit by such extraordinary good fortune, the Emperor, at day-break the following morning, established his headquarters at Schönbrunn, from which the young Archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to re-

gain his communications with the allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna; the hospital train was established there; the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been ordered up from Metz and Strassburg; while one half of the army, passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kufstein in the Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles.

107. On the other hand, the surprise of this important bridge contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his masterly movement in the valley of the Danube were now lost. The river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoleon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit by different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Nostitz, on the 15th November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rear-guard of the Russians was soon overtaken, and one hundred loaded waggons fell almost without a combat into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of the whole cavalry, and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaym before the enemy, which, if done, would have pre-

vented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. At the same time Milhaud, with a brigade of chasseurs, pursued the Austrians on the chaussée of Moravia, came up with their rear-guard, and at Woiersdorf captured a hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, with their caissons, which had been drawn from the arsenal of Vienna. Meanwhile Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian general, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable.

108. Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaym, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of an armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns. But he had now a very different antagonist to deal with, in such an attempt, from the honest unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as well skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shown themselves superior in address to all the diplomats of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but, in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia; while, in the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied.* Murat fell into the

* "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in view nothing

snare: Bagrathion, indeed, who was in presence of the French videttes with eight thousand men, remained stationary; but meanwhile the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaym, which opened up their communications with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves, which were approaching. The Emperor Napoleon was highly indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but before his answer could be received, twenty hours had been gained, Znaym was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagrathion and his division in presence of the enemy. His indignation exhaled in a letter of extraordinary asperity to Murat, in which he did not scruple to say that his folly had made him lose the whole fruit of the campaign.*

109. At noon on the 16th, despatches arrived from Napoleon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagrathion to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army. Nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to the last man on behalf of their country. He was soon assailed at once in front and both

but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The Adjutant-general, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that of the French Emperor, and meanwhile caused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagrathion to almost certain ruin; but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps."—*DUMAS*, xiv. 48.

* "I cannot find words to express my dissatisfaction. You only command my advanced guard and have no right to make an armistice without my authority. Break the treaty immediately, and march upon the enemy.—March, destroy the Russian army. NAPOLEON to PRINCE MURAT, Nov. 16, 1805." —*TRIENI, Consul at St. Empire*, vi. 273.

flanks by Lannes, Gudinot, and Murat, to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Muscovites made good their ground; in vain column after column advanced bravely to the attack; the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours' murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however, the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed; the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle; man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of fire-arms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night; and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife three thousand Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagrathion effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly five thousand, unbroken, from amidst forty thousand enemies—a glorious achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino.

110. Nothing could now prevent the junction of the allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau, in Moravia, without further molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoleon. It was no longer a dispirited band of forty thousand men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own, but a vast army, seventy-five thousand strong, animated by the presence of the Russian Emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoleon

was in consequence daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south: the Hungarian insurrection was organising in the east: seventy-five thousand Russians and Austrians were in his front: while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with eighty thousand men on his communications with the Rhine.

111. The measures of Napoleon to ward off so many concurring dangers were conceived with his wonted ability. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies by whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expend forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained, and a moral impression produced, and to concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to diseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria: Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria, to observe the Archduke Charles: Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians: Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, were moved towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia, to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with ten thousand men, whom he had collected in Bohemia after the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the Upper Danube; while Mortier, with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The troops of Soult and Lannes, with the Imperial Guard and the cavalry under Murat,

advanced on the road to Brunn to make head against the new united Russian armies.

112. Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the barriers were opened, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in possession of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government organised throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and the next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and considerable payments were even made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments—admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendancy of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration, if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under the authority of Napoleon himself, and if the coercion of private plunder* had not been all turned to the account of the great imperial robber. At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the

* The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000 sterling, a sum fully equivalent to £8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest, at Vienna were immense: 3000 pieces of artillery, of which 500 were ready for siege use; 100,000 muskets; 600,000 quintals of powder; 600,000 balls; and 160,000 bombs. 15,000 muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—*Buxton*, iv. 412.

war were, as usual, ascribed to the English and the corrupting influence of their gold; while, with a rudeness unworthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne—the character and influence of the Empress herself.

113. Meanwhile the allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau; one hundred and four battalions, including twenty Austrian, and one hundred and fifty-rine squadrons, of which fifty were of the same nation, presented a total of seventy-five thousand effective men. A division of the Imperial Guard, under the Grand-duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningsen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly ninety thousand. The forces which the French Emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great army were much less considerable, and hardly amounted at that moment to seventy thousand combatants; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmütz, before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their sovereign, whose presence amongst them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers. But in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but the indomitable firmness of northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground in the combats which had taken place between them.

114. The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Brünn, a fortified place, containing considerable magazines recently abandoned by the

Allies, and which afforded him the immense advantage of a secure depot for his stores, sick, and wounded, in the vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, when out on Horzeback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a strategical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. About two miles to the north-east, the road towards Hungary by Holitsch branches off from the main road from Vienna by Brünn to Olmütz, and passes through that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here: within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this position led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced guard of the French, in presence of Napoleon himself, and the rear-guard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the French compelled the Allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced guard of Massena had entered into communication with Marmon's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the Grand Army; so that Napoleon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany.

115. But notwithstanding all this, the French Emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Massena and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archduke Charles and John, nearly ninety strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the Allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their arms. The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Grand-duke Constantine at the enemies' headquarters had already

raised their efficient force to eighty thousand men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmütz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by sixty thousand of the soldiers of the Great Frederick. Everything depended upon striking a decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties. In this expectation he was seconded to a wish by the presumptuous confidence of the circle of young officers, headed by Weyrother,

* "Sire," said Napoleon. "I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty, to offer you my compliments on your arrival at the headquarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your Majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your Majesty will receive him with that condescension for which you are so eminently distinguished, and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you. I pray God to keep your Imperial Majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmütz, on the 27th, in these terms:—"I have received, sire, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments. I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you; receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declining against the ambition of the French government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The Emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him: it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The Emperor said, when I put

by whom the Emperor of Russia was surrounded. They represented that the army had exhausted its supplies at Olmütz, and could no longer exist; that its spirit, from fatal inactivity, was daily declining; that Napoleon evidently felt himself overmatched, and, contrary to his usual practice, had halted at Brünn; but that nothing could be so absurd as to allow him to remain there unassailed, in quiet possession of the resources of three-fourths of the monarchy.

116. The more to inspire the Allies with the false confidence which might lead to such a result, Napoleon despatched Savary with a letter to the Emperor Alexander, to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his having joined the allied army, and propose terms of accommodation." About

the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. He has long been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that, in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only Grand-duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters, and met with nothing but obloquy from the other cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian cabinet to take the lead, to induce the other powers of Europe to recognise the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence. I have been called on by them to concur with them in establishing an order of things which may tranquillise all parties, and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted, but I will never desert an ally in distress, or separate my cause from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but one not beyond the reach of remedy. I lead brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it, I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandisement? Since the peace of Lunéville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposal."

"Genoa has been acquired by us," answered Savary, "in spite of ourselves. Its politi-

the same time Count Giulay and Stadion arrived at the headquarters of the French Emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoleon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgorucki, whom Napoleon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoleon, when the aide-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Emperor Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease betwixt us." The Russian reprinted that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his cabinet; that the Emperor had only taken up arms to succour Austria, and obtain for the Continent

cal power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has regained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The Emperor, in sending me to your Majesty, was far from supposing that the war took its origin in these questions; if it does so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility." It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission; but having effectually gained its real design in making the French Emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the allied headquarters.—SAVARY, *ii.* 112, 128

a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter, or animosity against France; that he desired to see it powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast, that its extension was no object of ambition, and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects.

117. Napoleon replied, that the Allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgorucki contested; and he denied also that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia; but admitted that they insisted on the independence of Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. "Let the Emperor of Russia imitate my conduct," said Napoleon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation."—"He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgorucki.—"Then we must fight," rejoined Napoleon: "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But though it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the Allies as to the real state of affairs. The Emperor met the Prince at the advanced posts, as if solicitous to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward; field-works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army; and Dolgorucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French Emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed.*

118. On the same day Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in the treaty of 3d November. Since that time the measures of

* When Dolgorucki had retired, Napoleon said to the officers around him, "The Allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre before they make such proposals."—BOYER, *vii.* 67.

the cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover; a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade; and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia, and that all the former authorities were reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia; while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia, to bring immediate succour to the allied army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian, Muller, had wrought up the public mind to a perfect frenzy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoleon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He therefore resolved to temporise, and if possible dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. Accordingly he refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amidst the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily acted on his suggestion.

112. When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the north and south, it was the obvious policy of the Allies to remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmütz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had descended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in

a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The advice of Count Langeron, who earnestly counselled delay, was overruled by that of Weyrother, who had recently acquired great influence over the Emperor—an officer of extensive views and skill in combination, but with little practical acquaintance with war, and little fitted to anticipate the rapid movements, and ward off the terrible strokes of Napoleon. The Russian troops, miserably provided at that period with commissaries, and totally destitute of magazines in that part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions; while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply provided with supplies of all sorts. The allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brünn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in echelon in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the right flank of the French army, cut them off from their communications with Vienna and the reserve under Massena, and at the same time establish their own connection with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. If the movement proved successful, and the road to Vienna was cut off, Napoleon had no other resource but to retire on Bohemia, where he would meet the forces of Prussia. The movement commenced on the 27th at daybreak, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy. The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an assault; a detachment was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Rausnitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagrathion. Encouraged by this success of its advanced guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly

in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischnitz, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz.

120. This sudden irruption led to an immediate concentration of the French army. Murat, Lannes, and Soult received orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brünn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians at Iglau, and advance with his other troops by forced marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsburg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brünn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. With such promptitude were these orders obeyed, and to such a degree of vigour had long discipline brought the French troops, that part of Davoust's corps, which was farthest off, marched *thirty-six leagues in forty-eight hours*, from Vienna to Gross Raignern, and bivouacked at the place a league and a half from the field of battle, on the night of December 1. In this way Napoleon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than fifty thousand strong, was raised by the evening of the 1st to ninety thousand. But before these distant succours could arrive, great successes might have been obtained, and the Emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were assembled. Fortunately for him, their subsequent movements were as slow and vacillating as their first had been decided and audacious. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force to the heights of Kutscherau, towards the French extreme right; but on the day following they retraced their steps, and advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hodiegritz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching ~~across~~ ^{across} their position towards their own right.

121. Napoleon spent the whole of both days on horseback, at the advanced

posts, watching their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right towards Brünn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back, as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy; and the French army concentrated round Brünn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries. At length, on the morning of the 1st December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifest. Napoleon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched with intense anxiety their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops who had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the Allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Hohenlinden, where he had been chief of the staff, had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous movements in war—a flank march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that, too, when that enemy was Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand men! At midnight on the 1st, a council of war was held at the allied headquarters, at which Weyrother brought forward his plan of attack for the suc-

ceeding day, and soon took the lead in the discussion. Kutusoff took little share in the discussion, and soon fell asleep. Langeron, when Weyrother had concluded, asked what they should do if Napoleon took the initiative and attacked them at Pratzen, before their movement was completed. "You need not trouble yourself about that," replied he, "you know the boldness of Buonaparte; if he had been of sufficient strength to attack us, he would have done it yesterday. He has not forty thousand men."—"I trust it is so," replied Langeron, "but I have my own misgivings. He has extinguished his fires; I hear a loud murmur in his camp."

122. Meanwhile the Allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon-shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut him off from Vienna, and throw him back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which it was hoped would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. On the evening of the 1st December, they occupied the following position. Their first column, under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Anjezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied the important heights of Pratzen, directly before the French right wing; the third, under Prybyszewski, crowned the eminences immediately to the right of that elevated point: these three columns formed the left wing, commanded by Buxhowden; the fourth, under Kollowrath, consisting of fifteen Austrian and Miloradovitch's twelve Russian battalions, followed in order on the heights in rear of the third column; the cavalry under Lichtenstein, consisting of eighty-two squadrons, was destined to occupy the low ground from Blasowitz to Krüh, thus uniting the centre with the right wing, consisting of the fifth

column under Bagrathion, which was established on each side of the Olmütz road opposite to the Rosenitzberg: while the reserve, under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz. In all, their forces embraced a hundred and fourteen battalions and a hundred and seventy-two squadrons, amounting to fully eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition.

• 123. The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position in advance of the fortress of Brünn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. The Emperor's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brünn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues from the former place, a little in front of Bellowitz, between two streamlets, which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Puntowitz and form the Goldbach.* From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fish-ponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the lakes Menitz and Satschan, formed by the river Littawa; their left on the Rosenitzberg—an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the Marche, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which fringed on either side the stream of the Goldbach, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brünn to Olmütz, and by various country roads from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence. Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, lay the line of waving heights,

* These names will convey no ideas to readers in this country; but they will be of value to the traveller who explores, in that distant region, the theatre of this memorable conflict.

gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge, sought to conceal the general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoleon.

124. By great exertions, the French Emperor had succeeded in assembling an immense force for the decisive battle which was approaching. The left wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advanced guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Rosenitzberg. Behind these was placed the corps of Bernadotte, who by forced marches had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high road, also in reserve, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the Imperial Guard, under Bessières, in a third line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages from Gitzikowitz to Kobelnitz, opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the abbey of Raigern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the lake Menitz. Before the night of the 1st December, above ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues; all veterans inured to war, and burning with impatience to signalise themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow.

125. Napoleon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, addressing the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a

decisive blow," and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs, animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which so often, on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won.* Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled with the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought up to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved Emperor, celebrated thus, by the voluntary conflagration of the wood of their huts, and straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation.

126. The night was cold but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly permitted the sentinels to discern each other at ten yards' distance. At four in the morning the Emperor mounted on horse-

* "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the fire, if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first strokes; for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manoeuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious; while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the clearest indication of the mutual confidence which long service together had established between them.—Dumas, xiv. 148, 149.

back. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the south-eastern parts of the horizon; and all the reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, the orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Telnitz, the outermost village in the possession of the French on that side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoleon hear the sound of the distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that, the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross-march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced: every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still, in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared.

127. Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day; and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun

"The stars were never half so fair and clear
As in the breaking of that blessed day;
The merry morning smiled, and seem'd to wear,

Upon her silver crown, sun's golden ray;
And, without cloud, heav'n his redoubled light
Bent down to see this field, this fray, this fight."

TASSO, *Jerusalem Delivered*, xx. 5.

rose in unclouded brilliancy — that "Sun of Austerlitz" which he so often afterwards apostrophised as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life. As the mist sank, and the upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent: the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted. It was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Telnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the Allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoleon, saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour, and turning to Soult, said, "How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?"—"Less than twenty minutes," replied the marshal; "for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs; the enemy cannot see them."—"In that case," said Napoleon, "let us wait twenty minutes: when the enemy is making a false movement, we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right towards Telnitz, and an aide-de-camp, arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoleon; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time the Emperor mounted his horse, and riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers!" said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder."

128. The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the Allies were toiling in a wide

semicircle found their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action, but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their superiority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Telnitz, and Buxhowden was advancing beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoleon ordered Davoust, who, with his reserve, lay near the abbey of Raigern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up, Sokolnitz also was carried, amid loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokolnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of cannon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution.

129. Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth allied column, under Kollowrath, composed of Austrians and Milaradovitch's corps of Russians, consisting of twenty seven battalions, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of the Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, under Buxhowden, immediately preceding it, when its outposts perceived the immense dark mass of French infantry emerging out of the mist in the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been com-

mitted, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was wanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Pratzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Milaradovitch and Kollowrath, forming the fourth column, rapidly wheeling into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult, composed of the divisions of St Hilaire and Vandamme, had ascended the heights. Its attack was so impetuous that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Pratzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' duration, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the allied army, surprised in its cross march, was pierced through the centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army.

130. While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte, Murat, and Lannes, was also warmly engaged with the enemy. Lannes advanced direct upon Rausnitz; Murat, with his numerous squadrons in the low grounds, on the right of Lannes, between Girzikowitz and Kruh; Bernadotte debouched from Girzikowitz upon the village and heights of Blasowitz. They, too, surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoleon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. The French marshals advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in order of battle, the second in column, with the artil-

lery in front, and the heavy cavalry in reserve behind the second line—a disposition everywhere attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, while moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunderstruck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand-duke Constantine was one of the first divisions to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, nevertheless, were speedily made: the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellermann were assailing even the Russian Imperial Guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Russian hulans of the Guard, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoleon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain.*

131. This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive suc-

cess to either party; but it had the desired effect of preventing any succour being sent from that quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult. At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make a fresh effort against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: the remainder of the horse of Ouvaroff formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the Allies. But though these dispositions were judicious, they bore no sort of comparison to the measures of Napoleon, who, seeing clearly that Pratzen was the decisive point, ordered up to the support of Soult, already victorious, the whole corps of Bernadotte, the Guard, and grenadiers of Oudinot—in all, fully twenty-five thousand men. But before they could arrive, a desperate shock had taken place in the centre. The Grand-duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were making on his own side, brought forward the Russian Imperial Guard, and, descending from the heights, advanced, midway between Pratzen and Blaszowitz, to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme of Soult's corps; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by the Russian cuirassiers of the Guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant

* The combat of Lannes, Bernadotte, and Murat, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops, arranged in the order prescribed by Napoleon, baffled all the efforts of the Allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array; the second in squares of battalions—the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arranged in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares

behind the first line, from whose front and flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to hurl them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The British heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition made by Napoleon, which enabled him ultimately to baffle the most intrepid charges of the finest cavalry in the world after they had achieved important success.—DEMAS, xiv. 183.

the French column was broken, three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th Regiment lost its eagle.

132. Napoleon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder; and he immediately ordered Marshal Bessières, with the cavalry of the Guard, to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and set off at the gallop down the hill, to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there: they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to reform their squadrons after their glorious success, when this fierce enemy was upon them. They were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, upon being reinforced by the superb regiment of Chevalier Guards,* they returned to the charge. Both Imperial Guards met in full career: the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. Colonel Morland, who commanded the French chasseurs of the Guard, was killed in the mêlée, and the French horse were driven back. But as the Russian Chevalier Guards were pursuing with loud shouts, and in some disorder, they were in their turn assailed in flank by the grenadiers à cheval under Bessières in person. This powerful reserve, composed of the very flower of the Guards mounted on superb horses, immediately engaged in a desperate contest with Constantine's Chevalier Guards. The Russian infantry, though close at hand, merely looked on: so closely were the squadrons intermingled that they did not venture to fire, for fear of destroying their comrades. The resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, man to man, they fought with in-

vincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewn with the dead and the dying. At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their Guard gave way, and, after losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz; while, from a neighbouring eminence, the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army.†

133. This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing, between Auezd and Sokolnitz, to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoleon caused his reserves, consisting of the grenadiers of Oudinot and the Imperial Guard, to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokolnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of six thousand men, who were retracing their steps, too late, to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated, and half of its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate: and the survivors from his division, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central divisions of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouch from Auezd with a view to regain, by a road between the marshes of the Littawa and

* A corps in which all the privates were gentlemen.

† It is the moment when Rapp returned with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive success, that Gerard has selected for his admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz.—Rapp, 62.

the high grounds which adjoin them to the north, the remains of the army at Austerlitz. But before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle, and separating Buxhowden with a few battalions in advance from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear, by the Imperial Guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance, they were at length overwhelmed: seven thousand were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, the frozen lake of Satschan which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shot from the French batteries on the heights above broke it in all directions: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above two thousand brave men were swallowed up in the waves. Though great part of Doctoroff's corps, however, was destroyed, that general conducted himself with the most heroic resolution. Taking advantage of a rising ground which in some degree covered his rear, he drew up the remains of his corps in three lines—the cavalry in the front line, the artillery in the second, the infantry in rear. They there preserved a firm countenance, while some squadrons of horse explored a line of retreat between the lake of Satschan and that of Menitz. Part succeeded in making their way through; but the larger portion were cut down by Murat's dragoons. "I had seen," said Langeron, an eyewitness, "many battles lost; but I could not have formed an idea of such a defeat."

134. While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight

of their battalions on the heights which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat continued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse; but at noon the Allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Krush, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagrathion, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass, and dislodging it from the road to Olmütz, where almost the whole of the baggage of the Allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution, Bagrathion succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army.

135. Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoleon—that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; for the stroke, which at once re-established his affairs and prostrated Europe, was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the Allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners: * a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards, remained the trophies of the victor's triumph; and the disorganisation of the combined forces was complete. It is true, these advantages had been dearly purchased;

* The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a considerable proportion of them were wounded.

twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the Allies were cut off from the road to Olmütz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank, while Napoleon's victorious legions thundered in their rear. Such was the consternation produced by this disaster that, in a council held at midnight at the Emperor Francis' headquarters, it was resolved, by a great majority, that the further prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoleon to propose an armistice.

136. There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoleon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war, and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses: but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Muscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of eighty thousand men in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent, Massena, was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising en masse at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, with the aid of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Igla. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmütz;

while Prussia, with one hundred thousand men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to advance further into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat, without the commencement of a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power?

137. Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoleon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without further danger, but with the utmost possible éclat. As on the Carinthian mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were within his grasp. The better to increase the terror of his arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and, appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders in the mean time for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour.

138. Meanwhile the allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the attacks made on its rear-guard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the chateau of Holtzsch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitch, in order to be ready for the conference which

Napoleon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the roadside near Sarutshitz, still shown to travellers, where the fire of a bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoleon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months."—"You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoleon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the Allies. Everything, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders, which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amidst universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilised world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which, having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissension on the Continent, and, secure from attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoleon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins.

139. The conference lasted two hours, after which the two emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of mutual esteem. The conditions had been verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Pressburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference; but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally, that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without further molestation, to their own country.* Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which were immediately agreed to; and without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoleon immediately stopped the advance of his columns.† In truth, after the seces-

* Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it, in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Marches (or Morava) was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeld. Davoust had already commenced his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the Emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful, as, independent of the Austrians, twenty-six thousand Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—SAVARY, ii. 144, 145.

† Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's headquarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed; and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manœuvres never gave me time to succour the menaced points; everywhere you were at least double the number of our forces."—"Sire," replied Savary, "your Majesty has been misinformed. Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less

sion of Austria, the war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate in being able to extricate his army, without further loss, from its perilous situation. Anxious to conciliate the good-will of so powerful an adversary, Napoleon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, without exchange; and Alexander set out two days after, by post, for St Petersburg.

140. On the 6th December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated, that until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, the Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia, at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was levelled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered at so untoward a time. Napoleon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the

than yours; and even of that, the whole was not very warmly engaged; but we manoeuvred much, and the same division combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the Emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your Majesty does not, by accepting the armistice, dispose it otherwise."—"What guarantee does your master require?" replied Alexander; "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?"—"He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust."—"I give it with pleasure," rejoined the Emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—SAVARY, ii. 142, 143.

wounded, and the widows of those who had fallen in the battle.* At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners who could be moved from the hospitals, above sixteen thousand in number, in the most ostentatious manner through the streets of Vienna on their road to France, and returned himself to Schönbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Pressburg.†

141. Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the Great Frederick, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the grasp of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand-duke Constantine and Prince Dolgorucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposal of the Prussian cabinet, if they would vigorously prosecute the war. But the veteran diplomatist to whom the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing-stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Haugwitz, as already mentioned, had come to

* In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy—"Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory, peace cannot now be far removed. When everything necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy: and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'There is a brave man!'" Liberal donations at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 8000 francs each, and the common soldiers a napoleon each; the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or £240; of the colonels, 2400, or £96; of the common men, 200, or £8 sterling yearly.—SAVARY, ii. 148; and LIGNON, iv. 560.

† On his road thither, Napoleon met a large convoy of wounded Austrians on their route for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the waggon passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune!" So well did this great man know how to win the affections, and command the admiration, of the very soldiers who had lavished their best blood in combating his power.

Vienna to declare war against Napoleon, and the 15th December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French Emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing was more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his view of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessory, it was likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part.

142. But not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a step further. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to secure a part of the spoil of his former allies; and, if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least endeavour to wrest from England those Continental possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery he changed the whole object of his mission; and when admitted into the presence of Napoleon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing *Hanover to the Prussian dominions* until the conclusion of a peace between France and England. Although Napoleon had not received full accounts of the treaty of 3d November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, thirty thousand strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslau. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet; informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations; and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole force

against them; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovisioned, were in no condition to make any defence; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their infamous perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best founded causes of animosity: on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England; but this could be only on one condition—that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into the French alliance. On these terms he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with its dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria.

143. Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations. It was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Baireuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as well as all the other Continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neuchâtel and Clèves to France; and accede to all the conditions of the general peace of Pressburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed by Haugwitz on 15th December, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. And this treaty the King of Prussia, with disgraceful cupidity, ratified under only a slight modification. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous. It excited a just indignation in the government of Great Britain,* without really propitiating

* As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially to that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say, that it was signed by Haugwitz of his

that of France; and, by inducing a false security in the cabinet of Berlin, rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved.*

144. Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were made known. The war-party, in particular, with the Queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment, a friendly power, and with whom a close alliance, offensive and defensive, had just been concluded. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the cabinet, national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed, that the King, who had hitherto weakly yielded to Haugwitz, and agreed to the spoliation of his ally, was shaken, and the treaty was ratified only under the following reservations :

own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the government at home; and that so far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the prejudice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that, four days after the treaty was signed, a long official note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Hanover as a declaration of war, and various arrangements were proposed for the further continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterwards, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoleon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his habitual disregard of truth, some months afterwards published in the *Moniteur* an article, in which he declared that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the cabinet; and that he had for "base bribes prostituted

—That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only—a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction. "The conduct of Prussia," said Mr Fox, then minister for foreign affairs, in his place in parliament, "was a union of everything that was contemptible in servility, with everything that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces; but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation—that of being compelled to become the minister of the rapacity and injustice of a man."

145. To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Pressburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the north of Germany, which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria. The court of Naples had entered, somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France.

himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent." This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoleon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled: "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the treaty of 3d November, Napoleon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair; but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach.—BIGNON, v. 240, and HARDENBERG, ix. 30, 42.

"You have come," said Napoleon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory; but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoleon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on; but he prudently determined in the mean time to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by embroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unaided, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—BIGNON, v. 14.

Notwithstanding the treaty of 21st September, already mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated, a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three thousand English troops, cast anchor in the bay of Naples, in pursuance of the general plan of operations concerted by the Allies, and soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the Allies, what in effect happened, that this act would have the effect of embroiling the Neapolitan court with the French Emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality, and his inability to resist the allied forces; and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France: but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The Queen did everything in her power to engage the cabinet in the war. The French ambassador, disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the government, seeing war inevitable, was taking measures for organising a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, and delivered them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor.

146. It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the Continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the King's German Legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to eighteen thousand men, which arrived, in October, in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of twelve thousand men, and a Russian force,

under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of ten thousand; and it was the intention of the Allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover, and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and, after freeing the United Provinces from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscarriage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the Allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order to accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already in the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was to dissolve this heterogeneous armament: the Russians retired to Mecklenburg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund.

147. The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoleon, were not long of being brought to a close. By the peace of Pressburg she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Invgirtel; to the kingdom of Italy, the entire Continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognised. The Electors of Bavaria and Würtemberg were elevated to the thrones of their respec-

tive dominions, with large accessions of territory to each; to the former, besides the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the principality of Eichstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzburg and the possessions of the Teutonic Order, which, from their dispersion in different states, were little more than a nominal acquisition. But what was of still greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage "to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the Kings of Bavaria or Würtemberg or the Elector of Baden might think proper to adopt,"—a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic empire. The counter-stipulations were entirely illusory: Napoleon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic confederacy, which he held in chains; and that of the Batavian republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis.*

148. Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided, that Austria was to pay a contribution of forty million francs, or £1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered provinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for behoof of that power. But her government judged wisely that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire; and therefore they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large portion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through all the disasters of the war, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people—a memorable example of the

* The changes made by this treaty were as follows:—

| | Population. | Square German Miles. | Revenue in Florins |
|---------------------------------------|-------------|----------------------|--------------------|
| Austria lost | 2,975,620 | 1,417 | 17,075,000 |
| She received | 271,000 | 86 | 2,900,000 |
| Clear loss | 2,704,620 | 1,331 | 14,175,000 |
| Bavaria gained | 631,000 | 526 | 3,490,000 |
| Würtemberg gained | 182,400 | 58 | 691,000 |
| Baden gained | 143,629 | 54 | 508,000 |
| The Kingdom of Italy gained 1,836,000 | | 711 | 10,000,000 |

Besides this, the sums drawn from Austria in contributions and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or £3,500,000.—HARDENBERG, ix. 472, and BIGNON, v. 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly-erected states stood as follows:—

| | Population. | Army. | Square German Miles. | Revenue. In Florins. |
|--------------------------------|-------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Bavaria | 3,250,000 | 60,000 | 1,700 | 21,000,000 |
| Würtemberg | 1,154,000 | 20,000 ^a | 346 | 8,000,000 |
| Baden | 569,000 | 10,000 | 260 | 6,000,000 |
| But Austria retained | 24,900,000 | 230,000 | 10,936 | 110,000,000 |

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederick.—HARDENBERG, ix. 472, 474, App. and 23, 24; and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens*, par le BARON LICHTENSTEIN.

vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion.

149. It is evident, from the statistical details given in the preceding notes, that Napoleon had no intention, by the peace of Pressburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with, or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependent on France, between his empire and the Hereditary States;—the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Würtemberg to the north of these mountains. Talleyrand, improving upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danube, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a perpetual bone of contention between the cabinets of Vienna and St Petersburg. But Napoleon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with which he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty, with a view to turning his undivided force against England.

150. This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in European history—the pronouncing a sentence of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French Emperor. On the 26th December, a menacing proclamation proceeded from Pressburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evidently bore marks of Napoleon's composition, against the house of Naples. The conqueror announced, that Marshal St Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal queen, and precipitate her from the

throne. We have pardoned that infatuated king, who thrice has done everything to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? Shall we a fourth time trust a court without faith, without honour, without reason?—No! *The dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign*—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown." St Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which Napoleon afterwards pronounced against many of the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones, and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own.

151. This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only meditating hostilities against the French Emperor, and had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and at the same time descriptive of that mixture of boldness and prudence by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The ambassador of Naples at Paris, acting under the authority of his cabinet, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the court, under the like menaces, on the 8th October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the bay of Naples, six weeks afterwards, liberated them from their apprehensions, and the cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude; but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity? How often, on this principle, has Napoleon himself

deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry! And what excuse is to be made for the revolutionary government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states, to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and everywhere, rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom! But this has in every age been the system of the revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

152. In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoleon had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of subsidiary crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwarlike, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and the kingdom of Westphalia, constituted out of the spoils of Prussia. And without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

153. The remaining career of Napoleon during this memorable year was

a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers,* and at the same time complimented the burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and, as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous; the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. He arrived at Munich on the 31st December; and on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the Elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Josephine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugene Beauharnais, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stephanie Beauharnais, adopted daughter of the French Emperor. On this occasion Napoleon, in default of his own lawful issue, called Eugene Beauharnais to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known

* "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have in the last autumn made two campaigns—you have seen your Emperor share your dangers and your fatigues—I wish also that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first people in the universe. You shall all be there—we will celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns on the field of honour—the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, to resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies of the Continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoleon was contemplating a Prussian war—*Bacon*, v. 41.

by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise, between all the states in alliance with the French empire* which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strassburg, the Emperor recrossed that river, at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amidst applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th January. A hundred days ! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced ; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumph of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar ; but destined to be eclipsed by another hundred days, in future times, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which will endure till time itself shall be no more.*

154. The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of September the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the collected powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in less than four months ! In the first epoch of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against

the Republic ; in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and only yielded, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoleon, and the scientific combinations of Moreau ; but in the third she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with those of France ! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than their celerity ; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoleon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Difectory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var ? Blunders undoubtedly were committed ; misfortunes occurred ; but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign ; and in the long records of Imperial fatuity, parallels are not wanting to the advance to Ulm, or the flank march of Austerlitz. What was it, then, which made those false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable, and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but of the overthrow of empires and the dissolution of confederacies ?

155. This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French Emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the Hereditary States, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, and where a great navigable river constantly furnished the means of transport for the supplies of his army. In former wars the contest lay in corners of the empire ; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps ; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat. But in the present, all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation,

* The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoleon, but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, ii. 209.

with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commander, to the Italian plains, on which side the empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoleon in person, to an inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced leader. The ruinous effects of this error became manifest, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but in the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. Like a skillful player at chess, Napoleon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities: and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rhetian Alps.

156. This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk; and it was evident, even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the Allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated Napoleon from the most perilous situation in which he had stood since the commencement of his career. At Marengo, Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was secure by the St Gothard and the St Bernard: at Campo Formio, the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau with a vast force was preparing to advance to his support through southern Germany. But before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and already nearly equal to his own. Delay in

such circumstances was ruin: advance with such arrays in his rear was impossible: retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe: great as the talents of Napoleon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous and fearful retribution.

157. But though this rapid advance to the heart of the empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French Emperor, yet it was by no means the principal; and though perhaps his triumphs might not have been so rapid, the result would probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoleon poured down the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Massena fronted the Archduke Charles in Italy with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast had never before been brought into action at any period of the war. Nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort; it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men that France maintained the contest, and she was ca-

pable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period.* It was at once evident, upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace than nine of previous warfare; and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them. ‡

158. This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred, of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandisement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoleon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Lunéville, moderation and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded: every suspension of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces, or in the annexation of some minor state to his dominions; and he never

appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances, and been longest on terms of the greatest apparent cordiality. Five years of Continental peace followed the treaty of Lunéville; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprang up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoleon on its termination. Ten years of neutrality or alliance with the cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Bale; but at once he struck the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when at last she took up arms to resist his aggressions. For twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions. He professed eternal friendship to Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed, he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterwards led towards the Kremlin.

159. It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms the true and unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first marked out England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing-time in warfare, even on that element where his power was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase which was shown to have taken place in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities—an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted in 1800 that, before five years had elapsed, Napoleon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit, than if he had

* Strength of the French army in August 1805:—

| | Men. |
|----------------------------------|---------|
| Troops of the line, | 341,000 |
| Light infantry, | 100,130 |
| Light horse, | 60,554 |
| Heavy horse, or of the line, . . | 16,944 |
| Artillery, | 46,469 |
| Engineers, | 900 |
| Gendarmerie, | 75,691 |
| Imperial Guard, | 8,500 |
| | <hr/> |

Besides the Coast-guard,
100,000 strong, 590,208

—PEUCHET, 576.

forstold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign. Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of burning to such account every intermission of war. And the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views. For while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

160. Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoleon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the Hereditary States, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army; the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coast of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and the banks of the Elbe, were made to arrive, each at the time appointed around the ramparts of Ulm; the swift advance on Vienna; the subsequent fan-like dispersion of the army to overawe the Hereditary States; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross-march of the allied sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results, which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French Emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organisation which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which was the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Ri-

voli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the rapidity of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of the general; the previous preparations of the Emperor, the deeply-matured combinations of the statesman, produced their natural results. He did not now take the field with a force which left anything to chance; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate; and the fruit of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few months' duration.

161. Great, however, as were the abilities, and unbounded the resources of the French Emperor in this memorable campaign, it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the allied cabinets, had their full share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field; and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, to combat an inferior enemy, they exposed Mack, with seventy thousand, to the shock of Napoleon at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralysed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated; thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops, and giving the invader time to envelop with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the pre-

ceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to, and stopping the advance of, the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horse-flesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy.

162. When the rapid advance of Napoleon towards Vienna threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and everything depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into Napoleon's hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the Allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when everything counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumu-

lating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undisciplined veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with an equal number, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his gear, the Allies must inevitably have led him to destruction, or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence impelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank-march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction.*

163. But most of all is Prussia answerable for the disasters of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: Mr Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror; that he contemned her menaces, despised her power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part—then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillation of ten years, and, by a

* In a memoir presented to the British government by the cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Pressburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed,—1 To the failure on the part of the allied powers to realise, in the north of Germany, those promised diversions which might have prevented Napoleon from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover, against the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2 To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back upon the Inn, or see itself cut off from its base of operations. 3 To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutusoff in the Hereditary States, remained immovable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. 4 To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, for the purpose of watching the preparations of Prussia, which, until her intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5 To the negligence of Count Auersberg, in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at Vienna, which at once gave the French the coun-

mand of both banks, and exposed Kutusoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Buxhowden.—*HAND. viii. 511.*

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the enormous calamities of the campaign. But, without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted, that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillation of the former power from the first paralysed both Russia and England: the former, by detaining those forces long in Poland which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter, by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoleon on the Danube. Hanover was the ill-gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophe of Jena and Tilsit.

cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that, if she had done so, such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for the army of the latter to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoleon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearance, have prevented to Europe are considered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporising policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia more than any other power these misfortunes had been owing, so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them. Well might Napoleon have said with the Roman annalist—"Nec aliud adversus validissimas gentes pro nobis utilius, quam quod in commune non consulunt. Rarus duabus tribusve civitatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus: ita, dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur."*

164. In fact, the forces which Mr Pitt had now arrayed for this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers, is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished: the Continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armists fully adequate to

the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom: the presence of a common danger had at that moment at least extinguished their jealousy. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and five hundred thousand veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense; and the powers who had suffered so much from French ambition, were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor to interfere in the internal frame of its government. Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggressions in future, alone were to be insisted on.†

165. To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justice of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr Pitt necessarily intrusted the execution of its details to the allied sovereigns or their generals, and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross-march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make—and he spared none—were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic, in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its con-

* "Nor has anything been more advantageous to us, in combating the most powerful nations, than that they adopt no common measures. It is rare to see an alliance between two or three states to avert a common danger: thus, as they engage singly, they are all conquered."—TACITUS, *Agricola*, xii.

† See note, 11th January 1805. Mr Pitt to Russian ambassador.—Appendix A, Chap. xxxix.

struction, and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its cautious result; as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoleon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his immortal conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz, or striking down the Prussian monarchy on the field of Jena.

166. But though great in diplomacy and finance, Mr Pitt was little skilled in military combinations. A more vigorous warlike policy at that period, such as Mr Burke had from the first strenuously recommended, might have terminated the disasters of the war. England also must take her share of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command, but also, by abstaining from all Continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, having permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her sea-girt citadel, had then five hundred thousand men in arms. Had she despatched eighty thousand of this vast force early in the campaign to a decisive point; had her troops marched to the shores of Kent when the legions of Napoleon broke up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of the troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

167. The dissolution of the great confederacy, which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sank at length under anguish occasioned by the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain

he tried the waters of Bath; in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office; his constitution was worn out by the labours and the anxiety which have proved fatal to so many parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with overpowering force. From the time the disastrous news was received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. His constitution, though yet in middle life, was worn out by incessant exertion and overwrought excitement. In the intervals of rest, however, his thoughts were still riveted upon the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century!"—so little did the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce. At the close of a lingering illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house at Putney, near London, on the 23d January 1806, exclaiming with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle.

168. Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still in the zenith of his intellectual powers, William Pitt. He was born on the 28th May, 1759, and early distinguished himself by his ardent zeal and uncommon proficiency in the classical languages and mathematical studies, as well as by the quickness of his wit and repartee in society. The name of his father, the great Earl of Chatham, soon procured for him a favourable introduction to parliament; and at the age of twenty-two he made his first entrance into public life as member for the borough

of Appleby, in January 1781. From the very first his powers of speaking were so remarkable, that he took his place as if it had been set apart for him as a leader of the old Whig party, to which his father had belonged. On the rupture of George the Third with the coalition ministry in 1784, the sovereign turned to him as the only man in the country capable of contending with the formidable majority which Mr Fox and Lord North then directed in parliament; and the ultimate success which his talent and intrepidity won for him in that contest, gave him the undisputed command of government, which continued almost without interruption till the time of his death, two-and-twenty years after.

169. Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom and modern democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved, if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he arose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sank under the struggle. If the calamities which befell Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm, he had not merely seen its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch, by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every

period of his career. In the midst of a desperate strife in Europe, he extended the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the Continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoleon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere; strike down the throne of Tippoo Saib in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide expanse of the Indian peninsula. Under his administration, the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies, and political strength quadrupled; and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

170. But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting benefits of Mr Pitt's government. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness; there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom; early imbued with liberal principles; the strenuous supporter of a relaxation of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals or danger to the state, he was at the same time as fully alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on such vital subjects, or permitting democratic ambition, under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel the institution of society. In the first instance, he was rather favourable to the French Revolution, and, unlike Mr Burke, yielded only a cold and reluctant assent to those who proclaimed its dangers. He resolutely adhered to his pacific policy as long as it was possible for him to do so; and it was truly said at the time, by those who knew

him best, that "he was dragged into the contest with as much reluctance as a man of conscientious principles into a duel."

171. But when once forced into the conflict, he espoused it with all the ardour of his character. No sooner, therefore, did the French Revolution become ungovernable, and it had become evident that a general social convulsion was designed, than he threw the weight of his influence into the opposite scale. Though an advocate for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the king had thrown down the gauntlet to every established government, he then espoused it with the whole ardour and perseverance of his character, and became the soul of all the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life, were framed, to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady friend of freedom, he was on that very account the resolute opponent of democracy—the deadly, because the unsuspected enemy by whose triumphs, in every age, its principles have been subverted, and its blessings destroyed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling under the shock, when the ardent and philanthropic were everywhere rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening, when Mr Fox was pronouncing the revolutionary constitution of France "the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public virtue in any age or country," his superior sagacity, though only after that of Burke, beheld amid the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the world with darkness.

172. Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses: and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood, and ravaging Eu-

rope with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions. With admirable foresight he there established a system of finance adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition: with indomitable perseverance he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, among the discordant and selfish cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Next to Burke, he, alone of all the statesmen of his age, from a comparatively early period appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of democratic principles; and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object, to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles; for while liberty perished in a few months in France, amidst the favour of revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished in the British empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to democratic ambition, have proved not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

173. Chateaubriand has said, "That while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoleon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this high eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles, which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoleon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the Barricades,

* See Chap. xlii. "On the British Finances."

and the military government of Louis Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete with regard to foreign transactions; without the great organic change of 1832, and the subsequent experience of democratic influence in Great Britain, his worth in domestic government would never have been appreciated. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady assertor of general freedom. His doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and affluent; they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warning of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history: it is experience which brings conviction to the cold lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr Pitt's memory; but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's administration.

174. Foreign writers of almost every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent him as governed by an ardent ambition to elevate his own country, as the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation, and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the Continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by commercial jealousy of that country, he had em-

braced the generous maxim of Adam Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependent on the prosperity of those which surround it.* Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792, but, before the revolutionary levies were completed,

* In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr Fox said, "France is the *natural enemy* of Great Britain; and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands, and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility, all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France, its true situation is as the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours: on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependent on each other; and as a British subject, not less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably the enemy of another nation, is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposes the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man." Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate, they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure, and this statesman, whom the Continental writers represent as the eternal inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses anything ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe. The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal; their brandy on paying a duty of seven shillings a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron work on a duty *ad valorem* of ten percent! So erroneous is the common opinion as to the principles of this great statesman!—See the Treaty in *Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 234-240.

have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its government in the American war. He was to the last degree unwilling to engage in the war with France: he engaged in it with a reluctance, which all the horrors of the Revolution were hardly able to dispel. Ample evidence of this has now been obtained from the best informed memoirs of the period which have been recently published, particularly those of Lord Malmesbury and Mr Wilberforce. It was not against France, but *republican* France, that his hostility was directed: it was not French warfare, but French propagandism which he dreaded; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if those insidious principles had emanated from these states. And even as it was, it was not till a very late period that he was reluctantly compelled to forego his pacific policy; and if he is blamable at all, it is for having adhered to it too long.

175. If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr Pitt's government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion, and frequent cause for historic censure. Unequaled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies, and awakened the activity of cabinets, he was by no means equally felicitous in the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoleon has observed, that he had no turn for military combinations, and a retrospect of the campaigns which he had a share in directing, must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the Continental armies put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength

chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately, in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt: whereas, by the vigorous application of an English force, inconsiderable to what might have been raised, to the heart of the enemy's power at the outset, or when their resources were failing before the arrival of Napoleon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and at the same time liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In warlike combinations he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation, and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land, which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

176. "It is needless," say the republicans, "to raise statues to Mr Pitt's memory: he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people." If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoleon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as a salvage paid for the safety of the empire, and are no more chargeable on his

memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore protracted system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different, and, ultimately, less burdensome form. And probably the warmest of his partisans will find it difficult to defend the practice which he so much followed, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced—a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

177. Mr Pitt's eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of rhetoric—unequalled in modern times. He possessed that rapidity and acuteness of thought, united to richness of expression and tenacity of memory, which Cicero pronounced essential to a perfect orator.* He was an accomplished classical scholar, and continued through life, in all his leisure moments, the study of the exquisite remains of ancient genius. But he did this with the wise design of transferring to his own tongue the brevity and force of their expressions, not in the hopeless desire of rivaling their beauties in their own language. So successful was he in this, that many of his speeches, de-

livered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with all but the finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. Kindly and affectionate in domestic life, he yet felt in all their force the passions of youth, and was far from being inaccessible to the ascendant of female charms†. But these feelings were all kept in subordination to greater objects, and accordingly in private life his conduct was irreproachable. Concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. His figure was tall and thin, his features sharp, his forehead open and thoughtful—

“Deep in his brow engraven,
Deliberation sat, and sovereign care.”‡

Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune; and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies, was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds, to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote Mr Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred; but he resisted the motion for a monument to his memory at the public expense, upon the ground that, however splendid his abilities, or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of an “excellent statesman.”§ The monu-

† He was a great admirer of female dress, and so accomplished a connoisseur in it that the celebrated Lady Hester Stanhope, his cousin, who lived in his house for many years, and presided over his establishment, used to take his advice in the arrangement of her curls and drapery when she was going to a ball. In early life he was such an admirer of a captivating Devonshire beauty, that he had the gallantry to drink her health out of her satin slipper.—*Memoirs of Lady Hester Stanhope*. i. 11, 82.

‡ *Milton's Paradise Lost*.

§ “When I see a minister,” said Mr Fox, “who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected

* “Nam et animi atque ingenii celeres quidem motus esse debent, qui et ad excogitandum acuti, et ad explicandum ordinandumque sint uberes, et ad memoriam firmi atque diuturni.”—*De Oratore*, l. 1. § 25.

ment which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of so many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British empire at the close of the contest which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependent on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, "Si monumentum quaeris, circumspice!"

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR PITT'S SYSTEM OF FINANCIAL POLICY.

1. It would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the mainspring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay; in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other states, when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, in her citadel amidst the waves, the return of a right spirit in the neighbouring nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain. Even the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the

from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integrity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr Pitt as an 'excellent statesman.' Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not in such cases yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 61, 62.

contest they had so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of government the means of permanently continuing it. Vain would have been the reaction produced by suffering against the French Revolution, vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if Britain had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis. If she had been unable to alimient the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust, the sword of Wellington would have been drawn in vain; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts if the wealth of England had not at last arrayed them in dense and disciplined battalions on the banks of the Rhine.

2. How, then, did it happen, that this inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years; to uphold a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land forces of Napoleon, and equipped all the

armies of the north, on the Elbe and the Rhine, for the liberation of Germany! The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe. But the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organised and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seemed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

3. The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth it amounted only to £400,000 a-year; and in that of James I. to £450,000, and even including all the subsidies received from parliament during his reign, only to £480,000 a-year—sums certainly not equivalent to more than £800,000 or £1,000,000 of our

faucy. That enjoyed by Charles I. amounted on an average to £335,000 annually—a sum perhaps equal to £1,500,000 in these times. It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people of England—affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when they are relieved from all control by the other powers in the state. The sums raised in England during the Commonwealth—that is, from 3d November 1640, to 5th November 1659—amounted to the enormous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of £83,000,000,—being at the rate of nearly £5,000,000 a-year; or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had preceded it. The permanent revenue of Cromwell from the three kingdoms was raised to £1,868,000; or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I.† The total public income at the death of Charles II. was £1,800,000, under James II. £2,000,000; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was not then materially different from what it is at the present moment.‡

* “It is seldom,” says Hume, “that the people gain anything by revolutions in government, because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old: but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money and the tyranny of the Star-Chamber had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the Crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of the administration.”

The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of £83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth, —a striking proof of the despotic character of the executive during that period:—

| | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| Land-tax, | £32,000,000 |
| Excise, | 8,000,000 |
| Tonnage and poundage, | 7,600,000 |
| Sale of Church lands, | 10,035,000 |

Carry forward, £57,635,000

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Brought forward, | £57,635,000 |
| Sequestration of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years, | 3,528,000 |
| Sequestration of private estates in England, | 4,564,000 |
| Occasion rents for five years, Composition with delinquents in Ireland, | 2,965,000 |
| 1,000,000 | |
| Sales of estates in Ireland, | 3,567,000 |
| Other lesser, | 10,074,000 |
| Total, | £83,231,000 |

—PERRER, 139, 140.

| | |
|--|------------|
| † Of this sum, there was drawn from England, | £1,517,274 |
| From Scotland, | 143,652 |
| From Ireland, | 207,790 |

Total, £1,868,716
—PERRER, 140.

| | |
|---|------------|
| ‡ The quarter of wheat, from 1636 to 1701, was on an average, | 51s. 11½d. |
| From 1700 to 1765, | 40s. 6d. |
| From 1764 to 1794, | 44s. 7d. |

In 1835 the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 39s. 8d., and the average of the

4. These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of the house of Orange to the throne. The intimate connection of the princes of that family with Continental politics, and the long wars in which in consequence the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. The Prince of Orange brought from the republic of Holland, where it had been already practised and was thoroughly understood, the important secret of governing popular assemblies, and extracting heavy taxes from popular communities. Like the Roman emperors, he did not discard the senate, but he contrived to render it the instrument of his will. He did not, like the Stuarts, engage the throne in a contest with parliament: on the contrary, he did everything by its votes, and concealed the exactions of the crown under the shadow of the authority of the House of Commons. His whole efforts were directed to gain the majority of the constituencies in the country by corruption, and of votes in parliament by patronage. A vast government expenditure, incurred in a cause at first highly popular, and the profuse contracting of loans on the security of the revenue of future years, afforded the means of doing both. This system proved entirely successful, and it is to its success that the subsequent greatness of the empire is mainly to be ascribed. But for it, the means of raising taxes adequate to the protection, and necessary for the defence, of the empire, would never have been discovered; and England, like Poland, would have fallen a prey to the ambition of the adjoining nations, the resources of which had been drawn forth by the force of despotic power, while no means of developing its own had

five years preceding 1836 was only 48s. The price was much higher during the next five years, but that was the result of uncommonly rainy seasons coming in succession during that whole period.—*Smith's Wealth of Nations*, l. 366; and *Corn Average*, 1835.

been discovered. Great as have been the obligations which England owes in many different views to the Revolution, it is beyond all question the greatest that it brought in a sovereign instructed in the art of overcoming the ignorant impatience of taxation which is the invariable characteristic of free communities, and thus gave it a government capable of turning to the best account the activity and energy of its inhabitants, at the same time that it had the means given it of maintaining their independence.

5. So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled: being raised from £2,000,000 a year to £3,395,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity. Various motives combined to induce the government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-burnings and divisions soon succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of government over a nation thus divided: foreign wars were rightly deemed requisite to maintain the ascendant of the Protestant principles to which the king owed his accession to the throne; and the Continental connections of the house of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles by which the very existence of the commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same cause which led to nearly the duplication of the

public burdens of France by Louis Philippe,* after the revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and originated the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessment of future years. It was justly thought, that the present influence of government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself; and that, by the distribution of the debt among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power of attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank-notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed. But, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages: and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled

produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.

6. It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain were increased after this period. Suffice it to say, that both were largely augmented during the glorious war of the succession; that the long and pacific administration which followed, effected no sensible reduction in their amount; that the checkered contest of 1739, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' war, contributed equally to their increase; and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1783, in the opinion both of Mr Hume and Adam Smith, they must inevitably prove fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was £12,000,000, and the debt £240,000,000, the interest of which absorbed so large a proportion as £9,319,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during its disastrous continuance having been no less than one hundred millions.†

7. It was at this period that Mr Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr Fox and the coalition ministry. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inex-

* The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions, as France and England were at the accessions of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar.—

| | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1824, | 951,000,000, or about £88,000,000 |
| 1825, | 946,000,000 .. 37,800,000 |
| 1826, | 942,000,000 .. 37,000,000 |
| 1827, | 986,000,000 .. 39,400,000 |
| 1828, | 939,000,000 .. 37,500,000 |
| 1829, | 975,000,000 .. 39,000,000 |
| 1830, Revolution in July, | 981,063,900 .. 39,200,000 |
| 1831, Louis Philippe, | 1,511,000,000 .. 60,400,000 |
| 1832, | 1,109,000,000 .. 44,000,000 |
| 1833, | 1,120,000,000 .. 44,800,000 |

—*Stat. de France*, published by government.

† The following table exhibits, in a clear and condensed form, the increase of the public

troubles, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking-fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the preceding years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed now more than two-thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable

prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening at no distant period to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. Little foresight was required to show that, in the course of events, wars and changes must arise, which would render it indispensable for the government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities. But how could any administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralysing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

revenue, and progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1688 to the present times

| | Debt. | Interest | Public Revenue. |
|---|--------------|-------------|-----------------|
| National Debt at the Revolution, | £664,263 | £39,805 | £2,001,882 |
| Increase during the Reign of William, | 15,730,439 | 1,271,067 | |
| Debt at the accession of Queen Anne, | 16,394,702 | 1,310,922 | 3,395,205 |
| Increase during the Reign of Queen Anne, | 37,750,661 | 2,040,416 | |
| Debt at the accession of George I., | 54,145,363 | 3,371,369 | 5,091,808 |
| Decrease during the reign of George I., | 2,068,128 | 132,507 | |
| Debt at the accession of George II., | 52,092,235 | 3,217,561 | 6,762,468 |
| Decrease during the peace, | 5,137,612 | 253,526 | |
| Debt at the opening of the war, 1739, | 46,954,623 | 2,964,035 | 6,874,000 |
| Increase during the war, | 31,338,680 | 1,066,979 | |
| Debt at the end of the war, 1748, | 78,293,312 | 4,061,014 | 8,023,000 |
| Decrease during the peace, | 3,721,472 | 664,277 | |
| Debt at the opening of the war, 1756, | 74,571,840 | 3,396,737 | 7,127,164 |
| Increase during the war, | 72,111,001 | 2,444,104 | |
| Debt at the end of the war in 1763, | 146,682,844 | 5,840,841 | 8,523,440 |
| Decrease during the peace, | 10,739,793 | 364,000 | |
| Debt at the opening of the American war, 1776, | 135,943,051 | 5,476,841 | 10,266,405 |
| Increase during the war, | 102,541,819 | 3,843,084 | |
| Debt at the peace of 1783, | 238,484,870 | 9,319,925 | 11,062,000 |
| Decrease during the peace, | 4,751,261 | 143,569 | |
| Debt at the opening of the war, 1793, | 233,733,609 | 9,176,356 | 10,658,914 |
| Increase during the war, | 295,105,668 | 10,252,152 | |
| Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February 1801, | 528,839,277 | 19,428,508 | 34,113,146 |
| Increase during the second war, | 835,923,164 | 12,796,796 | |
| Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st February 1816, | 864,822,441 | 32,225,304 | 72,210,512 |
| Decrease since the peace, | 82,155,207 | 3,883,341 | |
| Debt on the 5th January 1832, | £782,667,234 | £28,341,463 | £50,000,000 |

—MOREAU and FLEURY'S Tables, 70, 89, 153, 245; and PORTER'S Parl. Tables, i. 1.

8. These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr Pitt; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his understanding with the utmost vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of money at compound interest; and Dr Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great.* Mr Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might, without difficulty, be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed in producing great effects, because they were directed to the annual discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation; they advanced, therefore, by addition, not multiplication—in an arithmetical, not a geometrical ratio. Mr Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy; he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and, inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound, to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam-engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same

laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

9. Mr Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject of the finances,—one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the constitution, sank into insignificance. From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted upon it, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on this subject on the 29th March 1786, "the people of England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions upon which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this House, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it—to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which on many accounts we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties

* A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would, in the year 1775, have amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

of my situation, but by the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate all my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity that which we ourselves have felt the want of,—an efficient sinking-fund for the national debt. To accomplish this is the first wish of my heart; and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt."

10. It is worthy of special notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking-fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired; and, on the contrary, he at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," he said, "by the plausible and popular name of economy—he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy—to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking-fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the sinking-fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies without which the nation must be endangered." Every measure of this great man was directed to great and lasting national objects. He was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

11. In pursuance of these designs, Mr Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of £900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of £100,000—should be granted to his Majesty, to be vested in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sums thus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the further purchase of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan would be secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the people, but from the *dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested in the public trustees*. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the *side of the creditor to that of the debtor*—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would, to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction. "If this million," said Mr Pitt, "to be so applied, is to be laid out, with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation; and this will diminish the debt of this

* The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of five per cent, is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that £20,000,000, is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for £1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of £200,000 to be annually applied to the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progress

country so much, as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the basis of this country; for if the original sinking-fund had been properly preserved, it can easily be proved, that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome; but this, as yet, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his convenience, gotten hold of this sum which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long, very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House, and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law

as of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt; *it must for ever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war.* To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan.”*

12. Nor was Mr Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments; but he pointed out with too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amidst the necessities or weaknesses of future administrations. “No man,” said he, “in existence, was, or ever had been, a greater friend to the principle of a sinking-fund than I have been, from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking-fund, for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals to whom the faith of parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions at

sive growth in ten years will stand as follows:—

| | |
|-----------------------------|----------|
| First year's surplus, . . . | £200,000 |
| Second, | 210,000 |
| Third, | 220,500 |
| Fourth, | 231,250 |
| Fifth, | 242,562 |
| Sixth, | 253,078 |
| Seventh, | 265,654 |
| Eighth, | 273,286 |
| Ninth, | 292,114 |
| Tenth, | 306,661 |

£2,500,105

The wonderful rate at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

* The speech delivered by Mr Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one of the most luminous of his whole parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded,

“That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was pre-occupied. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up, but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far-extended speech, as Mr Fox called it, without one omission or error.”—WILLIAM PITT—No. V.; *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxxvi. 552; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by Dr Croly, one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when parliament stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking-fund, or enabling government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents? Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in the composition of his scheme, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and on the 26th May, the King gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

13. The sinking-fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate period; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which

followed soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy of Mr Pitt is to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never on any pretence whatever to be departed from, that, when any additional loan was contracted, provision should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr Pitt, "not to confine our views to the sinking-fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time so severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter, we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should of course be issued out of the consolidated fund,* to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, an additional sum sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking-fund, after reaching its largest amount, will discharge what will then remain of the present debt. To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, £100,000 should be raised in addition to the

* The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which was amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated during war among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose that £200,000 a-year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking-fund." Mr Fox stated, "That he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt, and that as strongly when on the Ministerial as when on the Opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr Pitt, but he wished it as warmly." In conformity with the united opinion of these great men, it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "That whenever in future any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one per cent on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be placed to the account of the commissioners." Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty be expected in little more than forty years.

14. Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking fund was managed, till 1802: and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking-fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not indeed by Mr Pitt, but by Mr Addington, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now £488,000,000; its interest, including the charges of the sinking-fund, £23,000,000. It is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking-fund should be removed; and that both that original

fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to: it being enacted, "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking-fund of £1,000,000, with the £200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund to be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years. Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking-fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking fund which he established, down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

15. From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that the sinking-fund of a million which Mr Pitt established in 1786, had increased, by accumulation at compound interest, and the great additions drawn from the one per cent on the vast loans from 1792 to 1812, to the enormous sum of *fifteen millions and a half yearly* in 1813, while the debt which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than £238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years; whereas Mr Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years; the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of five per cent. The subsequent £200,000 a-year granted, undoubtedly

accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the prodigious accumulation which the one per cent on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the subjoined table* showing the sums paid off by the sinking-fund in every year from 1786 to 1813—the loans contracted during that period—the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking-fund rose, with the immense sums borrowed at different periods during the war; and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were £585,000,000, it will not appear surprising, that even the small sum of one per cent on each, regularly

issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked-for accumulation.

16. It is this subsequent addition of one per cent on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking-fund, which has been the cause at once of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr Pitt's financial statements, and delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking-fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply of loans, or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and, mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely during war, for its permanent charac-

* Table showing the sums paid to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in every year from 1792 to 1816, the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those commissioners in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time—MOREAU'S *Tables*; FERRER'S *Tables*, 153, 154, 246; *Parl. Papers*, 1822, &c. 145; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, l. 1, COLQUHOUN, 292, 294; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, n. 296.

| Years. | Sinking-Fund. | Stock Redeemed by Sinking-Fund. | Loans Contracted | Proportion of Loan paid to Sinking-Fund. | Expenditure, including Interest of Debt, Funded and Unfunded, and Sinking-Fund | Total Charge of Debt, including Sinking-Fund. | Revenue. |
|--------|---------------|---------------------------------|------------------|--|--|---|------------|
| | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ |
| 1792 | 1,458,504 | 1,507,100 | | | 16,179,347 | 9,437,863 | 16,382,435 |
| 1793 | 1,534,970 | 1,962,650 | 4,500,000 | | 17,434,767 | 9,890,904 | 17,674,395 |
| 1794 | 1,630,815 | 2,174,405 | 12,907,451 | 1,630,815 | 22,754,366 | 10,715,941 | 17,440,869 |
| 1795 | 1,672,000 | 2,804,945 | 42,090,646 | 1,872,200 | 29,305,477 | 11,061,169 | 17,374,890 |
| 1796 | 2,143,566 | 3,063,455 | 42,736,196 | 2,143,566 | 39,751,091 | 12,345,987 | 18,243,876 |
| 1797 | 2,639,724 | 4,390,670 | 14,620,000 | 2,639,724 | 49,791,533 | 13,683,129 | 18,668,925 |
| 1798 | 3,369,218 | 6,716,153 | 18,000,000 | 3,361,753 | 59,793,857 | 16,405,402 | 20,518,780 |
| 1799 | 4,294,325 | 7,858,109 | 12,500,000 | 3,984,252 | 51,241,798 | 20,108,885 | 23,607,945 |
| 1800 | 4,649,871 | 7,221,338 | 1,500,000 | 4,288,208 | 59,296,081 | 21,572,867 | 29,694,098 |
| 1801 | 4,767,992 | 7,315,002 | 34,410,000 | 4,620,479 | 61,617,988 | 21,661,029 | 28,085,829 |
| 1802 | 5,310,511 | 8,091,454 | 23,000,000 | 5,117,723 | 73,072,468 | 23,808,895 | 28,221,183 |
| 1803 | 5,922,979 | 7,733,421 | 10,000,000 | 5,685,542 | 62,373,480 | 25,436,894 | 33,401,738 |
| 1804 | 6,287,940 | 10,527,243 | 10,000,000 | 6,018,170 | 64,912,890 | 25,066,212 | 49,835,978 |
| 1805 | 6,851,900 | 11,395,692 | 21,526,089 | 6,521,394 | 67,619,475 | 26,669,646 | 49,682,471 |
| 1806 | 7,615,167 | 12,234,064 | 18,000,000 | 7,181,482 | 76,056,796 | 28,963,702 | 53,695,124 |
| 1807 | 8,333,329 | 12,807,670 | 12,500,000 | 7,829,588 | 75,154,548 | 30,336,859 | 58,902,291 |
| 1808 | 9,479,165 | 14,171,407 | 12,000,000 | 8,908,673 | 78,989,689 | 32,052,537 | 61,594,118 |
| 1809 | 10,188,007 | 13,965,824 | 19,532,000 | 9,555,853 | 76,565,013 | 32,781,592 | 63,042,746 |
| 1810 | 10,904,451 | 14,352,771 | 16,311,000 | 10,170,104 | 76,865,548 | 33,986,243 | 66,029,349 |
| 1811 | 11,690,601 | 15,659,194 | 24,000,000 | 10,813,016 | 83,735,223 | 35,248,933 | 64,427,371 |
| 1812 | 12,562,860 | 18,147,245 | 27,871,325 | 11,543,681 | 89,757,324 | 36,968,790 | 63,327,433 |
| 1813 | 13,483,160 | 21,107,442 | 68,763,100 | 12,439,631 | 105,945,727 | 38,443,147 | 63,211,422 |
| 1814 | 15,379,262 | 24,120,867 | 18,500,000 | 14,181,006 | 106,832,260 | 41,755,235 | 70,986,245 |
| 1815 | 14,120,963 | 19,149,684 | 45,135,569 | 12,748,281 | 92,280,180 | 42,902,430 | 72,131,214 |
| 1816 | 13,452,695 | 20,280,095 | 3,800,000 | 11,902,051 | 65,169,771 | 43,902,999 | 62,364,546 |

ten, which was to appear chiefly on the return of peace, loudly proclaimed that the whole was founded on an entire delusion: that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans; that at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed, had been actually borrowed since the commencement of the war; that it was impossible that a nation, any more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations; and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income.

17. These doctrines soon spread among a considerable part of the thinking portion of the nation; but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into other channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoleon; and democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal. Attacks on the sinking-fund were eagerly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr Pitt's system, the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth. The meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days. The heedlessness of future consequences, which ever distinguishes the masses of mankind, came to infect general opinion: the aversion to taxation, so general among the many, made them lend a ready ear to any proposed reduction of taxation, without the slightest regard to its influence on the future fortunes of the empire; and a system on which the greatest and best of men in the last age had been united—in commendation of which Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke—was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been

palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

18. Had these doctrines been confined to the declamations of the bustings, or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent, and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed, beyond what their authors intended, as an engine for the purposes of faction or ambition. But unhappily the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion. The prevailing ideas spread to the legislature; and the statesman who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens, without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking-fund till it was totally extinguished. During the great convulsion of 1832, the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The same mournful notice has since repeatedly been sent forth from the same office, accompanied, in some cases, with the still more alarming intelligence, that during a profound peace a considerable addition had been made annually to the total amount of the national debt. The principle acted upon since 1823, when it was first announced in parliament, has been to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the jealousy of expenditure incident to a democratic system, can never be expected to be considerable, Mr Pitt's sinking-fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed.*

19. In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form an

* The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the sinking-fund from the

important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history. But it is only by attending to the abandonment of Mr Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned, which, so far as human wisdom could, had guarded against the evils which must, to all appearance, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British empire. It is perfectly true, as Mr Hamilton and the opponents of the sinking-fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial opera-

tions—by borrowing with one hand, while you pay off with another; and unquestionably Mr Pitt never imagined that if the nation was paying off ten millions a-year, and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking-fund; because, as long as larger sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no *present* benefit to the state; nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But, all

time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken upon by Mr Vanstert in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1838:—

| Years. | Stock Redeemed. | Money applied to Reduction of Debt. | Total Amount of Funded Debt. | Years. | Stock Redeemed. | Money applied to Reduction of Debt. | Total Amount of Funded Debt. |
|--------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ |
| 1786 | 662,000 | 500,000 | 239,693,900 | 1813 | 24,244,039 | 16,064,057 | 661,409,958 |
| 1787 | 1,503,900 | 1,000,000 | 239,200,719 | 1814 | 27,552,230 | 14,431,957 | 740,023,535 |
| 1788 | 1,506,000 | 1,000,000 | 237,697,665 | 1815 | 22,599,653 | 14,241,897 | 732,857,236 |
| 1789 | 1,558,000 | 1,150,000 | 236,181,315 | 1816 | 24,001,083 | 13,945,917 | 816,311,940 |
| 1790 | 1,587,500 | 1,230,000 | 234,632,465 | 1817 | 23,117,541 | 14,514,457 | 796,200,168 |
| 1791 | 1,507,100 | 1,371,000 | 233,624,965 | 1818 | 19,480,982 | 15,339,483 | 776,742,408 |
| 1792 | 1,962,050 | 1,458,504 | 231,637,865 | 1819 | 19,648,469 | 16,305,590 | 791,607,314 |
| 1793 | 2,174,465 | 1,634,972 | 229,614,446 | 1820 | 31,191,702 | 17,409,773 | 794,960,480 |
| 1794 | 2,804,945 | 1,872,957 | 234,034,718 | 1821 | 24,518,885 | 17,219,957 | 801,565,316 |
| 1795 | 3,063,455 | 2,143,697 | 247,877,237 | 1822 | 23,605,931 | 18,889,319 | 795,312,767 |
| 1796 | 4,390,670 | 2,639,956 | 301,861,306 | 1823 | 17,866,686 | 7,482,325 | 796,530,144 |
| 1797 | 6,790,023 | 3,393,214 | 355,323,774 | 1824 | 4,828,530 | 10,652,050 | 791,701,612 |
| 1798 | 8,102,875 | 4,093,164 | 381,626,838 | 1825 | 10,583,782 | 6,093,475 | 781,123,322 |
| 1799 | 9,550,004 | 4,528,568 | 414,936,334 | 1826 | 3,313,834 | 5,621,231 | 778,128,365 |
| 1800 | 10,713,168 | 4,908,378 | 423,367,547 | 1827 | 2,886,528 | 5,704,706 | 788,801,739 |
| 1801 | 10,491,325 | 5,528,315 | 447,147,194 | 1828 | 7,261,414 | 4,667,965 | 777,476,890 |
| 1802 | 9,436,389 | 6,114,033 | 497,043,439 | 1829 | 6,035,414 | 4,569,485 | 772,323,540 |
| 1803 | 13,181,667 | 6,494,694 | 522,231,796 | 1830 | 6,495,485 | 4,545,465 | 771,251,932 |
| 1804 | 12,960,629 | 7,438,929 | 524,260,642 | 1831 | 3,304,729 | 1,063,093 | 757,446,897 |
| 1805 | 13,759,647 | 9,402,658 | 545,803,318 | 1832 | 9,079 | 5,696 | 754,106,540 |
| 1806 | 15,341,709 | 10,025,419 | 573,529,932 | 1833 | 1,321,749 | 1,023,704 | 751,658,883 |
| 1807 | 16,064,962 | 10,183,579 | 593,694,287 | 1834 | 2,461,927 | 1,776,378 | 745,675,299 |
| 1808 | 16,181,680 | 10,584,694 | 601,733,073 | 1835 | 1,848,791 | 1,270,050 | 758,549,860 |
| 1809 | 16,636,643 | 11,359,579 | 604,287,474 | 1836 | 2,169,700 | 1,590,727 | 761,428,570 |
| 1810 | 17,834,234 | 12,095,691 | 614,789,091 | 1837 | 1,968,219 | 1,300,609 | 763,630,532 |
| 1811 | 20,733,354 | 13,075,977 | 624,301,936 | 1838 | nil. | nil. | 762,771,224 |
| 1812 | 21,322,168 | 14,078,577 | 635,583,448 | | | | |

—*Porter's Parl. Tables*, I. and II. 6, 8; *FERRER'S Tables*, 247; *MOREAU'S Tables*; *PORTER'S Progress of the Nation*, II. 260; and for 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, pp. 3, 4, each year.

N.B.—This table exhibits the progress of the sinking-fund and stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table, applicable to Great Britain alone.

Since 1833 to 1843, no money has been applied to the reduction of the national debt; on the contrary, fresh debt, to the amount of £10,000,000, has been contracted, being at the average of £1,660,000 a-year. About as much has been paid off since 1843, but wholly by the operation of the war income-tax.—*Porter's Parl. Tables*, vii. 4, and viii. 4.

that notwithstanding Mr Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt was founded not only on consummate wisdom, but on a thorough knowledge of human nature. To be convinced of this we have only to look to the causes which have led to the abandonment of the sinking-fund since the war, and the state in which that abandonment has left the finances of the empire.

20. Mr Pitt never looked to the sinking-fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year: he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt *in time of peace*.^{*} It was then that its real effect was to be seen: it was then that the debt contracted during war

^{*} Mr Pitt's speech on the budget in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking-fund during war; but always looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased, in consequence of the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking-fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy,—we shall have to go far before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the war. Yet there are means by which I am confident it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise, and not less practicable, to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year: and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking-fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. I cannot indeed take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation; but if the means I have pointed out are adopted, and resolutely adhered to, it will leave us at least stationary."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxiii. 1058, 1054.

was to be really discharged. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance; indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation felt by mankind in general, and the especial desire always experienced, when the excitement of war ceases, that its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to get the popular representatives, at the conclusion of a contest, to lay on *new* taxes, and provide for a sinking-fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so that it might be at once brought forward in entire and efficient operation, upon the conclusion of hostilities, without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

21. From what has now been stated, it will readily be discerned in what the grand merit of Mr Pitt's financial system consisted. It was the imposition, by law, of sufficient *indirect* taxes to meet not only the interest of every new loan, but a hundredth part more to provide a sinking-fund for the extinction of its capital, which was its grand distinction. It brought the nation successfully through the crisis of the war, and would have proved the ultimate salvation of the empire, if it had been adhered to with the steadiness which he so earnestly impressed upon the nation, and if no subsequent monetary change had rendered impossible the continuance of the indirect taxes necessary to uphold the system. There was neither juggle nor deception in

this. It was a very plain and practical operation,—viz. the providing a surplus of taxation to eat in at compound interest on the capital of the debt. This principle of providing such a surplus is the well-known and indispensable preliminary to every system for the reduction of burdens, whether in public or private. It was in the building upon that foundation the superstructure of a regular invariable system, and bestowing on it the wonderful powers of compound interest, that Mr Pitt's great merit consisted. It was the subsequent repeal of the indirect taxes laid on to provide this surplus fund during peace, when there was no necessity whatever for such a measure, and no motive for it but the thirst for temporary applause in successive administrations, or the difficulty of upholding the indirect taxes, owing to a ruinous and unlooked-for contraction of the currency, which was the real evil that ruined this noble fabric, and has rendered the debt a hopeless burden on the nation. And if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by recollecting the example of France prior to the Revolution, when the system went on for half a century before that crisis, of borrowing large sums annually, and making no provision whatever for payment even of their annual interest, in consequence of which the finances got involved in such a state of hopeless embarrassment as, by rendering the convocation of the States-general unavoidable in a moment of extraordinary excitement, overturned the monarchy.

22. The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking-fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt—amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In the sixteen years from 1816 to 1832, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of five per

cent granted to the holders of the five per cents, which were reduced to four: that is, it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions.* It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

23. Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr Pitt's unbending self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking-fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has, to all practical purposes, swallowed it entirely up. The sinking-fund, when thus broken upon, has proved the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to

| | |
|-----------------------------|--------------|
| * Funded debt on January 5, | |
| 1816, | £816,311,940 |
| Unfunded ditto, | 48,510,501 |
| | <hr/> |
| Total, | £864,822,441 |
| Total debt on 5th January | |
| 1832,—viz: | |
| Funded, £54,180,540 | |
| Unfunded, 27,752,650 | |
| | <hr/> |
| | 781,858,190 |

Paid off in sixteen years, . . . £32,960,242

—Annual Finance Statement, 1833; and *PERMANENT*, 246; and *PORTER'S Parliamentary Tables*, ii. 6.

effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the conclusion of hostilities, with a view to effect a diminution of the public debt; and how completely dependent, therefore, the sinking-fund was for its very existence upon Mr Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view, *without any application to the legislature*, by the mere cessation of borrowing, on the return of peace.*

24. Not a shadow of a doubt can

* In Mr Pitt's Financial Resolutions, in the year 1790, which embrace a vast variety of important financial details, there is the clearest indication of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was,—

"That supposing the price of 8 per cent stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, £90 in time of peace, and £75 in time of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about £85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about forty years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793 will be redeemed in about forty-seven years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable), taxes would be set free in each year of peace to the amount of £133,000, and of war to that of £168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would, in the course of the same period, gradually rise from £5,000,000 to £10,000,000; and that, on the suppositions before stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of £10,000,000, and about 1846, further taxes to the amount of £4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793; making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of £19,000,000 yearly." Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and experience has now proved that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repealed, these anticipations would have been more than realised, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.

now remain that Mr Pitt's and Mr Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1845. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the commissioners the whole sinking-fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836 would, at five per cent, have been above five hundred millions, and the sinking-fund would now (1835) have been paying off above forty millions a-year.† Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking-fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent, which, on an average, is probably not far from the truth, the fund applicable to the re-

† Table I., showing what the sinking-fund, accumulating at five per cent, if maintained at £15,000,000 a-year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836.—

| | |
|--------|-------------|
| 1816 | £15,000,000 |
| 1817 | 15,750,000 |
| 1818 | 16,537,500 |
| 1819 | 17,363,870 |
| 1820 | 18,231,973* |
| 1821 | 19,143,566 |
| 1822 | 20,100,774 |
| 1823 | 21,005,038 |
| 1824 | 22,055,284 |
| 1825 | 23,157,048 |
| 1826 | 24,315,572 |
| 1827 | 25,530,240 |
| 1828 | 26,830,360 |
| 1829 | 28,181,423 |
| 1830 | 29,580,464 |
| 1831 | 31,079,690 |
| 1832 | 33,158,577 |
| 1833 | 34,816,000 |
| 1834 | 36,524,625 |
| * 1835 | 37,298,312 |
| 1836 | 39,000,214 |

Total in 20 years, £533,708,480

Table II., showing what the sinking-fund, if maintained from the taxes at £10,000,000

duction of the debt would now have been above twenty millions annually; and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of funded property would not probably have been consistent; either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury.

25. Everything, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but on an accurate knowledge of human nature, a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind, that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the wars of the French Revolution might have been discharged in

sterling, and if accumulating at four per cent only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836:—

| | |
|------|-------------|
| 1816 | £10,000,000 |
| 1817 | 10,400,000 |
| 1818 | 10,816,200 |
| 1819 | 11,234,000 |
| 1820 | 11,755,560 |
| 1821 | 12,271,544 |
| 1822 | 12,788,404 |
| 1823 | 13,305,540 |
| 1824 | 13,823,760 |
| 1825 | 14,342,948 |
| 1826 | 14,862,944 |
| 1827 | 15,383,540 |
| 1828 | 15,904,880 |
| 1829 | 16,426,832 |
| 1830 | 16,949,464 |
| 1831 | 17,473,240 |
| 1832 | 17,997,032 |
| 1833 | 18,520,824 |
| 1834 | 19,044,616 |
| 1835 | 19,568,408 |
| 1836 | 20,092,200 |

Total in 20 years, £331,005,428

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the £331,005,428 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or £367,000,000. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at an average of 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the £331,005,428 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or £385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment (1836).

little more than the time which was occupied in its contraction. What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to under the severest trials with unshaken fidelity? The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen: in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the fatal contraction of the currency in 1819, which rendered the continuance of the indirect taxes which formed the basis of the sinking-fund difficult, and in the end impossible; in the advent of times when government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain.

26. When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "for," said he, "if you had spoken wisely, these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest misasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual amongst them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage. The learned fiercely assailed the sinking-

fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile imposture, incapable of standing the examination of reason or experience. The Opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; the after tax was repealed amidst the applause of the whole nation; the general concurrence in the work of destruction for a time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amidst mutual compliments from the Opposition to the Ministerial benches, the broad foundations of British greatness were loosened; the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue, to the amount of forty millions a-year, surrendered without any equivalent; and the nation, when it awakened from its trance, found itself saddled for ever with eight-and-twenty millions as the interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and with a democratic constitution which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

27. The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxa-

tion upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when the excitement and expenditure of war were over. The income-tax could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid anything to government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitement and understood necessities of war can render them bearable. His system was, therefore, to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of government—those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security, on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple object was gained. The nation, during the continuance of war, was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties,

* Taxes repealed since the peace of 1814 to 1834:—

| | NET PRODUCE. | GROSS PRODUCE. |
|--|--------------|----------------|
| 1814. War duties on goods, &c. | £932,000 | £948,861 |
| 1815. Ditto. | 222,000 | 222,749 |
| 1816. Property tax and war malt, | 17,547,000 | 17,886,866 |
| 1817. Sweet wines, | 37,000 | 37,818 |
| 1818. Vinegar, &c. | 9,500 | 9,524 |
| 1819. Plate glass, &c. | 269,000 | 278,573 |
| 1820. Beer in Scotland, | 4,000 | 4,000 |
| 1821. Wool, | 471,000 | 490,113 |
| 1822. Annual malt and hides, | 2,139,000 | 2,164,037 |
| 1823. Salt and assessed taxes, | 4,185,000 | 4,266,389 |
| 1824. Thrown silk and salt, | 1,801,000 | 1,805,467 |
| 1825. Wine, salt, &c. | 3,676,000 | 3,771,019 |
| 1826. Rum and British spirits, | 1,967,000 | 1,973,915 |
| 1827. Stamps, | 84,000 | 84,038 |
| 1828. Rice, &c. | 51,000 | 52,227 |
| 1829. Silk, &c. | 126,000 | 128,406 |
| 1830. Beer, hides, and sugar, | 4,070,000 | 4,264,425 |
| 1831. Printed cotton and coals, | 1,588,000 | 3,189,312 |
| 1832. Candies, almonds, raisins, &c. . . . | 747,000 | 754,996 |
| 1833. Soap, tiles, &c. | 1,000,000 | 1,100,000 |
| 1834. House duty, | 1,200,000 | 1,400,000 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| | £42,125,500 | £44,845,530 |
| Laid on in the same time, | 5,813,000 | |
| Net taxation reduced, | £36,312,500 | |

Of which £18,690,000 was direct, and £17,490,000 indirect.—*Parl. Paper*, 14th June 1833, and *Budget*, 1834, *Parl. Deb.*

while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in those indirect duties which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of, from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state, in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amidst the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts, which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

28. Following out these principles, the income-tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt-tax, and in general all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated; but on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking-fund, and none of them repealed, till from the growth of a surplus, after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population, and the constant efforts of general industry, would progressively have enabled government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the

salt tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt-tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since the peace amount to £42,000,000, while £5,000,000 only have been imposed during the same period; and consequently, after the repeal of the income-tax, assessed taxes, and those oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking-fund, even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a-year, would have remained. Thus Mr Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.*

29. If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking-fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable; and therefore that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But unfortunately this was by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has, on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as its future prospects, from the change.

* Total taxes repealed since the peace,

£42,115,000

Might have been repealed, viz.—

| | |
|--------------------------------|------------|
| Property tax and war | |
| malt, | 17,547,000 |
| War duties on goods, | 2,154,000 |
| Annual malt and | |
| hides, | 2,139,000 |
| Salt and assessed | |
| taxes, | 4,185,000 |
| Candles, | 600,000 |
| Soap tax, | 800,000 |
| House tax, | 1,200,000 |

27,625,000

Leaving to support
the sinking-fund, 14,490,000

£42,115,000

Besides £5,815,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period.

In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect, that during the war the nation not only existed, but thrived under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than *half* of what they have since become. During the four last years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five millions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty; although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from twenty-five to thirty; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five; and in the last year the former had swelled to the enormous amount of one hundred and five millions, and the latter to sixty.*

30. Without doubt, the prosperity of the later years of the war was in a great degree fictitious: most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear, that if this had gone on for some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since

that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as in private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation; it is like reducing a patient suddenly from an inflammatory diet to the fare of an anchorite. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but unquestionably the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

31. It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step further, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking-fund? That was the ruinous measure. The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a-year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would to all appearance have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long-run diminishing the national burdens, would at the same time have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the disastrous effects of which, for twenty years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to languish. No one branch of the government expenditure would have gone fur-

| | Raised by taxes. | Official value. Exports. Great Britain and Ireland. | Official value. Imports. Great Britain and Ireland. |
|-------------------|------------------|--|--|
| * 1813, | £63,211,000 | £38,226,283 | £35,163,411 |
| 1814, | 70,926,000 | | |
| 1815, | 72,210,000 | 52,573,034 | 33,755,264 |
| 1816, | 62,264,000 | 58,624,600 | 32,987,396 |
| 1830, | 55,824,802 | 69,691,302 | 46,245,241 |
| 1831, | 54,810,190 | 71,429,004 | 49,713,889 |
| 1832, | 50,990,315 | 70,071,572 | 44,586,241 |
| 1836, | 48,591,180 | 97,621,549 | 57,230,968 |
| 1837, | 47,090,000 | 85,781,669 | 54,737,301 |
| 1838, | 47,978,753 | 105,170,549 | 61,268,330 |

—PEPPER'S *Tables*, 150, 341; PORTER'S *Tables*, i. 48, and ii. 49; *Finance Accounts*, 27th March 1839; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

ther to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking-fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a-year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty, thirty, and forty millions annually, applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum in loans, during the war, occasioned.

32. The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that, since 1820, they would have been constantly kept at from ninety to one hundred. The effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the government expenditure in other departments, must have been immense. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in amount, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking-fund would have operated like a great forcing-pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work could only have been drawn from the nation, as the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry. But experience has abundantly proved

that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income to such a productive investment, is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if, from an undue regard to popular clamour, it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner, not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilising of his fields and the draining of his morasses.

33. Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and increasing purchases of the commissioners, would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out, in order to realise the great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt, would have altogether counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going further than either reason or experience will justify. But this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively an endurable burden—that the nation would, to all appearance, have been much more prosperous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two-thirds of the national debt. This prosperity, doubtless, would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital; but, whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only

for its discharge—and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

34. Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking-fund and Mr Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that if the demands of government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, its demands on government must instantly undergo a similar diminution; that if the exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a-year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it was not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers; whereas, in truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real. Though a diminution of those burdens was effected, it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when such demand could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes and consequent abandonment of the sinking-fund necessarily occasioned, and which the maintenance of its machinery, till it had fulfilled its destined purpose, would to a very great degree have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious expedience for its recommendation, but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages

for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

35. Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain that heavy impost, as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income-tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities; and its weight was so excessive, that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit government to a contest with the nation on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above thirty millions a-year, when they were not complained of, and when the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr Pitt's principles.

36. The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result. It is not unlikely that, from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and history cannot acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous, popular weakness; and if they could not prevail on the House

of Commons to adhere to Mr Pitt's financial system, they should at least have laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment. And as the repeal of indirect taxes during peace was the fatal error, so the return to an income-tax during the burdens of the Chinese, and the disasters of the Affghanistaun wars, in 1842, was a wise and manly measure, as much in accordance with the spirit of Mr Pitt's financial policy as the previous calamitous reductions of indirect taxes had been against it.

It was impossible to explain Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's apology for the anachronism; and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

37. It is evident that, in some cases, the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, the interest of which is alone laid as a burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and if possible would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contexts, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so it is always advisable, to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income; so that, at the conclusion of hostilities, no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When, in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure; nor is it reasonable, in such cases, to lay

upon those who, for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalisation of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amidst all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation; or to resist the conclusion deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application, at the close of the war, that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed.*

38. But this system, like everything good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity and conducted with prudence — unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing

* Loans contracted by the British government in the latter years of the war:—

| | |
|-----------------|-------------|
| 1812, | £24,000,000 |
| 1813, | 27,871,000 |
| 1814, | 58,763,000 |
| 1815, | 18,500,000 |

Of these great loans upwards of £12,000,000 was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to the subsidising of foreign powers, in consequence of which the whole armies of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 80,000 men, was maintained on the southern frontier of France.—*MOREAU'S Tables*; PERRER, 246.

is to nations, not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leaving the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause, which has overwhelmed almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages. The existence of the means of relieving present difficulties by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by government, that, by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

39. Mr Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and of the ultimate dangers of the funding system. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue which present appearances seemed to afford. During its earlier years, when the Continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war supplies of the year were raised by that means; * provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and of the sinking-fund for the extinction of these loans, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the

national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged. It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of a hundred and sixteen million pounds was contracted before the Continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not, whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the contest it might speedily be brought to a successful issue? That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the Allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, let slip the means of triumph when within their grasp.

40. The financial measures of the British minister, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent: the real error consisted in the misapplication or undue husbanding of the land forces of the country, for which it is not so easy to find an apology. But after the peace of Campo Formio, in 1797, this system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle. Her Continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle; and the utmost that she could now expect was, to continue a defensive warfare till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having

| * LOANS CONTRACTED. | | |
|---------------------|------------|--|
| * 1793, | £4,500,000 | |
| 1794, | 12,907,451 | |
| 1795, | 42,000,646 | |
| 1796, | 42,736,196 | |
| 1797, | 14,620,000 | |

—MOREAU'S Tables.

£116,854,293

now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798:—

41. "Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth, and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the embarrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success, is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy, will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour, and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that, after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, or in a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever,

is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause, and to the supply of our own exigencies; by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

42. "To guard against the undue accumulation of the public debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed anything which has been raised at any former period at one time; but I trust that, whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle, by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations; and that, while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view -- if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert -- great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance. The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the

manner, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements, which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the proportion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into execution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardship in every individual instance; but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting the large deficiency which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year."

43. In pursuance of these admirable principles, Mr Pitt proposed to treble the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages; and that the house and window taxes, which in a great measure are borne by the middle ranks, should only be doubled; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the committee of the House of Commons; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never exceeded four millions and a half—a deficiency which demonstrated that the limits of indirect taxation on these objects had been passed, and rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year. The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr Pitt's plan, to be continued only for a limited time, and kept up only as a war burden.

44. "I propose," said he, "that the

increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking-fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exoneration of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope that, by stopping short of this effort, you will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and, by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability; the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware it will be said that it would have been fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated; but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sum by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it; but on the other hand, you find its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest, which, in forty years, will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language, fit for men legislating for a country that, from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow circumscribed sphere of short-sighted selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity, a sum of between forty and fifty

millions sterling." And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve everything dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity."

45. Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge the whole principal sums themselves. An admirable plan and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance—that of making the supplies raised within the year equal, or nearly equal, to the expenditure. It was soon, however, departed from amidst the necessities or profusion of future years; and from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it adds to the public, it was necessarily attended both with greatly more present suffering, and far less counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

46. The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr Pitt's administration. But, in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a niggardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort, it appeared possible to obtain, during the absence of Napoleon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects

of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr Pitt proposed the income-tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and, if considered as a war impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive, and, for such circumstances, the most expedient, that could be adopted. The grounds on which this addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr Pitt:—

47. "The principles of finance which the House adopted last year, were, first, to reduce the total amount to be at present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount; and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion: but I trust that all who value the national safety, will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts." In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under £60 a-year should pay anything: that, from that up to £200 a-year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for £200 a-year and upwards, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to make disclosure to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was,

if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three-fourths of the rack-rent of their lands. The total taxable income of Great Britain he estimated at £102,000,000 a-year, and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to £9,500,000, for which the income-tax was to be mortgaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged.

48. In opposition to this bill, it was argued by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downwards, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window-tax was a burden on a luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but on income: that is, of imposing a burden which, by no possibility, can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third, or even a half: that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution? The great danger of this tax, therefore, is, that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middle orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middle class, and do it soon: it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great

source of general prosperity; and then we should have only two classes in the community—and a miserable community it would be—of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means, is doubtless just: but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary—it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income may spend what portion of it he chooses, without injury to his heirs: but income resulting from personal industry, or from profession, stands in a very different situation; for it is necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed: and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who, in all probability, will be the more extravagant: and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the far-spread injustice be inflicted, which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration."

49. The income-tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799, the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, £18,500,000, besides £3,000,000 of exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary, if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr Pitt that no less than £120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account—a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and

providing them in great part by the funding system. The system of Mr Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy; and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required beyond one or two years; and, in consequence, it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income-tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it came to violate the principle that these direct taxes being a burdensome impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1798 to 1801, the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct war taxes was no less than fifty-six millions.

50. The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking-fund required for their redemption; and, in 1802, when Mr Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this £56,000,000, as well as £40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war. For the whole of this immense sum of £96,000,000 he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but for the sinking fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt that this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle—which is, that the whole sums required for the in-

terest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and that direct burdens should be reserved only for the extraordinary efforts made during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure.

51. The changes which have now been mentioned embraced all the leading principles of Mr Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of chancellor of the exchequer:—"In the year 1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, "the proportion of the sinking-fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being £5,835,000, and the latter £480,572,000. But in the year ending 1st February 1806, the sinking-fund amounted to £7,566,000, and the unredeemed debt was then £517,280,000; making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this, it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking-fund, or to detain the House with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the House to cling to it as their sheet-anchor for the future, they were called to support it, from having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact that, during the first ten years of the war, the increase of the debt was £253,000,000—being at the

rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a-year : whereas, during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downwards, the total sum borrowed has been £36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a-year only."

52. With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans annually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and the amounts requisite for the immediate redemption of the principals of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr Hume:—"The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously imposed; and being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the others. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting a universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenues of the empire. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition, that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as

they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans." It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr Pitt's financial measures, that he not only provided, in permanent imposts, for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking-fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially restricted to those years only during which the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

53. In addition to these forcible reasons for always, except in cases of obvious necessity, and when national resources are exhausted, preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish Pashas or the Indian Rajahs, have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason, though not apparent at first sight, when stated, appears entirely satisfactory. It consists in a difference to the resources of the state similar to that experienced in agriculture upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below, after it has fertilised numerous plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, before it is

withdrawn, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the government may be the same in both cases; but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the tax-collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax, and, by their united efforts and increased economy in production, discharge it without difficulty; a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone, and if he attempts to throw it upon another, he is immediately met by a diminished sale for his produce. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive, it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form; that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future subsistence.

54. Nor is there any foundation for the obvious reply to this argument, based on the observation, that if the productions of industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralysed as if the impact were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind have everywhere rejected its authority. No complaint was made during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain; but so burdensome was the income-tax, producing only fourteen millions a-year, felt to be, that all the efforts of government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals

opened by the Reform Bill, upon the legislators, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a half extracted directly by the assessed taxes, which were made the subject of such loud complaint, that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are felt as most oppressive by them at the moment.

55. Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse soever it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not in reality fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery for production of the article taxed, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguishes the burden. The proof of this is decisive: the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war: many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during that period, were sold at half the price at its termination which they brought at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the permanent expenses of the nation by the indirect taxes; of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention during peace of direct,

and the Jewish relinquishment of indirect taxes.

56. It results from these principles, that when an indirect tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material, or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or to lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption; it becomes a direct burden on production, and, if unduly heavy, may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in Great Britain in regard to the heavy import duties on sugar. The burden formerly of thirty shillings, then of twenty-seven shillings, and afterwards of twenty-four shillings the hundredweight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead (from £6 to £6, 10s. the cwt.): but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to twelve or fifteen pounds the hogshead (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt.), including duty, it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent on the rude material—the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production. The cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery; and the stoppage of the slave trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties, and defray the interest of their

mortgages, by raising more extensive crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices, and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive; the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per hundredweight was, in Great Britain, twenty-three shillings and eightpence, excluding duty; while in America it was thirty-six shillings per hundredweight in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than to America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to a hundred per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which had fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.

57. In all fiscal measures on this subject, there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than anything else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, *the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same*; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilised states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, that of producing agricultural produce is always much greater. Great Britain can undersell the world in manufactures, but her farmers would

be ruined without a corn-law—a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.

58. Such were the general features of Mr Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately followed; stigmatised by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amidst the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the governments by which he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing, the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages; inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understandings, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements, it required for its successful development, patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell, because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. It was abandoned, because the Revolution of 1832 placed a single class of society, that of the monied men and traders, in the chief possession of political power. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the Revolutionary war, we feel that we are conversing

with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman, in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and constructed for eternal duration, to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs who dwell amidst their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

59. While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, it is indispensable that we should not draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray. I. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Mr Pitt, is having carried too far, and continued too long, the funding system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterwards so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broken through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugene, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was past—after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Pichegru—after Spain and Prussia had retired from the struggle, and when the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napoleon, the

career of conquest in Italy, it became evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one-half. These loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time on account of the loans of these years, would have been above £120,000,000! So prodigious is the difference, as regards the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the energetic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more acceptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

60. II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding, were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale, and in a way, calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the immense burdens thus imposed on posterity; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the histories of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly accepted a temporary re-

spite from the victorious arms of their fait: after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura against the terrible energy of Suwarroff, and the scientific ability of the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at these periods at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might not the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been brought down by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers, then reposing inactive in the British Islands, on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies!

61. Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote. While the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most judicious exertion of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish present dissipation of its funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportionate efforts in the field had at the same time been made, and if it was evident that nothing had been omitted, which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war. But our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only two hundred and eight thousand men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a sea-girt and inaccessible citadel, never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand, and that only in the two first years of the war. Mr Pitt's plans for military operations

were all based on the action of Continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking off pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence in a great measure the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

62. III. But the greatest of all Mr Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which he carried the ruinous system of borrowing in the three per cents—in other words, inscribing the public creditor for £100 in the books of the bank of England, in consideration of only £60 advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true; though even that advantage, as will immediately appear, was very trifling. But what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable; the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions have been contracted in the three per cents; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to pay in all two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking-fund at 80, on an average—which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr Pitt's estimate in 1799—the surplus to be paid above what was received, would

still be one hundred and fifty millions.

63. Nor have the evils of this improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on somewhat more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the 5 per cents—that is, if a bond for £100 had been given for each £100 only paid into the treasury. But as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with great part of the funds so contracted, of reducing the interest in time of peace? It is impossible to lower the interest of the three per cents till interest generally falls below three per cent; because if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, four per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the five per cents, it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the five per cents, and which, on £157,000,000 only of the debt, the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time £1,700,000 a-year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to three and a half; the two together, after taking into view the dissentients, having saved the nation, *for ever*, £2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the £600,000,000 in the three per cents (£360,000,000 sterling) at £18,000,000 a-year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent, would have been £3,600,000, and by the second of one half per cent, £1,800,000 more; in all, £5,400,000 for ever. The sum

already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years in future the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions.

64. The temporary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner, will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses, with which the system was ultimately attended. It appears, from the curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the 3 per cents and the 5 per cents was seldom above a half per cent, generally not more than a quarter.* What is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled government to have effected on the return of peace! Even supposing the

difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent, what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest for ever to four or three-and-a-half per cent! This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument. And if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an additional loan every year while the inability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than, by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, to have disabled posterity for ever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts. So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that, by a solemn resolution in 1824, parliament

* Take, for example, the following loans contracted in the 3 and 5 per cents, at different periods during the war:—

| | Amounts actually paid into Treasury. | Interest. | Rate per cent. |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|--|
| | £ | £ | |
| 1794. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 1,907,451 | 94,326 | 5 per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 10,806,000 | 502,791 | 4½ per cent. |
| 1795. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 1,490,646 | 80,494 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 17,777,163 | 841,374 | 4½ per cent. |
| 1796. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 2,054,889 | 101,744 | 5 per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 8,500,000 | 498,145 | 5½ per cent. |
| 1797. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 17,815,918 | 1,006,242 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 13,000,000 | 825,500 | 5½ per cent. |
| 1801. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 2,227,012 | 111,380 | 5 per cent. |
| 1806. Loan in 8 per cents, . | 27,519,544 | 1,344,487 | 5½ per cent. |
| 1807. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 1,293,290 | 64,660 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 10,800,000 | 512,400 | 4½ per cent, but £140 stock created for each £80 paid. |
| 1809. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 7,932,100 | 408,878 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, . | 11,600,000 | 638,483 | 4½ per cent. |
| 1811. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 4,909,350 | 253,315 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, . | 11,925,248 | 569,500 | 4½ per cent. |
| 1814. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 5,540,400 | 277,470 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 per cents, . | 12,345,076 | 574,362 | 4½ per cent. |
| 1815. Loan in 5 per cents, . | 10,313,000 | 603,810 | 5½ per cent. |
| Do. in 3 and 4 per cents, . | 27,000,000 | 1,517,400 | 5½ per cent. |

—FERBER'S Tables, 246, from MOREAU.

It clearly appears, from this remarkable table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the 3 and the 5 per cents, from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears; for the public creditors were frequently, in the three per cents, inscribed for much more than £100 in consideration of £60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than £140 of stock for each £80 paid.

pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the 5 per cents: a resolution worthy of the British legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget, but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praiseworthy determinations, amidst the warlike profusion or democratic pressure of subsequent times.*

55. It is true, as Mr Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking-fund, and had provided means which, if steadily adhered to, would *unquestionably have produced that result* even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt, are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the 3 per cents could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal

itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated, was the purchase of stock by the sinking-fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they by no means exculpate Mr Pitt as regards these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 85 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking-fund which he himself had established; and the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effects of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements.†

66. To Mr Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are even yet far from being exhausted. The SUSPENSION OF CASH PAYMENTS in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a

* The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents, but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject in a company consisting of the most eminent and intelligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended, that if Mr Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a little loan to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that the money could not have been obtained on other terms; and the "little" loan became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr Anderson of Moredun, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes and Co. of Edinburgh, he will recur, perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

† It is a common opinion that the great expenses of Mr Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during the whole war only amounted to £52,528,470, of which no less than £38,000,000 were advanced during the three last years. At Mr Pitt's death the sum was only £6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war, were as given in the following table;—

measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century. When taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the productiveness of the Spanish mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, it led the way to a series of changes in prices, and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico, and which has already subverted the former balance of power in the interior of Great Britain. To it the future historian will perhaps point

as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate decline of the British empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its elucidation, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency, from the rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is at the same time made the subject of discussion.

67. At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed

| Years | Subsidies to Foreign Powers. | Army. | | Civil List. | Ordnance. | Navy, Total. | Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded. | Total Expenditure. |
|--------|------------------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--|--------------------|
| | | Ordinary. | Extraordinary. | | | | | |
| | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ | £ |
| 1793 | 2,198,200 | 4,167,312 | 1,021,536 | 843,603 | 2,464,307 | 10,715,941 | 22,754,868 | |
| 1794 | 4,000 | 9,209,236 | 1,027,761 | 1,500,767 | 4,219,156 | 11,081,159 | 29,305,477 | |
| 1795 | 810,500 | 14,562,737 | 1,025,842 | 1,968,008 | 8,135,140 | 12,945,987 | 39,751,091 | |
| 1796 | 99,500 | 13,738,350 | 1,125,053 | 2,590,000 | 7,780,868 | 13,683,129 | 40,761,563 | |
| 1797 | — | 16,208,690 | 1,081,046 | 2,121,552 | 11,984,031 | 16,405,402 | 50,739,857 | |
| 1798 | 120,012 | 7,986,297 | 3,165,854 | 1,111,376 | 1,713,355 | 12,591,728 | 20,108,885 | |
| 1799 | 325,000 | 9,894,716 | 4,241,433 | 1,208,067 | 2,221,516 | 13,036,490 | 21,572,867 | |
| 1800. | 2,613,178 | 9,971,869 | 3,906,000 | 1,247,420 | 1,918,967 | 14,869,468 | 21,661,029 | |
| 1801 | 200,114 | 8,838,266 | 5,347,174 | 1,290,136 | 2,165,069 | 17,303,370 | 23,808,895 | |
| 1802 | — | 6,951,193 | 2,635,063 | 1,338,766 | 1,500,733 | 11,704,400 | 25,436,894 | |
| 1803 | — | 8,134,315 | 3,165,092 | 1,425,545 | 1,827,150 | 7,979,878 | 25,066,212 | |
| 1804 | — | 12,183,891 | 3,560,804 | 1,417,517 | 3,550,142 | 11,759,352 | 28,669,646 | |
| 1805 | — | 10,758,343 | 6,261,387 | 1,914,104 | 4,782,289 | 14,466,998 | 28,963,702 | |
| 1806 | — | 9,282,192 | 5,829,000 | 1,676,323 | 5,511,064 | 16,094,028 | 30,336,859 | |
| 1807 | — | 9,556,684 | 5,431,867 | 1,680,061 | 4,190,748 | 16,775,762 | 32,052,577 | |
| 1808 | 1,400,000 | 11,363,390 | 5,847,760 | 1,724,147 | 5,108,960 | 17,467,891 | 32,781,592 | |
| 1809 | 2,050,000 | 12,591,041 | 5,872,054 | 1,696,994 | 4,374,184 | 19,236,037 | 33,998,223 | |
| 1810 | 2,660,103 | 11,357,623 | 7,178,677 | 1,651,297 | 4,652,333 | 20,054,412 | 35,248,933 | |
| 1811 | 2,977,747 | 13,753,163 | 10,116,846 | 1,582,097 | 4,357,509 | 19,540,679 | 36,388,790 | |
| 1812 | 5,315,828 | 15,382,050 | 9,605,313 | 1,748,349 | 4,252,416 | 20,500,339 | 38,443,147 | |
| 1813 | 11,394,416 | 18,500,985 | 10,968,535 | 1,708,526 | 3,404,582 | 21,996,624 | 41,755,285 | |
| 1814 | 19,024,624 | 16,532,945 | 17,662,610 | 1,675,152 | 4,480,729 | 21,961,567 | 42,912,440 | |
| 1815 | 11,985,248 | 23,172,137 | 1,682,051 | 2,963,892 | 16,373,970 | 43,902,989 | 65,169,771 | |
| Totals | £3,126,470 | 384,787,438 | 32,936,125 | 71,082,262 | 328,236,415 | 619,830,178 | 1,539,176,633 | |

—MOREAU and PORTER.

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of after a hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirtieth, the latter hardly a forty-eighth of the total expenditure. The vastness of the sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted; for it gave Britain the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; coinciding thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the niggardly use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficiency, which was the real reproach of Mr Pitt's administration.

to Mr Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor, like the subsequent changes of a similar kind in this country, of monied selfishness and theoretical opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national bankruptcy, stared him in the face, if the momentous step was any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at subsequent periods, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all the resources of the kingdom. No doubt, however, can remain that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war, and is to be regarded as the principal cause of its successful termination. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when, from over-issue, it becomes depreciated, or, from distrust of government, discredited, or when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place, that the perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amidst this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependants. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every new demand upon them, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all

classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the expansion of the currency, as productive of present strength, as the opposite system of contracting it, after the contest was over, was conducive to future weakness. No financial embarrassments of any moment were experienced while the war lasted, subsequent to 1797. In vain Napoleon waited for the failure of the funding system, and the giving way of England's financial resources. Year after year, the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained; and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the Continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle.

88. No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an *annual creation* of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that the great cause is to be found of the never-failing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, the quickened and extended circulation of which spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports, and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if it had not been sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency. It is evident, also, that the funding system, with all its dangers

and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassments with which it was to be attended, but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management.*

69. The contracting and immediately spending of loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a-year, in addition to a revenue of equal amount, raised by taxation, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so

much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was indeed withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry; but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence in that respect was still more powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals. It was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter; but still that circumstance, how prejudicial soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression: exports and imports doubled,

* Table showing the amount of bank-notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the commercial paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the gold and silver annually coined at the Bank, with the exports, imports, and revenue for the same period.

| Years. | L. S. Notes in circulation. | Under F. S. | Commercial Paper rendered at Bank. | Bullion Coined. | Total of Notes. | Official Value of Imports into Great Britain. | Official Value of Exports from Great Britain. | Revenue. | British Vessels Tonnage |
|--------|-----------------------------|-------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---|---|------------|-------------------------|
| 1792 | 11,307,380 | — | — | 1,171,863 | 11,307,380 | 10,659,356 | 24,904,860 | 17,984,404 | 1,540,145 |
| 1793 | 11,388,910 | — | — | 2,747,430 | 11,388,910 | 1,659,337 | 29,390,179 | 17,707,993 | — |
| 1794 | 10,744,090 | — | — | 2,538,895 | 10,744,090 | 22,294,899 | 26,744,068 | 17,699,294 | — |
| 1795 | 14,017,510 | — | 2,945,500 | 463,416 | 14,017,510 | 22,736,889 | 27,125,398 | 18,466,296 | — |
| 1796 | 10,739,590 | — | 3,808,000 | 464,090 | 10,739,590 | 22,167,510 | 30,518,913 | 18,549,928 | — |
| 1797 | 9,474,760 | 867,993 | 5,350,900 | 2,690,297 | 10,545,963 | 21,018,956 | 28,917,010 | 19,853,646 | — |
| 1798 | 11,647,610 | 1,446,320 | 4,480,000 | 2,967,565 | 13,045,630 | 23,132,303 | 27,217,087 | 30,493,998 | — |
| 1799 | 11,484,150 | 1,465,050 | 5,408,900 | 449,093 | 12,930,690 | 24,066,790 | 29,636,037 | 32,311,018 | — |
| 1800 | 16,379,960 | 1,371,540 | 6,401,900 | 189,637 | 16,854,860 | 28,957,781 | 33,881,017 | 34,069,457 | 1,905,438 |
| 1801 | 13,574,830 | 2,634,760 | 7,405,100 | 450,243 | 16,213,280 | 30,435,908 | 34,839,664 | 35,516,261 | 1,725,944 |
| 1802 | 12,574,890 | 2,519,030 | 7,623,400 | 437,019 | 12,196,890 | 28,308,373 | 37,472,224 | 37,111,030 | 2,147,029 |
| 1803 | 13,390,970 | 2,968,960 | 10,747,000 | 530,445 | 15,319,939 | 35,104,541 | 38,075,289 | 38,908,937 | 2,107,963 |
| 1804 | 19,546,520 | 4,531,270 | 9,932,400 | 719,397 | 17,077,530 | 26,494,241 | 31,771,109 | 43,615,153 | 2,369,979 |
| 1805 | 15,011,010 | 4,860,160 | 11,368,500 | 55,658 | 17,871,170 | 27,344,720 | 30,546,491 | 50,336,190 | 2,393,449 |
| 1806 | 13,271,520 | 4,459,090 | 13,380,100 | 405,106 | 17,090,120 | 25,504,478 | 28,084,101 | 54,071,906 | 2,638,714 |
| 1807 | 12,840,760 | 4,109,890 | 13,494,000 | None. | 16,950,650 | 23,326,445 | 30,544,004 | 59,400,731 | 2,281,021 |
| 1808 | 14,098,680 | 4,096,170 | 12,930,100 | 371,714 | 17,868,680 | 25,690,953 | 30,936,629 | 69,147,011 | 2,384,819 |
| 1809 | 14,841,390 | 4,301,500 | 15,475,700 | 298,546 | 18,543,490 | 30,170,292 | 45,607,316 | 63,679,902 | 2,398,408 |
| 1810 | 15,169,180 | 5,560,420 | 20,070,600 | 570,836 | 21,019,600 | 37,613,394 | 42,606,843 | 67,325,897 | 2,490,404 |
| 1811 | 16,946,180 | 7,114,690 | 14,355,400 | 312,363 | 23,869,330 | 35,340,704 | 47,337,262 | 65,300,100 | 2,474,774 |
| 1812 | 15,501,290 | 7,437,090 | 14,291,600 | None. | 23,408,980 | 34,923,923 | 37,969,977 | 65,793,123 | 2,478,739 |
| 1813 | 15,407,320 | 7,713,610 | 12,330,290 | 519,723 | 23,130,930 | None destroyed by fire | — | 66,302,860 | — |
| 1814 | 16,438,540 | 8,345,540 | 13,285,800 | None | 24,011,080 | 38,022,771 | 51,358,298 | 70,240,313 | 2,816,905 |
| 1815 | 16,233,000 | 9,035,280 | 14,917,000 | None. | 27,261,680 | 31,623,053 | 57,420,437 | 73,203,143 | 2,681,276 |
| 1816 | 18,001,380 | 9,001,400 | 11,416,400 | None. | 27,022,620 | 36,374,921 | 45,216,156 | 82,640,711 | 2,648,593 |

—*Parl. Deb.* vii. xiv. 15v.; *App. Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563; COLQUHOUN, 99.—*MOREAU'S Tables*, and FEBRER, 279.—*MARSHALL'S Digest*, pp. 97, 147, 236.

Thus in the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled; the revenue tripled, the exports more than doubled, and the imports increased a half. The increase of commercial paper, from 1792 to 1810, was sevenfold—indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were to a certain extent delusive; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emergencies; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow this feverish and unnatural period of excitement, is indeed certain. But still the effect at the moment was the same; and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created, were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state in future times it might have been, to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict; and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept for ever from the book of existence.

70. Had Mr Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking-fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience; and there can be no question that, if

it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1845; that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of a rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking-fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes on which it depended, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation, a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals; the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed alone to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent governments. Without exculpating the members of the administrations who did not manfully resist, and, if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may safely be affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for its redemption, they have to blame, not Mr Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind democratic spirit which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge.

71. "All nations," says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American democracy, "which have made a

great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable of durable achievements." The abandonment of a system fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking-fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the constitution had become overloaded in reality, before it was so in form, on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an "ignorant impatience of taxation" was to bring about that disregard of everything but present objects, which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. During nearly thirty years of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline, the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired under the increasing influence of the unthinking multitude; and at length, upon the subversion of that aristocratic predominance by the great change of 1832, it was finally to all practical purposes destroyed. Irrecoverable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state; for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected.

72. In truth, the abandonment of the sinking-fund, in consequence of the weak and vacillating conduct of the successive administrations in yielding to partial clamours, raised by interested parties for a reduction of taxation affecting themselves, was so enormous an error, and is fraught with such evidently disastrous effects to the future independence and existence of the country, that it would be wholly unaccountable, in an age of intelligence and political activity, were it not explained by the dreadful effects of the sudden and prodigious contraction of

the currency which took place in consequence of the act compelling the Bank of England to resume cash payments in 1819. Whoever will cast his eye over the instructive table given in the Appendix to the last volume of this work, will at once perceive that this fatal measure, which, at the very time that the annual supply of the precious metals for the globe had been reduced a half by the effects of the South American revolutions, curtailed the paper circulation of the British Islands by *another half*, had the effect of lowering prices for the next thirty years by fully fifty per cent.* The remuneration of industry in every department being so greatly reduced, while money engagements of all sorts, public and private, underwent no diminution, the payment of most of the indirect taxes became impossible. It was an easy matter for the masters engaged in the principal branches of manufacture in the kingdom to prove to the Chancellor of the Exchequer that, under the forcible reduction of prices which the contraction of the currency had produced, they could not carry on their operations without a great reduction or entire liberation from taxation. Such relief had become to them, in many cases, the price of existence. Hundreds of thousands would be thrown out of employment if it was not given. This explains, and can alone explain, the otherwise inexplicable infatuation of so many different administrations in abandoning to so great an extent the indirect taxes, the sheet-anchor of the British finances. Disastrous as it was, that abandonment was an effect, not a cause. It was the direct and unavoidable effect of a violent and uncalled-for contraction of the currency to the extent of a half, at the very time when the failure in the wonted supplies of the precious metals for the use of the globe, and the prodigious increase of population and transactions in the British Islands, most loudly called for its increase.

73. But this only removes the difficulty a step further back. How did it happen that government could ever

* See Appendix, Chap. xcv.

have been induced to give their consent to a measure fraught with such ruinous consequences as this contraction of the currency has proved to be! It affected the exchequer at least as much as the general industry of the country; it at once stopped the liquidation of the public debt, starved down the military and naval establishments of the empire to a scale inconsistent with its lasting defence, and has kept the treasury ever since in almost ceaseless embarrassments. The solution of this enigma is to be found in the weight acquired in the country by a body previously little regarded, but which has now become paramount to all others, in consequence of the success of the war,—the *monied interest*. So vast had been the accumulation of capital during the contest, so immense the numbers, and powerful the influence, of the trading and commercial classes who had risen to affluence while it continued, that they had now come to overshadow all the other classes of the state put together. The classes had become all-powerful whose interest was to buy cheap and sell dear. The consumers were enabled to set the producers at defiance. The Reform Act, produced by the widespread and universal suffering occasioned by this important change, gave the monied interest a permanent sway in the state; for it bestowed two-thirds of the seats in the House of Commons on the members for burghs, and two-thirds of the votes in every burgh on the trading or monied classes, or the persons whom they could influence. Thence the entire deviation of British legislation since that time from all the principles which formerly regulated it. Thence the abandonment of the sinking-fund to cheapen government, of the corn-laws to cheapen labour, of colonial protection to cheapen sugar and wood, of the navigation laws to cheapen freights. England, like imperial Rome, had fallen under the rule of a body of monied patricians whose interests were adverse to that of all the industrious classes in the state, but whose influence outweighed them all put together. They desired to cheapen everything except money, and that they

sought to make as dear as possible. Ultimate ruin will be brought upon the British as it was on the Roman empire, from the same cause, and in the same way. And thus the entire success of the measures of protection and a sufficient currency, which formed the leading features of Mr Pitt's domestic policy, was the immediate cause of their abandonment by the next generation, because they reared up a wealthy monied class whose interests were at variance with those of industry, but whose influence was beyond its control.

74. But if the sun of British greatness is from these causes setting in the Old, it is from the same cause rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the democratic spirit, both in the British Isles and on the shores of the Atlantic—the energy it develops, the desires it creates, the burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the west; and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilisation into the primeval recesses of the forest. Two hundred thousand of the Anglo-Saxons or Celtic race are now annually impelled, by necessity, ambition, or restlessness, from the British Islands to the shores of the New World.* In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown; but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality. But in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as in those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing opera-

* In the year 1848, 258,000 emigrants sailed from the British Islands, of whom 244,000 were destined for the United States or Canada, and in 1849 the number was still greater.

tion of those principles at once of corruption and regeneration which are combined in humanity; and which, universal in communities as in single

men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESSBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE CONTINENTAL WAR.
JANUARY—OCTOBER 1806.

1. THE peace of Pressburg seemed to have finally subjected the Continent to the empire of France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes was dissolved. The military strength of Austria had received, to all appearance, an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his overthrow. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they, too, had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was mute; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the Continental armies, and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible

object; while the death of the great statesman who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolution, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of government might be anticipated on the part of his successors.

2. The hopes entertained by Napoleon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power, to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon to all appearance likely to be realised. The death of Mr Pitt dissolved the administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none—friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unreserved confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sank into the grave, the ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The King, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the midst of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India bill introduced by

the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the government in the hands of the same party, and immediately after Mr Pitt's death commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new administration on the same basis. But that experienced and cautious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his short-lived power was the dubious one of accepting the wardenship of the Cinque Ports, which had been held by Mr Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift of the crown. This office was pressed upon him by the King, and had undoubtedly been well deserved by his faithful services, for which he had hitherto declined any remuneration; but, being the sole act of a short-lived power, it was much commented on, and gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussions in both houses of parliament under the succeeding administration.

3. Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the ministry after Mr Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties, and a union of all the principal statesmen of the time, to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that, having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its forces might not be more effectually disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a great degree. The Opposition journals had increased in number

and vehemence of declamation; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of government, in that point where Mr Pitt's administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, were exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when those absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true friends to their country, on whichever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish, accordingly, was felt for the formation of a government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction—a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England. It never can do so except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and as calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy for the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened.

4. Yielding, at length, though unwillingly, and with sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the King, on the 26th January, sent a message to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham House, to confer with his Majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr Fox as the person he should consult on the subject. The King, though personally averse to that statesman, instantly saw the necessity of making his private feelings give way to the public good. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the King: and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men. No time was lost

in sending for Mr Addington, recently before created Lord Sidmouth, who agreed to form part of the administration. The anxious wish expressed both by the sovereign and the nation that the government should be formed on the broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties, which, although it gave great apparent stability at the outset, was little calculated in the end to insure the permanence of the administration.

5. Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr Pitt's cabinet, then divided the legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to democratic principles, were represented by Mr Fox and Mr Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of highly popular institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the test acts, the abolition of slavery, peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had seceded with Mr Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families, and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold on the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stancher brethren. In hostility to France, and fierce opposition to revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the popular side, although they might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more democratic portion of the government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of

these great parties, though highly respectable from the weight of private character, the adherents of Mr Addington's administration, who had remained in Opposition ever since they were displaced from power, were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr Addington) was the leader of this portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalescence, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists; and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.*

6. The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new cabinet; but the preponderance of Mr Fox's adherents was so great as to render the ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most inconsiderable, under government.* Mr Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the crown, contented himself with the important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was to be expected, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made First Lord of the Treasury; Mr Erskine, Lord Chancellor; Lord Howick (for-

* The Cabinet was composed of the following members:—

Lord Erskine—Lord Chancellor.
 Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council
 Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.
 Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Earl Moira—Master General of the Ordnance.
 Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
 Mr Fox—Foreign Affairs.
 Mr Windham—Secretary at War.
 Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.
 Lord Ellenborough—Chief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet.
 —*Ann. Reg.* 1800, 2s.

merly Mr Grey), First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr Windham, Secretary at War; Earl Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home Department. The cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius, for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But, amidst the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily rejected the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs. By a still greater number, the admission of the Lord Chief-Justice into the cabinet was justly regarded as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties, which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.

7. Notwithstanding the essential and total change which the ministry had undergone, and the accession of a party to power who had so long denounced the measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the policy of government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterised the war as unjust and impolitic, preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors—a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of his great predecessor, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of

raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, it was proposed to carry the war-taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions and a half—an increase which was effected by raising the income-tax from six and a half to ten per cent, and by an addition of 3s. a hundredweight to the duty on sugar. The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still £18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and for a sinking-fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing £500,000 a-year, and an additional duty laid on pig-iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount in all of £1,136,000.* The great addition to the income-tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden, and a total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue; and there can be no doubt

* BUDGET OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1806.

Expenditure, Extraordinary.

| | |
|---------------------------------|-------------|
| Navy, | £15,281,000 |
| Army, | 18,500,000 |
| Ordnance, | 4,718,000 |
| Miscellaneous, | 2,170,000 |
| Arrears of subsidies, | 1,000,000 |
| Vote of credit, | 2,000,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £43,569,000 |

Income, Extraordinary.

| | |
|---|-------------|
| Malt and personal estate duties, | £2,730,000 |
| Grants from captured ships, | 1,000,000 |
| Lotteries, | 380,000 |
| Surplus of consolidated fund, | 8,500,000 |
| War taxes, | 19,500,000 |
| Deduct as outstanding at end of year, | 1,500,000 |
| Loan, | 18,000,000 |
| | <hr/> |
| | £43,680,000 |

exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand, and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being £23,000,000, and the total sum raised by taxes and other sources of revenue, £65,730,000, while the total expenditure was £73,730,000, and income, including the loan of £18,000,000, no less than £73,790,000.—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 566, 569; *Porter's Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesmanlike part.

8. The return of Napoleon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, had become necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to involve the government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from political, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the Emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Matters had arrived at such a pass, that the public service could no longer be carried on, and nothing but the Emperor's unparalleled victories and speedy return could have averted a national bankruptcy. He had often, during the preceding years, declared his resolution not to issue treasury bills; but he forgot to follow the only rule by which that resource could be averted, that of keeping his expenditure within his income. As it was, he instantly applied his mind, with its wonted vigour, to the consideration of the tremendous crisis which had arisen. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the council of finance was assembled: it sat nine hours; and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed minister of finances, and M. de Marbois, the former minister, dismissed.

9. This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, and which, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, might have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of

France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the empire, and urged on by the constant demand for accommodation on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, rendered necessary by the expenditure of government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progressively enlarging its discounts. Before the Emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoleon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amidst all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the minister of finances on the subject,* and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in ex-

* His words are, in a letter to the minister of finances—"The evil originates in the bank having transgressed the law. What has the law done? It has given the privilege of coining money in the form of paper to a particular company; but what did it intend by so doing? Assuredly, that the circulation thus created should be based on solid credit. The bank appears to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which is to discount to individuals, not in proportion to their real capital, but to the number of shares of its capital stock which they possess. That, however, is no real test of solvency. How many persons may be possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them a single farthing? The paper of the bank is thus issued in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on real credit, but on a delusive supposition of wealth. In one word, in discounting after this manner, the bank is *coining false money*. So clearly do I see the dangers of such a course, that, if necessary, I would stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in it. I am distressed beyond measure at the necessities of my situation, which, by compelling me to live in camps, and engaging me in distant expeditions, withdraw my attention from what would otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first wish of my heart—a good and solid organisation of all that concerns the interest of banks, manufactures, and commerce." What admirable wisdom in these remarks, written at the camp of Boulogne, in the midst of the boundless arrangements which the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced, must have required, and of which his correspondence furnishes such ample proof!—BROXON, v. 85, 86.

tensive transactions, or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the royal privilege of coining money. The immense discounts which occasioned the peril were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who, being obliged to make good their payments to government by a certain day, and embarrassed by the remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were unavoidably driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and the peremptory demands of the treasury, and their credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration. The Bank of France was the quarter to which they in general applied for accommodation; but the pressure thus occasioned upon that establishment was so severe that, even after the successes at Ulm, they had announced to the Emperor that they could not continue their advances, and that the drain of specie was such that they themselves stood in the most imminent danger.

10. To relieve the pressure on the bank, attempts had been made to obtain a supply of the precious metals from every quarter whence they could be drawn. For this purpose, recourse was had to certain great mercantile companies, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to that establishment, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these was that of which Ouvrard was the leading partner; and its engagements with the bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the Spanish fleet; and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service; and before the middle of 1805, nearly seventy millions of francs

(£2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the government, occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market; but so implicated was the treasury in these transactions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course, and thus increase the depreciation, which had already become sufficiently alarming. M. Desprez, a great capitalist, engaged also in the collection of specie, and who had long supported the bank, became embarrassed, and himself solicited aid from that establishment. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sank so much in value that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100. A universal disquietude prevailed, and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.

11. Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states; both on the part of government and individuals. Napoleon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) from the Bank of France, without the slightest regard to its necessary effect upon the credit of that establishment. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the minister of finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanlerbergh, and Seguire, who advanced 102,000,000 francs (£4,080,000) to the public treasury, and received in return long-dated bills for 150,000,000 francs. To meet this advance Ouvrard hastened to Madrid, to obtain a supply of piastres from the Spanish government; and such was the ascendancy which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded

a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an exclusive right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company: nearly the whole treasures of the world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining from America, before a year expired, 272,000,000 francs (£11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of the Continent, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Despréz—who had demanded a loan of 100,000,000 francs (£4,000,000) from the Bank, which they could not give him—and several other of the greatest capitalists—including M. Reclamier, the splendour of whose living, as well as the beauty of his wife, had long riveted public attention—failed. This immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the bank and the treasury. Paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanlerbergh, one of the greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing solely by an advance to a great amount from the public funds. The consequences would have been fatal to the empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany; for the government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service. But the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Pressburg operated like a charm in dispelling the panic: with the cessation of Continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased; and the crisis was in fact over, when the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public confidence. The danger, however, had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it: and, by merely

protracting the contest in Moravia for a few weeks, the Allies would infallibly have brought the French government to a national bankruptcy.

12. Napoleon was highly indignant at these embarrassments, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate victory of Austerlitz.* Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders; the imprudent facility of M. de Marbois, the minister of finances, became the general object of reprobation, and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration.† The Emperor minutely scrutinised the embarrassments of the bank and the treasury: it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the government amounted to 141,000,000 francs (£5,600,000), of which Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh owed nearly two-thirds, and prosecutions were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, including M. Despréz, who were thrown into prison without distinction. Measures of the last severity were threatened against Ouvrard and his partners, who were offered their choice between standing the chances of a criminal prosecution, and the immediate cession of all they possessed. They preferred the latter, and in consequence that gigantic company was reduced to bankruptcy: but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned: but a few years after, the government was under the necessity of resuming it: and Napoleon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by ap-

* "Beaten," says Savary. "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii. 161.

†The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Staël, "Ue," said she, "is nothing but a willow painted to look like bronze."—BOUR. vii. 111.

pointing him president of the Chamber of Accounts.

13. In fact, though it suited the interests of the Emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the minister of finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper; and the crisis was, in fact occasioned by the vicious system to which the extravagant expenditure of the imperial government had driven the finance ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoleon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the distressed condition of the finances. The actual receipts of the treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions of francs below the annual expenses. In addition to this, the payments of the finance minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year; while the period of his receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Hence arose an indispensable necessity for recourse to money-lenders, who advanced cash to the treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realised. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure, as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the Chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit, which was daily increasing; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted by the treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it.

14. Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances: and this system succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804. But the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the

Austrian war, rendered these resources totally insufficient; and it became necessary to apply to greater capitalists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, who were already the contractors for the supplies to almost all the forces, both by land and sea; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on exchequer bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of government, and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone government derived the funds requisite for its immense engagements. The monetary embarrassments of 1805, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure: but they arose not on the part of individuals, but of government; the crisis was not commercial but political.

15. Thence the singular and instructive fact, that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoleon so loudly complained, were made not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service. The root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the Emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of government. He often boasted that he never had, and never would, issue government paper. This was quite true; but it was equally true, what he passed over, that his expenditure of a hundred millions of francs annually, beyond his income, drove all the government contractors to that perilous expedient. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest: it indicated the arrival

of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the Convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but to maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution. Napoleon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. Marbois had long before represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoleon was so sensible of this, that he had expressed his resolution, in military fashion, to have M. Ouvrard arrested, and made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence.*

16. The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he, "between the bank and the treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign a decree for the emancipa-

* "Bourrienne," said he, in 1806, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested."—"General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?"—"Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel! He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? At the public expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the government.—BOUR. vii. 94, 95.

tion of the treasury." The difficulty was, that the treasury had to pay every twelve months a hundred and twenty millions of francs (£4,800,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (£2,400,000) were funded in the five per cents; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit banks, under the name of "caisses de service," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly.

17. But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by government greatly beyond its income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz provided the means of solving the difficulty. From the moment the grand army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany.† On the 18th November, an edict of the Emperor directed the transmission of all funds to the Army of the North to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the Army of Italy. Thus

† From the castle of Louisberg in Würtemberg, Napoleon wrote, so early as 4th October 1805, to the minister of finances at Paris—"The army maintains the most exact discipline; the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: I have no need of money from you." These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—BRUNON, v. 100.

the three principal armies of the Empire ceased to be any longer a charge upon its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoleon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were in consequence, as the Duke de Gaeta, their principal compiler, himself confesses, no true statement of the imperial expenses. They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; and, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the conquered states, totally fallacious.

18. The budget of France, for 1805, presented to the Chambers in February 1806, accordingly exhibited a most deceptive picture of the national finances;* but even as it was, it showed

* The receipts and expenditure exhibited were as follows:—

| RECEIPTS | |
|---|-------------|
| Francs. | |
| Direct taxes, . . . | 311,649,196 |
| Registration and stamps, . . . | 172,763,591 |
| Customs, . . . | 52,725,913 |
| Lottery, . . . | 13,860,000 |
| Post-office, . . . | 10,000,000 |
| Excise, . . . | 25,000,000 |
| Salt, . . . | 3,000,000 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total from France, 588,998,705 or £23,600,000 | |
| .. from Italy, 30,000,000 .. | 1,200,000 |
| .. from Germany and Holland, 100,000,000 .. | 4,000,000 |
| <hr/> | |
| Total, 718,998,705 .. | 28,800,000 |
| EXPENDITURE. | |
| Francs. | |
| Army, . . . | 271,500,000 |
| Navy, . . . | 140,000,000 |
| Church, . . . | 35,000,000 |
| Interest of debt, . . . | 69,140,000 |
| Civil list, . . . | 27,000,000 |
| Minister of Finance, 43,349,800 | |
| .. of Justice, 21,200,000 | |
| .. of Interior, 29,500,000 | |
| .. of Treasury, 8,000,000 | |
| .. of Police, 700,000 | |
| Miscellaneous, . . . | 20,765,339 |
| <hr/> | |
| 666,155,139 or £26,600,000 | |

—See DUC DE GAETA, 304; BIGNON, v. 102; PEUCHET, 560.

an expenditure of 666,000,000 francs (£26,600,000), and an income of only 589,000,000 francs (£23,600,000), the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states. But although Napoleon knew as well as any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a splendid exposition of the state of the Empire. The report drawn up by Champagny, minister of the interior, contained a picture of the imperial dominions, which, from the magnitude of the victories it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Saone as essentially improved; Alessandria as surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts, encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Apennines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mont Cenis, the Corniche, and the Mont Genève, opening to loaded chariots a path amidst heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Saone, and the Rhone; harbours and wet-docks in a state of rapid construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; the works of Antwerp and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England.

19. The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence. "The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the Republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system

Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The house of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions; Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded: the Italian peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great Empire; the Emperor has guaranteed, as chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects for exultation, Napoleon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers:—"The tempests have made us lose some vessels, after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion, by an hour. I shall always be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality—a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak, and temporise, till the proper time arrived, with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoleon's policy.

20. The return of Napoleon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the Emperor and the Grand Army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of the Emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect; five hundred Imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to

the summit of the structure, one hundred and twenty feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoleon, afterwards carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis Philippe, it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his grey riding-coat, the dress which has become canonised in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. The standards taken from the enemy during the campaign—one hundred and twenty in number—were brought with great pomp through the streets of Paris on the 1st of January, and divided between the senate, the tribunate, the city of Paris, and the cathedral of Notre Dame. "These standards," said the Archbishop of Paris, when they were placed beneath the sacred roof, "will attest to our latest posterity the efforts made by Europe against us; the glorious deeds of our soldiers; the protection vouchsafed by heaven to France; the prodigious success of our invincible Emperor, and the homage which he has rendered to God for his victories." The senate decreed that his birthday should be one of the national fêtes. Magnificent rejoicings were projected by the Emperor to signalise the return of the Grand Army to the capital; but they were adjourned, first on the account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign.

21. The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Massena was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month fifty thousand men, under the command of Joseph Bonaparte, had crossed the Pontifical States and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible; the feeble Russian

and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily; the court, thunderstruck by the menacing proclamation of 27th December, speedily followed their example; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hastened to appease the conqueror by submission; a futile attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St. Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops. In vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage; she was seconded by none. Capua opened its gates; Gaeta was invested; the Campagna filled with the invaders; she, vanquished but not subdued, compelled to yield to necessity, followed her timid consort to Sicily, and, on the 15th February, Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Buonaparte, enter its walls.

22. But although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the seagirt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The prince of Hesse-Philippsthal had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own heroic resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied, that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity; and the long resistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its Continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion, the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their government and its allies, submitted to the enemy; and General Reynier, with a considerable corps, in the outset experienced little resistance

in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Massena with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to despair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position. But they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campotenesse their tumultuary levies, though fifteen thousand strong, were entirely dispersed. The victorious Reynier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoleon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily.

23. When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in person to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district. He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Savigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoleon created him king of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time the states of Venice were definitely annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand-duke of Berg, with a consider-

able territory: and the Emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army. Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the military hero of the Revolution gave abundant indications of his design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, utterly to overturn its principles.*

24. Events, however, soon occurred which showed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects, on his elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment. Nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sidney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment amidst the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions, attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffection which prevailed in Calabria, the

English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the capital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than five thousand men, which landed in the Gulf of St. Euphemia; and the commander, Sir John Stuart, issued a proclamation calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received, and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Reynier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at MAIDA, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution, Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces, accordingly, in quest of the enemy. On the 5th July the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning: the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive, that it would be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers.

25. When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Reynier, consisting of five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and a battery of horse-artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet toward the sea; while the British bivouacked in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were

* "The interest of our crown," said Napoleon, "and the tranquillity of the continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and forming part of the great empire—we therefore declare our well-beloved brother Joseph King of the two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier was created Prince of Neuchâtel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the Pontifical States; Bernadotte became Prince of Ponte-Corvo; Cambacérès and Lebrun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories; a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues to be distributed among the French soldiers.—HARD. ix. 94, 95; BIGNOX, v. 131.

in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential influences of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Reynier was inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the errors of General Menou. He was encouraged, besides, by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to seven thousand five hundred men, and, resolving to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, he marched at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy.

26. Surprised, but nothing dismayed, at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current falls into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled with light troops, who kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached. Notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory, after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge. The 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward; and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity; their battalions broke and fled, but were instantly overtaken amidst deafening shouts, and assailed with such fury, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a

thousand, including General Compere, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Reynier made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the other flank. A rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons, rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left. This movement might have yet retrieved the day, had not the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, been assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 20th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew his shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers.*

27. The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation, amidst the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites, and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results, or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, seldom was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling: but what mattered all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had succumbed in the conflict.

* The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded. The Duchess of Abrantes states the entire loss of the French at 5000 men — D'ABRANTES, ix. 136; and Sir J. STUART'S *Despatch*, *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 594.

At last the rival states had come into collision, on terms approaching to equality, and free from the paralysing influence of lukewarm or dubious allies. The result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoleon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or ascribed to their true cause,—general inexperience in the military art; confidence, the surest presage of victory, when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service; and, reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy,* and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy: the people no longer hesitated to speak of Cressy and Azincour. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war. Napoleon was well aware of its importance: he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal. *"Sive tanta, sive minor, victoria fuit, ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima. illo bello, gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibale, vincentibus tunc difficilior fuit, quam postea vincere."*†

* In particular, Captain Pasley's able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England; a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

† "Be the victory great or small, a great affair was achieved on that day, and I know not but the most important in the war. For not to be conquered by Hannibal, was then more difficult than afterwards to conquer."
—Livy, xxiii. 16.

28. But, though productive in the end of the most important consequences from the moral feelings which it inspired, the victory of Maida was not attended at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily, were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wildfire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after, the town of Crotona, containing a thousand men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. The detachments of the French were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilised warfare. So general were the losses, that Reynier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the entrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of eight thousand men, at length to make head against the enemy.

29. These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Massena, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on board an Eng-

lish vessel to Sicily; his successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit; proposals of capitulation were made; and Massena, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions.* The garrison, still seven thousand strong, marched out with the honours of war; and on the 18th July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements.

30. The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Massena eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible. Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain of often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Massena, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents stood their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria, but were at length turned by the Monte Galdo, and defeated with great slaughter. A guerrilla warfare ensued, attended with

savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the slain. But after several months of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English; and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost by sickness and the sword little short of fifteen thousand men.

31. No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the regulation of the finances, the general police of the country, stood equally in need of improvement. Hence the remarkable fact, so common on the Continent, so rare in England, that the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education; while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses following in its train, were to be found among the rabble of the cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in a constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe, when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Buonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found ample room for, and soon effected, the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restricted; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the

* The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened on the 10th July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent.—Gaeta, named after the nurse of *Æneas*,† underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marshal Daun. Thirty years afterwards it was besieged and taken when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—DUMAS, xv. 155, 170.

† *"Tu quoque Iloribus nostris, Æneia nutrix,
Aeternam moriens laudam, Caieta, dedisti."*
VIRGIL, lib. vii.

public debt, part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national institute, and various other useful institutions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals, were undertaken or projected; and a general spirit of activity was diffused by the energy of the government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits induced in other countries by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution.

32. The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the Two Sicilies by the brother of Napoleon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Pressburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious Emperor; while the republic of Venice, incorporated by the decree of 30th March with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. „Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the grand pensionary in 1805, had almost established among them a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were to all appearance indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a half-way house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepot of the commercial riches of Holland in the eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean; and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotic rule of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others

was equalled only by their base adulation to the foreign rulers of the commonwealth. The people, despairing of relief, and worn out by the exactions of obscure tyrants, in the election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things.

33. Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoleon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view, a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble, "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that in the existing state of Europe a hereditary government could alone guarantee the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious liberties of the state," declared Louis king of Holland. A few days after, the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the Emperor. But the illusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which Napoleon made to his brother on the occasion:—"Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of constable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge towards me, and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states."

34. At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy afforded the Emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne. Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoleon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers; while a fifteenth of the

revenue which these states yielded to the treasury at Milan was set apart to form appanages suitable to those dignities. A revenue of one million two hundred thousand francs (£48,000) was on this occasion set apart from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund out of which he was to recompense his soldiers, and which was soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoleon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree.

35. The system upon which Napoleon now openly entered, of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of dependent dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere ebullition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances which had elevated him to the throne, and continued to surround him when there. He clearly perceived that it was revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both dreaded, from dear-bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship, his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him. This being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance to which he could trust was that which united him to his own family, and identified with his own the interests of inferior royalties, dependent on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own re-

lations! could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoleon; and that, *situated as he was*, they were founded on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite in the highest degree the jealousy and hostility of the other Continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is indeed equally certain. But these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They show only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played; and add another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal truth, that those who owe their elevation to revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by, than to those who resist its fury.*

36. On the same day on which a king was given by the French Emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the Grand Signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoleon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his subsequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Everything," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from

* "The truth is," said Napoleon, "that I was never master of my own movements—I was never altogether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—LAS CASES, vii. 124, 125.

me: united to my throne he need fear nothing from his enemies." Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoleon signed on the Niemen a treaty with Russia for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe.

37. But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoleon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations; and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies. The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievement of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which under Villeneuve had issued from Cadiz: but the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoleon had so fondly calculated, still existed; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their services. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations in smaller armaments, against their remote colonies or merchant vessels. Half the Brest squadron, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, was victualled for six months; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons. The first, under Admiral Leissegues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, was destined to carry out succours to St Domingo; while the second, under Willaumez, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward-bound merchant fleets. But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which nearly annihilated the enemy's remaining naval force, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war.

38. Admiral Leissegues arrived with-

out any accident at St Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the Imperial, a splendid vessel of a hundred and thirty guns, which bore the Admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action: a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb Imperial, being driven ashore and burned. The frigates stood out to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement, and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all their ships stood to their guns: on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760; while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed, and 294 wounded. The Imperial, before it ran ashore, had seen five hundred of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels.

39. Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a disaster, the cruise of Admiral Willaumez, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence, when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in

with the homeward-bound *Jarvis* fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane, with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th July, Sir John Borlase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the 4th June; Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance with a second fleet in the same latitude; while a third, under Admiral Louis, put to sea in the end of August, to intercept the return of the French. As it was now evident that the attention of the English government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St Domingo; and under the influence of these feelings the *Veteran*, of seventy-four guns, commanded by Jerome Buonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders stood away in the night of the 30th July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Willaumez saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet. The *Foudroyant*, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havannah, pursued by the English frigate *Anson*, under the very guns of the *Moro Castle*; the *Impetueux* was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burned, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the *Cassard* alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Buonaparte, in the *Veteran*, made a rich

prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by some English vessels when he reached the bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where she was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety.

40. The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmolested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given, [*Asie*, Chap. XXVII. § 27,] made an attack on the *Centurion*, fifty guns, and two English merchantmen, in the bay of Vizagapatam. But though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove the other on shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois reluctantly bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell in the night into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and after a short action was taken, with the *Marengo* of eighty, and the *Belle Poule* of forty guns. Next day, five large frigates, with troops on board bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron, under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were captured. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the *Rochefort* squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made eight hundred prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British government, Lal-

lemand's was called by the English sailors the *Invisible Squadron*. He had the fortune to meet and capture the *Calcutta* of fifty guns, which, while conveying some merchantmen, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships, and surrendered after a gallant resistance; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French, who, in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.

41. These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish navies were **TOTALLY DESTROYED**, and the English fleet, by general consent, had attained to **UNIVERSAL DOMINION**. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary dependency acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire. Napoleon afterwards acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the important harbours of Denmark, were put at his disposal; but he never again ventured on naval enterprises; and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the Brest fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque Roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, conveying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours. All apprehensions of invasion disappeared; and England, relieved alike from danger of domestic warfare and of colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and launch forth her legions in that career of glory which has immortalised the name of Wellington.

42. It was not thus at the commencement of the struggle, nor had it been

thus in the preceding war. The mild and pacific Louis XVI. had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of power. The French and Spanish fleets had ridden triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been reinvigorated in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the Convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can never produce a naval power. The insanity of Brissot and the society of *Les Amis des Noirs* cut off the right arm of the maritime strength of France by the destruction of St Domingo; the confiscations of the Convention utterly ruined her commercial wealth; the blockade of her harbours deprived her of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only her own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralysed, that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily insulted him in his harbours.

43. This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoleon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivalling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe. Aban-

doning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, everywhere set on foot, for the formation of a navy were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the Continental powers, which could everywhere be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for, if any considerable state were left out, the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to the separate interests of England, but it is the commencement of that important change in the system of Continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoleon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

44. Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illustrious men, who, during a series of ages, reared up the astonishing maritime power of England. It was not, like the empires of Napoleon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime; nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III. the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France; thirty thousand of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the victory of Sluys equal-

led in magnitude and importance, though, from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs, it has not attained equal celebrity with those of Cressy and Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake, the fire of Essex, the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric. It grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow. The power of Louis XIV., the genius of Napoleon, were alike shattered against its strength; the victories of La Hague and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the revolutionary war. Dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the northern ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen severity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amidst the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amidst the solitude of the waves, the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced.

45. But amidst all our admiration of the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities not less worthy of admiration. Theirs was

the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory, but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation, in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoleon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs. But had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that, as self-confidence is its soul, so despondence is its ruin; that the vehement bursts of anger with which he visited the leaders under whom disasters at sea had been incurred, was the chief cause of this nervous dread of responsibility; and that, in reality, the admirals who encountered not only danger but disgrace in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land forces to certain victory at Austerlitz or Jena.

46. As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal dominion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion, that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert, that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created, is already conspicuous. The Roman legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind the still more glorious inheritance of Transatlantic and Australian greatness.

A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than it did the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilisation follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will come before us, arising to greatness in the east of Europe. The Cross is inscribed on its banners: Woe to the Crescent! is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoleon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, irresistible, the one by sea and the other by land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

47. These defeats of the French naval squadrons were not the only maritime operations of this year. Before Mr Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, consisting of five thousand men, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope, the naval armament being under the direction of Sir Home Popham. On the 4th January 1806, the whole reached Table Bay; but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking in that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th they came up with the Dutch forces, five thousand strong, chiefly cavalry, in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders stood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet, than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle; while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; General Jansens, who had retired with three thousand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for

his safe return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days, from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the British dominions.

48. This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth: but the facility with which it was achieved, inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda in South America, and had even been appointed, in December 1804, to the Diadem of sixty-four guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the continent of South America favourable to the trade of this country." This intention, however, had been afterwards abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces, and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope; and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay, taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops. With these, and two companies which he had the address to procure from St Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio de la Plata.

49. The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th June, and the troops were immediately disembarked. General Beresford, who commanded the land forces, at once proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy, by threatening Monte Video, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders; and the capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property—a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat on the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors.

50. Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked-for success reached the British Islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpediency and unhappy tendency of the enterprise; for, on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing; which unhappily arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people, perhaps, of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though fortunately not very lasting, fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports. Boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered; and those fabled regions which formed the Eldorado of Sir Walter Raleigh, appeared about to pour their inexhaustible treasures into the British Islands. Under the influence of these

highly excited feelings, every principle of reason, every suggestion of sense, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience, was swept away: speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained; and government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.

51. But long before the cabinet of St James's were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the boundless consignments which were in preparation could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unwonted occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders. An insurrection was secretly organised in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward. The militia of the surrounding districts were assembled; Colonel Linieres, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Monte Video at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection within the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible; a desperate conflict ensued in the town; and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal conflict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender were afterwards violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining

troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till reinforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended, in the end, with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American governments, set sail from New York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after undergoing many hardships, and landing on the Spanish main, was obliged to re-embark and make the best of his way back to Trinidad.

52. Differences at this period arose, which threatened to involve the British government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service: the next, the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a necessary consequence from the right of search which the American government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had

recognised, and which constituted the basis of the whole maritime law of Europe. It was impossible to expect that when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to the service of these neutrals, and whom they recognised, they should not reclaim them for their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether.* The second arose from the decisions of the English admiralty courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country, contrary to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo.

* On the part of the Americans, it was contended, "that the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that, while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British-born subjects, and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to abstract right, or the practice of other states; the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their case than it could be in any other. The American government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships; but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, "That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which she owed to the government of his nativity; and that, provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them: that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its

53. The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that to bring the neutral within the exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done. On the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unlading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognise such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state; but it was equally

merchant vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if in the course of that search her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time reclaim its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary from the right of search; it is in truth the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment; if the Americans can show that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released; but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer, as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which has never yet been done."—See *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 244, 245.

natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity, and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognising as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then, after extensive capital had, on the faith of that recognition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize.

54. To these serious and lasting subjects of discord, was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship *Leander*, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so vehement a commotion, that Mr Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the Union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, and after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect on the 15th November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights, and everything announced the commencement of a Transatlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.

55. But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the excited populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr Munroe and Mr Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of

Great Britain. The instructions of their respective governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their important duties in a corresponding spirit. Under such auspices the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever, could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such difficulties, that the American commissioners, in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to be satisfied in the mean time, with a pledge by the British government, that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and would afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by America, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity. But on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade between the colonies and parent states of the enemy, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent on European, and two per cent on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the northern coalition.

56. While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoleon was rapidly advancing in his career of terrestrial

empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th December, whereby he substituted for the intended warlike defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral, if not allied, England. Great was the embarrassment of the cabinet of Berlin when the intelligence of this unexpected arrangement arrived. On the one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be rounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls. On the other, some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoleon prevailed over the king's better principles, and it was determined not to ratify the treaty unconditionally, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications. As a colour to the transaction, and also, perhaps, as a salve to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margravates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the mean time be obtained;" while it was represented to the English minister at Berlin that arrangements had been concluded with France for insuring the tranquillity of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Prussian troops, and to the administration of the king, until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitely annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the mean time the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army was disbanded, and a proclamation to the

same effect issued by the king on taking possession of that territory.

57. But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs of Napoleon to admit any modifications, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoleon the question was decided; all sincere alliance was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian government, the Emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect; Prussia had not resolution enough to resist; and on the 15th February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ratified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. Count Schulenberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation, closing its harbours against English vessels. Finally, on the 1st April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoleon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France.

58. This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater potentates, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoleon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to

manifest their resentment. But Prussia was egregiously mistaken when she applied it to Great Britain. So early as the 3d February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more than take possession of it for a temporary purpose. At the same time the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr Fox, when the intentions of the cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation appear announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to show that perfidious government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin; the Prussian harbours were declared in a state of blockade; an embargo was laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours: while a message from the King to both houses of parliament announced his resolution "to assert the dignity of his crown, and his anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power with whom his majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts." An order in council was soon after issued, authorising the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was soon almost swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed, four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.

59. In the speech which he made shortly after in the House of Commons, Mr Fox drew in vivid colours, and de-

picted with all the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. "The Emperor of Russia," said he, "after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French Emperor. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer; but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoleon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country—and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of everything that is contemptible in servility, with everything that

is odious in rapacity. Other nations have yielded to the ascendant of military power—Austria was forced, by the fortune of war to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master."

60. In consenting to this infamous transaction, the cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French Emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed by that dreaded conqueror. "From the moment," says Bignon, "that the treaty of 15th February was signed, Napoleon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France: he would not permit the delay of a single day." Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoleon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian cabinet before they were finally consummated.

61. The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared in a series of measures which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic empire, and ultimately brought the former power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French empire. On 15th March, 1806, without any previous concert with the cabinet of Berlin, was agreed with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of 15th February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Baireuth in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune, the brother-in-law of Napoleon, in the very heart of the

Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now awakened jealousy of the Prussian government; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Warden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of four million francs (£160,000) from the city of Frankfort; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburg to a still larger amount; while in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English, was seized without distinction and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (£240,000) was the price at which the imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound Continental peace, to tender to the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian government now began to fall; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies.

62. No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation, which animated all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they had made so many sacrifices; but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The Queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporising policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-

sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall. One universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks. It was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat; the elder spoke of the glories of Frederick and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved;* and

* One of the most remarkable of these was a pamphlet published by the celebrated Gentz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard everything as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But now is our salvation to be effected? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, resuscitating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes; they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource—that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations, and peace to the world. You, then, who amidst the universal shipwreck have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts; who have hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down, but not destroyed; in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is for Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved. It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more; we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe." *Gentz, Europe in 1806*; and *HARD* ix. 122, 128. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time!—a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

that universal fervour ensued which is the invariable forerunner, for good or for evil, of great events. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters.

68. While these generous feelings were gaining strength in the north of Germany, unbounded discontent arose in the south, from the exactions of the French army, which retired from Austria after the peace of Pressburg. According to Napoleon's usual policy, the whole of these immense bodies of men were fed, clothed, and lodged, at the expense of the territories in which they were quartered, or through which they passed; and a large part of their pay was also laid on the unhappy Germans, under pretence of retaining it, as a gratuity for the men, in the imperial exchequer, when they returned home. Unbounded was the exasperation which this iniquitous system excited in the countries in which it was enforced. But strong as were the feelings of patriotism and indignation which the conquests and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate feelings of many of their people, Napoleon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the Emperor at Mayence; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states of Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which these had elevated their sovereigns. France, on this occasion, played off with fatal effect the policy

so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution—that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoleon felt daily more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to direct their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance, under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on their resources.

64. Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty were not long of being brought to a termination. The plenipotentiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July; and on the 12th of that month the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were—the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand-duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau-Weilburg, Nassau-Usingen, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Salm-Salm, Salm-Kirburg, Isenburg-Birchstein, Aremberg, Lichtenstein-Darmberg, and the Count de la Leyen. The Arch-duke Ferdinand, Grand-duke of Würzburg, acceded to the confederacy a short time afterwards. By the act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be severed for ever from the Germanic empire, rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, and placed under the

protection of the Emperor of the French. Any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole. Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate of Ratisbon, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories enclosed within their dominions. Lastly, a separate article provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection; which were, for France, two hundred thousand, and for the German states, fifty-eight thousand men. But subsequent experience soon proved that Napoleon exacted and received military aid to double that number from them.*

65. This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoleon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic empire had been pierced to the heart, and some of her fairest provinces had been reft from the empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great. Sixteen millions of men were by a single stroke transferred from the empire to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the Emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions

* The contingents were settled as follows:—

| | |
|--|---------------|
| France, | 200,000 |
| Bavaria, | 30,000 |
| Würtemberg, | 12,000 |
| Baden, | 3,000 |
| Berg, | 5,000 |
| Darmstadt, | 4,000 |
| Nassau, Hohenzollern, and others, | 4,000 |
| | <hr/> 258,000 |

—Ann. Reg. 1806, 166.

which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Charlemagne had been crowned emperor in 800; Napoleon dissolved the empire in 1806. Immense was the sensation which this violent aggression produced in Europe. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened by what immediately followed. On the 1st August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced princes. The former deemed it unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the empire, the inconsistency between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amidst the weakness of their former chiefs, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess power adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterwards to expiate with tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Soul still held the battlements of Braunau; on one pretext or another the evacuation of the German states, which by the treaty of Presburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed; the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn; the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored; while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the Imperial cabinet dissembled their feelings; and, justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, renounced the throne of the Cæsars,

and declared himself the first of a new series of Emperors of Austria.*

66. Though in appearance levelled at the Emperor Francis as chief of the empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded. All classes, from the cabinet of the King to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet; they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. The increasing aggressions of Napoleon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. The senseless declamations of Murat, in particular, contributed not a little to open the eyes of all persons in the

* Napoleon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon, announcing the Confederation of the Rhine:—"The German constitution is no longer but a shadow; the Diet has ceased to have any will of its own. His majesty the Emperor and king can, therefore, no longer recognise its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. In his pacific views, he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his promises." 4. The confederate princes declared,—"The results of the three last wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the princes of the West and South have deemed it expedient to renounce all connection with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory and those of his empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity." With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the empire:—"Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the Imperial throne imposed upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the Princes Electors of the empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the Imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the electors, princes, and states, members of the supreme tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chiefs."—HARD, ix. 159, 162.

north of Germany to the dangers which awaited them. His companions said at table, "Yours is a pretty principality, indeed, for the brother-in-law of so great an emperor. Doubtless you will soon be King of Westphalia, and get a noble kingdom carved out of that despicable Prussia, which has betrayed all the world." Bernadotte, who was established at Anspach, indulged in still more extravagant chimeras; and Augereau's officers at Würzburg drank toasts openly, to success in the approaching war with Prussia. Nor were these vain and senseless words only. Murat advanced claims seriously to the principality of Embden, and the three abbacies which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the House of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, tributary to the vassal of Napoleon; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with the court of Berlin, Prussia was given to understand by the French Emperor, that if she was desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to her in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation.* But that power was informed shortly after, that the Hanse Towns, which Napoleon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy; that Saxony could not be allowed to form a part of it against

its will; while the Elector of Hesse, was invited to join the Confederacy of the Rhine, and on his refusing to comply, was struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions.

67. But all these grievances, serious as they were, sank into insignificance compared to that which arose, when it was discovered by M. Lucchesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign; that while continually urging the cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoleon had engaged to Russia in the treaty signed with d'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions; and that while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederick-William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand-duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the King of Prussia put his armies on the war-footing, despatched M. Krusemark to St Petersburg, and M. Jacobi to London, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers; opened the navigation of the Elbe; concluded his differences with Sweden; assembled his generals, and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible: the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne. Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able, single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the

* "L'Empereur Napoléon verra sans peine, et même avec plaisir, que la Prusse range sous son influence, au moyen d'une confédération semblable à celle du Rhin, tous les états du nord d'Allemagne. On promettait de n'apporter aucun obstacle à une confédération de ce genre. *Napoléon à l'ambassadeur Français à Berlin, Septembre 20, 1806.*"—TIERNS, vi. 507.

young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amidst thunders of applause, at the theatres; and the Queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch, by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps.

68. While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of southern Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England. The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz, had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France. Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities, and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Pressburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations towards his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still further removed the possibility of a rupture; while the withdrawing of Austria from the Continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. "Napoleon," said Prince Czartorinski to Alexander, "is at present victorious, but he may not be always so. Austria is beat down, but she detests her conqueror. Prussia is divided between the war and peace pursuit, but she will end by ranging herself on the side of German independence. Await your time: protract affairs till one or other of these powers is ready to act. Meanwhile remain united to England, and ready

to resume your arms on the first favourable opportunity. You will in the end compel Napoleon to give you what is your due."—"When we contend," replied Alexander, "with that man, we are children contending with a giant. Without Prussia we can do nothing. She is the only power that has not been conquered by France." There appeared, therefore, no chance of an immediate collision between the powers. But notwithstanding these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again brought them into collision; and the quarter where the difference arose, indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.

69. Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in its naval transactions. By the treaty of Pressburg, it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorized to take possession had not arrived; and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who were almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pursuance of these instigations, the people, who are styled Montenegrins, and ardently desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict investment, in which they were soon supported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived from Corfu. After a short blockade, he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately trans-

ferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force. But the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious, that the Austrian subaltern officers in the fortress protested against its conditions, and the governor was afterwards brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Transylvanian fortress for life.

70. Nothing that has since transpired authorises the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her, for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoleon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than Napoleon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Braunau, on the Austrian frontier, and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German states. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrins from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him, he was at liberty to look for an indemnity wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with which he had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians both by land and sea; but before anything of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the cabinet of St Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. d'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. In consequence, however, of that am-

bassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune arrival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrins. But these troops, having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued.

71. M. d'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he appears, when he arrived at Paris, to have acted in a way not agreeable to the cabinet of St Petersburg or his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria, if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with these powers was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands of the Emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and the Czar from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoleon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that

if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV. should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-Royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of king—the harbours of those islands being shut against the British flag during the continuance of the present war; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his queen; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties—a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concurred in within a year afterwards at Tilsit. Thus did Napoleon and d'Oubril concur in despoiling the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands; to his son; gift away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the court of Palermo or the cabinet of London; dispose of the Balearic Islands, without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden, at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover.

72. M. d'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions; for no sooner was it concluded, than he set off in person to render an account of it at St Petersburg, observing, at the same time—"I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my imperial master." In effect, before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A change of min-

istry had ensued: Prince Adam Czartorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the Imperial government, as entirely in opposition to the instructions which d'Oubril had received, though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been communicated to the cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian government was saved the dishonour which must for ever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one ministry with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the Imperial cabinet, between the time of issuing the instructions and signing the treaty, not any deviation from those instructions on the part of its ambassador. And all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states.*

* The powers conferred on M. d'Oubril bore:—"We authorise by these presents, M. d'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorised on the part of the French government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to addit to it our imperial ratification in the terms that shall be specified." On the other hand, the act of disavowal bore—"The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. d'Oubril has been submitted to a council specially summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions

73. The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the cabinet of St Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and England, which had been long in dependence at Paris; and the turn which they were now taking left little hope that hostilities, in every quarter, could be brought to a termination. This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private audience with Mr Fox, in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoleon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English minister, after having at first dismissed him from his presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply from that minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated that passage, in the exposition of the state of the empire by the Minister of the Interior, wherein Napoleon declared that he would always be ready to renew conferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments; and thus commenced a nego-

transmitted to him at Vienna before his departure from that town; and they found that M. d'Oubril, in signing that treaty, has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however—that of mere banishment to his estates—did not look as if there had been any very serious deviation from instructions.—*MARTENS'S Sup. iv. 308, 312; and HARD. ix. 222.*

tiation under the most favourable of all auspices—mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it.

74. The basis proposed by Mr Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle, that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their respective allies."—"Our interests," said Talleyrand, "are easily reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kingdoms of the earth put together. We are a great Continental power; but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If, in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent, by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty, independent of that power? No." Finding the English minister immovable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation; and it was agreed that the accession of the Continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.

75. The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and honour of England and France themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoleon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoleon was brought to agree to—although he had only a few

months before ceded it to Prussia—and the retention of Sicily by England or its allies;* the recognition of the Emperor of France by England, and the guaranteeing of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France. These terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti possidetis*, and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr Fox on the subject.

76. At the time when the proposals were made by the French government, no accommodation had been effected with Russia; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Ubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace in behalf of Russia, and Napoleon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British government. When pressed, therefore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti possidetis*, and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied, that though the sentiments of the Emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that some changes had taken place, the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and

* "I inquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, if having been so said. 'You are in possession of it,' he replied—*we do not ask it from you*; if you were not in possession, it would much augment the difficulties.' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make further questions. We ask nothing of you (*nous ne vous demandons rien*), amounting to an admission of *uti possidetis*, as applicable to his Majesty's conquests. Talleyrand concluded with these words:—'The sentiments of France are completely changed: the bitterness which characterised the commencement of this war no longer exists. And what we desire most, is to live on good terms with a power so vast as that of Great Britain.'"—Lord Yarmouth's Communication, No. 12; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

further mentioned that the Emperor had received reports from his brother, and the general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily*, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown, the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and of the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the cabinet of St James's to enter into the negotiation; that if a confidential communication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the Emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the Emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication." Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was alone on the faith of this basis, more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct it; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine quâ non*, without which it was useless to continue the conferences. Talleyrand upon this offered the *Hanse Towns* as an equivalent to the King of Naples for the loss of that island: and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian majesty: looking out thus, according to the usual system of Napoleon, in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions.

77. This clear departure on the side of France from the basis of the negotiation originally laid down by its own

minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be despoiled in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents; augured but ill for its ultimate success; and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily should be retained by the King of England, and enjoined on Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this was not acceded to. The changes in Germany consequent on the Confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be modified, if peace with Great Britain was concluded. Mr Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ispahana, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the proposed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoleon would by no means consent. Advices were received at Paris that an army of thirty thousand men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in that capital belonging to corps in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments, and the approaching signature of a separate treaty between France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles, taken from Spain, was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British plenipotentiary.

78. The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the cabinet of St Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacifi-

cation. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover: full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clark. Specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoleon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia, as a compensation for Hanover, or by his Sicilian majesty: and held out the menace that, by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views in regard to the Spanish peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as similar ones had been in Holland and Naples. But, regardless of these threats, Mr Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti possidetis*, as the only one which could be admitted; and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British government.

79. Under the auspices of this able nobleman, the negotiation was protracted two months longer without leading to any satisfactory result. The English minister continued incessantly to demand a return to the principle of *uti possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation; and the French cabinet, as uniformly eluded or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain. Lord Lauderdale in consequence repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of

the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. d'Oubril. This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, further than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia; but it considerably lowered those of Napoleon, and Talleyrand announced that France "would make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterwards explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain; the confirmation of its possession of Malta; the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire; and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity from *Spain*, in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoleon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia.

89. Thus this negotiation, begun under such favorable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro. Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the south and north of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but in reality the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view, in contending for these distant possessions, were more considerable than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the crown of Naples that Napoleon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother, it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire. It was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the colossal empires of France and Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was

the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties; and the negotiation broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France—the empire of the seas, and the dominion of continental Europe.

81. The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify d'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when shortly after it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible: a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the Queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin. The enthusiasm was universal; but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to frenzy. In proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital.* Luochesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his government full of acrimonious complaints of the cabinet of the Tuileries, which either by accident or design fell into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoleon. He instantly demanded the recall of the ob-

* He repeated with emphasis the lines of the poet Gleim, in allusion to the warlike bards of Berlin:—

"Sie singen laut im hohen Chor
Vom Tod, fürs Vaterland uns vor:
Doch kommt ein einziger Husar,
So läuft die ganze Barden Schar."

noxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission was mainly to protract matters, that the cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and if possible gain time for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoleon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His forces were so great that they might well inspire confidence in the issue of the contest. He had four hundred and fifty thousand men on foot, of whom a hundred and fifty thousand were in the interior, and a hundred and seventy thousand with the Grand Army in the centre of Germany, besides fifty thousand in Lombardy. Thirty thousand horse, and ten thousand artillerymen, formed part of the force with which he would first commence operations. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly desfilng from Braunau, the Inn, and the Necker, towards the banks of the Elbe, and one hundred thousand men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at their head on the night of the 26th September, conveyed the Guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were—1st, That the French troops should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the Emperor, and continuing it without interruption. 2d, That the districts on the Wesel should be detached from the French empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter-league in the north of Germany. No stronger proof of the insatiation which had seized the cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of

Napoleon and the Grand Army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England, proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rossbach than the eve of the battle of Jena.

82. The public mind was at this period violently excited in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder committed by orders of Napoleon on a citizen of one of the free cities of the empire, who had sold a work hostile to his interests. Palm, a tradesman in Nuremberg, had been instrumental with many other booksellers in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gents, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others were fortunate enough to make their escape; but Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers assembled by the Emperor's orders at Braunau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence.* This atrocious

* The judgment of the military commission convicting Palm, and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble:—"Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservation; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the progress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of nations and the respect due to crowned heads; injurious to the people committed to their government; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination—declares unanimously, that the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty of high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the frenzy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of

proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany. Men compared the loud declamations of the republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with this savage violation of it by their military chief; and concluded, that the only freedom which they really had at heart was license for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendancy, that of military violence. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the senate of Frankfurt, after recounting the enormous contributions which they had paid to the French armies in 1796, 1799, 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Augereau replied to this

crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination, or any private crime. If they had, they were published, not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its Emperor, but in the free city of Nuremberg, in the heart of the German empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoleon, but to Germans, aliens to his authority, and enemies of his government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Pressburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that *Russia*, a separate power at war with France, had in the usual course of hostility conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Applying Napoleon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Silesians, to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British empire to throw off the rule of their sovereign and parliament, and to establish annual parliaments and universal suffrage? —Bacon, v. 327, 328.

proclamation by a stern requisition to have the authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the magistrates of the state; but after they had been arrested, Napoleon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop further proceedings.

§ 83. The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevengeed, either upon Napoleon or the French people. It fell deeply and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general freedom by the spread of republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoleon for the negotiations which ultimately led to their abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the exile to St Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly, in every part of Europe, that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France; that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolor flag. Napoleon has frequently said, that if Mr Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all the subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted; but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to tear from one of the brightest ornaments of his country the honour of having at last been awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and of having possessed the magnanimity, in opposition to his former long-continued delusion, instantly to act upon the conviction.

§ 4. In his last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never

to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow out the path thus clearly chalked out.* In several of the speeches which he had delivered, after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration.† Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic

* "In the instructions," says Mr Fox in his last important official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his Lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded; in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct: the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to use them till the French government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his Majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand upon this made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany; and stated, 'that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place.' That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, the German confederation treaties were both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoleon's assertion, that, if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. Its last stages, down to his death on 17th September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—*Mr Fox's Despatches, Aug. 8d and 14th, 1806; Parl. Deb. viii. 198, 104.*

† In the Debate on Mr Windham's mil-

itary system, on April 3, 1806, Mr Fox said, with admirable candour:—"Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that I have been weaned from the opinions which I formerly held with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying on the war, we must be reduced to that state which I for one cannot contemplate without apprehension,—*'toto diviso orbe Britannos'*—and be left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or indeed under any system which we may act upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb. vi. 715, 716.*

‡ This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox, on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties. Ten years before, the champions of the constitution and of revolution, Mr Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the *Findus Gallica*, had in like manner come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm," said Mackintosh in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings, is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter: you are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitution of my country." Burke answered

85. The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining; and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill, his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th September he sank into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery. Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings, and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his character communicated confidence; the ardour of his eloquence roused enthusiasm; the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship."—"I admired," says Gibbon, "the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood." Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr Fox's character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between from the bed of death:—"You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shows how much your own sagacity, operating on your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the show of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end." What words between such men!—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 87, 88.

them ceased:—"To be sure, he is a man made to be loved!"*

86. A man of pleasure in every sense of the word; dissipated and irregular in private life; having ruined his private fortune at the gaming-table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in parliament, yet he never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments, and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration, not only of his partisans, but of his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic everywhere turned as to those of the gifted spirit intrusted with their cause. To his support the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he triumphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gratuitous exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

87. Mr Fox was the greatest debater that the English parliament ever pro-

* The convivial talents of Fox were great, as may well be believed from his so long being the idol of the brilliant circle of wits and beauties who in his early days did homage to the rising sun of the Prince of Wales. With men his conversation often partook of the licentious character of the fashionable and unscrupulous society in which he lived; but in the company of elegant women no man was more scrupulously well-bred, or often more felicitous in the delicate expression of flattery. On one occasion, when he was at a supper at the house of the young and beautiful Duchess of Devonshire, a sort of game went round, in which each gentleman presented the lady next him with fruit of some kind, accompanied by an impromptu line or verse: "Come, Mr Fox," said the Duchess, "you have given me nothing as yet: what are you thinking of?" He immediately took a bunch of grapes, and presented it to the Duchess with the words, "Je plains jusqu'à l'ivresse."

duced: he has been styled by a most competent judge, "the most Demosthenian orator who has appeared since the days of Demosthenes."* Without the admirable arrangement and lucid order which enabled Mr Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate. But his habits were too desultory—his indolence too great—his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge.† Respectable as a historian, the fragment on the annals of the English Revolution which he composed is justly admired for the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the parliamentary orator.‡ It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from

studying the vehement declamation—the powerful and fervent reasoning—by which his great speeches there are distinguished.

88. But, notwithstanding all this, the fame of Mr Fox is on the decline, not from a diminished sense of his genius, but an altered view, among the thinking few at least, of his principles. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected legislation the freedom of the press, and opposed the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind. But in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of democracy—in so far as he supported the wild projects of the French revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same destructive doctrines, and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition—he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

89. The doctrines, that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands—that the extension of

* Sir James Mackintosh.

† No man more frequently referred to Adam Smith; yet he had never read the "Wealth of Nations."

‡ This is the more remarkable, as he had so elevated a conception of the proper character of history that he classed the chief works of thought thus:—1. Poetry. 2. History. 3. Oratory. This was no slight homage to the historical muse, when coming from the first orator of his own, or perhaps any age—Fox's *History*, Introd. p. vii.

political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil—that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction—and that the growth of democratic ascendancy is the commencement of social regeneration,—are sometimes amiable, from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular, from the agreeable flattery they convey to the multitude. They are liable to only one objection—that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and a fatal forgetfulness of the character of the vast majority of men who in every rank are swayed by selfishness or stimulated by passion. They invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a democratic regime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, is kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated. It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional monarchy; no hope remains of its outliv-

ing the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when these antagonist forces are brought for any length of time to draw in the same direction."

90. The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr Pitt opposed to revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps for ever, under the triumph in which Mr Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by this great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration. On the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave. It can only award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, but not that of a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart,—it will indulge the pleasing hope, that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many, of his earlier

* "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes.—"Amidst mobs and sedition," says the Roman annalist, "all that is base has the greatest power; peace and tranquillity are sustained by the good."—"I see at last," said the French demagogue when going to the scaffold, "that in revolutions power falls into the hands of the most base." "A democratic republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few; with this difference, that the few who are thus

elevated to power are the most worthless and profligate of the community." "Democracy," says the author of the *Pindaric Gallies*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and to control; and consequently the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large." What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—THUCYDIDES, l. iii. c. 59; SALLUST, *de Bella Cat.*; RICHIE, 67; *Parlementaire Histoire*, xxx. 903; MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 92.

delusions; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors,

by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

CHAPTER XLIII.

CAMPAIGN OF JENA—FALL OF PRUSSIA:

1. No monarchy in Europe is less indebted than the Prussian, for its political power and importance, to the advantages of nature. Its territory, flat, sandy, and in great part comparatively sterile, can only be brought to a high state of cultivation by long-continued efforts, and the unsparing application of human industry. Its sea-coast has few advantageous harbours; its rivers, though numerous, and in general navigable, descend for the greater part of their course through the territories of separate or rival states. Without the natural fertility of the Sarmatian plains, or the mineral wealth of the Bohemian mountains; destitute alike of the flocks of Hungary and the herds of Switzerland; enjoying neither the forests of Norway nor the vines of France—it depends entirely on grain crops and pastures, and for them the bounty of nature has afforded no peculiar advantages. Vast tracts of gloomy heath, or blowing sand, hardly less unproductive, form a large part of its surface; in other places, cheerless, desolate plains, thickly strewn with rushes or stunted firs, convey a monotonous, mournful impression to the mind of the traveller. Yet have the industry and perseverance of man conquered all these disadvantages; the arid sands have been covered with waving crops, the rushy fields with rich pastures; and in no country in Europe is agriculture now advancing with more vigorous strides, or popula-

tion increasing with such steady rapidity.*

2. If Prussia owes little to her natural advantages, she is indebted still less to the political facilities of her situation, or the homogeneity in character of her inhabitants. Her territory, which has gradually been enlarged by the talents or good fortune of her rulers, is widely scattered from the Rhine to the Vistula, with other states in some places intervening, and in general in such long strids as equally to expose her to attack and to deprive her of the advantages of a compact formation of defence. Her population is composed of different races, speaking in some places different languages, and but recently actuated in any by a common bond of national attachment. The old electorate of Brandenburg originally formed part of the vast monarchy of Poland, and broke off from that unwieldy commonwealth during the weakness of its unbridled democracy;

* Prussia contains at present—

| | ARPENTS. |
|----------------------------|------------|
| Arable lands, | 47,285,176 |
| Vineyards, | 1,024,176 |
| Meadows, | 14,326,429 |
| Pastures, | 16,972,714 |
| Forests, | 23,800,000 |
| Wastes, lakes, &c. | 8,936,347 |

112,405,382

Or nearly 111,000 square English geographical miles. Twenty-one thousand four hundred and ninety arpents make a square German geographical mile.—TCHONORSKI, l. 115; and FORSTER and WEBER, *Statistiques de la Prusse*, 17, 21.

Silesia, conquered by the Great Frederick in the middle of the eighteenth century, is a province of Bohemia, and is chiefly inhabited by Slavonian tribes; while Prussian Poland was the fruit of the iniquitous spoliation of that unhappy state in 1772 and 1794, and its inhabitants retain all the mournful recollections and national traditions by which the Sarmatian race is characterised in every part of the world. Yet does the Prussian monarchy now form a united and prosperous whole: its rise during the last century has been rapid beyond example; it singly defeated, under the Great Frederick, a coalition of the three most powerful monarchies in Europe; and it yields to no country in the world in patriotic spirit, and the glorious efforts which it has since made to maintain its independence.

3. Augmented as it has been by the acquisitions made at the treaty of Paris in 1814, the Prussian monarchy now contains upwards of fifteen millions of inhabitants, who are diffused over a territory embracing one hundred and eleven thousand four hundred and eighty-eight square English miles—a surface little less than that of Great Britain and Ireland, which contain one hundred and twenty-two thousand. At the commencement of the war of 1806, however, both were much less considerable; the former only amounting to nine million five hundred thousand souls, the latter to seventy-two thousand square miles of territory. If this considerable population was placed on a compact and defensible territory, it would form a great and powerful monarchy, having nearly the resources, in population and territory, of the British empire in Europe at the commencement of the Revolutionary war; but both population and territory are so scattered over a long and narrow extent of level surface, that they seem at first sight to be a source rather of weakness than strength. They extend from the banks of the Niemen to those of the Sarre, over a space three hundred leagues, or nine hundred miles in length; while the greatest breadth does not exceed a hundred and thirty

leagues, and their average is not above forty. These straggling territories are in many places interrupted by the possessions of foreign princes, enclosed within those of Prussia, which, on the other hand, has no inconsiderable portion of its dependencies imbedded in the dominions of other states. Thus the Prussian dominions present an irregular strip stretching along the whole north of Germany, having its back to the Baltic Sea and German Ocean, the harbours of which are liable to be blockaded by the superior fleets of Britain; while its long front is exposed to the incursions of Austria, and its two extremities lie open, with no natural frontier capable of defence, and but few artificial strongholds, to the incursions of the great monarchies of France and Russia—the former possessing above twice, the latter nearly four times its military resources.

4. The urban population of Prussia bears a remarkably large proportion to the rural, for the former amounts to a fourth of the whole inhabitants. The number of towns and burghs is ten hundred and twelve, of which thirty-seven contain above ten thousand inhabitants.* This great number and

Population
in 1834.

| | | |
|---------|--------------------|---------|
| * Viz — | Pr lin, | 258,000 |
| | Breslau, | 88,000 |
| | Cologne, | 71,000 |
| | Königsberg, | 70,000 |
| | Torgau, | 70,000 |
| • | Dantzic, | 65,000 |
| | Magdeburg, | 42,000 |
| | Aix-la-Chapelle, | 37,000 |
| | Stettin, | 36,000 |
| | Elberfeld, | 29,000 |
| | Düsseldorf, | 28,000 |
| | Coblenz, | 28,000 |
| | Posen, | 26,000 |
| | Halle, | 25,000 |
| | Potadam, | 24,000 |
| | Erfurt, | 22,000 |
| | Memel, | 10,000 |
| | Frankfort-on-Oder, | 18,000 |
| | Krefeld, | 17,000 |
| | Trèves, | 16,000 |
| | Stralsund, | 16,000 |
| | Halberstadt, | 15,000 |
| | Brandenburg, | 15,000 |
| • | Neisse, | 13,000 |
| | Glogau, | 12,500 |
| • | Bonn, | 12,500 |
| | Quedlinburg, | 12,500 |
| | Görlitz, | 12,000 |
| | Brieg, | 12,000 |
| | Legnitz, | 11,500 |

size of towns indicates either extraordinary riches in the adjacent territory, as in Lombardy and Flanders, or considerable manufacturing advantages, such as those which have raised the cities to such a stupendous magnitude in the north of England and the west of Scotland. Such, accordingly, is the case; and the manufacturing industry of Prussia, in spite of the prohibitory system adopted generally by the Continental states, is very considerable. Inferior, of course, by more than a half, in proportion to the square league of territory to that of Britain, it is considerably superior to that of France.* The iron-works and manufactures of zinc and copper, as well as the salt-works, in its dominions, are very extensive; and the cotton manufactures, though recently established, are making, under the shelter of the heavy protective duties established against those of England, rapid progress. The total amount of its exports in 1828 was 24,102,000 thalers, or nearly £4,000,000, and four thousand merchant vessels bore the flag of Frederick-William.

5. The main strength of Prussia, however, lies in its agriculture; and it is in the patriotic spirit and undaunted courage of the class engaged in it, that the monarchy in every age has found the surest bulwark against foreign aggression. So rapid has been the increase of sheep of late years in Prussia, that their number, which in 1816 amounted only to 8,261,400, had risen

| | Population in 1834. |
|---------------------|------------------------|
| Grüneberg, . . . | 11,900 |
| Schweidnitz, . . . | 11,000 |
| Minden, . . . | 11,000 |
| Mühlhausen, . . . | 10,500 |
| Prentzlow, . . . | 10,000 |
| Aschersleben, . . . | 10,000 |
| Naumburg, . . . | 10,000 |

—MALTE BRUN, v. 297, 303.

* Horse-power of machines in proportion to the square league of territory:—

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------|
| In Great Britain, . . . | 415 horses. |
| In Prussia, . . . | 183 " |
| In France, . . . | 178 " |

In proportion to her extent of surface, Prussia has fewer steam-engines than France, but more hydraulic machines; and, on the whole, a greater amount of mechanical power.—EGEN, *Untersuchungen über den Effect, &c.*—Berlin, 1831; and MALTE BRUN, v. 291.

in 1828 to 14,158,000—that is, nearly doubled; and the most decisive proof of the general increase of rural produce is to be found in the fact, that though population in Prussia is now advancing more rapidly than in any country of Europe, so as to double, if the present progress should continue, in twenty-six years, yet no importation of foreign grain is required.† Subsistence, under the influence of increased production, so far from becoming scarce, is constantly declining in price, and the augmented comforts and wants of a prosperous people are amply provided for by the labours of the agricultural portion of the community.

6. It was by slow degrees, however, and by the successive efforts of more than one generation of great men, that Prussia was raised to its present prosperous condition. The monarchy, in reality, dates from the accession of Frederick the Great; but during the short period which has since elapsed, it has made unexampled progress. The treasure, indeed, amassed by that great warrior and able prince, had been wholly dissipated during the succeeding reign; but, both under his sway and that of his successor Frederick-William, the monarchy had made important advances in territory, wealth, and population. By withdrawing from the alliance against France in 1794, the cabinet of Berlin succeeded in appropriating to itself a large portion of the spoils of Poland; while the open preference to French interests which they evinced for the ten years which followed the treaty of Bale, was rewarded by a considerable share of the indemnities—in other words, of the spoils of the ecclesiastical princes of the empire; and a most important increase of influence, by the place assigned to Prussia as the protector of the neutral leagues situated beyond a fixed line in the north of Germany. During this long period

† In 1828, the total population of the Prussian provinces, exclusive of the Canton of Neuchâtel, was 12,672,000 inhabitants. In 1832, it was 13,643,000; and it is now (1843) upwards of 15,000,000. The proportion per square league in the first period was 892; in the second, 993—a prodigious difference to have taken place in so short a period as four years.—MALTE BRUN, v. 276.

of peace, the industry and population of the country rapidly advanced; a large portion of the commerce of Germany had fallen into its hands, and the whirl and expenditure of war, so desolating to other states, was felt only as increasing the demand for agricultural produce, or augmenting the profits of neutral navigation.

7. At the death of the Great Frederick in 1786, the population of the monarchy was 7,000,000 of souls, and its revenue 31,000,000 thalers, or about £4,600,000 sterling. By the shares obtained of Poland on occasion of its successive dismemberments, and the acquisition of Anspach, Baireuth, and other districts, its population was raised to 9,000,000; and although the treasure of 70,000,000 thalers (£10,500,000) left by the Great Frederick had disappeared, and given place to a debt of 28,000,000 of thalers, or £4,200,000, yet this was compensated by the increase of the revenue, which had risen to 36,000,000 thalers, or £5,400,000. Various establishments had been set on foot at Berlin, eminently calculated to promote the interests both of commerce and agriculture. In particular, a bank and society of commerce were established in that capital, and institutions formed in the provinces to lend money to the landed proprietors on reasonable terms. By the aid of these establishments, and the effect of long-continued peace and prosperity, the finances of the state were in the most flourishing condition in 1804; all the branches of the public service were provided for by the cur-

rent revenue, and some progress was even made in the reduction of the debt. The large share of the German indemnities, obtained through French and Russian influence by this aspiring power, made a considerable addition to the public resources: the acquisition of 526,000 souls raised the population to 9,500,000 souls, and the increase of 2,375,000 thalers yearly revenue swelled the income of the public treasury to 38,375,000 thalers, or £5,750,000 sterling—a sum equivalent, from the difference in the value of money, to at least ten millions sterling in Great Britain. This revenue, as in Austria, was the net receipt of the exchequer, and independent, not merely of the expenses of collection, but of various local charges in the different provinces. The regular army was nearly 200,000 strong, brave, and highly disciplined, but not to be compared to the French, either in the experience and skill of the officers, or in the moral energy which had been developed by the events of the Revolution.

8. Unlimited toleration prevails in Prussia. The Protestant is the religion of the sovereign and of the state, but persons professing all creeds are equally eligible to all offices under government, and, practically speaking, no difference is made between them. On the whole, two-thirds of the inhabitants are Protestants, one-third Catholics; but the proportions between these two great divisions of Christians vary considerably in the different provinces.* Each religion has its separate minis-

* The Prussian population was divided, according to its religion, in 1829, in the following manner:—

| Provinces. | Protestants. | Catholics. | Mormon-ites. | Jews. | Totals, including Military. |
|-------------------------------|--------------|------------|--------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| Prussia, . . . | 1,448,113 | 529,921 | 13,919 | 19,408 | 2,008,361 |
| Posen, . . . | 300,495 | 687,401 | .. | 67,590 | 1,064,506 |
| Pomerania, . . | 864,588 | 7,643 | .. | 4,709 | 876,842 |
| Brandenburg, . | 1,505,471 | 20,535 | 245 | 10,341 | 1,539,592 |
| Silesia, . . . | 1,284,448 | 1,091,132 | .. | 20,970 | 2,396,551 |
| Saxony, . . . | 1,816,700 | 89,081 | .. | 3,607 | 1,409,388 |
| Westphalia, . . | 504,611 | 711,883 | 171 | 11,981 | 1,228,548 |
| Rhenish Pro- vinces, . . . | 499,840 | 1,678,719 | 1,315 | 22,421 | 2,202,322 |
| | 7,753,264 | 4,816,215 | 15,658 | 160,978 | 12,726,110 |

ters and bishops. Berlin is every five years the seat of a general synod; that capital has a Protestant bishop, and Königsberg another; but the Catholics have two archbishops and six bishops in the Prussian dominions. Like the Austrian government, however, the Prussians are careful not to admit the slightest interference in matters not purely spiritual by the court of Rome, and Catholic ministers of vacant livings are appointed by a variety of lay patrons as in Great Britain, without any serious collision with the Holy See.

9. The revenue of Prussia, like that of all other countries in Europe, is derived partly from direct, partly from indirect taxation.* The total revenue is 79,180,000 florins, or nearly 28,000,000 sterling — a sum at least equal to £14,000,000 sterling in Great Britain, if the difference in the value of money is taken into consideration. The expenditure is somewhat less, amounting only to 75,238,571 florins, or £7,523,857 sterling, leaving a balance of above 5,000,000 florins, or £500,000 yearly to go to the discharge of the principal of the public debt.† The public debt of Prussia in 1833 amounted to 723,450,000 francs, or £29,000,000 sterling. In 1823 the debt was 908,950,000 francs, or £36,350,000; so that in ten years they have reduced the debt by £7,000,000, at which rate it will be entirely extinguished in 1872. It would appear, therefore, that the finances of Prussia are in a more prosperous state than those of Austria, France, or Great Britain, in all of which, although their

national resources are incomparably greater, the expenditure generally exceeds the income by a very considerable sum, and all thoughts of a sinking-fund, or of a permanent system for the reduction of the debt, have been practically abandoned. This fact speaks volumes as to the patriotic spirit of the Prussian people, and the economy and far-seeing policy of its government, especially when the large military establishment they are obliged to keep up to secure their independence is taken into consideration.

10. The military establishment of Prussia is greater, in proportion to its population, than that of any other country in Europe.‡ It consists, in time of peace, of one hundred and twenty-two thousand men: but so admirable are the arrangements for the augmentation of this force in time of war, and such the ardent and patriotic spirit of the people, that the state could then without difficulty call forth an army of five hundred thousand combatants. The regular army is composed of three classes. 1st, Of voluntary recruits, who are received from seventeen to forty years of age. 2d, Of young men who are balloted for: a burden to which all the inhabitants of the kingdom, without exception, are subject. 3d, Of veteran soldiers who prolong the period of their service voluntarily beyond the period required by law. Every Prussian, without exception, from the royal family downwards, between the ages of twenty and fifty, is liable to be drawn for the military service in some department or

* The particulars are—

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Direct taxes, | 26,802,837 florins, or £2,580,253 |
| Indirect, | 40,740,000 .. 4,074,000 |
| Domains and forests, | 7,171,428 .. 717,142 |
| Mines, | 1,310,000 .. 131,000 |
| Lottery, | 1,827,448 .. 181,000 |
| Miscellaneous, | 438,572 .. 43,857 |

Total, 79,810,000 florins, or £7,981,000

—TCHOBORSKI'S *Finances de l'Autriche et de la Prusse*, i. 4, 5.

† The particulars are—

| | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| Interest of public debt, including sinking-fund, | 12,244,286 florins, or £1,225,428 |
| Civil list and court, | 20,905,743 .. 2,090,574 |
| Army and ordnance, | 33,180,000 .. 3,318,000 |
| Miscellaneous, | 5,300,000 .. 530,000 |
| Reserve fund, | 3,318,572 .. 331,557 |

75,238,571 florins, or £7,523,857

—TCHOBORSKI'S *Finances de l'Autriche et de la Prusse*, i. 9.

other; but he is only bound to serve in the regular army five years; and of these he is only three years actually with his colours, the other two being allowed to be spent at home. Thus the military duty is so short that it is never considered as a burden, but rather as an agreeable mode of spending the first three years of manhood; and there are very few who either can or wish to avoid it. The *cadres* of the regiments, or permanent staff, and a certain proportion of the privates, are fixed, and hold to arms voluntarily as a profession for life; and this gives to the troops, notwithstanding the frequent change of the privates, the consistence and steadiness of old soldiers, while, at the same time, it spreads through a large part of the people a practical acquaintance with military duties. It is to this system, introduced by the Great Frederick, but matured and brought to perfection by those able statesmen, Stein and Scharnhorst, after the treaty of Tilsit, that the stability and continual progress of the Prussian monarchy is, beyond all doubt, to be ascribed.

11. Besides the regular army, the military establishment of Prussia embraces also the *landwehr* and *landsturm*, which, in time of need, can quadruple its effective strength. The former is divided into two *bans*: the first comprehending all the young men from twenty to thirty-two who have not gone through the five years' service in the regular army; the second formed of persons, whether they have served or not, from thirty-two to fifty years of age. After that period all obligation of military service entirely ceases. During peace the *landwehr*, which consists of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are never called into active service or removed from home; but they are not on that account the less carefully and regularly instructed during a certain number of days in the year in their military duties. In case of war or invasion, the first ban are called out, and united to the regular forces, to whom they are soon scarcely inferior in discipline and prowess: the second ban form the garrisons of strong places, and

perform the service of the interior. In addition to this immense force, which numbers fully two hundred thousand combatants, there is organised in Prussia a second reserve, called the *landsturm*, which embraces every man, without exception, not already enrolled in one of the other services, between the ages of seventeen and fifty years. Such a force in many countries would be little more than a tumultuary rabble, more likely to be burdensome than available in real service; but in Prussia, where almost all the citizens have at one period or another served in the ranks, it forms a much more efficient body, and actually performed good service on many occasions during the glorious struggle of 1813.

12. Education is more generally diffused in Prussia than in any other country of equal extent in Europe. Over the whole of its dominions, one in seven of the whole population is at school; while in France the proportion is one in twenty-three; in England one in fifteen; and in Scotland one in eleven. There can be no doubt that this is the greatest proportion of persons undergoing instruction which obtains in the world. Instruction is there compulsory: the laws compel the sending of children to school by their parents, and, when necessary, that duty is enforced by the magistrates. In general, however, it is unnecessary, so great is the desire of parents and relations to give their children the blessings of education. Schools are established in every parish, and the costs of instruction are very trifling, so as to be within the reach of the humblest of the people; and to the destitute it is given gratuitously. The tree of knowledge, however, has in Prussia, as elsewhere, brought forth its accustomed fruits of good and evil. In Prussia there are, according to the most recent returns, no less than *twelve times* as many crimes committed, in proportion to the population, as in France, where education is not diffused to a third of the extent it is in Prussia—a fact which demonstrates, equally with the experience of every other country, the sedulous care which it is indispensable to take before that great instru-

ment of *power*, is put into the hands of the people.*

13. The Prussian capital had long been one of the most agreeable and least expensive in Europe. No rigid etiquette, no impassable line of demarcation, separated the court from the people: the royal family lived on terms of friendly equality, not only with the nobility, but with the leading inhabitants of Berlin. An easy demeanour, a total absence of aristocratic pride, and of extravagance or parade, distinguished all the parties given at court, at which the king and queen mingled on terms of perfect equality with their subjects. Many ladies of rank, both at Paris and London, spent larger sums annually on their dress than the Queen of Prussia; none equalled her in dignity and grace of manner, and the elevated sentiments with which she was inspired. Admiration of her beauty, and attachment to her person, formed one of the strongest feelings of the Prussian monarchy; and nothing contributed more to produce that profound irritation at France, which, in the latter years of the war, pervaded all classes of its inhabitants, than the harshness and injustice with which Napoleon, to whom chivalrous feelings were unknown, treated, in the days of her misfortune, that captivating and high-spirited princess.

14. A spirit of economy, order, and wisdom, pervaded all the internal arrangements of the state. The cabinet, led at that period by Haugwitz, but in which the great abilities of Hardenberg and Stein soon obtained an ascendancy, was one of the ablest in Europe. Its diplomatists, inferior to none in information, penetration, and address, had long given to Prussia a degree of influence at foreign courts beyond what could have been expected from the resources and weight of the monarchy. The established principles of the Prussian cabinet, under the direction of

Haugwitz, ever since the peace of Bâle, in 1795, had been to keep aloof from the dangers of war, and take advantage, as far as possible, of the distresses of their neighbours to augment the territory and resources of the monarchy. From a mistaken idea of present interest, not less than the influence of former rivalry with Austria, they inclined to the alliance with France, and derived great temporary benefits from the union, both in the accessions of territory which they received out of the ecclesiastical estates of the empire, and the increase of importance which they acquired as the head of the defensive league of the north of Germany. Little did they imagine, however, in what a terrible catastrophe that policy was to terminate, or anticipate, as the reward of their long friendship, a severity of treatment to which Austria and England were strangers, even after years of inveterate and perilous hostility. The interview at Memel in 1802, and the open support given by Russia to the Prussian claims in the matter of the indemnities, had already laid the foundation of an intimate personal friendship between Frederick-William and the Emperor Alexander. But it was at first an alliance of policy rather than affection, and acquired the warmth of impassioned attachment at the tomb of the Great Frederick and on the field of Leipsic.

15. Notwithstanding the inconsiderate haste with which Prussia had taken up arms, the cabinet of Berlin made some attempts to induce the other powers of Europe to share with them the dangers of the conflict. With England it was no difficult matter to effect a reconciliation. At the first authentic accounts of the change in the policy of Frederick-William, an order in council was issued, raising the blockade of the Prussian harbours. M. Jacobi, the Prussian minister in London, returned to that capital immediately after he had left it; and the British ministry had the

* In France and Prussia there were in 1826:—

| | PRUSSIA. | FRANCE. |
|----------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Crimes against the person, . . . | 1 in 34,122 | 1 in 32,411 |
| „ against property, . . . | 1 in 597 | 1 in 9,892 |
| „ on the whole, . . . | 1 in 587 | 1 in 7,285 |

—MALTE BRUN, v. 278; and BALBI et GUERRY, *Sur l'Education en France*, til. 736.

generosity to resume its amicable relations with the cabinet of Berlin before an explanation had been given on the subject of Hanover. With Sweden an accommodation was also without difficulty effected, on the footing of the troops of that power taking possession of Lauenberg, which they did in the name of the King of Great Britain. It was not so easy a matter to convince the cabinet of St Petersburg of this unlooked-for change in the Prussian councils; and, taught by the long vacillation of its policy, they were for some time unwilling to yield to the general joy which was diffused through the Russian capital, on the intelligence that war was resumed on. But no sooner was Alexander informed, by confidential letters brought by General Krusemark from the King of Prussia, that he had embarked seriously in the contest, than he instantly wrote promising an immediate succour of seventy thousand men, and announcing his intention of himself marching at the head of a chosen army to aid in the support of his ally.

16. Important as the announcement of the intentions of Russia was, the accession of Austria would have been of still more value to the common cause, from its closer proximity to the scene of action, and the strong positions which the Bohemian mountains afforded on the flank of the probable theatre of war. The Prussian ambassador accordingly was indefatigable in his endeavours to rouse the cabinet of Vienna to a sense of the vital importance of joining heart and hand in the approaching conflict for the liberties of Europe. He represented to Count Stadion, then prime minister at Vienna, "that the losses inflicted on Austria by the treaty of Pressburg were so immense, that the emperor, of necessity, must at some future period look out for the means of repairing them. The province of the Tyrol is of such irreparable importance to Austria, that no doubt can be entertained that she will take advantage of the first opportunity to resume it from Bavaria, by rousing the patriotic attachment of the inhabitants of that important province to their ancient

masters. Napoleon has justly conceived the most serious apprehensions for the faithful observance of that treaty which he himself has been the first to violate. Does he not, in defiance of his engagements, still hold the fortress of Braunau, and the line of the Inn, six months after he was bound by a solemn treaty to have evacuated Germany with all his forces? The recent establishment of the Confederation of the Rhine, and dissolution of the Germanic empire, too clearly demonstrate with what ulterior views the French government is actuated in regard to the countries beyond the Rhine. Honour, necessity, the existence of his people, have forced the King of Prussia to take up arms alone; but a powerful Russian army, and the well-known generosity of England, diminish the perilous chances of the conflict. Now, therefore, is the time for Austria and Prussia to lay aside their jealousies springing from the conquest of Silesia, and unite their forces against the common enemy, who is about to make the Confederation of the Rhine an outwork from whence to enslave all the other states of Germanic origin."

17. Forcible as these considerations were, and strongly as the cabinet of Vienna felt their justice, there were yet many circumstances which forbade them to yield on this occasion to their inclinations. The conduct of Prussia for ten years had been so dubious and vacillating; her hostility to Austria, especially on the division of the indemnities, so evident; her partiality for the French alliance so conspicuous; her changes of policy during the last year so extraordinary, that no reliance could be placed on her maintaining a decided line of conduct for any length of time together, and, least of all, on her continuing steadfast in that sudden and perilous hostility in which she had now engaged, and the vehemence of which was the worst possible guarantee for its endurance. Who could insure that she would not desert this alliance as she had done the first coalition against France, or abandon her policy as suddenly as she had done her recent hostility against England, and leave to Aus-

tria, irrevocably embarked the whole weight and dangers of the contest? The Archduke Charles, on being consulted as to the state of the army, reported that the infantry, which had not yet been rejoined by the prisoners taken during the campaign, was hardly a half of its full complement; the cavalry but recently remounted, and for the most part unskilled in military exercises; the artillery numerous, but the majority of the gunners without any experience. The treasury was empty; some of the most valuable provinces of the monarchy had been torn away, and those which remained were exhausted by enormous war contributions, wrung from them by the enemy. Influenced by these considerations, the cabinet of Vienna resolved to preserve a strict neutrality, and issued a proclamation to that effect. However much the historian may lament that determination, from a knowledge of the boundless calamities which an opposite course might have saved to both monarchies, it is impossible to deny that, situated as Austria was at that time, it was the most prudent resolution which its government could have adopted; and that, if Prussia was left single-handed to maintain the cause of European independence, it was no more than she was bound to expect from the selfish and temporising policy which she had so long followed."

* The instructions of Mr Adair, the British ambassador at Vienna at that period, were, not to stimulate the Austrian government to hurry into a war of which the consequences, if unsuccessful, might be fatal to that country, but to offer its government, if they deemed the opportunity favourable for engaging in hostilities, or if the necessities of their situation compelled them to such a course, the whole pecuniary aid which Great Britain was capable of affording. Of the wisdom of this course of proceeding, no one who considers the precarious situation of Austria at that crisis can entertain a doubt; and it affords another proof of the clear insight which Mr Fox at that period had obtained as to the insatiable ambition of Napoleon, and of the magnanimity with which that upright statesman instantly acted upon his conviction. "A man," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "unjustly styled by Napoleon and his adherents, the last prop of the pacific dispositions of the cabinet of St James's." —*LUCCHESINI*, ii. 96, 97, note; and *BIGNON*, v. 417.

18. Hopes were not wanting to the cabinet of Berlin of efficacious aid in another quarter where it was least expected, and of a kind to paralyse a considerable part of the French forces. Spain, bereft of her navy by the battle of Trafalgar, blockaded in her harbours, destitute of commerce, cut off from all intercourse with her colonies, had felt all the burdens of war without any of its glories. The public indignation was hourly accumulating against the Prince of the Peace, whose ignoble birth, exorbitant power, and immense wealth, rendered him as much an object of jealousy to the Castilian noblesse, as the uniform disasters which had attended his administration made him detested by the people. Still, however, that ruling favourite persevered, against the almost unanimous wishes of the kingdom, in the French alliance, till his pride was offended at the haughty conduct of Napoleon, who excluded the Spanish ambassador from any share in the negotiations for a general peace at Paris, and it was revealed to him, that in those conferences the French Emperor had seriously proposed to take the Balearic islands from the Spanish crown, and confer them as an indemnity for Sicily, together with a revenue drawn from Spain, on the King of Naples. At the same time the assembling of a powerful army at Bayonne, ostensibly directed against Portugal, sufficiently indicated a design to overawe both states of the Peninsula.

19. The light now suddenly flashed upon the Spanish rulers. They perceived, as Prussia had done during the same negotiation, that the French Emperor made use of the powers with whom he was in alliance as mere dependencies, excluding them from any participation in treaties in which they were deeply interested, and disposing of their provinces to others without condescending even to ask their consent to the transfer. No sooner, therefore, did they receive intelligence of the rupture of the conferences between Great Britain and France at Paris, and the resolution of Prussia to take up arms, than they resolved to detach

themselves from the French alliance, and join their forces to those engaged in the cause of European independence. Despatches from the Prussian envoy at Paris to the Prince of the Peace on this subject were secretly intercepted and deciphered by the French government, which from that moment resolved on the overthrow of the Spanish branch of the house of Bourbon at the first convenient opportunity. At the same time, the Prince of the Peace, deeming concealment of his designs no longer necessary, issued two proclamations, in the middle of October, in which he enjoined the immediate filling up of the ranks of the army, and the organisation of the national militia, under their constitutional leaders, in all the provinces of the monarchy. Thus was the ambition and reckless disregard of national rights by Napoleon again reviving, on a surer basis, because that of experience and common danger, the great original * European coalition against France; and on the eve of the battle of Jena were the first sparkles of that terrible conflagration visible, which afterwards burned with such fury in Russia, Germany, and the Spanish peninsula.

20. But although the greater and distant powers, with the exception of Austria, were thus arming in favour of the coalition, the lesser states nearer the scene of action were overawed by the influence and the authority of France. Napoleon was daily receiving accessions of strength from the states which bordered on the Confederation of the Rhine. The Archduke Ferdinand, though brother to the Emperor of Austria, gave the first example of defection by joining his states of Wurtzburg to that alliance; the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, whom interest as well as family connections strongly inclined to the cause of Prussia, was nevertheless so overcome by his apprehensions, as to persist, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the cabinet of Berlin, in a forced neutrality; and summoned to each of the hostile camps, and sorely perplexed between his inclinations and his apprehensions, put his troops on the war footing of twenty thousand

men, and contrived to protract his ultimate decision till the battle of Jena rendered submission to France a matter of necessity. Saxony alone, continuous along its northern frontier with Prussia, and capable from its strength of adopting a more generous resolution, openly joined the cabinet of Berlin; but twenty thousand men were all that it brought to the standards of the Prussian generals.

21. The whole weight of the contest, therefore, fell on Prussia; for although great and efficacious aid might be expected to be derived in time from Russia, and succours were hoped for from England, both in men and money, yet these auxiliaries were as yet far distant. The Muscovite battalions were still cantoned on the Niemen; those of England had not yet left the Thames; while Napoleon, at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops, was rapidly approaching the Thuringian Forest. Nothing daunted, however, by this formidable prospect, Frederick-William gallantly took the field, and directed all the disposable troops of the monarchy towards Saxony and Erfurth. The total military strength of the kingdom was two hundred and forty thousand men, of whom one hundred and twenty thousand were assembled on the frontier, and twelve thousand were in observation in Westphalia, for the approaching campaign; the remainder being dispersed in garrisoned depots, or not yet put in a state for active operations. Such was the general enthusiasm, and so little did they anticipate the terrible reverses which awaited them, that the Prussian guards marched out of Berlin, singing triumphant airs, amidst the shouts of the inhabitants, almost in a state of sedition from the tumultuous joy they experienced on at length being about to measure their strength with the enemy. Napoleon's forces were much more considerable. They amounted in Germany alone to one hundred and ninety thousand men; of whom twenty-eight thousand were the terrible reserve cavalry under Murat, and they were directed by the ablest and most

experienced marshals in the French army.*

22. The memorable military operations of the year 1806, and the tenacious hold which Napoleon then kept of the fortresses on the Elbe, when assailed by the greatly superior forces of the coalition, have demonstrated that no position in Europe is more susceptible of defence than the course of that river; and that supported by the ramparts of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden, an inferior force may there for a considerable time prolong its defence against an enemy possess-

* Napoleon's army was divided into nine corps, and stationed as follows, on the 31 October, when he arrived at Würzburg,—

| | MEN. |
|---|---------|
| First corps—Bernadotte—at Lichtenfelds, | 20,000 |
| Second do.—Marmont—Illiria, | |
| Third do.—Davoust—Bamberg, | 27,000 |
| Fourth do.—Soult—between Amberg and Bamberg, | 32,000 |
| Fifth do.—Lefebvre, succeeded by Launes—in front of Schweinfurt, | 22,000 |
| Sixth do.—Ney—Nuremberg, | 20,000 |
| Seventh do.—Augereau—Würzburg, | 17,000 |
| Cavalry do.—Murat—between Würzburg and Kronach, | 28,000 |
| Imperial Guard—Bessières and Lefebvre, after Launes got the 5th corps—Würzburg, | 20,000 |
| | 186,000 |

The bulk of the army was grouped round Coburg and Bamberg. The whole force bearing on the Prussians, exclusive of Marmont in Illiria, was 136,000 men.

The Prussians, when the campaign opened, were divided into three armies: the right wing under General Rüchel, of 30,000 men, was stationed on the frontiers of the Hessian territories; the centre, 55,000 strong, commanded by the King in person, with his lieutenant-general, the Duke of Brunswick, under his orders, was in front of the Elbe around Magdeburg, with its advanced guard on the Saale; the left wing, composed of 40,000 men, including the Saxons, was commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, with Prince Louis, the King's brother, under him. In all 125,000—a noble force, but as much inferior to that at the command of Napoleon, as was the capacity of their leader compared to his. It was assembled in Saxony; its extreme left rested on the Bohemian mountains, and its advanced posts were pushed as far as Hof and the Kirchberg. A detached corps of 12,000 men, in Westphalia, was under the orders of a general destined to future celebrity.—BLÜCHER.—DUMAS, xv. 290, 514; JOM. ii. 275, 276; *Official Report of the Prussian strength to the Duke of Brunswick*, HARD. ix. 484, App. G.; and THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 42.

ing an overwhelming superiority in the field. Had these fortresses been properly armed and provisioned, and the Prussians been commanded by a general capable of turning to the best advantage the means of defence which they afforded, it is probable that as protracted a contest might have been maintained as Napoleon supported in 1796 on the Adige, or Kray in 1800 around the bastions of Ulm, and time gained for the arrival of the Russians before a decisive blow was struck in the centre of Germany. But not only had no preparations for such a defensive system been made, but the nation, as well as its rulers, were in such a state of exultation as to despise them. None of these important bulwarks were provisioned; hardly were guns mounted on their ramparts. The interior fortified towns on the Oder and in Silesia were for the most part in the most deplorable state. No depots were formed; no provision was made for recruiting the army in case of disaster. They had not even a rallying point assigned in the event of defeat, though the strong fortresses of Magdeburg, Wittenberg, and Torgau lay immediately in the rear of the theatre of war, and the Elbe spread its ample stream to arrest the victor. Careless of the future, chanting songs of victory, and enjoying its triumphant march through the villages, the army bent its steps towards Erfurth; strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, stronger still in the anticipation of the overthrow of Napoleon, and dreaming rather of the banks of the Rhine or the plains of Champagne, than of the shores of the Vistula and the fields of Poland.

23. But if the infatuation of the army was great, greater still was the delusion of its commanders. The Duke of Brunswick, though an able man of the last century, and enjoying a great reputation, was altogether behind the age, and ignorant of the perilous chances of a war with the veteran legions and numerous columns of Napoleon. The disasters of the late campaigns were by him ascribed entirely to timidity or want of skill in the Aus-

trians; the true way to combat the French, he constantly maintained, was to assume a vigorous offensive, and paralyse their military enthusiasm by compelling them to defend their own positions. That there was some truth in this opinion, no one acquainted with the character and history of the French army could deny; but unfortunately, it required, for its successful application, both a general and an army very different from the Prussian at this period. The former did not possess the energy and rapidity, the latter the strength or experience, requisite for so perilous a system. Bold even to rashness in the original conception of the campaign, the Duke of Brunswick was vacillating and irresolute when he came to carry it into execution; and, while his opponent was counting hours and minutes in the march of his indefatigable legions, he frequently lost whole days in deliberation or councils of war, or changed the destination of the forces when their movements were half completed. The troops, indeed, were numerous and perfectly disciplined: the artillery admirable; the cavalry magnificent; the staff skilful and highly educated, but in matters of theory and detail, rather than the practical disposal of large masses in presence of a powerful and enterprising enemy. But what the whole army, from the general to the lowest drummer, were alike ignorant of, was the terrible vehemence and rapidity which Napoleon had introduced into modern war, by the union of consummate skill at headquarters with enormous masses and a vast application of physical force; combining thus the talent of Cæsar or Turenne, with the fierceness of the sweep of Scythian warfare. Applying then to the present the experience of the past age, the usual error of second-rate men, they calculated their measures upon the supposition of a war of manœuvres, when one of annihilation awaited them; and advanced against the columns of Daun or Laudohn, when they were in presence of Napoleon and a hundred and fifty thousand effective men.

24. As usual in such cases, the con-

tending parties prefaced the war of arms by mutual manifestoes calculated to rouse the spirit of their respective forces, or vindicate their hostility in the eyes of Europe. That of Napoleon, which bore intrinsic evidence of his composition, was, as usual, admirably calculated to dazzle and stimulate his followers. "Soldiers! the order for your return to France was already issued; you had already approached it by several marches; triumphal fêtes awaited you; preparations for your reception were already made in the capital; but whilst we were surrendering ourselves to a too confident security, new conspiracies were formed under the mask of friendship and alliance. Cries of war have been heard from Berlin: for two months provocations have daily been offered to us; the same insane spirit which, taking the advantage of our dissensions fourteen years ago, conducted the Prussians into the plains of Champagne, still prevails in their councils. If it is no longer Paris which they propose to raze to its foundation, it is now their standards which they announce their intention of planting in the capitals of our allies; it is Saxony which they wish to compel to renounce, by a shameful transaction, its independence, and range itself by their side; it is your laurels which they wish to tear from your brows: they insist upon our evacuating Germany at the mere sight of their army! The fools! Let them learn that it is a thousand times easier to destroy the great capital than to wither the honours of a great people and its allies. Their projects were then confounded: they found in the plains of Champagne defeat, shame, and death; but the lessons of experience are forgotten; and there are men in whom the feelings of hatred and jealousy are never extinguished. Soldiers! there is not one among you who would return to France by any other path but that of honour. We should never re-enter there except under triumphal arches. What then! shall we have braved the seasons, the sea, the deserts—vanquished Europe, repeatedly coalesced against us—extended our

glory from the east to the west—to return at last to our country like deserters, after having abandoned our allies, and to hear it said that the French eagle fled at the mere sight of the Prussian standards! But they have already arrived at our advanced posts. Let us then march, since moderation has not been able to awaken them from this astonishing trance: let the Prussian army experience the same fate which it did fourteen years ago: let them learn that if it is easy, by means of the friendship of a great people, to acquire power and dominions, its enmity, though capable of being roused only by an abandonment of every principle of wisdom and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."

25. Less fitted to rouse the military passions and warlike enthusiasm of its subjects, than this masterpiece of Napoleon, the Prussian manifesto, drawn by Gentz, was yet a model of dignified reason, and concluded with a sentiment as to the ultimate issue of the contest, which subsequent events have rendered prophetic. "All our efforts, and those of our allies, to preserve peace have proved unsuccessful; and if we are not willing to abandon to the despotism of an implacable enemy, and to deliver over to his devouring armies, the whole north of Germany, and perhaps of Europe, a war is inevitable. His majesty has resolved upon it, because the honour and security of the state are in danger: he would have deemed himself happy could he have attained the same end by pacific means; but it is with the firmest confidence that he takes the command of the army which is about to combat for its country and national honour, because the cause in which it is engaged is just. His majesty is well aware that for long the army desired war; and even when circumstances prevented him from yielding to its wishes, these wishes commanded his respect, because they took their origin in those feelings of honour and patriotism which have ever distinguished the Prussian forces. The nation, in a body, has manifested the warm interest which it takes in

this conflict; and that strong expression of enthusiasm has confirmed his majesty in the opinion, that now it is not only unavoidable, but in unison with the wishes of all the people. His majesty is convinced that the desire to preserve unchanged the national honour, and the glory which the Great Frederick has shed over our arms, will suffice to excite the army to combat with its accustomed valour, and to support with constancy all its fatigues.

26. "But this war possesses even a more general interest. We have to deal with an enemy who all around us has beaten the most numerous armies, humbled their most powerful states, annihilated their most venerable constitutions; ravished from several nations their honour, from others their independence. A similar fate awaited the Prussian monarchy; numerous armies menaced your frontiers; they were daily augmenting; it had become your turn to fall into the gulf; to bow beneath a stranger yoke; and already his pride and rapacity coveted the spoils of the north of Germany. Thus we combat for our independence, for our hearths, for all that is dear to us; and if God gives victory to the just side, to our arms, to the courage which burns in the heart of every Prussian, we shall be the liberators of oppressed millions. Every warrior who shall fall on the field of battle will have sacrificed his life in the cause of humanity; every one who survives will acquire, besides immortal glory, a just title to the gratitude, the triumph, the tears of joy of a liberated country. Who amongst us could endure the thoughts of becoming the prey of a stranger? While we combat for our own safety, to avert for us the deepest humiliation to which a nation can be subjected, *we are the saviours of all our German brethren*; the eyes of all nations are fixed on us as the last bulwark of liberty, security, or social order in Europe."

27. The opposite style of these two eloquent proclamations is very remarkable. Both are addressed to the strongest passions of the human breast; both are masterpieces of manly oratory;

but the language which they severally employ is strikingly characteristic of the different situations in which their authors respectively stood. Napoleon speaks to his soldiers only of an insult offered to their arms — of glory and triumphs, and victories to be won; Frederick-William, equally firm, but less sanguine as to the result, disguises not the dangers and chances of the struggle, but reminds them of the duty they owe to themselves, their country, the cause of the human race. The former invokes the eagles of France, and calls on the soldiers to follow their glorious career: the latter appeals to the God of battles, and anticipates from his aid a final triumph to the arms of freedom. The battle of Jena and chains of Tilsit seemed for long to have announced an abandonment of this cause by the care of Providence; but let these words be borne in mind, and compared with the final issue of the contest.

28. Napoleon had no gallantry or chivalrous feeling in his breast. The Prussian minister had, with the ultimatum of the cabinet of Berlin, given a pressing request for an answer to the Prussian headquarters, by the 8th October. "Marshal," said he to Berthier, "they have given us a rendezvous for the 8th; never did a Frenchman refuse such an appeal. We are told that a beautiful queen is to be a spectator of the combat; let us then be courteous, and march without resting for Saxony." Francis I. might have used the same language; but what followed in the first bulletin of the campaign, dictated by Napoleon himself? "The Emperor was right when he spoke thus for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, dressed as an Amazon, wearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, writing twenty letters a-day to spread the conflagration in all directions. We seem to behold Armida in her madness setting fire to her own palace. After her follows Prince Louis of Prussia, a young prince full of bravery and courage, hurried on by the spirit of party, who flatters himself he shall find a great renown in the vicissitudes of war. Following the example of

these illustrious persons all the court cries 'To arms!' but *when war shall have reached them with all its horrors, all will seek to exculpate themselves from having been instrumental in bringing its thunder to the peaceful plains of the North.*" Such was the language in which Napoleon spoke of the most beautiful princess in Europe, rousing her subjects to patriotic resistance! How singularly prophetic is the concluding part of the sentence of what he himself experienced just six years afterwards, in the frozen fields of Russia.

29. Animated by those heart-stirring addresses, the forces on both sides rapidly approached each other; and their advanced outposts were in presence on the 8th October. Then began the terrible contest of the north with the south of Europe; never destined to be extinguished till the domes of the Kremlin were reddened with flames, and the towers of Notre Dame were shaken by the discharges of the Russian batteries. The first plan discussed at Berlin, was for the whole army to debouch in separate columns by the two great roads, those of Adorf and Saalfeld, and Eisenach and Gotha, and commence the offensive towards the valley of the Maine, on the east and west of the Thuringian Forest, the intermediate passes of which were to be occupied by a central corps; but this plan was soon abandoned, as exposing the army to a perilous division of force in presence of so powerful and enterprising an enemy. The design ultimately adopted was to advance with the right under Ruchel in front, which was pushed on to Eisenach; next in echelon followed the centre, commanded by the King in person, which, united with the corps of Hohenlohe, was to advance upon Saalfeld and Jena, while each wing was covered by a detached corps of observation, the right by Blücher on the confines of Hesse, the left by Tauenzien, on the side of Bai-reuth. The object of this movement was to determine the hesitation of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel, and effect the junction of his contingent to the Prussian army, and at the same time pierce

the centre of the valley of the Maine, which was the base of the enemy's operations, and cut them off from their communications with France. Both objects were important, and the design was well conceived had the Duke of Brunswick possessed a force adequate to its execution. But it necessarily involved his army in great hazard in presence of a numerous and skilful enemy; and by leaving open to his advance the great roads to Dresden and Leipsic, exposed the Prussians to the very danger of being themselves turned and cut off from their communications and magazines, when endeavouring to inflict that injury on their opponents.

30. Napoleon was not a man to let slip the opportunity which this hazardous attempt of the Prussians to pass his position afforded, of not merely defeating, but destroying their army. Confident in the numbers and experience of his troops, which rendered a situation comparatively safe to them, which was to the last degree perilous to their opponents, he instantly resolved to retort upon the enemy the measure they were preparing to play off upon him; and, by throwing forward his army with the right in front, turn the Prussian left, and cut them off from their magazines on the Elbe, and the heart of the monarchy. On the 8th October, the French army was concentrated round Bamberg; at three o'clock on the morning of the 9th, Napoleon put himself in motion, and his columns marched towards Saxony, on three great roads, by echelon, the right in front. On the right, Soult and Ney with a Bavarian division moved from Baireuth by Hof, on Plauen; in the centre, Murat with the cavalry, as also Bernadotte and Davoust, marched from Bamberg by Kronach, on Saalburg; on the left, Launes and Augereau, breaking up from Schweinfurt, advanced by Coburg and Graffenthal upon Saalfeld. The effect of these movements was to bring the centre and right of the French directly upon the Prussian magazines and reserves, while they were stretch-

ing forward on the left, to interpose between their antagonists and the Rhine. In commencing these movements, the French Emperor put in practice his usual system for providing for his army. This was to make his troops subsist daily, in general, on the resources of the country which they occupied,—to extend themselves sufficiently to obtain supplies, but not so as to be beyond concentration in case of attack,—and to have in reserve, in waggons, bread adequate for several days, to meet any sudden emergency. This reserve store, carefully husbanded and duly replenished when drawn upon, served for all cases of concentration before or after battles. To convey it, Napoleon allowed two caissons for a battalion, and one for a squadron. Adding to that the carriages provided for the sick and wounded, he calculated that four or five hundred waggons should suffice for the largest army. The most peremptory orders were issued against any general or officer applying any part of these public conveyances to his private purposes; and in one instance, having discovered that one of his marshals made such use of them in the outset of the campaign, he manifested the utmost displeasure, and declared Berthier responsible for all such evasions of his orders in future.

31. The Prussians were in the midst of their perilous advance to the French left, when intelligence of this rapid accumulation of forces against their own centre and left reached the Duke of Brunswick's headquarters. It was indispensable to renounce forthwith the hazardous enterprise; and orders were instantly despatched to countermand the advance, and direct the concentration of the army in the neighbourhood of Weimar: the principal column, commanded by the King, at Erfurth; Ruchel at Gotha; Hohenlohe at Hochdorf; the reserve, under the Duke of Württemberg, at Halle. Thus the Prussians, in presence of the greatest general and most powerful army of modern times, were thrown into a change of position, and a complicated series of cross movements, with their

flank exposed to the enemy—the situation of all others the most perilous in war, and which, not a year before, had proved fatal to the combined army, when attempting a similar movement in front of Austerlitz. To complete their danger, the concentration, from the orders which they received, took place on the centre and right; whereas it was on the left, towards Hof, that it should have been made, to resist the rapid march of the invaders upon their magazines and resources. The Thuringian Forest, which those movements promised to render the first theatre of approaching hostilities, is a range of broken hills, for the most part covered with wood, which, branching off from the central chain that encircles Bohemia, stretches to the northwards until it subsides into the plains of Westphalia, where it terminates. This range separates the valley of the Rhine from that of the Elbe, the waters from the western slope flowing into the former, those from the eastern into the latter. It thus runs directly athwart the line of communication between France and Prussia, and requires to be traversed in one quarter or another in going from the one country to the other. Three great roads cross this broken woody region, and conduct the traveller from the banks of the Rhine to the sands of Prussia. The first, starting from Mayence, follows the windings of the Maine as far as Coburg, where it approaches the summit of the Thuringian ridge, from which the Maine flows in one direction, the Saale in another. Three défilés penetrate the summit level: that of Baireuth to Hof, that of Coburg to Saalfeld, that of Kronach to Schleitz. The second route, which is the one usually followed by travellers going from Mayence to Saxony or Berlin, passes the wooded summits of the Thuringian Forest to the left of their highest elevation. It branches off from the valley of the Maine at Hanau, ascends the lateral valley of the Fulda, and, after surmounting the ridge, descends by Eisenach, Gotha, and Weimar into the Saxon plains and the banks of the Elbe. The third, by striking far to

the north, avoids entirely the Thuringian range, and, leaving the Rhine at Wesel, makes straight for the Westphalian plains between the northern extremity of the hills and the sea. Of these routes Napoleon chose the first, which brought him by Würzburg to the sources of the Saale; and it was there that he came in contact with the Prussian army, in the very act of making their perilous movement from left to right.

32. But before the junction of the Prussian forces, even in this false direction, could be effected, the formidable legions of Napoleon were already upon them. As might have been expected, when surprised in this manner in the middle of a lateral movement, they were attacked at the same time in different quarters, and in all by greatly superior columns of the enemy. The French masses, dense and strong, marching on the great chaussées, fell perpendicularly upon the flank of their opponents when endeavouring, by cross and often deplorable roads, to reach the points of rendezvous assigned to them. The consequences might easily have been anticipated. They were defeated in every quarter, and lost, in the very outset of the campaign, the moral influence of an advance. On the 9th, Tauenzeln, who was at the moment in front of Schleitz with six thousand Prussians and three thousand Saxons, was attacked by Bernadotte, at the head of greatly superior forces, and after a gallant resistance dislodged from his position with the loss of several hundred men. The day following, Murat marched on Gera, and on the road fell in with and captured a convoy of five hundred carriages and a pontoon train—an extraordinary proof of the advantage the French had already gained, when, on the third day after hostilities had commenced, they had fallen in with and captured a large part of the reserve trains and heavy baggage of the enemy.

33. Nor was the French left, under Lannes and Angereau, less successful. On the 10th, the former of these generals arrived on the heights of Saalfeld, and animated his troops to the highest

degree by reading to them the proclamation of Napoleon on the opening of hostilities; and on the same day, in continuing his advance upon Saalfeld, he fell in with Prince Louis, who commanded the rear-guard of the Prussian left, and had been stationed at Rudolstadt and Blankenburg by Prince Hohenlohe to cover the cross-march of his columns, who were then endeavouring to reach the points of rendezvous assigned them by their commander-in-chief. This gallant prince, in common with his immediate superior, Prince Hohenlohe, had long expressed the opinion, which they had in vain endeavoured to impress upon the Duke of Brunswick, that Napoleon meditated an attack on the Prussian left, and that a concentration of their troops in that direction should have been made some days before.* Unable to prevent the disastrous resolution to assemble on the right, he now set himself with heroic bravery to mitigate its effects. The forces under his command were only eleven battalions and eighteen squadrons of hussars, with eighteen pieces of cannon; and with these he had to withstand the shock of Lannes, with twenty-five thousand men. Notwithstanding this fearful preponderance of force, he resolved to hold firm

* In the great council of war, held on the 5th October at Erfurt, when the Duke of Brunswick's project of continuing the march across the Thuringian Forest was discussed, Prince Hohenlohe, Prince Louis, and Colonel Massenbach, his chief of the staff, strongly represented that, by continuing the march in that direction, the army would be exposed to certain ruin; that they would soon arrive at a country where the ground was entirely favourable to the operations of the enemy, and adverse to their own method of fighting; and that if the French were inclined, as seemed more than probable, to turn either of the wings of the army, nothing could favour this design so much as the plunging the Prussian host by columns into the forest. These sage observations made no sort of impression on the Duke of Brunswick; and all the modification of his plan which these generals could effect, was that the troops should halt for a day on the 8th October, and on the following morning throw out strong reconnoitring parties, and receive bread for eight days before entering the defiles of Thuringia. It may safely be affirmed that that council, by continuing this fatal advance, determined the result of the campaign.—*Dumas*, xvi. 25, 26; and *Saalfeld*, *Allgemeine Geschichte*, iii. 299.

during the remainder of the day, to gain time for the evacuation of the considerable magazines which were collected close in his rear at Saalfeld.

84. In this gallant but unhappy determination he was confirmed from an opinion that it was only by resuming the old Prussian system of a vigorous offensive, that the spirits of the soldiers, which had been much sunk by the general order to retreat on the preceding day, could be revived. The sensible increase of the enemy all around him on the following day—even the turning of his right flank by Suchet with a powerful body of light troops, which rendered his position no longer tenable—could not induce him to abandon his ground; and when the attack commenced, the Prussians were surrounded on all sides. Notwithstanding this, they made a gallant resistance, and enabled the artillery and chariots to leave Saalfeld in safety. Returning from the town to his gallant comrades, who still made good their ground in its front, Prince Louis found them dropping fast under the murderous fire of the French tirailleurs. Soon their retreat was converted into a rout by the ravages of the hostile artillery; and the prince himself, while combating bravely with the rear-guard, still striving to restore order among the fugitives, was surrounded by the enemy's hussars—"Surrender, colonel," said their chief, not knowing the rank of his opponent, "or you are a dead man." Louis answered only by a blow with his sabre, which wounded without disabling his adversary, who replied with a mortal stroke, which laid the heroic prince dead at his feet.

85. In this disastrous encounter the Prussians lost twelve hundred prisoners, besides eight hundred killed and wounded, and thirty pieces of cannon. But this was the least part of their misfortunes: the heroic Prince Louis was no more. He had fallen, it is true, while bravely combating on the field of honour; but his body had remained the trophy of the victors, and the continued advances of the enemy too surely indicated that defeat had attended the first serious en-

counter of the Prussian arms.* Their army was now broken in upon in several points; its magazines in part seized; its concentration interrupted; and the dejected columns, without any fixed rallying-points, were wandering about in every direction, while the terrible French legions, in dense masses, were falling perpendicularly on their flank. These disasters rapidly communicated their depressing effect to the minds of the soldiers. The death of Prince Louis, above all, equally dear to the officers and private men, diffused a universal gloom. So grievous a calamity in the outset of the campaign was regarded as the worst augury of its future fortunes; and, as is usual with great bodies in a violent state of excitement, the transition was immediate from the preceding exultation to an extraordinary degree of depression.

36. Meanwhile the movements preparatory to a decisive battle continued, though in a very different spirit, on both sides. In deep dejection, and with infinite difficulty, the Prussians at length concentrated their forces in two great masses under the King in the neighbourhood of Weimar, and under Hohenlohe near Jena. It was in the highest exultation, on the other hand, and in the full anticipation of victory, that the French made a sweep which brought them completely round the Prussian army. The early triumphs with which the campaign had opened had given Napoleon hopes of rapid and decisive success. He no longer feared, as he admitted he had done at first, that he would be obliged to have recourse to the mattock.† The confusion of the enemy's columns had dissipated the prestige of the Great Frederick. Encouraged by these events, he

now hesitated not to follow out the brilliant career which had opened to his arms. A complete conversion, turning on the pivot of the left, took place in the direction of his columns, who wheeled round so as to face the Northern Ocean. Davoust, Bernadotte, and Murat marched upon Naumburg, where, on the next day, they made themselves masters of considerable magazines; Soult was advancing on Jena, where Lannes was already established; while Ney and Augereau were at Roda and Kahla, in its immediate neighbourhood. Such was the confusion of the Prussian movements, and the bad understanding which already prevailed between them and the Saxons, that, when the French took up the ground which the Allies had just quitted in the environs of Jena, they found the fields and roads covered with arms, cuirasses, and chariots, like the scene of a defeat. The Saxons had pillaged the Prussians, and the Prussians the Saxons. Baggage and ammunition waggons had been abandoned by their drivers, and lay scattered in confusion, while some guns had even been spiked to prevent their being of service to the enemy.

37. The result of these different marches was in the highest degree favourable to the French arms. By the advance on Naumburg they had cut the enemy off from the line of retreat to Eeipsic, and thrown their left back in such a manner that the French on the banks of the Saale had their back to the Elbe, and faced the Rhine; while the Prussians had their back to the Rhine, and could only hope to regain their country by cutting their way through the enemy. Finding affairs in a situation so much more favourable than he could possibly have

* No sooner was the rank of the prince known, than Marshal Lannes, with deserved courtesy, showed his corpse all the honours due to so illustrious a character. It was interred with military honours in the cemetery of the princes of Coburg, at Saalfeld; and Berthier wrote on the 12th to the chief of the Prussian staff, announcing that the Emperor had ordered it to be restored, if it was desired that his remains should rest in the tomb of his ancestors—an offer which the disasters immediately ensuing rendered it

impossible for the royal family at that time to accept.—BIGNON, v. 469.

† In setting out for the Prussian campaign, Napoleon expected to experience a more formidable resistance than he had yet met with in Europe. The exploits of the Seven Years' War had filled him with the highest idea of the troops trained in the school of its illustrious hero, and he said to his assembled officers at Mayence, "We shall have earth to move in this war."—JOMINI, ii. 282.

anticipated, Napoleon, to gain additional time to complete the encircling of his antagonists, despatched, on the 12th, an officer of his household with proposals of peace to Frederick-William, taking care meanwhile not to suspend for one instant the march of his columns; but the latter did not reach that monarch till the battle was over. In the evening of the 12th the army of Hohenlohe, which, with all the additions it had received from Ruchel, did not exceed forty thousand men, was grouped in dense masses on a ridge of heights to the north on the road from Jena to Weimar, between the Ilm and the Saale. Its advanced posts were on the Landgrafenberg, a steep hill between its position and the town of Jena, from the summit of which the whole lines of the Prussians could be descried, and over which the only road to the attack of their position in front lay.

38. The army of the King of Prussia, on the other hand, under the immediate command of the Duke of Brunswick, sixty-five thousand strong, was concentrated at the distance of somewhat more than a league in the rear of Hohenlohe, near Weimar. Thus the whole Prussian army, consisting of above a hundred thousand men, of which eighteen thousand were superb cavalry, with three hundred pieces of cannon, was at length assembled in a field of battle, where their far famed tactics had a fair theatre for development; and notwithstanding the early disasters of the campaign, an opportunity was afforded them of reinstating affairs at the sword's point. Each army had passed its opponent, and mutually intercepted the other's communications. But there was this extreme difference between the two, that the army of the Duke of Brunswick, cut off from all its magazines, had no resource but in victory; whereas that of Napoleon, though severed from the Rhine, had a clear line of retreat, in case of disaster, to the Maine and the Danube.

39. It would have been well for the Prussians had they continued and given battle in this concentrated posi-

tion; but the intelligence of the advance of Davoust and Murat upon Naumburg, which arrived at headquarters on the night of the 12th, led to a renewed separation, attended in the end with the most frightful disasters. Conceiving that the French Emperor had no intention of immediate combat, and being anxious for the safety of that town, where the principal magazines of the army were placed, the Duke of Brunswick came to the ruinous resolution of again dividing his forces; and while Hohenlohe was left in position near Jena, as a rear-guard to cover the retreat of the army, the principal body, with the King at its head, moved at daylight for Sulza, and at night arrived on the heights of AUERSTADT. Thus at the very moment when Napoleon, with above a hundred thousand men, was making his dispositions for a general battle on the day following, and surmounting the difficulties of the approach to the enemy's position on the heights in his vicinity, the Prussian general dislocated the imposing mass of his soldiers, and, diverging to the left with two-thirds of his forces, engaged in a hazardous flank-march of ten leagues in presence of his antagonists, leaving a comparatively inconsiderable rear-guard to be crushed by more than double its force in its position at Jena. Such was the dearth of provisions which already prevailed in the allied camp from the capture of their magazines by the enemy, that no regular supply of bread was dealt out to the men after the long and fatiguing march; but great numbers lay down, wearied and supperless, to sleep on the ground which was to cover their graves on the morrow.

40. Meanwhile Napoleon, never suspecting this division of the enemy's force, and supposing they were to follow the principles of the Great Frederick, which were to combat in concentrated masses and on as confined a field of battle as possible, was endeavouring, with his wonted energy, to overcome the all but insurmountable difficulties of the passage of the Landgrafenberg, by which access was to be

afforded to his columns for the attack of the Prussian position. No sooner had the French light troops dislodged the enemy's patrols from these important heights, than the Emperor repaired to them in person, from whence he distinctly beheld the portion left of the Prussian army still reposing at leisure on its formidable position on the opposite ridge. Not doubting that he would have to deal with their whole force on the following day, he pressed without intermission the march of his columns; and soon arranged the forces of Lannes, who with his infantry first reached its summit by this steep and rugged ascent, in such formidable masses around its declivities on the other side, that the enemy, who were now sensible of their error in abandoning so important a point, and were making preparations to retake it, were obliged to desist from the attempt. This valuable height, therefore, from which the whole of the Prussian position and all the movements of their troops were distinctly visible, remained in the hands of the French; and its elevation not only gave them that advantage, but entirely concealed from the observation of the Prussians the rapid concentration of troops on the Jena side of the mountain, which would at once have revealed the intention of a decisive attack on the following day. Still the difficulty of surmounting the ascent was very great, and for artillery and waggons it was as yet totally impassable.

41. Nothing, however, could long withstand the vigour of Napoleon and his followers. He stood on the spot till the most rugged parts of the ascent were widened by blasting the solid rock, or smoothed by pioneers; and when the men were exhausted, revived their spirits by himself working with the tools, and exhibiting his old experience as a gunner in surmounting the difficulty of dragging the cannon up the pass. Animated by such an example, and the vigorous exertions of the successive multitudes who engaged in the task, the difficulties which the Prussian generals deemed altogether insurmountable were rapidly over-

come; before night in the evening the ascent was passable for cavalry and artillery; and at midnight the whole corps of Lannes, with all its guns and equipage, reposed in crowded array on the ridges and flanks of the mountain. The Imperial Guard, under Lefebvre, lay on its summit; Angereau on its left; Soult and Ney received orders to march early in the morning before daybreak to the right, in order to turn the enemy by his left, after the combat was begun; Murat bivouacked during the night near Dornburg, but he was ordered up to Jena, and was in reserve before the action was far advanced; while Davoust and Bernadotte were directed to advance from Naumburg, the first upon Apolda, in order to threaten the enemy's rear, the second upon Dornburg, to cut off his retreat to the Prussian dominions. The two armies now lay so near that their fires were within cannon-shot, and the lines of sentinels in communication the lights of the Prussians, dispersed over a space of six leagues, threw a prodigious glow over the whole heavens to the north-west; those of the French, concentrated in a small space, illuminated the heights in the middle of their position. Surrounded by his faithful Guards, the Emperor, after having despatched his last orders to his marshals, wrapped himself in his cloak, and shared the frigid bivouac of the soldiers on the summit of the Landgrafenberg.

42. At four in the morning of the 14th he was already on horseback, and, surrounded by his generals, rode along the front of the line of Suchet's and Gazan's divisions, which were first to be engaged, and were already under arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the Prussian army is turned, as the Austrian was a year ago at Ulm; it now only combats to secure the means of retreat. The corps which should permit itself to be broken would be dishonoured. Fear not its renowned cavalry; oppose to their charges firm squares and the bayonet." Loud acclamations rent the air at these words: but the morning was still dark; the first streaks of dawn were only beginning to appear, and a thick cold fog obscured every object around. Burning

with impatience, the soldiers awaited the signal of attack, but for two long hours they were kept shivering in their lines. At length at last, when the day, though still misty, was light, and the Emperor judged that his marching columns would be no far advanced on their respective routes as to justify the commencement of the action in front, he gave the signal for the attack. Meanwhile the Prussians, little suspecting the tempest which was about to burst on them, were securely reposing in their position, and, anticipating a day of complete rest on the 14th, had made no provision either for marching or battle. This fatal security had been increased by the opinion generally entertained at Hohenlohe's headquarters, that the bearer of the flag of truce who had appeared at their advanced posts on the preceding day, and had been forwarded with his despatches to the king, brought proposals of peace, and that nothing serious would be attempted till his answer was received. Their position was strong and admirably chosen: secure from attack on either flank, and approachable in front only by narrow and steep defiles, in which, if the heads of the enemy's columns were vigorously resisted and hindered from deploying, horse, foot, and cannon would be jammed up together, and the disaster of Hohenlinden might have been repaid with interest to the French army. But the departure of the king with nearly two-thirds of the army, and the total absence of any preparations for an attack on the part of those who remained, deprived them of the advantages which they might otherwise have gained from this position, and relieved Napoleon from a risk in the outset of the campaign, greater, perhaps, than he underwent even during the perilous changes which signalised its later stages.

43. Great was the astonishment of the Prussian outposts, when, through the grey mist of the morning, they beheld the French battalions close upon them, and advancing swiftly in the finest order to the attack. They made, however, a gallant resistance, and did their utmost to prevent the French,

led by Suchet, from debouching from the defiles at the mouth of which they were stationed; but being altogether unprepared for the attack, and completely surprised, they were not long able to make good their post, and back, with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, to the main body of the army. The ground thus gained by Suchet was of the utmost importance, for it enabled the heads of the French columns, after emerging from the defiles, to extend themselves to the right and left, and gain room for the successive corps as they came up to deploy. Roused by the first discharge of fire-arms in front, Prince Hohenlohe rode through the mist from his headquarters in the rear at Capellendorf towards the front; but, still confident that it would only prove a skirmish, he said to General Muffling, "that his troops should remain quiet in their camp till the fog had risen; and that, if circumstances demanded it, he would move forward the division of Grawert, as he did not wish the Saxons to combat at all that day." Soon, however, messengers arrived in breathless haste from the outposts with urgent demands for assistance, and Grawert was rapidly advanced towards Vierzehn-Heiligen to support Tauenzien, who there with difficulty held his ground against the impetuous attacks of Suchet. Meanwhile the whole army of the Prussians, alarmed by the sharp and incessant fire of musketry in their front, stood to their arms, and reinforcements were sent to the points in advance which were menaced: but in spite of all their exertions the enemy gained ground; the villages of Closwitz and Kospoda, at the foot of the eminence on which the lines of Hohenlohe were posted, were successively carried; and all the low grounds in front of his position were filled with troops. Still the mist was so thick as to be almost impenetrable; the contending bodies could not see each other till they were within a few yards' distance; and under cover of this veil, and in the midst of the confusion arising from an unexpected attack, the movements of the assailants were completed, the defiles

passed, and the precious moments, when the heads of their columns might have been driven back into the gorges by a vigorous attack, as those of the Imperialists had been at Hohenlinden, for ever lost.

44. At length at nine o'clock, the increasing rays of the sun dispersed the fog, and his light shone forth in unclouded brilliancy. Then, and not till then, the Prussians perceived the full magnitude of the danger. On every side they were beset by assailants, no longer struggling through steep and narrow gorges, but deployed, with all their cavalry and artillery, on the open expanse to which these led. Directly in their front, the whole corps of Lannes, having made itself master of the villages at the foot of the Prussian position, was preparing to ascend the slope on which the latter stood: immediately to the right, Ney, and beyond him Soult, had already cleared the defiles, and were drawn up in line or column on the open ground; while Augereau on the left was pressing forward to turn their flank; and the Imperial Guard, with Murat's cavalry, were stationed in reserve on the slopes of the Landgrafenberg. Above ninety thousand men had outflanked on either side, and were preparing to crush forty thousand, in a strong position, indeed, but totally inadequate to so desperate an encounter. Surprised, but not panic-struck, the Prussians drew up their lines in admirable order in the form of an obtuse triangle, with the apex in front, to avoid the danger of being turned on their flanks; and instructions were despatched to Ruchel, who, with the reserve, twenty thousand strong, was at a short distance on their right, to hasten his march to the scene of action. Before he could arrive, however, the battle had commenced: the preparatory movements were made on either side in the finest style—the French columns advancing, and the Prussian retiring to their chosen ground, with all the precision of a field-day.

45. But though they stood their ground bravely, and received their assailants with a close and well-directed fire, the odds were too great to

give any hopes of success. Ney, indeed, whose impetuous courage led him to begin the attack before his columns were properly supported, and who had, by a charge of cuirassiers, carried a battery of thirteen pieces on an eminence, which severely galled his soldiers, was for a few minutes in imminent danger. The Prussian cavalry broke the French horse, and enveloped the infantry in such numbers as would inevitably have proved fatal to less resolute troops; but the brave marshal instantly formed his men into squares, threw himself into one of them, and there maintained the combat by a rolling fire on all sides, till Napoleon, who saw his danger, sent several regiments of horse, under Bertrand, who disengaged him from his perilous situation. But on all other points the French obtained early and decisive success. Ney, extricated from his difficulties, with an intrepid step ascended the hill, and after a sharp conflict carried the important village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, in the centre of the Prussian position. In vain Hohenlohe formed the flower of his troops to regain the post; in vain these brave men advanced in parade order, and with unshrinking firmness, through a storm of musketry and grape; the troops of Lannes came up to Ney's support, and the French established themselves in such strength in the village as to render all subsequent attempts for its recapture abortive. Emboldened by this success, Ney next attacked the right of the Prussian line towards Isserstadt, which Augereau with the French left had already carried. A devouring fire ran along the whole right wing, and the French were for some time arrested by the intrepid resistance of their adversaries: but the odds were too great, and, despite of all their efforts, the Prussians were compelled to give ground in that quarter. But on the left of Vierzehn-Heiligen they obtained some advantage: their numerous and magnificent cavalry made several successful charges on the French infantry, when advancing on the open ground beyond its enclosures; several cannon were taken, and Hohenlohe for a short

time flattered himself with the hope of obtaining decisive success.

46. Matters were in this state when the approach of Ruchel with his corps, twenty thousand strong, to the field of battle from the right, confirmed the Prussian general in these flattering anticipations; and he despatched a pressing request to him to direct the bulk of his forces to the village of *Vierzehn Heiligen*, already the theatre of such desperate strife.* Thither, accordingly, the brave Prussian directed his steps; but before he could arrive at the decisive point, matters had essentially changed for the worse, and he came up only in time to share and augment the general ruin. The lapse of time had now enabled the French to bring their immense superiority of force to bear upon the enemy at all points: Soult, by a heavy and well-directed fire, had driven the cavalry from the field on their left; while Lannes and Augereau, pressing them at once in front and flank on their right, had forced back the infantry above half a mile. Emerging from the villages which had been the theatre of such obstinate conflict, the French forces advanced with loud shouts and in irresistible strength towards the Prussians, who, weakened and dispirited, and in some places almost mown down by the terrible fire of their adversaries, were now yielding on all sides. Up to this time, however, their retreat was conducted in the most orderly manner. Napoleon saw that the decisive moment had arrived, and from his station on the heights in the rear, sent orders to Murat with the whole cavalry to advance and complete the victory. This terrible mass was irresistible. Fifteen thousand horse, fresh, unwearied, in the finest array, animated by the shouts of triumph which they heard on all sides, bore down

with loud cheers on the retreating lines of the Prussians. In an instant the change was visible. In vain their cavalry, so brilliant and effective in the early part of the day, strove to make head against the assailants, and cover the retreat of the infantry and cannon: their horses, wearied by eight hours of fighting or fatigue, were unable to withstand the fresh squadrons and ponderous cuirassiers of Murat, and by their overthrow contributed to the disorder of the foot-soldiers. After a gallant resistance, the lines were broken: horse, foot, and cannon pressed tumultuously together to the rear, closely followed by the bloody sabres of Murat. In the general confusion all order was lost: the infantry and cavalry were blent together, the guns and caissons abandoned to the victors.

47. In the midst of this appalling scene, the columns of Ruchel, still in battle array, emerged through the cloud of fugitives to stem the torrent.† It was a movement extremely similar to the arrival of Desaix on the field of *Marengo*: but he had to meet Napoleon, not *Mélas*. The fresh troops, though advancing in good order, and with an undaunted countenance, were speedily assailed on all sides: an ephemeral advantage gained by their cavalry was rapidly, in the disorder of success, turned into disaster: in front they were charged with the bayonet by the French grenadiers, in flank assailed by an endless succession of Murat's dragons; the villages of *Romstedt* and *Capellendorf* were strewed with their dead; and Ruchel himself, while bravely animating his men, was wounded in the breast by a musket-ball, and carried off the field. After a

* At this crisis, *Hohenlohe* wrote to Ruchel—"It is highly gratifying to me to hear at this moment that your Excellency has arrived to my support. Send all the force you can to the village of *Vierzehn-Heiligen*, the chief point of attack. You are a brave man and sincere friend. At this moment we beat the enemy at all points; my cavalry has captured some of his cannon."—*DUM.* xvi. 114.

† The rapid change for the worse in the prospects of the Prussians since he first approached the field, may be discerned in the altered tone of the next letter despatched to him by *Prince Hohenlohe*—"Lose not a moment in advancing with your as yet unbroken troops. Arrange your columns so that through your openings there may pass the broken bands of the battle: be ready to receive the charges of the enemy's cavalry, which in the most furious manner rides on, presses and sabres the fugitives, and has driven into one confused mass the infantry, cavalry, and artillery."—*LUIGIENI*, II. 157.

terrible combat of an hour's duration, this powerful reserve, which in any other circumstances would have changed the fortune of the day, was broken, dispersed, and almost totally annihilated. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre. In frightful disorder the whole army rushed like an impetuous torrent from the field; but nearly the whole right wing was cut off by the rapidity of Soult's advance, and made prisoners. Almost all the artillery of the Prussians was taken, and the victors entered Weimar pell-mell with the fugitives, at the distance of six leagues from the field of battle. Behind that town, on the road to Auerstadt, Hohenlohe, at six o'clock, collected twenty squadrons, whose firm countenance till nightfall gave some respite to the wearied foot-soldiers, now dispersed through the fields in every direction; while Napoleon, according to his usual custom, rode over the bloody theatre of death, distributing prizes to those who had most distinguished themselves, and giving directions for the care and consolation of the wounded.

48. While this terrible disaster was befalling the united corps of Hohenlohe and Ruchel, the King of Prussia was combating under very different circumstances, but with little better success, on the plateau of AUERSTADT. Little expecting any engagement on the morrow, this fine army, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick in person, had bivouacked in close array around the village of that name; the Queen was only prevailed on by the most pressing entreaties to retire late in the evening, with a slender guard, to Weimar. Informed of the occupation of Naumburg by a considerable force, the Duke directed the division of Schmettau to occupy the heights of Koessen, and present themselves in battle array before the enemy, whom he supposed to be at the utmost a few thousand strong, while under their cover the remainder of the army leisurely continued its march towards the Elbe. These orders were obeyed; but Schmettau's division, contenting themselves with occupying the heights in the neighbourhood, neglected to send

forward detachments to seize the defile of Koessen—an omission which was speedily taken advantage of by Davoust on the morning of the 14th, who, advancing from Naumburg according to his directions, early seized upon this important pass. At six on that morning, the French marshal had received an order from Napoleon, dated three o'clock A.M., from his bivouac on the Landgrafenberg, in which he announced his intention to attack in a few hours the Prussian army, which he imagined to be concentrated in his front, and ordered Davoust to march without loss of time upon Apolda, in order to fall upon their rear, leaving him the choice of his route, provided he took a part in the action. The despatch added: "If the Prince of Pontecorvo (Bernadotte) is with you, you may march together; but the Emperor hopes that he will be already in the position assigned to him at Dornburg." Davoust instantly repaired to the headquarters of Bernadotte, who at that moment was in communication with his corps in the neighbourhood of Naumburg, and showed him this order, proposing that they should march together to Apolda; but that officer, relying on the ambiguous expression in the despatch—which indicated that the Emperor "hoped he would be in the position assigned to him at Dornburg"—did not conceive himself entitled to deviate from his previous instructions, and set out with his whole corps in the direction of that town.

49. Left thus to his own resources, Marshal Davoust notwithstanding began his march in the direction which Napoleon had assigned. His forces were considerable, amounting to twenty-six thousand infantry and four thousand horse—a body perfectly adequate to its destined task of falling on the rear of the Prussian army, when defeated in front by Napoleon, but little calculated to withstand the shock of fifty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, whom the King was leading in person to the encounter. The Prussians, on their side, were as little prepared for an action; and, deeming their march sufficiently secured by Schmettau's

division on the heights of Koessen, were in open column and straggling, advancing on their march towards the Elbe, when suddenly, at eight o'clock, they were met on the plateau by the vanguard of Davoust, which had emerged from the long and steep ascent so well known to travellers who visit that memorable field, and was already drawn up in battle array on its summit. The thick mist which here, as at Jena, concealed the movements of the opposing armies, prevented the troops seeing each other till they were only a few yards distant; and both parties deeming their adversaries only an inconsiderable detachment, fell back to collect forces to clear their advance,—the Prussians, to drive the enemy back again down the defile, and secure the flank of the army from insult; the French, to clear their front, and pursue their route to Apolda.

50. Speedily reinforced, both sides returned to the charge. Davoust supported the advanced guard by the whole division of Gudin, with instructions to maintain themselves to the last extremity on the level space at the upper end of the defile, in order to gain time for the remainder of the corps to debouch; while the King of Prussia, impatient at the check given to the march of his army, ordered Blücher, with two thousand five hundred hussars, to ride over the Sonnenberg and clear the plateau of the enemy. Little anticipating the formidable resistance which awaited them, the Prussian cavalry were thrown into disorder by the close and steady fire of the French infantry, which speedily formed themselves into squares. Their cavalry were, indeed, overthrown by the overwhelming numbers of the Prussian horse; but all the efforts of that gallant body, even when guided by the impetuosity of Blücher, were shattered against the compact mass of Gudin's infantry, and the terrible discharges of grape which issued from his artillery. Surprised at the obstinacy of the resistance, the King, adopting the opinion of Marshal Moellendorf, who insisted that it was only a detached column which occasioned the delay, and diare-

garding the advice of the Duke of Brunswick, who strongly counselled a general halt, and formation of the army in order of battle, till the mist cleared away and the enemy's force could be ascertained, continued the attack by means merely of successive divisions as they came up to the ground. The divisions of Wartensleben and the Prince of Orange were ordered to pass the defile of Auerstadt, where the road runs through a winding hollow skirted with copse-wood or rough slopes, and advance to the support of the discomfited cavalry. The former, who first emerged from the defile, was directed to assail the flank of Gudin's division, which had advanced on the plateau beyond the village of Hassenhausen. At this moment the mist was dissipated, and the sun shone in full brilliancy on the splendid squadrons and regular lines of the Prussians.

51. The Duke of Brunswick put himself at the head of the infantry, and led them gallantly to the attack, while Schmettau and Blücher pressed them with their respective divisions of foot and horse on the opposite flanks. But the brave troops of Gudin, forming themselves into squares, resisted all the charges with unconquerable resolution; and the nature of the ground, which permitted the successive divisions to come up to the support of either side only by degrees, the one by the long and winding defile of Auerstadt, the other up the steep ascent of Koessen, rendered it impossible for the Prussians to bring all their overwhelming force to bear at once upon the enemy. The conflict, therefore, was more equal than might have been imagined, and most severe. The French troops, stationed behind the hedges, enclosures, and garden-walls of Hassenhausen, kept up an uninterrupted and murderous fire upon the enemy. The Duke of Brunswick was mortally wounded by a ball in the breast while leading on a charge. Schmettau experienced the same fate. Wartensleben had his horse shot under him; and the Prussians, discouraged by the loss of their leaders, wavered in the attack,

which, being made in line, and not in column, was not pressed with the requisite vigour. Still the terrible discharge of artillery and fire-arms continued. Gudin's division had lost nearly half its numbers, and it was evident they could not long maintain their ground against their redoubtable and hourly increasing adversaries.

52. From this peril, however, they were at length relieved by the arrival of the other divisions of Davoust's army. Morand was the first who got up the defile. His troops, as they successively arrived on the summit, drew up on the left of Gudin, towards the Sonnenberg; and shortly after Friant, with his division, debouched upon the right, and extended to the foot of the Speilberg. The combat was now equal, or rather the advantage was on the side of the French, for their three divisions were superior in strength to those of Schmettau, the Prince of Orange, and Wartensleben,* to which they were opposed. Prince William of Prussia, at the head of a powerful body of cavalry, which had surmounted the Sonnenberg and arrived on the French left, furiously assailed Morand's division immediately after it formed; but these veteran troops, with admirable coolness, threw themselves into squares, and with rapid discharges received the repeated and impetuous attacks of the Prussian horse. In vain these gallant cavaliers, with headlong fury, drove their steeds up to the very muzzles of the French muskets. In vain they rode round and enveloped their squares. ceaseless was the rolling fire which issued from those flaming walls: impenetrable the hedge of bayonets which the front rank, kneeling, presented to their advances. The heroic devotion of Prince William in vain led them again and again to the charge; still the fire continued, still the bayonets remained firm. At length he himself was wounded, half his followers were stretched on the field, and the remainder sought refuge in disorder, partly on the heights of the Sonnenberg, partly in the enclosures of Neu Zulza.

53. While this desperate conflict was going on on the left of Hassenhausen,

the division of Friant had debouched from the defile, extended itself on the ground to its right, and chased the enemy who assailed it back to the village and heights of Speilberg, which were speedily carried. The left of the Prussians was thus threatened; but it was not there that the principal danger lay. The progress of Morand on their right was much more alarming. On that side, not content with repulsing the furious attacks directed against them, the French had now assumed the offensive, and were rapidly pressing forward to the heights of Sonnenberg, from whence their guns would command the whole field of battle, and render untenable the position of the Prussian reserves, which had hitherto taken no part in the action. Sensible that the battle was irrecoverably lost if these important heights fell into the hands of the enemy, the King put himself at the head of a chosen body of troops, and bravely led them to the charge. But if the attack was gallant, the defence was not less obstinate: Morand himself was to be seen at the head of his regiments, and for some minutes the balance quivered. Insensibly, however, the French gained ground, and at length their artillery, dragged up to the summit of the heights, was placed in battery, and opened such a tremendous fire of grape and canister upon the enemy's columns, as completed their discomfiture in that quarter; and with the blood-stained Sonnenberg, and the village of Rehausen, the whole left of the field of battle fell into the hands of the invaders.

54. The experienced eye of Marshal Davoust now told him that the moment for striking the decisive blow had arrived. The heights at Eckartaberg commanded the line of the enemy's retreat, as those of Sonnenberg did the field of battle: by moving forward his centre and seizing that important point, their defeat would be rendered complete, and all possibility of their rallying prevented. Thither, accordingly, Gudin's division advanced, driving before them the broken remains of Schmettau's and Wartensleben's divisions, which had lost nearly half their

numbers during the sanguinary strife in which they had been engaged. But the Prussians made one effort more to regain the day. Their broken battalions, which had retired from the field, were rallied under cover of the powerful reserve commanded by Kalkreuth, who assumed the direction upon Moellendorf being wounded: this consisted of two divisions which had hitherto taken no part in the action, and were placed in front; while the whole cavalry, re-formed under Blücher's orders, was posted in a second line immediately behind the infantry, to take advantage of any hesitation which might appear in the enemy's columns. Wearing a morning's march and four hours' hard fighting, the French soldiers had now to withstand the shock of fifteen thousand fresh troops, to whom they had no corresponding reserve to oppose. Had the quality of the troops on the opposite sides been equal, this powerful addition to the enemy's forces, at such a moment, must have proved decisive: but nevertheless they were totally defeated; and this last success put the keystone to the arch of Marshal Davoust's fame. Though strongly posted on an eminence, and protected by the fire of a powerful battery, they were charged with such intrepidity by Gudin's division, supported by a part of Friant's, that they were driven from their position with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon. At the same time, Morand repulsed an attack against the troops which he had stationed on the heights of Sonnenberg: the artillery, from that commanding position, carried death through all the ranks of the enemy; and at length his gallant forces descended from the eminence, and, carrying all before them, drove the reserves opposed to their advance through the defile of Auerstadt. Thither Blücher's cavalry followed the retreating columns: the Guards still kept their ranks, and retired in good order in open square, and by their firm countenance enabled the broken infantry to rally at a distance from the field of battle, where Davoust reposed amidst his heroic followers.

55. The King of Prussia, who, during

this disastrous day, had manifested the most signal coolness and intrepidity, and, during the repeated charges which he made at the head of his troops, had lost two horses killed under him, gave directions for the army to retreat in the direction of Weimar, intending to fall back on the corps of Prince Hohenlohe, of whose disaster he was still ignorant. But as the troops, in extreme dejection, and with little order, were following the great road which leads to that place, they were suddenly startled in the twilight by the sight of an extensive line of bivouac fires on the heights of Apolda. These lights were made by the corps of Bernadotte, who, adhering to his original instructions to march to Dornburg, had arrived in this position, after passing that town, late in the evening, and, ignorant of the combats which had taken place, was preparing to fall on the rear of the Prussian army on the following day. His too strict adherence to the letter of the orders he had received deprived him of the glory of sharing in either battle, endangered Davoust's corps, and had well-nigh cost him his own life, from the indignation of the Emperor;* but, nevertheless, this sudden apparition of a fresh corps of unknown strength upon the flank of their line of retreat at that untimely hour, com-

* Napoleon's anger at Bernadotte, on account of his not supporting Davoust, and taking a share in the battle of Auerstadt, knew no bounds. "If I should send him to a council of war," said he, "nothing could save him from being shot. I will not speak to him on the subject; but I will let him see what I think of his conduct. He has too much honour not to be aware himself that he has committed a disgraceful action." In truth, however, Napoleon had no sufficient grounds for this ebullition. If Bernadotte did not take a part in the action, it was because his own latest instructions expressed a hope that he should go to Dornburg rather than march toward Auerstadt with Davoust. Had he violated these instructions, and, in consequence, the Prussian army had escaped by Dornburg, its natural and most probable line of retreat, what defence could Bernadotte have offered for his conduct? "I was piqued," said that marshal, "to be addressed in the language of authority by Davoust; but I did my duty. Let the Emperor accuse me if he pleases, I will answer him. I am a Gascon, but he is still more so."—BOU-RIENNE, vii 161, 162.

pelled the Prussians to change their direction and abandon the great road.

56. About the same time, obscure rumours began to circulate through the ranks of a disaster experienced on the same day at Jena; and soon the appearance of fugitives from Hohenlohe's and Ruchel's corps, flying in the utmost haste across the line which the troops retiring with the King were following, announced but too certainly the magnitude of the defeat sustained in that quarter. A general consternation now seized the men—despair took possession of the firmest hearts, as the cross-tide of the battalions flying from Jena mingled in increasing numbers with the wreck which had survived the fight of Auerstadt. The confusion became inextricable, the panic universal. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery disbanded, and, leaving their guns, horses, and ammunition waggons, fled in mingled disorder across the fields, without either direction, command, or rallying point. The King himself narrowly escaped being made prisoner during the tumult and horrors of the night; and it was not till five in the morning that, by a long circuit, he arrived at Sommerda, where he received the official news of the melancholy disaster at Jena, accompanied by the letter, offering an accommodation, so insidiously despatched by Napoleon the day before that great victory.

57. Such were the astonishing battles of Jena and Auerstadt, which, in a single day, prostrated the strength of the Prussian monarchy; and did that in a few hours which the combined might of Austria, Russia, and France, in the Seven Years' War, had been unable to effect. The subsequent disasters of the campaign were but the completion of this great calamity—the decisive strokes were given on the banks of the Saale. The loss of the Prussians was prodigious: in the two fields there fell nearly twenty thousand killed and wounded, besides nearly as many prisoners; and two hundred pieces of cannon, with twenty-five standards, were taken. Ten thousand of the killed and wounded fell at Auerstadt—an honourable proof that, in infatuation

led them into the field, valour inspired them when there. Nor was that victory bloodless to the conquerors: their total loss was fourteen thousand men; of whom seven thousand five hundred belonged to Davoust's corps—a striking indication of the dauntless intrepidity with which they had fought. Napoleon,* with his usual disregard of truth, called his whole loss in both battles four thousand, little more than a fourth part of its real amount.†

* Napoleon's official account of the battle of Jena, in the fourth bulletin of the campaign, is characterised by that extraordinary intermixture of truth and falsehood, and that unflinching jealousy of any general who appeared to interfere with his reputation, which in one who could so well afford to be generous in that particular, is a meanness in an especial manner reprehensible. Davoust was the real hero of the day, since, with thirty thousand men, he had defeated the King of Prussia in person, at the head of sixty thousand. His own achievement in overthrowing forty thousand, or, including Ruchel, sixty thousand, with ninety thousand veteran troops, including the whole cavalry of Murat, is nothing in comparison. Nevertheless, he represents the action as all fought in one field, speaks of the enemy, eighty thousand strong, as being commanded by the King and the Duke of Brunswick in person, and after dilating fully on his own achievements, dismisses the wonderful exploits of Davoust in the following words:—"On our right, the corps of Marshal Davoust performed prodigies. Not only did he keep in check, but maintained a running fight for three leagues with the bulk of the enemy's troops, who were seeking to debouch on the side of Koessen. That Marshal has displayed alike the distinguished bravery and firmness of character which are the first qualities of a warrior. He was seconded by Generals Gudin, Friant, Morand, Dautanue, chief of the staff, and by the rare intrepidity of his brave corps." Who could imagine that it was the glorious battle of Auerstadt which was here narrated? The injustice to Davoust is so manifest that it is admitted even by the eulogists of Napoleon.—Bignon, v. 487, 488; and *Fourth Bulletin*, 1806, in *Camp. de la Saxe*, i. 265.

† Davoust's loss at Auerstadt was 270 officers and 7200 privates, killed and wounded. Of these 134 officers and 8500 privates belonged to Gudin's division of 7000 men: in other words, more than a half of that band of heroes had fallen. This was the bravest action fought by the French troops during the whole contest: but the valour both of the corps and the division was inferior to that displayed by the English in more than one action of the Peninsular war, if the number of killed and wounded, a fair test with armies both of which have been victori-

58. Great as were these results, however, they were but a part of the effects which ultimately flowed from these memorable battles. The disasters consequent on the retreat of the Prussians exceeded anything hitherto recorded in modern history, and were equalled only by the still greater calamities which followed the flight from Waterloo. No provision had been made for such a contingency; no rallying point assigned, no line of march prescribed, no magazines collected. The extraordinary circumstance of the four principal generals of the army—the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Moellendorf, General Schmettau, and General Ruchel—being killed or disabled by wounds, left the confused mass of fugitives without a head. The unparalleled calamity of the survivors from two different defeats, experienced on the same day, crossing each other, and becoming intermingled during the horrors of a nocturnal retreat, rendered it impossible for them to know whose orders were to be obeyed. Thus, when morning dawned on the scene of ruin, the soldiers from the three armies of Ruchel, Hohenlohe, and the Duke of Brunswick, collected, as chance threw them together, in disorderly groups, and, inspired only with a common panic, fled in different directions, as accident or intelligence guided their steps. Vast numbers of stragglers wandered at large through the fields, or hurried, with so little knowledge of the country, from the scene of danger, that, instead of avoiding, they rushed headlong into the jaws of the enemy. It is in the extraordinary confusion arising from this disastrous retreat, and the terror which seized the minds of both officers and men at finding themselves thus huddled together with

soldiers, to whom they were perfect strangers, that the true cause of the unparalleled disasters which followed the battle of Jena is to be found.

59. The effect of the general consternation which prevailed speedily appeared in the fate which befell the fragments of the mighty army. Six thousand fugitives, almost without leaders, had taken refuge, the day after the battle, in Erfurth, whose embattled walls and almost inaccessible citadels promised the means of at least a temporary defence. It contained also the grand park and reserve artillery stores of the army, with the greater part of its camp equipage. Thither also the Prince of Orange, Marshal Moellendorf, and a great number of the wounded of distinction, besides seven thousand private soldiers, also wounded, had been conveyed. Such, however, was the terror of the governor at finding himself thus suddenly overwhelmed by a mass of wounded and stragglers, incapable of aiding in the defence, but who would speedily consume his slender stock of provisions, that he thought the best thing he could do was to negotiate a capitulation, on condition that the officers should retire on their parole into Prussia, and the private men remain prisoners of war. On these terms the place surrendered, and with it fourteen thousand men, including the dying Marshal Moellendorf and the Prince of Orange; a hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and immense military stores, fell into the hands of the enemy.

60. Hohenlohe, who had retired, covering the retreat of the fugitives beyond Weimar with a considerable body of cavalry, in good order, at nightfall on the 14th found himself so completely overwhelmed by the crowd of stragglers who attached themselves during the night to his squadrons, that by degrees his array melted away; and it was only by making frequent circuits, and repeatedly crossing the fields, that he was enabled to reach Darnstedt at seven on the following morning, at the head of sixty horsemen. On the day following, the King, who had arrived at Sondershausen, ac-

ous, is taken as a criterion. At Talavera, out of 19,500 English soldiers, 6000 were killed and wounded; nearly the same proportion as fell of the victors at Auerstadt: but at Albuera, out of 7000 English troops, only 1500 were unwounded at the close of the fight; and 8481 red-coats fell at Waterloo, out of a force of native English not exceeding 29,000 men. — *Dumas*, *vol. 171*; *NAPOLÉON'S Peninsular War*, *lib. 341*; and *WEL- LINGTON'S Official Account of the Battle of Waterloo*, *Ann. Reg.* 1815, *App. to Chron.*

accompanied only by his aides-de-camp, conferred the command of all the troops which had combated at Jena and Auerstadt upon Prince Hohenlohe, with the exception of the two divisions under the orders of Kalkreuth, the reserve at the latter battle, which it was thought would still be in some sort of order; but in the general confusion this corps had dispersed like the rest, and there remained only eight battalions around his standard. Magdeburg was assigned as the rallying point to the army, within the almost impregnable walls of which fortress it was hoped the wreck of its once mighty array could be reorganised, and a defensive struggle maintained till the arrival of the Russians from the Vistula, and of the reinforcements which were collecting in the interior of the kingdom. Thither accordingly the King repaired, attended only by a few horsemen, to make preparations for the reception of the army; and there he was quitted by the British envoy, Lord Morpeth, who, seeing no chance of diplomatic concerns being attended to amidst the general confusion, returned to London to render an account to his bewildered cabinet of the extraordinary events which he had witnessed in the outset of his mission.

61. But if there was any one thing more than another in which the genius of Napoleon shone prominent, it was in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. The present was not an opportunity to be lost of displaying this essential quality of a great general. Without an instant's delay, therefore, he prepared to pursue the extraordinary advantages he had gained. From all parts of Germany his forces had been assembled to one point, in order to strike the decisive blow. That done, the next object was to disperse them like a fan over the conquered territory, to carry everywhere the impression of their victory, and the terrors of their arms. On the night after the battle, Napoleon, instead of retiring to rest, sat up dictating orders to all the corps of his army for the directions they were to follow in pursuing the enemy. On the ex-

treme right, Bernadotte, whose numerous corps was still untouched, received orders to advance from Apolda to Neustadt, to cut off the line of retreat from Weimar to Naumburg, and so shut out the army from the great road to Magdeburg. Davoust was to return to Naumburg to hold that important post, and keep himself in readiness to debouch on the Elbe before the enemy could arrive there; Soult was to move on Buttelsdorf, the point in rear of the fields of battle, where the greatest number of fugitives had assembled; Murat and Ney to march direct upon Erfurth, and reduce that important place; while Lannes and Angereau were directed to take a position in advance of Weimar; and the Imperial Guard and Napoleon's headquarters were transferred to that town. The general object of Napoleon in these movements was, that while the corps of Soult, Murat, and Ney, pursued the broken remains of the Prussian army to Magdeburg, those of Bernadotte, Lannes, Davoust, Angereau, and the Guard, under his immediate orders, should cross the Elbe at Barby, Dessau, and Wittenberg, and, moving upon Berlin and Spandau, intercept the line of retreat of the Prussians to Stettin and the Oder. This was the more easy, as the French held the chord of the arc along which the Prussians had to move.

62. Soult was the first who came up with the enemy. At Greussen his cavalry reached the retiring squadrons of Kalkreuth's division, which alone preserved any semblance of an army. That general proposed a suspension of arms, in order to gain time, declaring that he knew an armistice had been concluded, and for the purpose of arranging its conditions repaired to the advanced posts in order to a conference with the French general. The terms, as might be expected, could not be agreed on. The statement was made in perfect good faith, under the impression founded on the letter from Napoleon offering an accommodation, written the day before, but not received till the night after the battle; and it gave the Prussian commander leisure

to cause a considerable part of his forces to retire in safety to the rear. Enraged at finding himself thus overreached, Soult, the moment the conferences were broken off, attacked the Prussian rear-guard posted in front of Greussen, which, after a short resistance, was cut to pieces, and the victors entered that town pell-mell with the vanquished. Following up his success, the French marshal, early the following morning, resumed the pursuit, and came up with the enemy at Nordhausen, where they were again defeated with the loss of twenty pieces of cannon, and three thousand men. Unable, from want of provisions, to keep his men together, and having no other means of escape to any part of his forces, the Prussian general divided his troops into two bodies, with instructions to follow different routes to Magdeburg. An almost total dispersion immediately followed this order. The stragglers came into that fortress by companies, squadrons, and groups of single men in hardly any array; and thus was the disorganisation of the only divisions of the army which still preserved their ranks rendered complete within three days after the battle. Collecting prisoners at every step, Soult continued rapidly to advance, and on the 21st his vanguard reached the Elbe, and planted their victorious standards around the walls of Magdeburg.

63. A more important action awaited the arms of Bernadotte. This able chief, whose too literal adherence to the letter of his instructions had deprived him of his share of the laurels of Auerstadt, was burning with anxiety to achieve some exploit worthy of the deeds of his comrades and his own renown, when fortune threw the wished-for opportunity in his way. Prince Eugene of Würtemberg, who commanded the Prussian reserve, fourteen thousand strong, stunned by the intelligence of the disasters of the army at Jena, was preparing to make the best of his way back to Magdeburg and the Elbe, when he was beset on all sides at Halle by the corps of Bernadotte. The Prussians who were brought into

action had not shared in the preceding defeats: notwithstanding the great superiority of force on the part of the French, they made a brave resistance; and there might be seen what elements of success existed in their army had they been opposed by less, or guided by greater ability. Assailed with the utmost impetuosity by the vanguard of the French, under Dupont, at Paasendorf, they were driven in haste back to the islands in the Saale, over which the road passes; but in that defile they stood firm, and, supported by a cloud of light troops who lined the dikes on either hand along the margin of the stream, long withstood their assailants, and debarred all access to the gates. After an obstinate resistance, however, a column of grenadiers, headed by Dupont himself, rushed across the bridges, carried the guns which enfiladed them; and, rapidly pursuing their success, pushed on and made themselves masters of the town.

64. The Prussians had now no alternative to gain time for the retreat of their main body to Magdeburg, but to prevent as long as possible the French troops from debouching from the gates on its opposite side: and the gallant efforts of the Duke of Würtemberg long delayed them at that important point; but at length the increasing numbers of the French, and the murderous fire of the artillery which they brought up and planted on the ramparts, drove the Prussians from their strongholds in the gardens and walls of the suburbs, and enabled the columns to issue from the gates. Charged while retreating in open square along the level plain, the Prussians, during a running fight of four leagues, sustained severe loss from the enemy, and lost nearly their whole artillery. Still they combated with heroic resolution, and yet kept their ranks, when the pursuit ceased on the approach of night. Then the combat terminated on the right bank of the river; but on the left bank a greater disaster awaited the allied arms. Three thousand Prussians had broken up from

their quarters near Magdeburg, in order to join the main body of the reserve at Halle, and, ignorant of the occupation of that town by the French, fell into the midst of such superior forces that they were almost all either killed or made prisoners. Honourable as this affair was to the Prussians, it augmented in an alarming degree the dangers of the army by dissipating its last regular corps: four thousand prisoners and thirty pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors, whose loss did not exceed twelve hundred men; while the broken remains of the vanquished crossed the Elbe at Dessau in such haste, that they were unable completely to burn the bridge behind them, which was speedily restored by the French, who established themselves in force on the right bank, and drew their posts round Magdeburg.

65. Meanwhile the other corps of the army continued their triumphant progress, with hardly any opposition, through Saxony. Four days after the battle of Auerstadt, Marshal Davoust took possession of Leipsic: strange coincidence, that the French army should for the first time enter that city on the very day on which, seven years afterwards, they were there to experience so terrible an overthrow! Napoleon gave testimony of the rigorous warfare which he was about to commence against English commerce, by there issuing an edict* of extraordi-

* "Your city," said Napoleon, "is known throughout Europe as the principal depot of English merchandise, and on that account the enemy most dangerous to France. The Emperor and King commands—1. Within four-and-twenty hours immediately following this notification, every banker, merchant, or manufacturer, having in his possession any funds *the produce of English manufactures*, whether they belong to a British subject or the foreign consignee, shall declare their amount in a register appointed for that special purpose. 2. As soon as these returns are authentically received, domiciliary visits shall be made to all, whether they have declared or not, to compare the registers with the stock in hand to ascertain its exactness, and punish by military execution any attempt at fraud or concealment." Well may the honest General Mathieu Dumas exclaim, "What a deplorable abuse of victory!"—DUMAS, xvi. 225.

nary severity against British merchandise. Rapidly following up his success, Davoust, two days afterwards, reached Wittenberg, at the very time that the retiring Prussians were preparing to blow up its great bridge over the Elbe; the French grenadiers rushed so rapidly over it, that the enemy had not time to set fire to the train, and thus that important passage was secured. On the same day, Lannes made himself master of the passage at Dessau. Thither Napoleon followed with his Guards three days afterwards; and, regarding the capture of Berlin as certain and a secondary object, he already began to give directions for the march of his troops from the Elbe to the Oder. Davoust's corps was pushed on towards that capital—Napoleon having permitted, as a reward for his transcendent heroism at Auerstadt, that his corps should be the first to enter the capital of the fallen monarch.†

66. Such was the rapidity of the French advance, that they arrived round Magdeburg before a large portion of the broken Prussians had taken refuge within its walls. Napoleon saw clearly the importance of accumulating as large a number as possible of the enemy in a situation where it was evident they would ere long become his prisoners, and therefore he gave orders to leave the entrance to the place open, and dispersed his cavalry in all directions to drive the stragglers into that devoted fortress.‡ Murat's horsemen in conse-

† Bernadotte was unavoidably detained a day longer than he was ordered in marching to the Elbe, and in consequence did not cross that river till the 23d and 24th, instead of the 21st and 22d, before which time the corps of the Duke of Württemberg had defiled through Magdeburg, and was in full march for the Oder. This escape of a considerable part of the best organised corps of the Prussians excited to the highest degree the indignation of Napoleon, who took occasion bitterly to reproach him with this delay, as well as with his conduct in not marching with Davoust to Auerstadt. Already were to be seen the germs of that mutual discontent which, seven years afterwards, on those very plains, brought Bernadotte in arms against the French Emperor on the field of Leipsic.—BROWN, vi. 9; DUMAS, xvi. 230.

‡ "Magdeburg," said Napoleon, "is a net where all the isolated men who have wandered about since the battle may be taken. We

quence inundated the adjacent plains; and the garrison of the town, ill provided with subsistence, already began to feel the pangs of hunger from the multitude of useless soldiers who were driven to its shelter. Summoned to surrender by Marshal Soult, the governor replied, that he hoped to gain the esteem of the besiegers by an honourable defence; but the confusion of the garrison, and the evident discouragement of the multitudes of insulated men who thronged round the gates, rendered it more than probable that his resistance could not be prolonged for a very long period. Hohenlohe, despairing of preventing the investment of the place with so disorganised a wreck as was collected within its walls, and aware that the want of provisions would soon compel its surrender, resolved to depart with all the forces which still maintained the appearance of order, and make for the great line of fortresses on the Oder; but such was the universal confusion which prevailed, that he could only collect fifty battalions and a hundred and sixty squadrons in a state to keep the field. With these he departed on the day following, leaving fifty skeleton battalions, hardly containing in all twelve thousand combatants, within the walls.

67. Upon leaving Magdeburg, Hohenlohe, abandoning Berlin to its fate, made for Stettin, situated near the mouth of the Oder, by the route of Spandau. But when he drew near to the latter place, he received intelligence that on that very day it had capitulated to the first summons of the advanced posts of the cavalry under Murat, and that Davoust on the same day was to make his entrance into the capital. Driven thus to a circuit to avoid the captured towns, he moved by Granssee and Zeydenick, in order to reach before the enemy, if possible, the defile of Lücknitz, near Stettin, which would have secured his retreat to that important fortress.

must, therefore, invert our manœuvres, and beat all the country for fifteen leagues around; we shall thus collect numbers of prisoners; and also gain accounts of the direction taken by the strong columns of the enemy, of whose route we have as yet no certain intelligence."—DUMAS, xvi. 232.

Aware of the importance of anticipating the Prussian general in these movements, Napoleon sent Murat forward with the cavalry, to get before him to the defile, while Lannes advanced as rapidly as possible in pursuit of his steps with his indefatigable infantry. By forced marches, Murat got the start even of the horsemen who formed the advanced guard of Hohenlohe's corps; and on leaving Zeydenick, the point where the road from Spandau and Berlin falls in with that from Magdeburg to Stettin, they were assailed by that active officer himself, at the head of Lasalle's dragoons. Confounded at being thus anticipated in a quarter where they expected a leisurely retreat, the Prussian horse made but a feeble resistance. Even the renowned regiment of the Queen's dragoons was repulsed after a short effort, surrounded, and almost cut to pieces; and the Prussian cavalry were compelled to fall back on Templin, while their main body had to renounce all hope of pursuing the direct road to Stettin. Driven thus from his line of retreat, and his right flank being exposed to the attack of Marshal Lannes, Hohenlohe, after waiting at Granssee three hours in the vain hope of being joined by Blücher, who had retreated to the same quarter, changed his direction, and moved upon Boitzenberg, where he arrived on the 27th, hoping to reach Stettin by this circuitous route of Prenzlau; but in attempting to do so, the unhappy prince found himself again beset by his indefatigable pursuers.

68. No sooner was Murat informed of his change of direction, than he marched across the country all night, from the one road to the other, again got before him, and assailed the Prussian horse at once in front and flank with his terrible dragoons, on the following morning, as they were continuing their march two leagues beyond Prenzlau. To troops wearied by incessant marching for a fortnight together, and discouraged by such a succession of disasters, the shock of his victorious squadrons was irresistible: the Prussian cavalry were speedily broken, and fell back in disorder to

the suburbs of Prentzlow, already encumbered with infantry and artillery. To complete their misfortunes, Marshal Lannes appeared at this critical moment on their right flank, having, with indefatigable perseverance, marched all night from Templin on the direct road. Murat now summoned Hohenlohe to surrender, which the latter refused, and brought up a powerful battery of cannon to answer the fire of the French artillery, which was severely galling his troops as they attempted to debouch from the town. This battery was immediately attacked and carried, and a regiment of infantry and cavalry which advanced to support it broken and made prisoners. Prince Augustus of Prussia, at the head of his regiment, which was still two leagues in the rear of Prentzlow, was surrounded, and after heroically resisting the repeated charges of the French cuirassiers, during a march in hollow square of four miles, was at length made prisoner, with almost all his men, while bravely resisting to the last.

69. Overwhelmed by such a multitude of calamities, and seeing no chance of escape, while every hour increased the forces against him by permitting the formidable battalions of Lannes to arrive on his rear and flank, Prince Hohenlohe, after several unsuccessful attempts to obtain a capitulation, was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition that the officers should be dismissed on their parole. With him were taken fourteen thousand men, including the flower of the Prussian army; the Guards, six chosen regiments of cavalry, forty standards, and fifty pieces of field-artillery. Notwithstanding the many defeats and disastrous circumstances which had occurred, this grievous surrender did not take place without the most profound grief on the part of the Prussian troops. The officers retired from the circle where it had been agreed to in stern silence, or shedding tears; many of them fiercely and indignantly accused their commanders of treachery, and invited their comrades to cut their way through the enemy, sword in hand. The private soldiers, by loud sobs and lamentations,

gave vent to their grief, and, flinging their muskets on the ground, slowly and mournfully pursued their way into the town; while a loud flourish of trumpets, the quick rattle of drums, and the triumphant shouts of the soldiers, announced the successive arrival of the French regiments at the scene of their triumph.

70. Meanwhile another Prussian column—consisting of six regiments of cavalry, four of infantry, and eight pieces of artillery, which, avoiding Prentzlow, was moving upon Passowalk—was overtaken by Milhaud's light cavalry, and surrendered. Of the army, lately so splendid and numerous, there remained only in the field the corps of the Duke of Weimar and General Blücher. The former of these, which formed the advanced guard of the host that advanced to the Saale, and had been pushed on through the Thuringian Forest to Verra, with the view of threatening the rear of the French army, had become entirely detached by subsequent events from the principal body, and thus escaped the catastrophes of both defeats. Almost forgotten in the rapid succession of succeeding triumphs, the duke was left to his own discretion; and he no sooner received accounts of the ruin of the main army, than he took steps for making the best of his way back to the Elbe. He had much difficulty in steering his course through the numerous corps of enemies which traversed the intervening country in every direction; but by great exertions he contrived to escape, and, rallying to his standard a considerable detachment of Ruchel's corps, which had been separated from the remainder, reached the Elbe in safety at Stendal, by Seesen, Lutter, and Schlade, with fourteen thousand men. He was there superseded in the command by the King of Prussia, and his corps passed into the hands of General Winning, who gave it a day's rest at Kyritz. As the approach of the French corps rendered those quarters dangerous, he broke up and retired towards the Oder, and by good fortune, and no small share of skill, he succeeded in reaching Kratzemburg, near the lake

of Mûritz, in the first week of October, where he joined Blücher with the cavalry which had escaped from Auerstadt. Their united forces now amounted to twenty-four thousand men.

71. Meanwhile the fortresses on the Oder fell in the most disgraceful manner. The day after the capitulation of Hohenlohe, a brigade which had escaped from the wreck of his corps, presented itself at the gates of Stettin; the governor sternly refused them admittance upon the pretence that his provisions were only adequate to the support of his own garrison. Next day, however, he capitulated, on the first summons, to the advanced guard of Marshal Lannes; and the French, without firing a shot, became masters of a fortress of the first order, armed with a hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, and garrisoned by six thousand men. The brigade of Prussians, shut out from its walls, was soon after surrounded at Andam and made prisoners. Encouraged by these repeated successes, the French soldiers deemed nothing beyond the reach of their arms; and the advanced guard of Davoust's corps, which had traversed the district between the Elbe and the Oder without meeting with any enemies, presented itself before Cüstrin, and threatened the garrison with a severe bombardment if they did not instantly capitulate. This menacing outpost consisted merely of a regiment of foot, and had only two pieces of artillery at its command. On the other hand, the governor of the town had ninety pieces of cannon mounted on the ramparts, and four hundred in the arsenal; four thousand brave men for a garrison, and every requisite for a prolonged defence. Nevertheless, such was the terror produced by Napoleon's arms, and such the skill with which the French officer, General Gauthier, concealed the real amount and description of his force, that the Prussians capitulated almost on the first summons; and one of the strongest places in the kingdom, amply garrisoned, situated in an island of the Oder, and invested only on one side, had the disgrace of surrendering to a regiment of foot with only two pieces of cannon.

The besiegers could not approach it to take possession till the garrison furnished them with boats.

72. These disgraceful capitulations, at which the brave troops involved in them were so much exasperated that it was with difficulty they could be induced to yield obedience to their officers in carrying them into execution, demonstrated that the Prussian generals were so overwhelmed by the magnitude of their misfortunes, that they deemed the monarchy irrevocably ruined, and that *sauve qui peut* had become the only remaining principle of their conduct. Astonished at his good fortune in effecting the reduction of such a fortress without firing a shot, Marshal Davoust inspected the fortifications on the day following, which he found in the best condition; and, deeming his base on the Oder now sufficiently secured, pushed on his light troops to Posen, in Prussian Poland; while six thousand Bavarians formed the investment of Glogau, the only remaining stronghold on its banks which was still in the hands of the enemy; and Augereau established himself at Frankfort. Meanwhile Napoleon, after resting a day at Wittenberg, which he ordered to be put in a respectable posture of defence, in order to give him the command of the bridge over the Elbe, and where he established one of his chief depots, was busied with preparations for securing his rear during the perilous advance, so far from the base of the operations, in which he was about to engage. The grand park of artillery was established at Wittenberg, where immense depots of ammunition and provisions were ordered to be formed; while, at Erfurth, a grand depot was by his provident care formed for the collecting of horses from all parts of Germany. All the cavalry regiments were directed through that town, while those on foot were mounted, and those indifferently provided with horses soon found themselves in possession of hardy and powerful steeds.

73. The only corps of the Prussian army which had hitherto escaped destruction was that formed by the union

of Blücher's cavalry with the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's infantry, and commanded by the former of these generals. Before this junction was effected, Blücher's cavalry had been hard pressed by a brigade of horse under the French general, Klein, and escaped in consequence of his affirming that an armistice had been concluded on the propositions for an accommodation sent to Napoleon after the battle by the King of Prussia. Whether the Prussian general really believed the report to that effect, which unquestionably prevailed through the whole army at that time, or whether he made use of this very questionable military stratagem as a device to extricate his troops from present danger, does not appear; and therefore neither praise nor blame can in this uncertainty be awarded on the subject. But this much is clear, that if he knowingly affirmed a falsehood, as the French assert, no necessity, how pressing soever, no advantage, how great soever, can suffice as any apology.* Though the resistance of this corps, however, was

* But when the French historians inveigh with such severity against Blücher's conduct on this occasion, and affirm, "In the campaigns of the Revolution, the Austrian generals have frequently had recourse to that *strange ruse de guerre—the French never*," they forget or wilfully conceal immediately preceding events, on which they bestow no sort of censure. What is to be said to General Lecourbe, who, in November 1799, escaped destruction at the hands of the Austrian general Starray, solely by falsely affirming that a negotiation for peace was commenced? to Lannes and Murat, in the campaign of Austerlitz, who won the bridge of Vienna by the fallacious declaration that an armistice had been concluded, which they well knew was not the case? or to the leader of these marshals, who a few days afterwards tried a similar piece of deceit with Kutusoff, and was only foiled by the superior finesse of that astute commander? All the French historians, Bignon, Norvins, and Thiers, mention these unworthy stratagems not only without censure, but with the highest admiration. It would be well, if, in making such random assertions, they would calculate less confidently on the want of information or recollection in their readers; and if, in the survey of the conduct of their own officers, they would display a little of that warm anxiety for the great principles of public morality, to which they so loudly appeal when any violation of it occurs to their disadvantage on the part of their enemies.

more honourable, its ultimate fate was not less calamitous. No sooner was Napoleon informed of the junction of these two corps in the north of Prussia, than he ordered their pursuit by forces so considerable, that escape became impossible. Bernadotte was instructed to follow closely on their footsteps; while Murat was despatched by a circuit to cut them off, on the right, from Stalsund and Rostock, under the cannon of which they might have found shelter; and Soult threw himself on the left, to bar the communication with the lower Elbe. Blücher arrived at Boitzenburg the day after the ill-fated Hohenlohe had left that town; and having there learned the catastrophe which had befallen that brilliant portion of the army, he renounced all hope of retiring before the enemy, and retraced his steps in order to unite with General Winning and the Duke of Saxe-Weimar's corps, which he effected at Kratzemburg on the day following. Finding himself now at the head of eighteen thousand infantry, six thousand cavalry, and sixty pieces of cannon, he resolved to move to the right, recross the Elbe, raise the siege of Magdeburg, and supported by that fortress and Hameln, maintain himself as long as possible in the rear of the Emperor's army.

74. The project was boldly conceived and intrepidly followed out; but the three corps now directed against him, numbering nearly sixty thousand combatants, rendered its execution impossible. A sharp conflict took place with his rear-guard at Nossentin, in which five hundred prisoners fell into the hands of the French; and the next day the junction of Bernadotte with Soult rendered it necessary for the gallant Prussian to be more circumspect. An opportunity, however, soon occurred of taking his revenge. Next day the French hussars were charged and put to the rout by the Prussian light dragoons, at the entrance of a defile. Colonel Gerard and three hundred horsemen were made prisoners: but the cavalry having fallen back on the support of their infantry, headed by Bernadotte in person, the Prussians were in their

turn repulsed with severe loss. Finding the enemy's forces so considerable, that all chance of making good his way to the lower Elbe was out of the question, Blücher resolved to fall back by Gadebusch on Lübeck, where he hoped to find resources to recruit his wearied troops, and the decayed bastions of which he flattered himself he would soon be able to put in a respectable state of defence. Before arriving at that city, he was summoned by Bernadotte to surrender, and informed that he was beset by forces triple his own. "I will never capitulate," was the brief and characteristic reply of the Prussian general: and, continuing his march, he entered Lübeck on the evening of the 5th, closely followed by his indefatigable pursuers. In the course of the pursuit, a detachment of twelve hundred Swedes fell into the hands of Bernadotte, who treated them with unusual courtesy and kindness. From the gratitude of the Swedes for this treatment, arose the interchange of good deeds which terminated in his elevation to the throne of Gustavus Adolphus. At that period, events, in appearance the most trivial, were big with the fate of nations.

75. Unfortunately for Lübeck, it was still surrounded by a ruined wall and deep ditches filled with water; and this gave Blücher an excuse for representing it as a military post, and disregarding all the remonstrances of the magistrates, who loudly protested against this violation of their neutrality. Hastily planting the few heavy cannon which he still retained to defend the principal gates, Blücher caused the greater part of his forces to defile through the town, and take post on the low marshy ground on the opposite side, on the confines of the Danish territory. At daybreak on the following morning the French columns were at the gates, and every preparation was made for an instant assault. In spite of a heavy fire of grape and musketry from the old walls, the French approached with their accustomed gallantry to the assault. The corps of Bernadotte advanced against the Burg-Thor, the gate which looked to the

north; that of Soult approached the Hurtor-Thor and Mühlen-Thor, the gates of Hanover. After sustaining a terrible discharge from the bastions, which were armed with the Prussian field-pieces, the French advanced guard, under Generals Morle and Frère, succeeded in breaking through with their hatchets the exterior palisades of the Burg-Thor, and, rapidly following the Prussian regiments which held that outwork, entered the gate pell-mell with the fugitives, and made themselves masters of the adjoining bastions. At the same moment Soult's divisions threatened the gates opposed to their attack; but so murderous was the fire which the Prussians kept up from the walls flanking their approaches, that the assailants were unable to make any progress, till Bernadotte's divisions, having penetrated into the town, threatened to take the defenders in rear.

76. Even then, nevertheless, the brave Prussians at this gate, to the number of two thousand, faced both ways, and, besieged in their turn, sustained the double attack from within and without. Posted on the roofs of houses, and on the summits of the ramparts, they kept up an incessant fire till their cartridges were exhausted, when they were all either killed or made prisoners. So rapid, however, was the advance of the French through the Burg-Thor, that Blücher, who had retired to his lodgings, after having made his dispositions, to dictate orders, had barely time to mount his horse with his son and a single aide-de-camp, and ride off: all the rest of his staff were made prisoners. Having joined the remaining troops in the town, that brave general, with his gallant followers, prolonged the defence. He himself repeatedly charged along the König-Strasse at the head of a body of cavalry, but was unable to clear it of the French soldiers, who had now broken into the houses near the gate, and from thence kept up a fire of such severity upon the street as rendered it impossible for the dragoons to advance to its further extremity. Presently the besiegers brought up their field-pieces, the guns on the ramparts were turned

upon the town, and repeated discharges of grape from both sides swept the pavement, and occasioned a terrific slaughter. With invincible resolution, however, the Prussians maintained the combat. From street to street, from church to church, from house to house, the conflict continued. Blood flowed on all sides. The incessant rattle of the musketry was almost drowned in some quarters by the cries of the wounded and the shrieks of the inhabitants, who in that day of woe underwent all the horrors consequent on a town being carried by assault. By degrees, however, the superior numbers of the French, who were soon reinforced by part of Murat's corps, prevailed over the heroic resolution of the Prussians. With difficulty Blücher succeeded, towards evening, in collecting five thousand men, with whom he forced his way through by the gate of Holstein, and rejoined his cavalry, which lay at Schwertau on the opposite side of the town, near the Danish frontier; while the remainder of his corps in the town, consisting of eight thousand men, were slain before nightfall in that fearful fight, or fell into the hands of the enemy.*

77. The situation of Blücher, with his cavalry and this slender body of infantry, was now altogether desperate. He was driven up to Ratkau, in the extremity of Germany, on the very edge of the Danish territory, where a

* The French writers made it a just reproach to the English army that its soldiers committed such disgraceful excesses at San Sebastian, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, when these fortresses fell by assault. It is the duty of the historian to condemn equally such outrages, by whomsoever committed; and certainly in this work no veil shall be thrown over those atrocities when they come to be recounted. But it would be well if they would reserve a little of their humane indignation for the sufferers under their own soldiery on similar catastrophes. On this occasion, though they pass it lightly over, the cruelties and devastation committed by Bernadotte's and Soult's corps for two days after the town was taken, notwithstanding all the efforts of those marshals, were equal to the very worst deeds that ever stained the British arms.—See the frightful details, drawn with a graphic hand, in *Lettre de Villers à la Comtesse Fanny Beauharnais*, Amst. 1806.

powerful body of troops was collected to prevent his entrance. In the night he received intelligence that Travemünde, a fortified town on the sea-coast, to which he proposed to have retired, had been taken by Murat, along with a battalion which he had sent forward to garrison that important post, where he hoped to have embarked; and to complete his misfortune, information arrived in the morning that the salt-marshes between Schwertau and that town were not passable by the army. At the same time a flag of truce arrived from Murat, while his numerous squadrons had already driven the Prussian infantry out of Schwertau, and were closing in, in all directions, on his last position. Overcome by stern necessity, the hardy veteran, with tears in his eyes, agreed to a capitulation, in virtue of which all his troops laid down their arms. On this occasion were taken ten battalions and fifty-three squadrons, amounting to four thousand foot-soldiers, and three thousand seven hundred cavalry, with forty pieces of cannon, the remainder of his fine train of artillery having been left on the ramparts of Lübeck.

78. To complete the disasters of the Prussian monarchy, nothing was wanting but the surrender of Magdeburg; and that important bulwark was not long of falling into the hands of Marshal Ney. Although its garrison was in great part composed of fugitives of all regiments, who had made their escape into that asylum from the disastrous fields of Jena and Auerstadt, yet such was the strength of its works, and the ample store of provisions and magazines of all sorts which existed within its walls, that a prolonged defence might confidently have been anticipated. Nevertheless, if its fall was not quite so disgraceful as that of Stettin and Cüstrin, it was such as to affix a lasting stigma on the Prussian arms. After fifteen days of a blockade, Marshal Ney commenced operations in form; but before having recourse to the tedious method of regular approaches, he resolved to try the effect of a bombardment. Furnaces for this purpose were heated, and arrangements

made to throw four-and-twenty pound shot, red-hot, into every part of the town, while a copious array of bombs was prepared to bring terror and conflagration upon the inhabitants. It was not necessary, however, to proceed to these extremities. The citizens of Magdeburg preserved a vivid traditional recollection of the horrors which their forefathers underwent after the memorable storm by Count Tilly in 1631, when the whole town was reduced to ashes. No sooner, therefore, did the first flaming projectiles begin to descend upon their houses than they besieged General Kleist, the governor, with entreaties for a surrender. That officer, deeming the Prussian monarchy destroyed, and seeing no use in singly prolonging a contest now become hopeless, agreed to a capitulation on the same terms as Stettin, in virtue of which this important frontier town, the bulwark of the monarchy, with its redoubtable ramparts still untouched, and not even an outwork lost, containing twelve thousand troops in arms and four thousand in hospital, six hundred pieces of cannon, eight hundred thousand pounds of powder, a pontoon train complete, and immense magazines of all sorts, fell into the hands of the enemy, who hardly mustered a greater force without its walls.

79. After these stunning calamities, it was not to be expected that the fortresses on the Weser, which were now left far in the rear of the storm of war, should long continue to hold out. A host of fugitives from Jena and Auerstadt had taken refuge in these strongholds, particularly Hameln and Nienburg; into the former of which General Lecocq, who had been separated in the confusion of the disastrous night which followed these battles, had thrown himself with four thousand men who still preserved a military array. There he speedily found himself blockaded by the forces of the King of Holland, who had advanced by Würzburg and Paderborn to the banks of the Weser. The disastrous state of the monarchy gave him too plausible a ground for assailing the fidelity of the besieged. "You are insulated," said he, "with-

out hope of succour. Abandoned, and more than a hundred leagues in the rear of the victorious invaders, what can your efforts do to avert the fall of the Prussian monarchy?" These arguments, supported by the official intelligence of the fall of Magdeburg and the surrender of almost all the fragments of the army, produced the desired impression; and it was speedily agreed that the fortress should be evacuated, the private soldiers made prisoners, and the officers return on their parole to Prussia. A mutiny broke out among the soldiers upon learning the terms of this disgraceful capitulation; but it was speedily suppressed by Savary's dragoons, the men disarmed, and the fortress, in admirable condition, delivered over, with five thousand prisoners, to the French. Nienburg speedily followed the same example, and, with its untouched fortifications and garrison of three thousand men, capitulated to the victors; and with it all the elements of resistance expired between the Weser and the Oder.

80. While the arms of Napoleon, guided by his penetrating eye, were reaping in this astonishing series of successes the fruits of the victories of Jena and Auerstadt, the Emperor himself, occupied alike with military and diplomatic objects, was preparing the means of further triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of the power which fortune and genius had thus combined to place at his disposal. His first care was to detach Saxony from the coalition; and after the defeat of its army in those disastrous days, and occupation of its territory by the conquerors, this was easily accomplished. The Saxons have a hereditary jealousy of the Prussians, by whom they have a presentiment they are one day to be swallowed up. Necessity, not inclination, had brought them into the field with their ambitious neighbours; and they gladly availed themselves of the first opportunity to range their forces on the side to which their secret inclinations had long pointed, and which seemed to be recommended alike by prudence and necessity. Early in the campaign, Napoleon had addressed to

them a proclamation, in which he called on them to assert their national independence, and throw off that withering alliance with Prussia from which nothing but ultimate ruin was to be anticipated.* This address had already produced a great impression on the Saxon troops, when the victory of Jena seemed to dissolve at once the bonds which held the two nations together. Improving on these dispositions, Napoleon assembled the Saxon officers, three hundred in number, who had been made prisoners at Weimar, strongly represented to them the impolicy of any longer uniting their arms to those of their natural enemies the Prussians; and offered, upon their subscribing the oath tendered to them of fidelity to its fortunes, to admit them into the Confederation of the Rhine. Gladly the officers, for themselves and the troops under their command, subscribed the conditions; and immediately they were all, with the private soldiers, six thousand in number, sent back to Dresden. The Elector shortly after recalled the remainder of his forces from the Prussian standard; he

* "Saxons! the Prussians have invaded your territory. I have come to deliver you. They have violently dissolved the bond which united your troops, and incorporated them with their own ranks. You must, forsooth, shed your blood, for interests not merely foreign but adverse to those of your country! Saxons! your fate is now in your own hands. Will you float in uncertainty between those who impose and those who seek to liberate you from the yoke? My success will secure the independence of your country and your prince. The triumph of the Prussians would rivet on you eternal chains. Tomorrow they will demand Lusatz; the day after, the right bank of the Elbe. But what do I say? Have they not already done so? Have they not long endeavoured to force your sovereign to recognise a feudal supremacy which would soon sweep you from the rank of independent nations? Your independence, your constitution, your liberty, would exist only in recollection; and the spirits of your ancestors, of the brave Saxons, would feel indignant at seeing you reduced, without resistance, by your rivals, to a slavery long prepared by their councils, and your country reduced to the rank of a Prussian province." None could descant more fluently than Napoleon on the withering effect to inconsiderable states of an alliance with a greater power; for none put it in force so invariably towards his own tributary states.—DUMAS, xvi. 205.

accepted first neutrality, then an alliance with the conqueror; and before the war in Poland was concluded, his troops were to be seen actively engaged under the French eagles. Such was the origin of that intimate union which, down to the close of the war, subsisted between Napoleon and the Saxon government, and which, though in the end fraught with numberless calamities to that electorate, must ever command respect, from the fidelity with which its engagements were adhered to under adverse fortune.

81. It was shortly after having detached Saxony from the Prussian, and united it to his own alliance, that Napoleon received an answer from the King of Prussia to the elusory proposals of accommodation made by him before the battle of Jena, and which that unhappy monarch eagerly caught at after that disaster, as the only light that seemed to break upon his sinking fortunes. The times, however, were not now the same: there was no longer any need of dissembling; the Prussian army was routed, and he was not the man to let slip the opportunity of completing its destruction. He therefore coldly replied, that it was premature to speak of peace when the campaign could hardly be said to have commenced; and that, having resolved to try the fate of arms, the king must abide by its issue. At the same time, he made amends to the infantry of Lannes' corps, which, in consequence of their not having been mentioned by Murat in his report of the successes at Prentzlow, in which they had borne so glorious a part, had not been mentioned in the bulletin regarding that event, by replying to a letter of remonstrance from Lannes on the subject. "You and your soldiers are children. Do you suppose I do not know all you have done to second the cavalry? There is glory enough for all. Another day it will be your turn to fill the bulletins of the Grand Army." When Lannes read these words to his soldiers, they were so transported with joy that they raised the cry "Vive l'Empereur d'Occident!" Nothing could have more completely answered the secret wishes

of the Emperor than both the title with which he was saluted by these brave men, and the circumstances so closely resembling those of the Roman legions under which it arose.

82. Following the march of his victorious armies, Napoleon continued his progress, by Weimar, Naumburg, Wittenberg, and Potsdam, towards Berlin. On the march he passed the field of Rosbach, the well-known theatre of the Prussian victory over the French, and ordered the column erected in commemoration of that triumph, which had been thrown down by the soldiers of his army, to be preserved from further injury, and transported as a trophy to Paris. At Potsdam he visited, with eager haste, the palace of Sans-Souci and the tomb of the Great Frederick. Everything in the apartments of the illustrious monarch had been preserved as when he breathed his last: the book which he read shortly before his death remained on the table; the furniture was untouched; the writing materials still there: the simplicity of all surprised the conqueror, who was accustomed to the magnificence of St Cloud. By a singular coincidence, but one of the many with which the history of Napoleon is full, he visited the sepulchre on the anniversary of the day on which Alexander, just a year before, on the same spot, had sworn fidelity to Frederick-William. Such had been the confusion of the Prussian flight, that on the tomb there still remained the cordon of the black eagle, the scarf and sword of the hero, which he had worn in the Seven Years' War, as well as the standards of his guard. With deep emotion Napoleon approached the awful monument; but even at that solemn moment unworthy feelings gained the ascendancy. He himself seized the venerable relics, and sent them with indecent haste off to Paris. "I will make a present of them," said he, "to the Hotel des Invalides: the old veterans of the Hanoverian war will receive with religious respect all that once belonged to one of the greatest captains of whom history has made mention." Such an act could not injure the dead; his glory

was enshrined in imperishable lustre in the page of history: but it lowered the living, and sullied the triumph of Jena by an unbecoming act of rapacity. Little did Napoleon at that moment anticipate the advent of times when the Prussians, now so humbled, were to have the mastery of his proudest trophies, and naught was to remain but veneration for the remains of the dead to protect his own ashes in a foreign and far distant land from the rude hand of the spoiler.*

83. This interesting episode did not interrupt for a moment the military movements of the corps immediately around the person of the Emperor. The same weakness and infatuation appeared there, as elsewhere, to have seized the Prussian authorities. On the same day Marshal Davoust, agreeably to the promise of Napoleon, headed the splendid vanguard which, with all the pomp of war, entered Berlin. No words can describe the mingled feelings of rage, astonishment, and despair, which animated the inhabitants at this heart-rending spectacle, occurring in less than a fortnight after hostilities had commenced. With speechless grief they gazed on the proud array which defiled through their gates, and drank deep, in the agony of that dreadful moment, of the punishment for the political sins of their government during the last ten years. On the same day the strong fortress of Spandau, with its strong citadel and a garrison

* How much more honourable as well as magnanimous was the conduct of the Russian officer who, instead of destroying the monument erected at Coblenz to commemorate the campaign of 1812, simply engraved below the inscription the words, "Seen and approved by the Russian governor of Cologne, January 1, 1814." It is for the interest of all nations to preserve the trophies of their enemy's victory and the remains of the dead from insult; for it is impossible to foresee how soon they may themselves suffer from an opposite system. Nor is such forbearance without its reward. It obliterates the disgrace of defeat in the magnanimity of subsequent victory. The Pillar of Anstettitz, in the Place Vendôme, is now a monument not less to German generosity than to French valour. It would be well for the memory of Napoleon if more instances of moderation in victory, and regard for the vanquished, were mingled with his military triumphs.

of twelve hundred men, surrendered, without firing a shot, to Marshal Lannes;* and Napoleon, after inspecting that stronghold, on the day following made his triumphal entry into the capital. He had not the same delicacy towards the feelings of its inhabitants which he had previously evinced towards those of Vienna: the palace of Charlottenburg would have answered his purpose of a residence as well as that of Schoenbrun had done; but he seemed as anxious to lacerate the feelings of the Prussians as he had been to spare those of the Austrians, and determined to punish ten years of subservience and ten days of warfare more than he had done the inveterate hostility of twelve campaigns. Surrounded, therefore, by all the splendour of the empire, in the midst of a brilliant staff, preceded by this splendid Guards on horseback in their richest attire, and environed by Berthier, Duroc, Davoust, and Augereau, Napoleon, in his usual simple costume, made his triumphal entry under the arch erected to the honour of the Great Frederick. The "observed of all observers," the object of eager gaze to the speechless assembled multitude, the mighty conqueror traversed the long street which leads from the gate Charlottenburg, and advancing through an innumerable crowd, in whom passion, admiration, and wonder were mingled in some cases with joy, alighted at the gates of the old palace.

84. Prince Hatzfeld, one of the leaders of the war party, in the total

* Napoleon spoke thus of this fortress.—"The citadel of Spandau, situated on the Spree, fully victualled for two months, is an inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of open trencher. But such was the general confusion that the batteries were not even aimed."—19th *Bulletin*. It is evident that treachery, or selfishness equivalent to treachery, occasioned the sudden fall of so many of the Prussian fortresses at this period; and Bignon tells us that he became convinced of that when, on being sent by the Emperor to superintend the capitulation of Spandau, he found the governor, Benckendorf, occupied with no other consideration but disputes with the French commander as to some wretched culinary articles which he alleged the capitulation authorised him to remove!—BIGNON, vi. 13.

absence of any authority emanating from the King, had been besought by the principal inhabitants to take an interim direction of affairs, and assume the command of the burgher guard. In doing so he had issued a proclamation, in which he said, "Nothing remains for us now but to assume a pacific attitude; our cares should not extend beyond what is within our own walls: that constitutes our sole interest, and as it is of the highest importance, we should bestow our exclusive attention upon it." This prince, as the chief of the pacific authorities, presented himself at the head of the magistrates before Napoleon at Potsdam, and was well received. He again waited on him when he arrived at the palace; but the conqueror received him with a severe air, and averting his head said, "Do not present yourself before me; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates." Shortly after the astonished nobleman withdrew, he was arrested by orders of Napoleon, who had commanded him to be seized and executed before six o'clock that evening. In fact he had transmitted to Prince Hohenlohe a letter, containing military details in regard to what he had seen at Potsdam when waiting on Napoleon, which had been intercepted by Davoust and brought to the Emperor. The imperious commands of the conqueror left his subordinate authorities no alternative but submission; although Berthier, shocked at the deed of violence which was in contemplation, did his utmost to avert the storm, and even refused to write out the warrant, which Rapp was called in to do. He could not, however, prevent Napoleon from ordering another murder as atrocious as that of the Duke d'Enghien, and the death-warrant was signed, and Rapp was directed to send it to Davoust for immediate execution.

85. The former brave and generous man, at his own imminent hazard, took upon himself to delay its transmission; and in the mean time the Princess of Hatzfeld, having arrived in the ante-chamber of the palace, was informed of the danger of her husband, and sank in a swoon on the floor. Rapp ad-

vised her, after she recovered, to endeavour to throw herself in Napoleon's way at the hotel of Prince Ferdinand, where he was going in a short time; she did so, and fell at his feet in the extremity of despair. Her grief and beauty touched Napoleon, who, though subject to violent fits of passion, was not insensible to generous emotions. Rapp warmly seconded the return to feelings of humanity, and orders were despatched to Davoust to suspend the execution till further directions. Meanwhile the princess was enjoined to repair to the palace, whither Napoleon soon after returned. He ordered her to be brought into the room which he occupied. "Your husband," said he with a benign air, "has brought himself into a distressing situation; according to our laws, he has incurred the penalty of death. General Rapp, give me the letter: take it; read, madam. Is it your husband's writing?" She did so trembling. "I cannot deny his subscription," she replied, almost fainting with emotion. Napoleon then took it from her, tore it, and threw it

into the fire. "I have no longer any proof; your husband is pardoned." He then desired Rapp to bring him back immediately from Davoust's headquarters; that officer ventured to admit that he had not even sent him there: the Emperor manifested no displeasure, but on the contrary seemed gratified at the delay which had taken place in the execution of the order.*

86. Shortly after his arrival at Berlin, Napoleon paid a visit of condolence to Prince Ferdinand, brother of the great King of Prussia, and father of Prince Louis who fell at Saalfeld, and manifested the most delicate attentions to the widow of Prince Henry, as well as the Princess Electoral of Hesse-Cassel. At the same time he addressed an animated proclamation to his troops, in which he recounted with just pride their astonishing exploits, and promised to lead them against the Russians, who, he foretold, would find another Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. Next day he reviewed the corps of Marshal Davoust on the road to Frankfort, and, assembling

* It is always pleasing to record a generous action, and doubly so when it occurs in an enemy; but justice compels the admission that, by delaying the transmission of this order, Rapp conferred a greater favour on Napoleon than on the intended victim of his passion; for the one he saved only from death, the other from the guilt of murder. Rapp informs us that the Prince of Hatzfeld had come to Potsdam on the 25th, and it was for the account transmitted to Hebenlohe on that day of what he there saw that he was about to be condemned. The 25th was the day on which Davoust entered Berlin. The information objected to was collected, and the letter written, therefore, before the prince had come under the military government of the French Emperor. There is no law against a private citizen, or a civic authority of one nation, transmitting to its military officers details which have come to his knowledge regarding an enemy, when not yet subject to their authority—Napoleon himself called on the French prefects and magistrates to do so a hundred times. If the circumstance of Hatzfeld having collected and transmitted this information, while on a civil mission to the Emperor at Potsdam, exposed him to the penalty of death, what is to be said to Savary the year before, who, by orders of Napoleon, when conferring with the Emperor Alexander on the proposed terms of accommodation, obtained and brought to him military details of inestimable importance in regard to the tem-

per and strength of the allied army on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz; or to Napoleon himself, who in 1797 transmitted orders to his brother Joseph, when holding the sacred office of ambassador at Rome, to do all in his power to revolutionise the Eternal City, and overturn the papal authority. What the Prince of Hatzfeld did was no more than all ambassadors do, or than Napoleon invariably required from all his diplomatic agents. The character of the intended transaction may be judged of by what Borthier, with generous warmth, said on the occasion—"Your majesty will surely not shoot a man connected with the first families in Berlin for so trifling a thing; the supposition is impossible—you will not do so;" and from his positive refusal to write out the order, as well as from Rapp's delaying its transmission. Had the prince been shot, it would have been, like the death of the Duke d'Enghien and the bookseller Palm, an act of deliberate murder. History, therefore, cannot award to Napoleon the praise of having pardoned, on this occasion, a criminal who had forfeited his life either by the laws of war or the principles of justice; but it must not refuse the meed due to a conqueror who returns to generous feelings after having been led, in a moment of irritation, to command an atrocious deed; and joyfully seizes on this incident as illustrative of that ascendancy which, in his cooler moments, humane feelings obtained over ruthless passion in the mind of this extraordinary man.—RAPP, 108.

the officers in a circle, assured them of the admiration which he felt for their achievements, and the grief which he had experienced at the numerous losses which had thinned their ranks.* "Sire," answered the marshal, "the soldiers of the third corps will ever be to you what the tenth legion was to Cæsar." Already, in the emulation of the different corps, the mutual knowledge and attachment of the officers and men, were to be found the happy effects of that permanent organisation into separate armies and divisions, which, first of the moderns, Napoleon had adopted from the ancient conquerors of the world.

87. While Napoleon and his followers were thus indulging in an excusable pride at the retrospect of their wonderful achievements, the Prussian officers who had traversed the country, or reached the capital in virtue of the several capitulations which had been granted, were exposed to the most grievous humiliation. The officers of the Guard, especially, who had escaped from the wreck of Hohenlohe's corps, were ostentatiously marched by the

* "Soldiers! you are worthy defenders of my crown, and of the great people. As long as you are animated with your present spirit nothing can resist you. Behold the result of your labours! One of the first powers in Europe, which recently had the audacity to propose to us a shameful capitulation, is annihilated. The forests and defiles of Franconia, the Saale, the Elbe, which our fathers would not have traversed in seven years, we have surmounted in seven days, besides, during the same period, fighting four combats and a great battle. We have arrived at Potsdam and Berlin sooner than the renewal of our victories! We have made sixty thousand prisoners, taken sixty-five standards, including those of the royal guard, six hundred pieces of cannon, three fortresses, twenty generals, while half the army regret their not having had an opportunity of firing a shot. All the Prussian provinces, from the Elbe to the Oder, are in our hands. Soldiers! the Russians boast that they are advancing to meet us: let us march to encounter them; we will spare them the half of their journey; they will find an Austerlitz in the heart of Prussia. A nation which has so speedily forgot the generosity which we manifested towards it after the battle when its Emperor, its court, the wreck of its army, owed its safety entirely to the capitulation which we granted to it, is a nation that will never be able to contend with us."—Dumas, xvi. 259, 260.

Emperor through Berlin to Spandau. Words cannot describe the mortification of those high-spirited young men, at the unparalleled calamities in which their inconsiderate passions had involved their country; wherever they went, crowds beset their steps, some lamenting their sufferings, others reproaching them as the authors of all the public misfortunes. Napoleon made a severe and ungenerous use of his victory. The old Duke of Brunswick, respectable from his age, his achievements under the Great Frederick, and the honourable wounds he had recently received on the field of battle, and who had written a letter to Napoleon, after the battle of Jena, recommending his subjects to his generosity, was in an especial manner the object of invective. His states were overrun, and the official bulletins disgraced by a puerile tirade against a general who had done nothing but discharge his duty to his sovereign. For this he was punished by the total confiscation of his dominions. So virulent was the language employed, and such the apprehensions in consequence inspired, that the wounded general was compelled, with great personal suffering, to take refuge in Altona, where he soon after died.†

88. The Queen, whose spirit in prosperity and constancy in adverse fortune had justly endeared her to her subjects, and rendered her the admiration of all Europe, was pursued in successive bulletins with unmanly sarcasms; and a heroic princess, whose only fault, if fault it was, had been an

† "If the Duke of Brunswick," said the bulletin, "has richly deserved the animadversions of the French people, he has also incurred that of the Prussian army and people: of the latter, who reproach him as one of the authors of the war; of the former, who complain of his manoeuvres and military conduct. The false calculations of the young may be pardoned, but the conduct of that old prince, aged seventy-two, is an excess of insanity, and his catastrophe can excite no regret. What can there be respectable in grey hairs, when to the faults of age are united the inconsideration and folly of youth? For these extravagancies he has justly incurred the forfeiture of all his dominions."—28d and 27th *Bulletins*, *Camp. de Saxe*, ii. 216, 293.

excess of patriotic ardour, was compared to Helen, whose faithless vices had involved her country in the calamities consequent on the siege of Troy.* The whole dominions of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel were next seized; and that prince, who had not even combated at Jena, but merely permitted, when he could not prevent, the entry of the Prussians into his dominions, was dethroned and deprived of all his possessions. Animosity to England was the secret motive for all those acts of robbery. So strongly was Napoleon influenced by these feelings that he made no attempt to dis-

* "All the world accuses the Queen as the author of all the calamities which have befallen the Prussian nation. The public indignation is at its height against the authors of the war, especially Gentz, a miserable scribbler, who sells himself for money. After her ridiculous journey to Erfurth and Weimar, the Queen entered Berlin a fugitive and alone. Among the standards we have taken are those embroidered by the hands of this princess, whose beauty has been as fatal to her people as that of Helen was to the citizens of Troy."—27th and 33d *Bulletins, Camp de Saxe*, li. 215. It is worthy of observation, that M. Gentz, who is here stigmatised as a miserable hireling sold to England, was one of the most distinguished writers of the age, and one with whom Sir James Mackintosh, the eloquent apologist of the French Revolution, maintained a constant and valued correspondence down to the time of his death. That distinguished author, in reply to a letter from Gentz, which he received at Bombay, where he then was holding a high judicial appointment, thus speaks of the pamphlets to which Napoleon alluded:—"I received by the mail your two precious fragments. I assent to all you say, sympathise with all you feel, and admire equally your reason and your eloquence throughout your masterly fragment. I have read your letter fifty times since I received it, with the same sentiment which a Roman in the extremity of Mauritania would have felt, if he had received an account of the ruin of his country after the battle of Pharsalia, written the morning after that calamity, with the unconquerable spirit of Cato, and the terrible energy of Tacitus. He would have exulted that there was something which Caesar could not subdue, and from which a deliverer and avenger might yet spring."—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 384. Certainly of all the unaccountable peculiarities in the mind of Napoleon, the most extraordinary is his total insensibility to the ultimate ascendancy of truth over falsehood, and the extent to which he calculated on painting off falsehood and misrepresentation on the credulity or ignorance of mankind.

guise that it was the ruling principle which governed all his measures towards the vanquished.† The Prince of Orange, brother-in-law to the King of Prussia, in favour of whom the Prussian plenipotentiaries then at Berlin made the strongest representations, shared the same fate; while to the nobles of Berlin he used publicly the cruel expression, more withering to his own reputation than theirs—"I will render that noblesse so poor that they shall be obliged to beg their bread." When a conqueror, in the midst of his greatest triumphs, uses such insulting language to the vanquished, and makes such an atrocious use of his victory, it is impossible to sympathise with his fall, and Waterloo and St Helena are felt to be a just measure of moral retribution.

"Necesse mense hominum fati sortisque future,
Et servare modum rebus, sublata secundis.
Turno tempus erit, magno quum obtaverit
emptum
Inactum Pallanta, et quum spolia ista diemque
Oderit."‡

89. Meanwhile the French armies, without any further resistance, took possession of the whole country between the Rhine and the Oder; and

† M. Bignon, who was present on the occasion, gives the following curious account of the conversation which led to the dethronement of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel:—"Duroc and I said everything we could, during breakfast, in favour of the Elector. He only petitioned to be allowed to resume possession of his estates; his fortresses were all to be ceded to the French arms; his troops, twelve thousand strong, were to be joined to their forces, and a heavy contribution paid.‡ These offers appeared to make a considerable impression on the Emperor, especially the offer of so many troops; but after musing a while, he said abruptly, 'Bah! Brunswick, Nassau, Cassel: all these princes are essentially English; they will never be our friends,'—and instantly set out for a review. Two days afterwards appeared the 27th bulletin, containing the announcement of their dethronement."—BIGNON, vi. 35.

‡ "O mortals! blind in fate, who never know
To bear high fortune, or endure the low!
The time shall come when Turnus, but in
vain,

Shall wish untouched the trophies of the
slain—

Shall wish the fatal belt were far away,
And curse the dire remembrance of the day."

DRYDEN'S *Fergus*, x. 530.

in the rear of the victorious bands appeared, in severity unprecedented even in the annals of the Republic, the dismal scourge of contributions. Resolved to maintain the war exclusively on the provinces which were to be its theatre, Napoleon had taken only twenty-four thousand francs in specie across the Rhine in the military chest of the army. It soon appeared from whom the deficiency was to be supplied. On the day after the battle of Jena appeared a proclamation, directing the levy of an extraordinary war contribution of one hundred and fifty-nine million francs (£6,360,000) on the countries at war with France, of which one hundred million was to be borne by the Prussian states to the west of the Vistula, twenty-five million by the Elector of Saxony, and the remainder by the lesser states in the Prussian confederacy. This enormous burden, equivalent to at least £12,000,000 sterling, if the difference between the value of money in England and Germany is taken into account, was levied with unrelenting severity; and the rapacity and exactions of the French agents employed in its collection aggravated to a very great degree the weight and odious nature of the imposition. Saxony, in the scourging contributions with which she was overwhelmed, had soon abundant cause to regret the French alliance; while Berlin, as well as the Hanoverian and Prussian states which had been occupied, experienced, in the rapacity of General Clarke and his subordinate agents, all the bitterness as well as the humiliation of conquest.

90. Nor was this all. The whole civil authorities who remained in the abandoned provinces were compelled to take an oath of fidelity to the French Emperor,* — an unprecedented step,

* The oath was in these terms:—"I swear to exercise with fidelity the authority which is committed to me by the Emperor of the French, and to act only for the maintenance of the public tranquillity, and to concur with all my power in the execution of all the measures which may be ordered for the service of the French army, and to maintain no correspondence with its enemies."—BRONX, vi. 61.

which clearly indicated the intention of annexing the Prussian dominions to the great nation; while General Clarke, governor of Berlin, acting towards the magistrates as if they were already his subjects, barbarously shot a burgo-master of the town of Kyritz,† whose only fault was that he had, when destitute of any armed force, been unable to resist the abstraction of the arms of the burgher guard and local militia by Colonel Schill, who commanded a flying detachment, that still, in the open country, maintained its fidelity to the colours of the monarchy. Even the highest authorities gave way to the indiscriminate passion for pillage: "the name of General Clarke," says Bourrienne, "became justly odious from every species of exaction, and a servile execution of all the orders of Napoleon;" while the great reputation of the conqueror of Augrstadt was disgraced by the pillage of the noble library at Tempelberg, the country-seat of Baron Hardenberg, minister of state, which took place by his authority, while he was in person occupying the edifice.

91. These evils, great as they were, and disgraceful to the arms and generals of France, were however, in the ordinary case, only transitory; but it soon became evident that in the case of Prussia and the adjoining states they were to be permanent, and that the iron grasp of the conqueror was to be not only laid, but retined, on the north of Germany. Early in November there appeared an elaborate ordinance, which provided for the complete civil organisation and military occupation of the whole country from the Rhine to the Vistula. By this decree the conquered states were divided into four departments: those of Berlin, of Magdeburg, of Stettin, and of Cüstrin; the military and civil government of the whole conquered territory was intrusted to a governor-general at Berlin, hav-

† At a dinner given by Louis XVIII. in 1815, to the King of Prussia, this murder became the subject of conversation. "Sire," said Clarke, then Duke of Feltre, "it was an unhappy error."—"Say, rather, an unworthy crime!" replied the indignant monarch.—HARD. ix. 318.

ing under him eight commanders of provinces into which it was divided. Receivers-general were appointed in each province, charged with collecting its whole revenue and all the war contributions imposed on it, and their transmission to the French governors. Magistrates, police, gendarmes, all were nominated by the authority of Napoleon; the whole civil and military government of the country was concentrated in his hands. Clarke was governor-general, aided in the details of government by Count Daru, whose great capacity soon appeared in the admirable order which he introduced into every branch of the administration, and which would have been worthy of the highest admiration if it had not been rendered instrumental to the most cruel and universal system of public extortion. The same system of government was extended to the duchy of Brunswick, the states of Hesse and Hanover, the duchy of Mecklenburg, and the Hanse Towns, including Hamburg, which was speedily oppressed by grievous contributions, in exacting which the Dutch generals and troops were peculiarly conspicuous. The Emperor openly announced his determination to retain possession of all these states till England consented to his demands on the subject of the liberty of the seas. Careful, at the same time, to mingle with these important civil changes such deeds as might captivate the imaginations of his subjects, he paraded before the deputation which came to Berlin from the senate of Paris, to congratulate him on his victories, three hundred and forty grenadiers of his Imperial Guard, each bearing a standard taken from the enemy in this short campaign—the most splendid display of military trophies seen in Europe since the triumphs of the Roman generals.

92. Meanwhile the negotiations for the conclusion of a separate peace between France and Prussia were resumed. The misfortunes of the King rendered it almost indispensable that a respite should be obtained on any terms, while it was not less advan-

tageous for Napoleon to reap at once the fruits of his triumphs, without undergoing the fatigues and dangers of a winter campaign in the frozen plains of Poland. Plenipotentiaries, accordingly, were appointed on both sides: on that of France, Duroc; on that of Prussia, MM. Lucchesini and Rastrow. There was no need of lengthened conferences; the situation of the parties gave to the one the power of demanding whatever he pleased, and deprived the other of that of withholding anything which was required. Napoleon insisted that Prussia should renounce all the provinces she possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, pay a contribution of a hundred millions of francs for the expenses of the war, cease to take any concern in the affairs of Germany, and recognise in the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine whatever titles the conqueror chose to confer upon them. Not daring to refuse these conditions, and yet unwilling to take upon themselves the responsibility of making so great a sacrifice, the Prussian envoys referred the matter to the King and his cabinet. They returned an answer agreeing to all the exactions which were required; but in the interval matters had essentially changed for the worse, the wreck of the Prussian armies had been almost totally destroyed, and the demands of Napoleon rose in proportion.

93. Perpetually haunted by the idea that it was the influence of England which he required to combat,* and that the northern powers were brought into the field only to maintain her cause, he next insisted that the Prussian troops

* "He was persuaded," says the Marquis Lucchesini, "that it was the intrigues of England which had arrayed the northern courts against France, which had brought about the refusal of the Emperor Alexander to ratify the treaty of Paris, and pushed forward Prussia into the field of battle. It was England, therefore, which it had become necessary to strike in Prussia; and it was on the conduct of the cabinet of London, in regard to the restitution of conquests, that the Emperor announced he would measure his own steps for the future fate of the Prussian monarchy."—LUCCHESINI, ii. 176, 177; *Diction*, vi. 44.

should retire entirely to Königsberg and the small portion of the monarchy which lies to the east of the Vistula; that Colberg, Dantzic, Graudentz, Thorn, Glogau, Breslau, Hameln, and Nienburg, should be placed in the hands of the French; and that no foreign troops should be suffered to enter any part of the Prussian territory. In agreeing to terms so ruinous to the monarchy, the Prussian plenipotentiaries could hardly expect that the King would ratify them; but so desperate had its affairs now become, that it was of importance to obtain a delay even of a few days, in the departure of Napoleon for Posen, in order to gain time for the arrival of the Russian troops on the Vistula. They signed the convention at Charlottenburg accordingly, stipulating only for its ratification by the King of Prussia. In fact, however, no hope remained to either side that it would lead to a permanent accommodation; for, a few days before the truce was concluded, Talleyrand openly announced to the Prussian plenipotentiaries that they must look for no restitution of his conquests by the Emperor Napoleon, and that the vast territory from the Rhine to the Vistula would be retained until a general peace, as a means of compelling England to surrender its maritime acquisitions, and forcing Russia to evacuate the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which had recently been invaded by its arms. Thus the unhappy Prussian monarchy was made responsible for the ambition or successes of other powers, over whose measures it had no sort of control; and the negotiations at Berlin, diverging from their original object, were degenerating into a mere manifesto of implacable hostility against the cabinets of London and St Petersburg.

94. The severity of the terms demanded, as well as their express assurances that no concessions, how great soever, could lead to a separate accommodation, as Napoleon was resolved to retain all his conquests until a general peace, led, as might have been expected, to the rupture of the negotiations. Desperate as the for-

tunes of Prussia were, what was to be gained by the cession of three-fourths of its dominions, and its fortresses still unsubdued on the Vistula, to the French? Left as he was of his kingdom and his army, the King still preserved his honour, and nobly resolved to continue faithful to his engagements. He declined, therefore, to ratify the armistice, which was presented to him for signature at Osterode, by Duroc, on the part of France, and at the same time published a melancholy but noble proclamation, in which, without attempting to disguise his hopes, or conceal the deplorable state of his affairs, he rose superior to the storms of fortune, and declared his resolution to stand or fall with the Emperor of Russia.* This refusal was anticipated by Napoleon. It reached him at Posen, whither he had advanced on his road to the Vistula; and nothing remained but to enter vigorously on the prosecution of the war in Poland.

95. To this period of the war belongs the famous Berlin decree of the

* "Matters," said the proclamation, "had arrived at that pass, that Prussia could no longer hope to obtain peace, even at the price of the greatest sacrifices. It was not in his power to make the Russian forces retrograde, since already their own frontiers were menaced. The Emperor of France has shown a determination, even when he acceded to the basis of a negotiation, not to suspend for one moment his military operations; and he has protracted the conferences till his successes enabled him to declare that the conquest of Prussia should afford him the means of dictating peace to England and Russia. Compelled thus to resume hostilities, the king is not without hopes of yet bringing them to a successful issue. He hopes that the governors of the fortresses on the Vistula will not imitate the weakness of those on the Oder and Elbe, and all the disposable forces of the monarchy will hasten to unite their colours on the Vistula and the Wartha to the brave Russian battalions. Such a proof of courage and constancy is not new to the Prussian nation. In the Seven Years' War the capital and provinces were also occupied by the enemy; but the firmness and intrepidity of the nation brought it safe through all its perils, and excited alike the admiration and astonishment of posterity. Then Prussia combated alone the greatest powers of Europe: now the powerful and magnanimous Alexander is about to take his place by her side, with all the forces of his vast empire. Their cause is the same; they will stand or fall together."—DOMAS, xvii. 70, 71

21st November, against the commerce of Great Britain. But this subject is too vast to be adequately touched on in the close of a chapter embracing such a variety of objects as the present; and it will be fully enlarged on in a subsequent one, which will include also the Milan decree which followed in 1807, the Continental System, and the Orders of Council adopted as a measure of retaliation by the British government.

96. Napoleon set out from Berlin for the Vistula soon after he had fulminated this anathema against English commerce, and at Posen, in Prussian Poland, gave audience to the deputies of that unhappy kingdom, who came to implore his support to the remains of its once mighty dominion. His words were calculated to excite hope which his subsequent conduct never realised: "France," said he, "has never recognised the partitions of Poland; but, nevertheless, I cannot proclaim your independence until you are resolved to defend your rights as a nation at every sacrifice, even that of life itself. The world reproaches you with having, in your continual civil dissensions, lost sight of the true interests and safety of your country. Taught by your misfortunes, now unite, and prove to the world that the same spirit animates the whole Polish nation." Universal acclamations attended his arrival at Posen; all the population advanced to meet his carriage; four magnificent triumphal arches were erected to the victor of Rivoli, Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena. Count Palatine Radzimirski, at the head of the deputation from Great Poland, addressed him in terms of Eastern adulation, mingled with strange expressions, which proved prophetic: "The universe knows your exploits and your triumphs; the west beheld the first development of your genius; the south was the recompense of your labours; the east became to you an object of admiration; *the north will be the term of your victories.* The Polish race, yet groaning under the yoke of the Germanic nations, humbly implores your august highness to raise up its remnant

from the dust."—Napoleon replied,—*"That which has been destroyed by force cannot be restored except by force. I would with pleasure behold the independence of Poland restored, and a barrier formed by its strength against the unbounded ambition of Russia; but petitions and discourses will not achieve this work; and unless the whole nation, including nobles, priests, and burghers, unites, and embraces the firm resolution to conquer or die, success is hopeless. With such a determination it is certain; and you may always rely on my powerful protection."*

97. While the main body of the French army was advancing by rapid strides from the Odes to the Vistula, Napoleon, ever anxious to secure his communications, and clear his rear of hostile bodies, caused two different armies to advance to support the flanks of the invading force. To Jerome Buonaparte, who commanded the ninth corps, consisting of twenty-five thousand Bavarians and Württembergers, and who had Vandamme for his adviser, was intrusted the difficult task of reducing the six fortresses of Silesia—Glogau, Breslau, Brieg, Weiss, Schweidnitz, and Glatz—containing in all a force nearly equal to his own. Glogau, however, with its garrison of three thousand men, made but a show of resistance, and, early in December, fell into the hands of the French. The other bulwarks of the province exhibited more determination, and operations in form were commenced against them. Mortier, on the extreme left, was intrusted with the subjugation of Hanover and the Hanse Towns, and the occupation of Hamburg, which was accomplished with hardly any resistance. Having done this, he advanced to observe Stralsund and the Swedes; while a fresh reserve was collecting on the Elbe, under the command of Louis, King of Holland. Thus, though the Grand Army was advancing by rapid strides to the shores of the Vistula, its flanks on either side were protected by subordinate corps; and fresh forces, stationed in echelon in the rear, overawed the intermediate

states, and kept up the communication with the Rhine. The whole of the north of Germany was overrun by French troops, while a hundred thousand were assembling to meet the formidable legions of Russia in the heart of Poland.

98. Vast as the forces of Napoleon were, such prodigious efforts over so great an extent of surface rendered fresh supplies indispensable. The senate at Paris was ready to furnish them; and on the requisition of the Emperor, eighty thousand were voted from the youth who were to arrive at the military age in 1807. "In what more triumphant circumstances," said the Emperor, "can we call on the youth of France to flock to our standards? They will have to traverse, in joining their comrades, the capital of their enemies, and fields of battle made illustrious by immortal victories." It may easily be conceived with what transports this appeal was received by a nation, so passionately attached to military glory as the French, and the Emperor resolved to turn it to the best account. Not content with this great addition to his prospective resources, he instituted corps of volunteers to receive the numerous and enthusiastic youth, whom even the conscription could not drain off in sufficient numbers; additional battalions were added to the Imperial Guard, the troops of Hesse taken in a body into French pay, and the most energetic measures adopted to augment as much as possible the military resources of the Confederation of the Rhine. Detailed instructions were at the same time transmitted to Marmont in Illyria, and the Viceroy Eugene Beauharnais, to have their forces disposed on the Austrian frontiers in the most advantageous position; and the King of Bavaria was informed by the Emperor himself of all that he should do for the defence of his dominions. The activity displayed in the fortresses on the Adige, the Isongo, and the Inn, looked as if he was making preparations rather for a defensive struggle in the plains of Bavaria, or the fields of Italy, than for a decisive stroke at Russia on the shores of the Vistula.

99. A treaty, offensive and defensive, between Saxony and France, was the natural result of these successes. This convention, arranged by Talleyrand, was signed at Posen on the 12th December. It stipulated that the Elector of Saxony should be elevated to the dignity of king; he was admitted into the Confederation of the Rhine, and his contingent fixed at twenty thousand men. By a separate article, it was provided that the passage of foreign troops across the kingdom of Saxony should take place without the consent of the sovereign—a provision which sufficiently pointed it out as a military outpost of the great nation—while, by a subsidiary treaty, signed at Posen three days afterwards, the whole minor princes of the house of Saxony were also admitted into the Confederacy.

100. Such was the astonishing campaign of Jena, the most marvellous of all the achievements of Napoleon, that in which success the most unheard-of attended his steps, and his force appeared most irresistible to the bewildered nations. Europe had hardly recovered the shock arising from the fall of Austria in three months, during the campaign of Austerlitz, when she beheld Prussia overthrown in as many weeks by the shock of Jena. Without halting one day before the forces of the enemy, without ever once pausing in the career of conquest, the French troops had marched from the Rhine to the Vistula; the fabric reared with so much care by the wisdom and valour of Frederick the Great had fallen by a single blow; and one of the chief powers of Christendom had disappeared at once from the theatre of Europe. Three hundred and fifty standards, four thousand pieces of cannon, six first-rate fortresses, eighty thousand prisoners, had been taken in less than seven weeks. Of a noble array of a hundred and twenty thousand men, who had so lately crowded on the banks of the Saale, not more than fifteen thousand now followed the standards of the King to the shores of the Vistula. Results so astonishing were altogether unprecedented in modern Europe: they recalled rather the classic exploits of

Cæsar or Alexander, or the fierce inroads of Timur or Genghis Khan, than anything yet experienced in Christendom. But they possessed this superiority over the achievements of antiquity or the sanguinary conquests of modern barbarism, that it was not over inexperienced tribes or enervated nations that the triumphs had been won, but the most warlike nation of the civilised world that had been overthrown, and the army which had not long before withstood the banded strength of Europe which had been dissolved.

101. The talents displayed by Napoleon in this campaign, though of a very high order, were not equal to the transcendent abilities evinced at Ulm and Austerlitz. Doubtless the celerity with which the hazardous advance of the Duke of Brunswick across the Thuringian Forest to turn the French left and interpose between the Rhine and their army, was turned to the best account, and the Prussians cut off from their magazines and communications at the very moment they were endeavouring to inflict that injury on the enemy: the vigour of the fight at Jena, and the incomparable energy with which the mighty host which there conquered was dispersed in pursuit of the broken remains of the enemy, and incessantly pressed on till they were totally destroyed, were worthy of the highest admiration. But in the very outset of the campaign, he exposed himself to unnecessary hazard, and but for a change of position on the part of the bulk of the Prussian army, of which he was ignorant, might have been involved in as great a catastrophe as the rout on the banks of the Isar had been to the Imperialists. To advance and attack the Prussian army, strongly posted at Jena, through the narrow and rugged defiles of the Laudgrafenberg, was a greater piece of rashness in military conduct than it was in the Archduke John to advance against Moreau through the pines of Hohenlinden. Napoleon has told us this himself,—"The first principle of the military art," says he, "is never to fight with a defile in your rear; for if defeated in

such a station, total ruin is hardly avoidable." Had the whole Prussian army, a hundred thousand strong, continued posted at the opening of the defiles as it was only the day before, instead of a rear-guard of forty thousand only, the French would probably have never been able to debouch, and a disastrous defeat have been experienced. There was little of the usual calculation of means to end in this great commander, when he himself, with eighty thousand men, was opposed only to Hohenlohe with forty thousand, while Davoust, with thirty thousand, was left to struggle with the King in person, at the head of sixty-five thousand. No man knew better than Napoleon that such combinations were against the first principles, not merely of the military art, but of common sense applied to such subjects. But the truth is, that the campaign of Austerlitz had given him an undue confidence in his destiny; he deemed himself invincible, because he had always hitherto proved so; and already were to be seen the symptoms of that fatal rashness which was to lead him to the Moscow retreat and the disasters of Leipsic.

102. After making every allowance for the magnitude of the defeat sustained by the Prussians at Jena and Auerstadt, and the extraordinary circumstance of the fugitives from these two fields getting intermingled during their nocturnal flight, there is something extraordinary and almost unaccountable in the sudden prostration of the monarchy. Had the people been lukewarmer disaffected in the cause, this result would have admitted of easy solution; but this was very far indeed from being the case; public spirit ran high, patriotic ardour was universal, and unanimity unprecedented against Gallic aggression existed among all classes. Yet in the midst of this ardent and enthusiastic feeling, pusillanimity the most disgraceful was generally evinced, and fortresses all but impregnable surrendered at the first summons of a contemptible enemy! Where were the soldiers of the Great Frederick, where the constancy of the Seven Years' War, when Magdeburg,

Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau lowered their colours without firing a shot, and the weakness of these garrisons permitted the army on the Vistula to be reinforced at the decisive moment by forty thousand men, who otherwise would have been chained round their walls! These unprecedented capitulations demonstrate that, however high was the spirit of part of the nation, the same feelings were not universal, and that the kingdom of Prussia, newly cemented by the genius of Frederick, had not yet acquired that general patriotic spirit which can withstand the severer shocks of adversity, and constitutes the only secure basis of national independence. And the English historian who recollects how the energies of his own country were prostrated in a similar manner after the battle of Hastings, will probably be inclined to judge charitably of an infant nation placed in such trying circumstances; and feel a deeper thankfulness for that long career of national independence, that unbroken line of national glory, which has formed the indomitable public spirit of his own country, and constitutes the unseen chain which has so long held together the immense fabric of the British dominions.

103. In proportion to the unbounded enthusiasm which these wondrous events excited in France, was the despondency which they diffused through the other states of Europe. Alarm now seized the most sanguine, despair took possession of the most resolute. The power which had risen up in Europe to vanquish and destroy seemed beyond the reach of attack. Every effort made against it, every coalition formed for its overthrow, had led only to fresh triumphs, and a more complete consolidation of its strength. The utmost efforts of Austria, supported by all the wealth of England and all the military strength of Russia had sunk in the conflict; and now a few weeks had sufficed to dissipate that admirable army which the Great Frederick had bequeathed as the phalanx of independence to his country. The thoughtful and philanthropic, more even than the multitude, were penetrated with appre-

hensions at these portentous events.* They looked back to ancient times, and read in the long degradation of Greece and the Byzantine empire, the consequences of their subjugation by the military force of Rome, and could anticipate no brighter prospect for futurity than the ultimate resurrection of Europe after many ages of slavery and decline. So little can the greatest intellects anticipate the future course of events in a society so perpetually influenced by new moving powers as that of modern Europe; and so necessary is it, in forming a judgment on the ultimate consequences of existing changes, not merely to look back to the lessons of history, but to take into account also the hitherto unexperienced influence of fresh causes rising into action in the ever-varying scene of human affairs.

104. That bright dawn, however, which philanthropy looked for in vain, and philosophy was unable to anticipate in the dark gloom of the political horizon, the ardent mind of a hero had

* See, in particular, Sir James Mackintosh's letter on this subject, *Memoirs*, i. 304. "I do not," says he, "despair of the fortunes of the human race. But the moral days and nights of these mighty revolutions have not yet been measured by human intellect. Who can tell how long that fearful night may be before the dawn of a brighter to-morrow? Experience may, and I hope does, justify us in expecting that the whole course of human affairs is towards a better state; but it does not signify to us, supposing that many steps of this progress may be to the worse. The race of man may reach the promised land; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity of all that we can discover, except with the eyes of speculation, seems very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France seems the least part of the evil: an evil greater than despotism, or rather the worst form of despotism, approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established.—Sir J. Mackintosh to M. Orléans, Feb. 24, 1808.—MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 303.—It is curious, but not unnatural, to observe the earliest and warmest advocates of the French Revolution most gloomy in their anticipations of its ultimate effects. Ardour of imagination, the habit of looking before the multitude into the ultimate consequences of passing events, a sincere desire for the good of mankind naturally produced in the same minds, in 1790 and 1806, these opposite results.

already begun to desecrate; and, what is very remarkable, he fixed on the precise circumstances in the temper of the times which were destined to make it ultimately expand to all the lustre of day. "I reckon much," said Blücher to Bourrienne at Hamburg, whither he had retired on his parole from Lübeck, "on the public spirit of Germany, on the enthusiasm which reigns in our universities. Success in war is ephemeral; but defeat itself contributes to nourish in a people the principles of honour and a passion for national glory. Be assured, when a whole people are resolved to emancipate themselves from foreign domination, they will never fail to succeed. I have no fears for the result. We shall end by having a landwehr such as the slavish spirit of the French could never produce. England will yield us its subsidies; we shall renew our alliances with Russia and Austria. I know well the principles of the coalition. The sole object which the allied sovereigns have in view is to put a limit to the system of aggression which Napoleon has adopted, and which he pursues with the most alarming rapidity. In our first wars against France at the commencement of its Revolution, we fought for the rights of kings, in which, for my part, I felt very little interest; but now the case is totally changed; the population of Prussia makes common cause with its government; the safety of our hearths is at stake; and, reverses, when such a spirit is abroad, destroy armies without breaking the spirit of a nation. I look forward without anxiety to the future, because I foresee that fortune will not always favour your Emperor. The time may come when *Europe in a body, humiliated by his exactions, exhausted by his depredations, will rise up in arms against him.* The more he enchains different nations, the more terrible will be the explosion when they burst their fetters. Who can now dispute the insatiable passion for aggrandisement with which he is animated? No sooner is Austria subjugated than Prussia is destroyed; and though we have fallen, Russia remains to continue the strife.

I cannot foresee the issue of this struggle; but supposing it to be favourable to France, it will come to an end. You will speedily see new wars arise, and if we held firm, France, worn out with conquests, will at length succumb."

105. Blücher was right in these anticipations. It is not in the suffering but the prosperity of nations that the seeds of ruin are in general to be found; the anguish and humiliation which are the consequences of weakness, disunion, or corruption, are often the severe school of ultimate improvement. If we would discern the true cause of the fall of Prussia, we must go back to the vacillation and selfishness which characterised its national councils during the ten prosperous years which succeeded the treaty of Bâle in 1795: which caused it to temporise when the moment for action had arrived, and brought it in heedless security to the very edge of perdition; which lowered the national feeling by sacrificing the national honour, and paralysed the arms of its allies by inspiring distrust in the good faith of its government. In the misery and degradation consequent on the battle of Jena, is to be found the commencement of the causes destined to produce the glorious resurrection of 1813. Periods of adversity are seldom lost in the end to nations any more than individuals; it is the flow of unbroken prosperity, which, by promoting the growth of the selfish passions, is the real source, in most cases, of irremediable ruin. Those twin curses of humanity, despotism and democracy, act in precisely the same way on the sources of public welfare, by poisoning the fountains of individual exertion, and inducing in the active members of society a slavish submission to the authority of the irresistible executive, or a selfish prosecution of their own interest, instead of a generous devotion to the public good. Till this last stage of national degradation has arrived, there is always a hope of revival to its fortunes. No misfortunes are irremediable as long as the spirit of the people is unbroken; no calamities irreparable but those which undermine their virtue.

CHAPTER XLIV.

CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU. DECEMBER 1806—MARCH 1807.

1. THE campaign of Jena had destroyed the power of Prussia; inconsiderate valour had yielded to overwhelming force and skilful combination; with more justice the King than the people could say with Francis I. at Pavia, *Tout est perdu hors l'honneur*. But Russia was still untouched; and while her formidable legions remained unsubdued, the war, so far from being completed, could hardly be said to have seriously commenced. Napoleon felt this. On the Trebbia, at Novi, at Durrenstein, and Austerlitz, the French had experienced the stern valour of these northern warriors; and he counted the hours, as the mortal conflict approached, which was to bring either universal empire or irreparable ruin in its train. Nor were the Russians less desirous to commence the struggle. Confident in the prowess of their arms—proud of the steady growth of an empire, the frontiers of which have never yet receded, and which its meanest peasant believes is one day to subdue the world—they anticipated a glo-

rious result from their exertions, and, without underrating the forces of their opponents, indulged a sanguine hope that the north would prove the limits of their power, and that, while they repelled them from their own frontiers, they would afford the means of liberation to oppressed Europe. The severity of a Polish winter could not deter these undaunted combatants. Eager for the conflict, both the mighty hosts approached the Vistula; and, at a period of the year, when some respite is usually given in ordinary war to suffering humanity, they commenced a new campaign, and advanced through a snowy wilderness to the bloody field of Eylau.

2. Alexander had displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses which his army had sustained in the campaign of Austerlitz. Thirty fresh squadrons and fifty-one battalions had been added to its amount,* all the chasms occasioned by the casualties of war supplied, and the new French organisation into divisions universally adopt-

* The Russian army was organised into eighteen divisions, each of which was composed of six regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of heavy cavalry, ten of light, two batteries of heavy cannon, three of light or horse artillery, and a company of pioneers; in all for each, eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and seventy-two pieces of cannon; about 12,000 men. The army was thus divided:—

| | Battalions. | Squadrons. | Cannons. |
|---|-------------|------------|----------|
| 1. Guard, under Grand-duke Constantine. | 33 | 35 | 84 |
| 2. Polish army—Eight divisions, under Ostermann, Sacken, Gellitzin, Tschikoff, Barclay de Tolly, Doctoroff, Essen, Gortchakoff, afterwards Kamenskoi. | 147 | 170 | 504 |
| 3. Army of Moldavia—Five divisions under Michelson as general-in-chief, commanded by Volkonsky, Zacomilsky, Miloradowitch, Meindorf, and the Duke of Richelieu. | 90 | 100 | 306 |
| 4. Intermediate corps under the Count Apraxin, consisting of the divisions of General Ritchoff, Prince Labanoff, and Gortchakoff. | 54 | 30 | 144 |
| Total. | 324 | 335 | 1038 |

besides the local corps in Georgia, Finland, and garrison battalions. The whole regular force was about 380,000 men; but in no country is the difference between the numbers on paper and in the field so great as in Russia, and the troops engaged in the campaign of Poland never exceeded 80,000 men.—JOMINI, ii. 335; and WILSON, 4.

ed. Nor was this all:—Anxious to rouse the religious enthusiasm of his subjects, and deeply impressed with the magnitude of the struggle which was approaching, he had called out a defensive militia of six hundred thousand men, and excited their devout loyalty to the highest degree by a proclamation, in which Napoleon was represented as the relentless enemy of the Christian religion, and they were called on to shed their best blood in defence of the faith of their fathers.* This proclamation excited the ridicule of a large part of Europe, still tainted by infidel fanaticism, and not then awakened to the impossibility of combating revolutionary energy with any other weapons but those of religious fervour. But it was admirably calculated for the simple-minded people to whom it was addressed, and excited such an enthusiasm, that not only was this immense armament without difficulty raised, but, contrary to usual custom, the peasants drawn for the regular army joyfully left their homes, and marched with songs of triumph amidst the blessings of their countrymen, towards the frontier, the anticipated scene of their glory or their martyrdom.

3. The troops who were now press-

* "Bonaparte," said this proclamation, which was read in all the Russian churches, "after having, by open force or secret intrigue, extended his power over the countries which he oppresses, menaces Russia, which Heaven protects. It is for you to prevent the destroyer of peace, of the faith, and of the happiness of mankind, from seducing the orthodox Christians. He has trampled under foot every principle of truth; in Egypt he preached the Koran of Mahomet, in France manifested his contempt for the religion of Jesus Christ by convoking Jewish synagogues. Do you love your fellow-creatures? Fly the persecutor of Christians. Do you desire to be saved? Oppose an invincible barrier to his advances. He has dared to the combat God and Russia; prove that you are the defenders of the Most High and of your country. Chase far from your frontiers that monster; punish his barbarity to so many innocent persons, whose blood cries aloud to Heaven for vengeance. God will hear the prayer of the faithful; he will shield you with his power; he will cover you with his grace. Your exploits will be celebrated by the church and by your country; immortal crowns or abodes of eternal felicity await you."—HARDENBERG, ix. 376.

ing forward to defend the western frontiers of the empire were very different from those with whom the French had hitherto, for the most part, contended in the fields of Germany or the Italian plains. The forces of civilisation, the resources of art, were exhausted; the legions of Napoleon had reached the old frontier of Europe; the energy of the desert, the hosts of Asia were before them; passions hitherto, save in La Vendée, unexperienced in the contest, were now brought into action. Religious enthusiasm, patriotic ardour, the fervour of youthful civilisation, were arrayed against the power of knowledge, the discipline of art, the resources of ancient opulence. There was to be seen the serf but recently emancipated from the servitude of his fathers, whose mother and sisters had checked the lamentations of nature when he assumed the military habit, and bade him go forth, the champion of Christendom, to present glory and future paradise; there the peasant, inured from infancy to hardy exercise, ignorant alike of the enjoyments and the corruptions of urban society, long accustomed to rural labour, and habituated equally to the glow of a Russian bath or the severity of a Scythian winter; there the Cossack, whose stead, nourished on the steppes of the Don, had never yet felt the curb, while his master, following his beloved Hetman to the theatre of action, bore his formidable lance in his hand, his pistols and sword by his side, and his whole effects, the fruit of years of warfare, in the folds of his saddle. Careless of the future, the children of the desert joyfully took their way to the animating fields of plunder and triumph; mounted on small but swift and indefatigable horses, they were peculiarly adapted for a country where provisions were scanty, forage exhausted, and hardships universal. The heat of summer, the frost of winter, were alike unable to check the vigour of their desultory operations; and when the hosts on either side were arrayed in battle, and the charge of regular forces was requisite, they often appeared with decisive effect at the critical moment. Urging their horses

to full speed, they bore down, by the length of their spears and the vehemence of their onset, the most powerful cavalry of Western Europe.*

4. If the whole disposable Russian forces had been united upon the Vistula, they would have presented an imposing mass of a hundred and fifty thousand warriors, against which all the efforts of Napoleon would, in all probability, have been exerted in vain. But by a strange and unaccountable infatuation, at the very moment when this formidable contest awaited them on the Polish plains, a large portion of their disposable force was drawn off to the shores of the Danube, and a Turkish superadded to the already overwhelming weight of the French war. Of the causes which led to this unhappy diversion, and the grounds which the cabinet of St Petersburg set forth in vindication of their aggression on the Ottoman dominions, a full account will be given in the sequel of this work;† but, in the mean time, its effect in causing a most calamitous division of the Russian force is too obvious to require illustration. At Eylau

* "Mounted," says Wilson, "on a little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk with ease at the rate of five miles an hour, or dispute in his speed the race with the swiftest, with a short whip on his wrist, as he wears no spur, armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, the Cossack never fears a competitor in single combat; but in the Polish war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge; and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arms and skill of the Cossack, but in the battle of Prussisch-Eylau, when the cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and, in a few moments, five hundred and thirty Cossacks reappeared in the field, equipped with the spoils of the slain. But they did not permanently wear them; the steel trophies were conveyed by subscription to the Don and the Volga, where they are inspected as trophies of their prowess, and respected as the pride of their kindred and glory of their nation"—Wilson, 27, 28. When the author saw the Cossacks of the Don and the Guard at Paris in May 1814, this description was still precisely applicable.

† See *infra*, Chap. LXIX. on the Turkish War.

the hostile forces on either side were nearly equal, and both retired without any decisive advantage from that scene of blood; ten thousand additional troops would there have overthrown Napoleon, and driven him to a disastrous retreat, while fifty thousand of the best troops of the Muscovite empire were uselessly employed on the banks of the Danube. At the same time it must be remembered that the war in Moldavia was resolved on, and the necessary orders transmitted, before the disasters in Prussia were known, or the pressing necessity for succour on the Vistula could have been anticipated; the battle of Jena was fought on the 14th October, and on the 23d November, General Michelson entered Moldavia, and commenced the Turkish campaign. But though the Russian cabinet is thus not answerable for having given orders to commence an additional war unnecessarily in the midst of the desperate struggle in the north of Germany, yet it cannot be relieved of the responsibility of having, without any adequate cause, provoked hostilities in the southern provinces of its empire, at a time when the contest in Saxony, if not commenced, might at least have been easily foreseen, when the resolution to annul the treaty, signed by d'Oubril at Paris, had been already taken, and all the strength of Europe was required to meet the encounter with the conqueror of Austerlitz on the banks of the Elbe.‡

5. While Russia, distracted by the varied interests of her mighty dominions, was thus running the hazard of destruction by the imprudent division of her forces in presence of the enemy, Napoleon was extremely perplexed at Posen by the consideration of the Polish question. The destiny of the Sarmatian people, which enters so deeply

‡ The determination to refuse the ratification of the treaty, signed at Paris by d'Oubril, was taken at St Petersburg on the 25th August—the Dniester was passed on the 23d November. The resolution to provoke a Turkish war, therefore, was taken after it was known that a continued struggle with the enemy, whose strength they had felt at Austerlitz, had become inevitable. — *Ante*, Chap. XLII. § 72.

into the solution of every political combination of the nineteenth century, here stood in the very foremost rank, and called for immediate decision. The advance of the French armies through Prussian Poland towards Warsaw, the ambiguous, but still encouraging words of the Emperor to the numerous deputations which approached him, had awakened to the highest degree the hopes and expectations of that unfortunate, but impassioned race. A solemn deputation from Great Poland, headed by Count Działinski, waited upon Napoleon, and announced an approaching insurrection of the Polish nation, headed by their nobles, palatines, and chiefs: a great excitement prevailed in Lithuania, and symptoms of alarming effervescence were visible even in Galicia. The crisis was of the most violent kind; an immediate decision was called for by imperious necessity; Napoleon was much at a loss how to act, and the question was warmly debated by the council assembled at his headquarters.

6. On the one hand, it was urged by the friends of Poland, "that the only ally in the east of Europe, on whom France could really and permanently depend, was now preparing to range itself by her side, and enter into a contest of life or death in her support. The alliances of cabinets may be dissolved, the friendships of kings may be extinguished, but the union of nations, founded on identity of interest and community of feeling, may be calculated upon as of more lasting endurance. But what people was ever impelled towards another by such powerful motives, or animated in the alliance by such vehement passions, as Poland now is towards France? Alone of all great nations, in ancient or modern times, she has been partitioned by her powerful and ambitious neighbours, struck down to the earth by hostile armies, and swept, by repeated spoliation, from the book of existence. Her nationality is destroyed, her people scattered, her glories at an end. Is it possible that these injuries can be forgotten, that such unparalleled calamities should leave no traces behind

them, in the breasts of the descendants of the Sarmatian race? Is it not certain, on the contrary, that they have left there profound impressions, ineradicable passions, which are ready, on the first favourable opportunity, to raise throughout the whole scattered provinces of the old republic an inextinguishable flame? Where has the Emperor found such faithful followers, such devoted fidelity, as in the Polish legions of the Italian army, whom Muscovite barbarity drove to seek an asylum in foreign lands? Is it expedient to refuse the proffered aid of a hundred thousand such warriors, who are ready to fly to his standards from the whole widespread fields of Sarmatia?

7. "True, they are undisciplined—without arms, fortresses, magazines, or resources—but what does all that signify? Napoleon is in the midst of them; his invincible legions will precede them in the fight; from his enemies and their spoilers his victorious sword will wrest the implements of war; in the example of his followers, they will see the model of military discipline. The Poles are by nature warriors; little training or organisation is requisite to bring them into the field. When the regular forces of Germany had sunk in the conflict, their tumultuary array chased the infidels from the heart of Austria, and delivered Vienna from Mussulman bondage. Nor is it merely a temporary succour which may be anticipated from their exertions; lasting aid, a durable alliance, may with confidence be expected from their necessities. Surrounded by the partitioning powers, they have no chance of independence but in the French alliance; the moment they desert it, they will be again crushed by their ambition. Not only the nationality of Poland, but the individual safety of its whole inhabitants, must for ever bind them to their deliverers; they well know what cruel punishments and confiscations would await them should they again fall under the Muscovite yoke. In restoring the oldest of European commonwealths, therefore, not only will a memorable act of justice be done, a memorable

punishment of iniquity inflicted, but a durable alliance on the frontier of civilisation will be formed, and a barrier erected against the inroads of barbarism in the people who, in every age, have devoted their blood to combating its advances."

8. Specious as these arguments were, and powerfully as they appealed to the generous feelings of our nature, it may be doubted whether they were not opposed by others of greater solidity. "It is in vain," it was urged in reply, "to dwell on the misfortunes of Poland, or represent her partition as an unavoidable calamity for which her inhabitants are now answerable. Such a misfortune may doubtless sometimes occur to a small state surrounded by larger ones; but was that the case in the present instance? On the contrary, Poland was originally the most powerful nation in the north: her dominions extended from the Euxine to the Baltic, and from Suabia to Smolensko. All Prussia, great part of the Austrian dominions, and a large portion of Russia, have at different times been carved out of her widespread territories. So far from being weaker than Russia, she was originally much stronger; and the standards of the Jagellons and the Piasts have more than once been planted in triumph on the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, her history for the last five hundred years has been nothing but a succession of disasters, illuminated at intervals by transient gleams of heroic achievement; and, notwithstanding the valour of her inhabitants, her frontiers have, from the earliest times, been constantly receding, until at length she became the prey of potentates who had risen to importance by acquisitious reft from herself. So uniform and undeviating a course of misfortune, in a kingdom so brave, so enthusiastic, and so populous, as even at the moment of its partition to contain sixteen millions of inhabitants, argues some incurable vice in its domestic institutions. It is not difficult to see what this vice was, when we contemplate the uniform and fatal weakness of the Executive, the disorders consequent on an elective monarchy, the inveterate and deadly ani-

mosity of faction, and the insane democratic spirit of a plebeian noblesse, which made John Sobieski, a century before its final destruction, prophesy the approaching ruin of the commonwealth.

9. "Such being the character of Polish institutions, as they have been ascertained by experience, and proved by the ruin of the commonwealth, it becomes a most serious question whether it is for the interest of France, for the aid of such an ally, to incur the certain and inveterate hostility of the three northern powers. That Russia, Prussia, and Austria will thenceforth be combined in an indissoluble alliance against France, if Poland is restored, and the rich provinces now enjoyed by them from its partition wrested from their vast dominions, is evident; and, whatever may be thought of the strength of the Sarmatian levies, there can be but one opinion as to the military resources which they enjoy. What aid can Polish enthusiasm bring to the French standards, to counterbalance this strong combination of the greatest military powers of Europe? A hundred thousand horsemen, brave, doubtless, and enthusiastic, but destitute of fortresses, magazines, and resources, and inhabiting a level plain, unprotected by mountains, rivers, or any natural frontier, and open on all sides to the incursions of their well-organised opponents. Supposing that, by the aid of the vast army and still vaster reputation of Napoleon, they shall succeed at this time in beating back the Russian hosts, and wresting Lithuania from their grasp, what may not be apprehended from the appearance of Austria on the theatre of conflict, and the debouching of a hundred and fifty thousand men in the rear of the Grand Army, when far advanced in the deserts of Muscovy? That the cabinet of Vienna is preparing for the conflict is evident; that she is arming is well known; fear and uncertainty as to the future alone restrain her forces. But the stroke which by restoring Poland severs Galicia from her empire, will at once determine her policy, and bring the Imperial legions in formidable strength to the banks of

the Elbe. Even supposing that, by an unprecedented series of victories, these dangers are averted for the moment, and the French battalions, loaded with honours, regain the Rhine, how is Poland, still torn by intestine faction, and destitute of any solid institutions, without fortresses, or the defence of mountain ranges, to withstand her formidable military neighbours? How is France, at the distance of four hundred leagues, to protect a power whose internal weakness has always been such that it has never been able to protect itself against its own provinces? If a barrier is to be erected against Russian ambition, and a state formed dependant on the French alliance for its existence, far better to look for it in Prussia, whose history exhibits as remarkable a rise as that of Poland does a decline, and the solidity of whose institutions, not less than the firmness of her national character, has been decisively exhibited in her contest with all the military forces of Europe during the Seven Years' War."

10. Pressed by so many difficulties, and struck in an especial manner by the danger of bringing the forces of Austria upon his rear, while engaged in the hardships of a winter campaign in Poland, Napoleon resolved upon a middle course.* Irrevocably fixed upon humbling Prussia to the dust, and entirely indifferent to the irritation which he might excite among its people, he resolved to rouse to the uttermost the inhabitants of Prussian Poland; but at the same time sedulously to abstain from any invitations to Galicia to revolt, and even to hold out no encouragement to the Russian provinces of

Lithuania to join the standard of Polish independence. Kosciuszko, who, since his heroic achievements in 1794, had lived in retirement near Fontainebleau, was invited by Napoleon to join his countrymen; and a proclamation, drawn up in his name, was even published in the French papers, in which he promised speedily to put himself at their head; but the course of time soon dispelled the illusion, and it became painfully evident to the Poles that their illustrious hero, despairing of success, or having no confidence in their pretended allies, was resolved to bear the responsibility of no future insurrections under such auspices.† In fact, he had been profoundly affected by the indifference manifested by all the European powers to the fate of Poland on occasion of the final partition, and thoroughly impressed with the idea that no efficacious co-operation could be expected from any of them. While, therefore, he rendered full justice to the military talents of Napoleon, he did not the less despair of seeing the deliverance of Sarmatia in good faith attempted by his despotic arms. The task of rousing the Poles in the Prussian dominions was therefore committed to Dombrowski and Wybicki: the former of whom had acquired a deserved celebrity at the head of the Polish Legion in Italy, while the latter possessed such influence with his countrymen as to promise great advantage to the cause of Napoleon.

11. At the same time, every care was taken to excite the feelings and diminish the apprehensions of the Poles of Prussia; heart-stirring proclamations in Kosciuszko's name were addressed to them by the generals of their na-

* "I love the Poles," said he to Rapp, after having received one of their deputations; "their ardour pleases me. I could wish to render them an independent people, but it is no easy undertaking. Too many nations are interested in their spoils—Austria, Russia, Prussia. If the match is once lighted, there is no saying where it would stop. My first duty is towards France, and it is no part of it to sacrifice its interests to Poland—that would lead us too far. We must leave its destinies in the hands of the supreme disposer of all things—to Time. It will possibly teach us hereafter what course we ought to pursue."—BOUR. vii. 230.

† "Kosciuszko," said this fabricated epistle, dated 1st November, "is about to place himself in the midst of you. He sees in your deliverers no ambitious conquerors; the great nation is before you; Napoleon expects you; Kosciuszko calls you. I fly to your succour, never more to leave your side. Worthy of the great man whose arm is stretched forth for your deliverance, I attach myself to your cause never again to abandon it. The bright days of Poland have returned; we are under the ægis of a monarch accustomed to overcome difficulties by miracles."—HARDENBERG, ix. 329.

tion in the Italian army; but that brave man himself, faithful to the oath he had taken to the Emperor of Russia, and aware of the delusive nature of Napoleon's support, refused to take any part in these proceedings; resisted all the brilliant offers which he made to induce him to engage in his service, and even had the boldness, in foreign journals, to disavow the letter which the French government had published in his name. Notwithstanding this reserve, however, the advance of the French armies to Warsaw, and the sedulous care which they took to save the inhabitants from every species of insult or contribution, produced an extraordinary excitement in the Polish provinces. Universally they were hailed as deliverers—the substantial benefits, the real protection, the fostering tranquillity of the Prussian administration, were forgotten in the recollection of ancient achievements, and, incited by the heart-stirring prospect of coming independence, the nation was fast running into its ancient and ruinous anarchy. The public exultation was at its height when Napoleon arrived at Posen: several régiments were already formed in Prussian Poland; and the arrival of the French troops in Warsaw, which the Russians evacuated at their approach, was universally hailed as the first day of Polish restoration.

12. Napoleon was not insensible to the important effects of this national enthusiasm, both in augmenting the resources of his own army, and intercepting those of his opponents; but at the same time he felt the necessity of not rousing all Poland in a similar manner, or incurring the immediate hostility of Austria, by threatening the tenure by which she held her Polish acquisitions. He resolved, therefore, to moderate the general fervour, and confine it to the provinces of Prussia, where it was intended to excite a conflagration, and this was done by the bulletin which appeared on the 1st December:—"The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and the sentiment of nationality, is not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but it has become more pro-

found from misfortune. Their first passion, the universal wish, is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their chateaux to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the nation, and to offer their children, their fortune, their influence, in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have everywhere resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs. Is, then, the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is the nation destined to resume its existence and independence? From the depth of the tomb is it destined to start into life? God alone, who holds in his hands the combination of great events, is the arbiter of that great political problem, but certainly never was an event more memorable of worthy of interest." Situated as Napoleon was, the reserve of this language was an act of humanity as well as justice to the unhappy race whose destiny it still held in suspense; but it contributed powerfully to allay the rising enthusiasm of the Russian and Austrian provinces of the ancient commonwealth; and the prudent, despairing of any national resurrection from such an ally, began to ask, "if the restoration of the republic of Poland could in good faith be expected from the man who had extinguished the liberty of his own country?"

13. One chance, and only one, remained to Napoleon of smoothing away the difficulties which surrounded the restoration of Poland, and that consisted in the proposal, which at this time he made to Austria, to exchange its share of Poland for its old province of Silesia. During the negotiation with Prussia for a separate peace, he only held out the prospect of this exchange in a doubtful manner to the cabinet of Vienna; but no sooner had the King of Prussia refused to ratify the armistice of Charlottenburg, than General Andréossi was authorised to propose it formally to that power. Count Stadion replied, that the good faith of the Imperial government would not permit them to accept a possession whose surrender was not assented to by Prussia; and it would indeed have

been an extraordinary fault in policy, as well as breach of morality, to have thus despoiled a friendly power and reopened an ancient wound, at the very moment when a concentration of all energies was required to resist the enemy who threatened to destroy all the European states. In consequence of this refusal, the conduct of Napoleon, in regard to Poland, became still more guarded; and, although a provisional government and local administration were formed at Warsaw, yet none but natives of Prussian Poland were admitted to any share in the direction of affairs. Meanwhile the conduct of Austria was so dubious as to inspire no small disquietude for the rear of the Grand Army. Already sixty thousand men were assembled in Bohemia; new troops were daily directed towards Galicia, and the greatest activity was displayed in forming magazines in both these provinces. When questioned concerning these armaments, the cabinet of Vienna returned only evasive answers, alleging the necessity of making their frontiers respected by the numerous armies by which they were surrounded. Napoleon saw well that the Austrians were dissembling, but he concealed his resentment, and merely sent General Andréossi to Vienna to keep a more vigilant eye on the warlike preparations which were going forward.

14. During his stay at Posen, the French Emperor made, on repeated occasions, the strongest professions of his resolution to support the Turks against the invasion of the Russians. To the Prussian plenipotentiaries at Charlottenburg he declared, "That the greatest of all the evils which Prussia has occasioned to France by the late war, is the shock they have given to the independence of the Ottoman Porte; as the imperious commands of the Emperor of Russia have brought back to the government of Wallachia and Moldavia the hospodars, justly banished from their administration; which, in effect, reduces their principalities to the rank of Russian provinces. But the full and complete independence of the Ottoman empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Em-

peror, as it is indispensable for the security of France and Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence. In conformity with these principles, the Emperor is determined that, until the Sultan shall have recovered the full and entire command both of Moldavia and Wallachia, and is completely secured in his own independence, the French troops will not evacuate any part of the countries they have conquered, or which may hereafter fall into their power." The same resolution was publicly announced in the bulletins, when intelligence of the ill-judged invasion of the principalities arrived; and yet, within six months afterwards, though Turkey had faithfully and gallantly stood to the French alliance under circumstances of extreme peril, Napoleon, as will shortly appear, signed a treaty at Tilsit, by which not only were Wallachia and Moldavia ceded to Russia, but provision was made for the partition of the whole Turkish dominions in Europe!

15. While this great political question was under discussion, during the fortnight that the Emperor's stay continued at Posen, the army in great force approached the Vistula; but the severity of the weather, and the incessant fatigue of the troops, in the long and dreary marches through that monotonous country at so inclement a season, produced a general feeling of despondency among the soldiers, and gave rise to a fermentation which even Napoleon deemed alarming. To the intoxication consequent on the victory of Jena had succeeded a mortal disquietude, when, immediately after such glorious successes, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged on in the depth of winter to begin a new campaign, amidst pathless snows and gloomy forests. Even the heroic Lannes was so impressed with these difficulties, that he wrote to Napoleon in the strongest terms, advising the cessation of hostilities, and describing

the anarchy and confusion which prevailed in Poland, from which no efficient aid could be expected.* In order to dispel these sinister presentiments, Napoleon took advantage of the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz to address an animating proclamation to his army. "Soldiers! this day year, at this very hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalions fled in terror before you, or, surrounded on all sides, laid down their arms to their conquerors. On the day following they read the words of peace, but they were deceitful. Hardly had they escaped, by the effects of a generosity perhaps blamable, from the disasters of the third coalition, than they set on foot a fourth; but the new ally on whose skilful tactics they placed all their hopes, is already destroyed. His strongholds, his capital, his magazines, two hundred and eighty standards, seven hundred field-pieces, five first-rate fortresses, are in our power. The Oder, the Wartha, the deserts of Poland, have been alike unable to restrain your steps. Even the storms of winter have not arrested you an instant; you have braved all, surmounted all. Everything has flown at your approach. In vain have the Russians endeavoured to defend the capital of the ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula: the brave and unfortunate Poles, when they behold you,

imagine that they see the soldiers of Sobieski returning from his memorable expedition! Soldiers! we shall not again lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce liberty and its colonies. On the Elbe and the Oder we have conquered Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish colonies. Who has given the Russians right to hope that they can balance the weight of destiny? Who has authorised them to overturn such great designs? Are not they and we the soldiers of Austerlitz?" Even in the forests of Poland, and amidst ice and snow, the thoughts of Napoleon were incessantly fixed on England and the East; and it was to overthrow her power on the banks of the Ganges that a campaign was undertaken in the depth of winter, on the shores of the Vistula.

16. This proclamation, dictated by a profound knowledge of the French character, produced an extraordinary effect upon the soldiers. It was distributed with profusion over all Germany, and none but an eyewitness could credit the influence which it had in restoring the spirit of the men. The veterans in the front line forgot their fatigues and privations, and thought only of soon terminating the war by a second Austerlitz on the banks of the Vistula; those who were approaching by forced marches in the rear, redoubled their exertions to join their comrades in the more forward stations, and counted the days till they gained sight of the eagles which appeared to be advancing to immortal renown. The better to improve upon these dispositions, and at the same time establish a durable record of the glorious achievements of his troops, Napoleon, by a decree published on the same day, gave orders for the erection of a splendid edifice on the site of the convent of the Madeleine, at the end of the Boulevards Italiens at Paris, with the inscription — "The Emperor Napoleon to the soldiers of the Grand Army." In the interior were to be inscribed, on tablets of marble, the names of all those

* "After the success of the Prussian war, Lannes wished to halt upon the Oder, and expressed that opinion without restraint. On arriving at Bromberg after a severe march, he wrote to Buonaparte that he had traversed a sandy, barren, uninhabited country, with the exception of the climate only fit to be compared with the desert to be crossed in passing from Egypt to Syria; that the soldiers were cast down and stricken with the fever arising from the damp soil and season; that the Poles were little disposed for insurrection, and trembling under the yoke of their masters; that their disposition should not be estimated by the factitious enthusiasm of a few nobles attracted to Posen by the love of noise and novelty. That at bottom they were ever *frivolous, divided, and disorganised*, and that in striving to reconstitute them as a nation, the blood of France would be spent in vain in a work neither solid nor permanent."—THIERIA, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 267.

who had been present in the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; on tablets of gold, the names of all those who had fallen in these memorable conflicts. There also were to be deposited the arms, statues, standards, colours, and monuments of every description, taken during the two campaigns by the Grand Army. Every year a great solemnity was to commemorate, on the 2d December, the glory of these memorable days; but, in the discourses or odes made on the occasion, no mention was ever to be made of the Emperor: like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, his exploits, it was well known, would only be the more present to the mind from being withdrawn from the sight.

17. This project took a strong hold of the imagination of Napoleon: he gave immediate orders for the formation of plans for the edifice, and the purchase of all the buildings in the vicinity, in order to form a vast circular place of uniform buildings around it; and, as a previous decree had directed the construction of the Bourse or public exchange on that situation, he shortly after directed the minister of the interior to look out for another isolated situation for that structure, "worthy of the grandeur of the capi-

"I will have nothing in wood. The spectators should be ranged on benches of marble forming the steps of this amphitheatre of the public.—Nothing in this temple should be movable and changeable; everything, on the contrary, should be fixed in its place.—No wood must be used in the construction of such a temple.—Granite and iron are the materials for such a monument.—Granite must be found for the other monuments which I shall institute, which by their nature, may admit of thirty, forty, or fifty years for their construction. I intend to erect such a temple as might have stood at Athens, and has not hitherto existed in Paris. All the interior sculpture must be in marble, and sculpture fitted to grace the saloons and banqueting rooms of the wives of Paris bankers, must not be proposed. Mere ornament is neither simple nor noble; nothing that is not durable must be employed in this monument. I repeat that we must have no upholsterers' work, not even curtains."—*NAPOLEON au Ministre de l'Interieur Finkenstein*, 30th May 1807; *THIERS's Consulat et l'Empire*.—Napoleon was endowed with the real soul of an artist; like Michael An-

tal, and the greatness of the business which will one day be transacted within its walls." The Place which it fronted was to retain its title "de la Concorde," "for that it is," said Napoleon, "which renders France invincible." He was desirous that the monument should be an imitation of the Pantheon, or some other Grecian temple, and constructed entirely of the most durable and costly materials. The interior, in the form of an amphitheatre, was to be arranged with seats of solid marble; iron, bronze, and granite, intermingled with letters of gold, were alone to be employed in the inside. Among the designs presented, he at once fixed on that which has since been adopted for that exquisite structure.* Such was the origin of those beautiful edifices, the Church of the Madeleine and the Exchange at Paris; and which, carried on through other reigns, and completed under another dynasty, with that grandeur of conception and perseverance in execution by which the public edifices in Paris are distinguished, will for centuries attract the educated from all countries to Paris, as the centre of modern architectural beauty. To the world, at that time, Napoleon revealed no other design in the structure of the

gelo, he would have placed another Pantheon in the air. Had fortune not made him the first general, he was qualified to have become the greatest artist of modern times—another proof among the many which history affords of the truth of Johnson's observation, that "genius is nothing but strong natural parts accidentally turned in one direction."† Yet, strange mixture of the great and the little in that extraordinary mind, even when engaged with those lofty designs destined to perpetuate glorious deeds to remote ages, he could not forget the senseless jealousies of the moment. His observation as to the sculptures in the saloons of the bankers' wives at Paris was a hit at Madame Recamier, the object of his extreme jealousy on account of her beauty, which almost balanced his colossal fame, and whose suite of rooms had been richly ornamented in that style.—another proof of the truth of the same great moralist's observation, "that no one ever raised himself from a private station to great eminence among men, who did not unite commanding qualities to meannesses which would be inconceivable in ordinary men."

Madeleine than that of a monument to the Grand Army; but, penetrated with the magnitude of the mission with which he was persuaded he was intrusted—that of closing the wounds of the Revolution—he in his secret heart destined for it another and a greater object. He intended to have made it an expiatory monument to Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution—a design which he did not propose to declare for ten years, when the fever of revolutionary ideas was in a great measure exhausted; and therefore it was, that he directed its front to face the centre of the Place Louis XV., where those august martyrs had perished, and constructed it on the site of the Madeleine, near which their uncoffined remains still lay in an undistinguished grave.*

* “No one but myself,” said he, “could restore the memory of Louis XVI., and wash from the nation the crimes with which a few galley slaves and an unhappy fatality had stained it. The Bourbons being of his family, and resting on external succour, in striving to do so, would have been considered as only avenging their own cause, and have increased the public animosity. I, on the contrary, sprung from the people, would have purified their glory, by expelling from their ranks those who had disgraced them, and such was my intention; but it was necessary to proceed with caution: the three expiatory altars at St Denis were only the commencement; the Temple of Glory on the foundation of the Madeleine was destined to be consecrated to this purpose with a far greater éclat. It was there that, near their tomb, above their very bones, the monuments of men, and the ceremonies of religion, would have raised a memorial to the memory of the political victims of the Revolution. This was a secret which was not communicated to above ten persons; but it was necessary to allow it to transpire in some degree to those who were intrusted with the preparation of designs for the edifice. I would not have revealed the design for ten years, and even then I would have employed every imaginable precaution, and taken care to avoid every possibility of offence. All would have applauded it; and no one could have suffered from its effects. Everything, in such cases, depends on the mode and time of execution. Carnot would never have ventured under my government to write an apology for the death of the King, but he did so under the Bourbons. The difference lay here; that I would have marched with public opinion to punish it, whilst public opinion marched with him, so as to render him unassailable.”—*LAS CASES*, i. 270, 371.

18. The commencement of a winter campaign, which would obviously be attended with no ordinary bloodshed, required unusual precautions for the protection of the long line of communication of the Grand Army, and the efforts of Napoleon were incessant to effect this object. The march of troops through Germany was urged forward with all possible rapidity; some attempts at insurrection in Hesse were crushed with great severity; the conscripts, as they arrived from the Rhine or Italy at the different stations in the Prussian states, were organised and sent into the field almost before they had acquired the rudiments of the military art; and the subsidiary contingents of Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and the states of the Rhenish confederacy, raised to double their fixed amount. By these means not only were the rear and communications of the Grand Army preserved from danger, but successive additions to its active force were constantly obtained; while at the same time Austria, whose formidable armaments on the Bohemian frontier already excited the attention of the Emperor, and had given rise to pointed and acrimonious remonstrances from his military envoy, General Andréossi, to the cabinet of Vienna, was overawed.†

19. How to maintain these vast and hourly increasing armaments was a

† In an audience of the Emperor of Austria, which that general obtained, he said, with more of military frankness than diplomatic ambiguity:—“The Emperor Napoleon fears neither his avowed nor his secret enemies. Judging of intentions by public acts, he is too clear-sighted not to dive into hidden dispositions; and in this view, he would infinitely regret if we were compelled to arrive at the conclusion, that the considerable armaments which your Majesty has had on foot since the commencement of hostilities were intended to be directed, in certain events, against himself. Your Majesty appears to have assembled on the flank of the French army all your disposable forces, with magazines beyond all proportion to their amount. The Emperor asks what is the intention of this army while he is engaged with Russia on the banks of the Vistula? Ostensibly intended for the preservation of neutrality, how can such an object be its real destination, when there is not the slightest chance of its being threatened.”—*BIGNON*, vi. 58.

more difficult question; but here, too, the indefatigable activity of the Emperor, and his grinding system of making war support war, contrived to find resources. Requisitions of enormous magnitude were made from all the cities in his rear, especially those which had been enriched by the commerce of England: Napoleon seemed resolved that their ill-gotten wealth should, in the first instance, be devoted to the necessities of his troops. The decrees against English commerce were everywhere made a pretext for subjecting the mercantile cities to contributions of astounding amount. Fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) were, immediately upon its occupation, demanded from Hamburg as a ransom for its English merchandise, seized in virtue of the decree of 21st November; and it only escaped by the immediate payment of sixteen millions, (£640,000.) In addition to this, that unhappy city, which had taken no part in hostilities against France, was ordered to furnish at once fifty thousand greatcoats for the use of the troops; while Lubeck, which had been successively pillaged by the troops of Blücher and Bernadotte, was compelled to yield up four hundred thousand lasts of corn,* and wood to the value of sixty thousand pounds; Leipzig redeemed its English merchandise for ten million of francs, (£400,000), while all the other Hanse Towns were subjected to equally severe requisitions; and the great impost of one hundred and sixty-nine millions of francs (£6,800,000), imposed after the battle of Jena, was everywhere collected from the Prussian territories with a rigour which greatly added to its nominal amount. Under pretext of executing the decree against English commerce, pillage was exercised in so undisguised a manner by the French inferior agents, that it attracted in many places the severe animadversion of the chiefs of the army. Thus, while the decrees of the Emperor professed to be grounded on the great principle of compelling the English government, by the pressure of mer-

cantile embarrassment, to accede to the liberty of the seas, in their execution he had already departed from their ostensible object; and, while the merchandise seized was allowed to remain in the emporiums of British commerce, its confiscation was made a pretext for subjecting neutral states or towns to inordinate requisitions for the support of the Grand Army.†

20. By these different means Napoleon was enabled, before the middle of December, not only to bring a very great force to bear upon the Vistula, but to have the magazines and equipments necessary for enabling it to keep the field, during the rigours of a Polish winter, in a complete state of preparation. He was particularly solicitous for the increase and remounting of his cavalry, which had suffered extremely during the fatiguing marches of the preceding campaign. Four splendid regiments of cuirassiers, and five of light horse, formed by the sedulous care of Murat, were ordered up from Naples; and an immense establishment for cavalry was organised at Spandau, where all the horses taken from the enemy, and all that could be purchased, were collected, and distributed among the different corps which required them. The army in Italy was put on the war footing, to overawe Austria, and raised to 52,000 men. Fifty thousand more were on their march from the interior for the Grand Army. In all 300,000 men, in Germany, Italy, and Poland, were assembled round the standards of Napoleon, which, after making all deductions, promised to afford 150,000 ready for active service in the field. To make room for this

† As an example at once of the enormous magnitude of these contributions, and the provident care of the Emperor for the health and comfort of his troops, reference may be made to his letter to the French governor of Stettin, from which contributions to the amount of twenty million francs (£800,000) were demanded, though the city only contained thirty-two thousand inhabitants. "You must seize goods to the amount of twenty millions, but do it by rule, and give receipts. Take payment as much as possible in kind; the great stores of wine which its cellars contain would be of inestimable importance. It is wine which in winter can alone give the victory."—Bignon, vi. 99.

* Each last weighs 2000 kilogrammes, or about half a ton.—Bour, vii. 249.

immense force, the front was advanced towards the enemy. Davoust and Murat had entered Warsaw at the end of November, which was abandoned by the Prussians at their approach; and two days afterwards they crossed the Vistula, and occupied the important *étie-de-pont* of Praga on its right bank, which was in like manner evacuated without a struggle. On the right Lannes supported them, and spread himself as far as the Bug; while on the left, Ney had already made himself master of Thorn, and marched out of that fortress, supported by the cavalry of Bessières, and followed by the corps of Bernadotte. In the centre, Soult and Augereau were preparing with the utmost activity to surmount the difficulties of the passage of the Vistula at Plock and Modlin. Thus eight corps were assembled, ready for active service, on that river, which, even after taking into view all the losses of the campaign, and the numerous detachments requisite to keep up the communications in the rear, could in all bring a hundred thousand men into the field; while the powerful reinforcements on their march, through Prussia and Poland, promised to enable the Emperor to keep up the active force in front at that great numerical amount.

21. The Emperor Alexander was far from having an equal force at his disposal. The first army, under Benningsen, consisting of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred and twenty-five squadrons, could muster forty-five thousand men, organised into four divisions, under Ostermann Tolstoy, Sacken, Prince Gallitzin, and Sidmarzski. It arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November. The second, consisting also of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred squadrons, arranged in the divisions of Touchkoff, Doctoroff, Essen, and Aurepp, was about thirty thousand strong, its regiments having not yet filled up the chasms made by the rout of Austerlitz. The wreck of the Prussian forces, re-organised and directed under the able management of General Lestocq, did not number more than fifteen thousand men, when the requisite garrisons for Dantzic and

Gratzen were completed from its shattered ranks. Thus the total allied forces were not above ninety thousand strong, and, for the actual shock of war in the field, not more than seventy-five thousand men could be relied on. This imposing array was under the command of Field-marshal Kamenskoi, a veteran of the school of Suwarroff, nearly eighty years of age, and little qualified to measure swords with the conqueror of Western Europe. But the known abilities of Benningsen and Buxhowden, the two next in command, would, it was hoped, compensate for his want of experience in the novel art of warfare which Napoleon had introduced.

22. Headquarters had been established at Pultusk since the 12th November: Warsaw, all the bridges of the Vistula, were in the hands of the Allies; and the firmness of their countenance gave rise to a belief that they were disposed to dispute the passage of that river with the invaders. Until the arrival of the second army under Buxhowden, however, which was advancing by forced marches from the Niemen, they were in no condition to keep their ground against the French; and it was deemed better to give them the moral advantage arising from the occupation of the Polish capital, than to hazard a general engagement with so decided an inferiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishes, therefore, the Russians fell back at all points, their advanced posts were all withdrawn across the Vistula, and Warsaw, evacuated on the 28th, was occupied by Davoust on the 30th November. Previous to the opening of the winter campaign, Alexander addressed the following proclamation to his soldiers:—"Prussia formerly was the barrier between France and Russia, when Napoleon's tyranny extended over all Germany. But now the flame of war has burst out also in the Prussian states, and after great misfortunes, that monarchy has been struck down, and the conflagration now menaces the frontiers of our territory. It would be useless to prove to the Russians, who love the glory of their country, and are ready to undergo every sacrifice to

maintain it, how such events have contributed to render our present efforts inevitable. If honour alone compelled us to draw our sword for the protection of our allies, how much more are we now called upon to combat for our own safety? We have in consequence taken all the measures which the national security requires—our army has received orders to advance beyond the frontier—Field-marshal Kamenskoi has been appointed to the command, with instructions to march vigorously against the enemy—all our faithful subjects will unite their prayers with ours to the Most High, who disposes of the fate of empires and battles, that he will protect our just cause, and that his victorious arm and blessing may direct the Russian army, employed in the defence of European freedom.”

23. Sensible of the inferiority of its forces to those which Napoleon had assembled on the Vistula from all the states of Western Europe, the Russian cabinet made an application to the British government for a portion of those subsidies which she had so liberally granted on all former occasions to the powers who combated the common enemy of European independence; and, considering that the whole weight of the contest had now fallen on Russia, and the danger had now approached her own frontiers, they demanded, not without reason, a loan of six millions sterling, of which one was to be paid down immediately for the indispensable expenses connected with the opening of the campaign. It was easy to see, however, from the answer to this demand now, that the spirit of Pitt no longer directed the British councils. The request was refused by the ministry on the part of government; but it was proposed that a loan should be contracted for in England for the service of Russia, and that, for the security of the lenders, the duties on English merchandise, at present levied in the Russian harbours, should be repealed, and in lieu thereof, the same duties should be levied at once in the British harbours, and applied to the payment of the interest of the loan to the British capitalists. This strange

proposition, which amounted to a declaration of want of confidence, both in the integrity of the Russian government and the solvency of the Russian finances, was of course rejected, and the result was, that no assistance, either in men or money, was afforded by England to her gallant ally in this vital struggle. An instance of parsimony and blindness beyond all example calamitous and discreditable, when it is considered that Russia was at that moment bearing the whole weight of France on the Vistula, and that England had at her disposal twenty millions in subsidies, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers in Europe.

24. No sooner had the advanced guards of Buxhowden's army begun to arrive in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, than Kamenskoi, whose great age had by no means extinguished the vigour by which he was formerly distinguished, made a forward movement. Headquarters were advanced to Nasielsk, and the four divisions of Bennigsen's army cantoned between the Ukra, the Narew, and the Bug; while Buxhowden's divisions, as they successively arrived, were stationed between Golymin and Makow; and Lestocq, on the extreme right of the Allies, encamped on the banks of the Drewentz, on the great road leading to Thorn, was advanced almost up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this general advance was to circumscribe the French quarters on the right bank of the Vistula; and as it was known that Napoleon with his guards was still at Posen, hopes were entertained that his troops would be entirely driven from the right bank before his arrival, and the river interposed between the winter quarters of the two armies.

25. No sooner did Napoleon hear of this forward movement of the Russians, than he broke up from his quarters at Posen on 16th December, and arrived at Warsaw two days afterwards. No words can do justice to the warlike and patriotic enthusiasm which burst forth in that capital when they beheld the hero whom they hailed as their deliverer actually within their walls, and saw the ancient arms of Poland affixed

to the door of the hotel where the provisional government of Prussian Poland was established. The nobility flocked into the capital from all quarters; the peasantry everywhere assembled in the cities, demanding arms; the national dress was generally resumed; national airs were universally heard; several regiments of horse were speedily raised, and before the conclusion of the campaign, thirty thousand men were enrolled in disciplined regiments, from the Prussian provinces alone of the ancient monarchy. To secure for themselves the powerful support of the French Emperor, the Polish leaders were desirous not only that the entire Sarmatian nation should be restored, but that a prince of his own family should be placed on its throne. With this view they suggested Murat, the Emperor's brother-in-law, whose great reputation, especially as a cavalry officer, and his chivalrous character, seemed to point him out as peculiarly adapted for a nation whose nobles had boasted, in the days of their glory, that if the heaven itself were to fall, they would support it on the points of their lances. But Napoleon knew both the Poles and Murat too well to go into any such proposal. "I have not here," said he, "to beg a throne for my family—I have thrones enough to bestow without asking. Tell the Poles it is not by means of precautions, and personal calculations, that nations are delivered from a foreign yoke. I have come here for the general interest of Europe, to engage in one of the most difficult of enterprises, from which the Poles have more to gain than any other people. Their national existence is at stake, and not merely the general interests of Europe. If by unbounded devotion they second me sufficiently to secure success, I will award to them their independence. If not, I will do nothing, and leave them to the Russians and Prussians." The general enthusiasm did not make Napoleon forget his policy: the provisional government was established by a decree of the Emperor, only "until the fate of Prussian Poland was determined by a general peace;" and the prudent began to entertain mel-

ancholy presages in regard to the future destiny of a realm thus agitated by the passion of independence, and the generous sentiments of patriotic ardour, with only a quarter of its former inhabitants to maintain the struggle against its numerous and formidable enemies.

26. Having taken the precaution to establish strong *îlles-de-pont* at Praga, the outwork of Warsaw, Modlin, Thorn, and all the bridges which he held over the Vistula, Napoleon lost not an instant in resuming the offensive in order to repel this dangerous incursion of the enemy. Davoust, who formed the advanced guard of the army, was pushed forward from Praga on the road towards Pultusk, and soon arrived on the Bug; and, after having reconnoitred the whole left bank of that river, from its confluence with the Narew to its junction with the Vistula, made preparations for effecting the passage at Okernin, a little below the junction with the Ukra. The Cossacks and the Russian outposts lined the opposite bank, and the difficulties of the passage were considerable; but they were not in sufficient force to dispute it in a serious manner; and after some sharp skirmishing, the experienced talents of General Gauthier, who was intrusted with the enterprise, established the French on the right bank, where they soon after sustained a severe action with the Russian advanced guard at Pomichowo. The Muscovites, however, returned in greater force; and the result was, that the French advanced guards were cut off, and the detachment to which they belonged fell back to the *île-de-pont* established at the river. Meanwhile Soult and Angereau in the centre advanced to Pionsk, and Ney, and Bernadotte, with Bessières' cavalry, moved forward on the left from Thorn to Soldau and Biezun, in such a manner as to threaten to interpose between the detached corps under Lestocq and Benningsen's main body, which was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Nasielsk.

27. This partisan warfare continued for ten days without any decisive result on either side; but the arrival of

Napoleon at Warsaw was the signal for the commencement of more important operations. On the 23d December, at daybreak, he set out from that capital for the army, with the Gdards and Lannes' corps, and no sooner arrived at the advanced posts of Davoust, than he dictated on the spot directions for forcing the passage of the Ukra, which had hitherto bounded all their incursions.* The operation was carried into effect with the happiest success at Czarnovo, and with that ardour with which the presence of the Emperor never failed to animate the troops. After a severe action of fourteen hours, the passage was forced, and Count Ostermann, who commanded the Russian rear-guard, retreated upon Nasielsk. In this well-contested affair each party had to lament the loss of about a thousand men. Kamenskoï, finding the barrier which covered the front of his position forced, gave orders for concentrating his forces towards Pułtusk on the Narew, and the Allies accordingly fell back at all points. They were vigorously pursued by the French, and another desperate conflict took place next day in front of Nasielsk, between General Rapp and the Russians under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, in which the latter were worsted, but not without a severe loss to the assailants. In this warm conflict the opposite bodies had become so intermingled that Colonel Ouvaroff, an aide-de-camp of Alexander, was made prisoner by the French; while Count Philippe de Ségur, destined for future celebrity as the his-

torian of the still more memorable campaign of 1812, and attached to Napoleon's household, fell into the hands of the Russians. On the same day Augereau fought from daybreak till sunset at Lochoczyn on the Ukra, with the divisions opposed to him, which at length began to retire. Thus the Russians, pierced in the centre by the passage of the Ukra at Czarnovo and Lochoczyn, and the combat at Nasielsk, were everywhere in full retreat. No decisive advantage had been gained; but the initiative had been taken from the enemy; and his divisions, separated from each other, were thrown into eccentric lines of retreat, which promised every moment to separate them more widely from each other.

28. Kamenskoï, though a gallant veteran, was altogether unequal to the perilous crisis which had now arrived. The army, separated into two parts, of which one was moving upon Gdymin, the other falling back towards Pułtusk, was traversing a continual forest, through roads almost impassable from the mud occasioned by a long-continued thaw, and the passage of innumerable carriages, which had broken it up in all parts. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, he issued orders to sacrifice the artillery, which impeded the retreat—gave directions to arrest the supplies destined for the army at Grodno, and himself took the road of Łomża. Deeming such an order wholly unnecessary, and the result of that approaching insanity which soon after entirely overset the mind of the veteran marshal, Benningsen took the bold step of disobeying it; and, in order to gain time for the artillery and equipages to defile in his rear, he resolved to hold fast in the position of Pułtusk, with all the troops which he had at his disposal. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Russians, to whom the fatigues and privations of a retreat, at a season when sixteen hours out of the twenty-four were involved in total darkness, and the roads, bad at all times, were in many places several feet deep of mud, had been the severest trial of discipline and courage. No sooner, however, was it known that

* "Napoleon," says Rapp, "no sooner arrived in sight of Okorin, than he reconnoitred the position of the Russians, and the plan which it was necessary to pass before arriving at the river. Covered with woods, intersected by marshes, it was almost as difficult to traverse as the fieldworks, which were bristling with Cossacks, were to carry on the opposite bank. The Emperor surveyed them long and with close attention; but as the thickets of wood in some places intercepted his view, he caused a ladder to be brought, and ascended to the roof of a cottage where he completed his observations. He then said, 'It will do—send an officer,' and when he arrived, dictated on the spot the minute directions for the movement of all the corps during the operation, which are preserved in Dumas, xvii. 137."—RAPP, 125

they were marching towards a chosen field of battle, than their hardships, and difficulties were all forgotten, and the troops which, from mid-day on the 25th, successively arrived at Pultusk, took up their ground in parade order, full of enthusiasm for the battle on the morrow. Before it was dark, sixty battalions and fifty-five squadrons, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, in all about forty thousand men, were here assembled; while the division of Doctoroff, with part of those of Sacken and Goltz, were opposed at GOLYMIN to Augereau's corps, one division of Davoust's, and one of Murat's cavalry. Three Russian divisions, viz. those of Essen, Aurepp, and Touchkoff, were at such a distance in the rear, both of Pultusk and Golymin, that they could not be expected to take any part in the actions which were approaching.

29. The object of Napoleon in these complicated operations was in the highest degree important; and the vigour of Benningsen and Prince Goltz, joined to the extreme shortness of the days and the horrible state of the roads, alone saved the Allies from a repetition of the disasters of Auerstadt and Jena. His right wing, under Lannes, was intended to cut Benningsen's army off from the great road through Pultusk; his centre, under Davoust, Augereau, Soult, and Murat, was destined to penetrate by Golymin and Makow to Ostrolenka, directly in the rear of that town, and two marches between Benningsen and the Russian frontier; while the left wing, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessieres, was to interpose between Lestocq and the Russian centre, and throw him back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven up to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blucher, to surrender. A more masterly project never was conceived; it was almost a repetition of the semicircular march of the Grand Army round Mack at Ulm; and the hesitation of Kamenskoi between an advance and a retrograde movement, served to offer every facility for the success of the enterprise. The celerity of the

Russian retreat, the sacrifice of seventy pieces of their heavy artillery, the dreadful state of the roads, which impeded the French advance, and the impervious intervening country, which separated their numerous corps from each other, alone defeated this profound combination, and prevented the arrival at Pultusk and Golymin, before the enemy, the corps which were there destined to fall upon their retreating columns, or bar the road to the frontiers of Russia.

30. The position of Pultusk is the only one in that country where the ground is so far cleared of wood as to permit of any considerable armies combating each other in a proper field of battle. An open and cultivated plain on this side of the river Narew, there stretches out to the south and east of that town, which lies on the banks of its meandering stream. A succession of thickets surround this open space in all directions, excepting that on which the town lies; and on the inside of them the ground rises to a semicircular ridge, from whence it gradually slopes down towards the town on one side, and the forest on the other; so that it is impossible, till this barrier is surmounted, to get a glimpse even of the buildings. There the Russians were drawn up in admirable order in two lines—their left resting on the town of Pultusk, their right on the wood of Moszyn, which skirted the little plain, the artillery in advance; but a cloud of Cossacks swarmed in front of the array, and prevented either the force or composition of the enemy from being seen by the French as they advanced to the attack. Sacken had the command of the left; Count Ostermann Tolstoy of the right; Barclay de Tolly, with twelve battalions and ten squadrons, occupied a copsewood in front of the right; while Bagavout, with twenty battalions and ten squadrons, was placed in front of the left, covering the town of Pultusk: Benningsen was stationed in the centre;—names destined to immortal celebrity in future wars, and which, even at this distant period, the historian can hardly enumerate without a feeling of exultation

and the thrilling interest of former days.

31. Lannes, with his own corps, and the division Gudin from that of Davoust—in all about thirty-five thousand men—resolved to force the enemy in this position, and for this purpose he, early on the morning of the 26th, advanced to the attack. The woods which skirted the little plain, occupied by the Russian light troops, in front of their position, were forced by the French voltigeurs after an obstinate resistance, and a battery which galled their advance, and which could not be withdrawn, was carried by assault. No sooner, however, had the French general, encouraged by this success, surmounted the crest of the ridge, and advanced into the open plain, than the cloud of Cossacks dispersed to the right and left, and exposed to view the Russian army drawn up in two lines, in admirable order, with a hundred and twenty guns disposed along its front. Astonished, but not panic-struck by so formidable an apparition, Lannes still continued to press forward, and as his divisions successively cleared the thickets, and advanced to the crest of the hill, they deployed into line. This operation, performed under the fire of all the Russian cannon, to which the French had as yet none of equal weight to oppose, was executed with admirable discipline, but attended with a very heavy loss, and the ground was already strewn with dead bodies when the line was so far formed as to enable a general charge to take place. It was attended, however, with very little success. The soil, cut up by the passage of so many horses and carriages, was in many places knee-deep of mud; heavy snow-showers at intervals obscured the heavens, and deprived the French gunners of the sight of the enemy; while the Russian batteries, in position and served with admirable skill, alike in light and darkness sent their fatal storm of grape and round-shot through the ranks of the assailants. Notwithstanding these obstacles, however, the French advanced with their wonted intrepidity to the attack, and gradually the arrival of their suc-

cessive batteries rendered the fire of cannon on the opposite sides more equal. Suchet, who commanded the first line, insensibly gained ground, especially on the French right, where the division of Bagavout was stationed; but Benningsen, seeing the danger, reinforced that gallant officer with fresh troops: a battalion of the French infantry was broken and cut to pieces by the Russian horse, and the rout in that quarter became so serious that Lannes was compelled to advance in person, with his reserve, to repair the disorder. By his efforts the forward movement of the Russians in that direction was arrested, and their victorious columns, charged in flank, while disordered by the rapidity of their advance, were forced to give ground, and resume their former position in front of Pultusk.

32. Meanwhile another of Suchet's columns, on the left of the French, had commenced a furious attack on the advanced post in the wood, on the right of the Russians, occupied by Barclay de Tolly. After a violent struggle the Russians were driven back; reinforced from the town, they again regained their ground, and drove the French out of the wood in disorder. Lannes, at the head of the 34th regiment, flew to the menaced point, and again in some degree restored the combat: but Barclay had regained his lost position and menaced the French extreme left. At this time, Gudin's division of Davoust's corps, coming up, began an unexpected attack on the Russian right; Ostermann Tolstoy upon this brought up the Russian reserve, and after a murderous conflict, which lasted till long after it was dark, a frightful storm separated the combatants. Neither party could boast of decisive success; but the Russians remained masters of the field of battle till midnight, when they crossed the Narew by the bridge of Pultusk, and resumed their retreat in the most orderly manner; while the French also retreated to such a distance that next day the Cossacks, who patrolled eight miles from the field of battle towards Warsaw, could discover no traces of the enemy. The losses were severe on both

sides : on that of the French they amounted to six thousand men ; on that of the Russians to nearly five thousand ; and the twelve guns which they lost in the morning were never regained.

33. On the same day on which this bloody battle took place at Pultusk, a serious conflict also occurred at Golymin, about thirty miles from the former field of battle. Davoust and Augereau, supported by a large party of Murat's cavalry, there attacked Prince Gallitzin, who, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, had taken post at the entrance of the town, to gain time for his artillery and carriages to defile through the forest in his rear. His force was successively augmented, however, in the course of the day, by the arrival of other troops from Sacken's and Doctoroff's corps, and before night-fall twenty-eight battalions and forty squadrons were assembled in line. Operations in that quarter had begun at daylight on the 24th, which in that inclement season was at eight in the morning ; the bridge of Kollosump, over the Ukra, was carried by a brilliant charge by Colonel Savary ; but that of Lochodzyn resisted all the efforts of the French, and it was only when it became no longer tenable, from the number who had crossed at Kollosump, that orders for the evacuation of the post were given. Continuing his march all the succeeding day, Augereau found himself, on the morning of the 26th, in presence of Prince Gallitzin, who was advantageously posted on the right of Golymin. As the French battalions and squadrons successively arrived on the ground, and deployed to the right and left, they were severely galled by the Russian artillery stationed in front of their positions ; but they bravely formed line, and advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the attack, though few of their guns could as yet be brought up to reply to the enemy. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the assault was impetuous, and, despite all their efforts, the French, after several hours' hard fighting, had not gained any ground from the enemy. But while

this severe conflict was going on in front, a division of Murat's cavalry, advancing on the road from Czarnovo,* was discerned driving before it a body of Cossacks who had been stationed in that village ; while a powerful mass of Davoust's infantry, which had broken up that morning from Stretzeggoczin, joined the horse in front of Czarnovo, and their united mass, above fifteen thousand strong, bore down upon the troops of Gallitzin, already wearied by a severe combat of several hours' duration.

34. This great addition to the attacking force must have proved altogether fatal to the Russian troops, had they not shortly after received considerable reinforcements from the corps of Doctoroff and Touchkoff, which in some degree restored the equality of the combat. Davoust, with the divisions Morand and Friant, so well known from their heroic conduct on the plateau of Auerstadt, charged vehemently through the woods which skirted the open space in front of Golymin ; throwing off their haversacks, the Russian infantry met them with the bayonet ; but after repulsing the French advance, they were themselves arrested by the murderous fire of the tirailleurs in the wood. Nearly encircled, however, by hourly increasing enemies, Prince Gallitzin withdrew his troops towards evening into the village, but there maintained himself with heroic constancy till nightfall, vigorously repulsing the repeated attacks of the conquerors of Jena and Auerstadt. Davoust, after occupying all the woods around the town, detached a brigade of horse to cut off the communication by the great road with Pultusk ; and they succeeded in clearing the causeway of the Cossacks and light horse who were posted on it. But the French dragoons, following up their success, were assailed by so murderous a fire from the Russian voltigeurs, standing up to the middle in the marshes on either side of the road, that half their number were slain ; General Rapp,

* A village on the road from Lochoczyn to Golymin, about a league distant from the latter town.

while bravely heading the column, had his left arm broken, and the discomfited remnant sought refuge behind the ranks of their infantry. When night closed on this scene of blood, neither party had gained any decisive advantage; for if the French had taken twenty-six pieces of cannon, and a large train of carriages which had stuck fast in the mud, the Russians still held the town of Golymin, and had inflicted upon them a loss of above four thousand men,* while they had not to lament the destruction of more than half the number, in consequence chiefly of their great superiority in artillery to their assailants. As the order for retreat still held good, Prince Gallitzin, at midnight, resumed his march for Ostrolenka.

35. Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance thus experienced by his lieutenants on both the roads on which his corps were advancing, and the unsatisfactory issue of the combats in which they had been engaged, Napoleon was still not without hopes of effecting the grand object of his designs—the isolating and surrounding the enemy's centre or left wing. On the extreme left of the French, Bernadotte and Ney had succeeded, after several severe actions, particularly one at Soldau, which was taken and retaken several times, and where the Prussians behaved with the most heroic resolution, in interposing between Lestocq and the Russian forces on the Ukra, and throwing the Prussian general back towards Königsberg. If Soult could have effected the movement on Makow which was prescribed to him, he would have been directly in the rear of the troops who had combated at Pultusk and Golymin, who must have been reduced to the necessity of laying down their arms, or cutting their way through against great odds. But the frightful state of the roads, which in many places were three

feet deep of mud, and the rudeness of the season, which alternately deluged the marching columns with drenching rain, driving sleet, and melting snow, rendered it totally impossible for that enterprising officer to effect the forced marches necessary to outstrip and get into the rear of the enemy; and the Russians, retiring to Ostrolenka and Hohenstein, still found the line of their retreat open. On the 28th, Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Golymin; but having there received certain intelligence that the Russians must arrive at Makow before Soult could possibly get thither, he saw the object of the campaign was frustrated, and resolved to put his men into winter quarters. On that day, accordingly, he issued orders to stop the advance of the troops at all points; they were put into cantonments between the Narew and the Ukra, and the Emperor himself returned with the Guards to Warsaw.

36. On the side of the Russians, repose had become nearly as necessary; the weather was as unfavourable to them as to the French. Their infantry, equally with the enemy's, had shivered up to the knees in mud at Pultusk; their cavalry, equally with his, sank in the marshes of Golymin: the breaking up of the roads was more fatal to them than their opponents, as the guns or chariots, which were abandoned, necessarily fell into hostile hands; and experience had already begun to evince, what more extended observation has since abundantly confirmed, that exposure to an inclement season was more fatal to the troops of the north than those of the south of Europe. In these circumstances it was with the most lively satisfaction that they perceived that Napoleon was disposed to discontinue the contest during the remainder of the rigorous season; and their troops, retiring from the theatre of this bloody strife, were put into cantonments on the left bank of the Narew, after having evacuated the town and burned the bridge of Ostrolenka.

37. This desperate struggle in the forests of Poland in the depth of winter made the most lively impression in

* The 47th Bulletin admits a loss of 800 killed and 2000 wounded on the part of the French at Golymin and Pultusk; and as their usual practice was to allow only a loss of a third to a fourth of its real amount, this would seem to imply that they lost on these occasions at least 10,000 or 12,000 men.—See 47th Bulletin in *Camp. en Prusse*, iii. 232

Europe. Independent of the interest excited by the extraordinary spectacle of two vast armies, numbering between them a hundred and fifty thousand combatants, prolonging their hostility in the most inclement season, and engaging in desperate conflicts amidst storms of snow, and when the soldiers on both sides were, often sunk up to the middle in morasses, bivouacking for sixteen hours together, without covering on the cold damp ground, or plunging fearlessly into streams swollen by the rains and charged with the ice of a Polish winter, there was something singularly calculated to awaken the passions in the result of this fearful contest. Both parties loudly claimed the victory : Te Deum was sung at St Petersburg ; the cannon of the Invalides roared at Paris ; and Benning-sen, imitating, in his official despatches the exaggerated accounts of the French bulletins, asserted a complete victory at Pultusk, under circumstances where a more faithful chronicler would only have laid claim to the honour of a divided combat. The French indignantly repelled the aspersion on their arms, and pointed with decisive effect to the cantonments of their troops, for evidence that the general result of the struggle had been favourable to their arms. But though there was no denying this, when the Russian troops, instead of having their advanced posts between the Ukra, and the Vistula, had now retired behind the Narew at Ostrolenka, still enough was apparent on the face of the campaign to excite the most vivid hopes on the one side, and serious apprehensions on the other, throughout Europe. It was not to win merely eighty miles of forest, interspersed with the wretched hamlets or squalid towns of Poland, that the Emperor had left Warsaw at the dead of winter, and put so vast an army in motion over a line thirty leagues in length. There was no claiming of the victory on both sides at Austerlitz or Jena ; the divided trophies of the late engagements indicated a struggle of a very different character from those which had preceded them ; it was evident that the torrent of

French conquest, if not permanently stemmed, had at least been checked. The interest excited by these events, accordingly, was intense, over all the Continent, and still more so in England ; and hopes began to be entertained that the obstinate valour of the north would at length arrest the calamities which had so long desolated Europe. Happy would it have been if the cabinets of Vienna and St James's had improved on these dispositions, and taken advantage of the pause in the career of universal conquest, to render effectual aid to the powers who now threw the last die for the independence of Europe on the shores of the Vistula. But recent calamities had prostrated the strength of the Austrian monarchy, and shaken the nerves of its rulers ; and the administration of affairs in Great Britain had fallen into the hands of a party whose minds had been so perverted by long and impassioned opposition to Mr Pitt's policy, that they could not see that the time had now arrived when it was loudly called for, and might be followed out with a certainty of success. Hence the opportunity of decisive interposition was allowed to pass over without anything being done by either power ; and to Austria was bequeathed, in consequence, the overthrow of Wagram—to England, the costly and bloody efforts of the Peninsular campaigns.

38. The French army, which was now put into winter quarters, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, including forty thousand horse : so wonderfully had the levies in France and the allied states compensated the consumption of human life during the bloody battles and wasteful marches which had occurred since they arrived on the banks of the Saale. The cantonments, from the extreme right to left extended over a space of fifty leagues, forming beyond the Vistula the chord of the arc which that river describes in its course from Warsaw to Dantzic. The left wing, under Bernadotte, was, from its position, most exposed to the incursions of the enemy ; but no apprehensions were entertained of its being disquieted, as that mar-

shal, whose rallying point was Osterode, could speedily receive succour, in case of need, from Marshal Ney, who lay next to his right, and would thus have fifty-five thousand men under his command. The centre and right wing, nearly a hundred thousand strong, were almost detached from the left wing, and lay more closely together on either side of Warsaw. To provide subsistence for so great a multitude amidst the forests and marshes of Poland was no easy matter; for its fertile plains, though the granary of Western Europe, raise their admirable wheat crops only for exportation, and present, in proportion to their extent of level surface, fewer resources for an army than any country in Europe. But it was in such subordinate though necessary cares, that the admirable organisation and indefatigable activity of the Emperor shone most conspicuous.

39. Innumerable orders, which for a long time back had periodically issued from headquarters, had brought all the resources of Germany to the supply of the army in Poland. Convoys from all quarters were incessantly converging towards the Vistula, and supplies of every sort, not only for the maintenance of the soldiers, but for the sick and wounded, as well as the munitions of war, transported in many thousand carriages, were brought up from the Rhine and the Danube in abundance. So great was the activity in the rear of the army, that the roads through Prussia bore rather the appearance of a country enriched by the extended commerce of a profound peace, than of a district lately ravaged by the scourge of war. Great hospitals were established at Thorn, Posen, and Warsaw; thirty thousand tents, taken from the Prussians, were cut down into bandages for the use of the wounded; immense magazines formed all along the Vistula, and formidable intrenchments erected to protect the *états-major* of Praga, Thorn, and Modlin on the Vistula, and Sierock on the Narew. Though the blockade of Dantzic was not yet formally commenced, yet it was necessary to neutralise the advan-

tages which the enemy derived from the possession of so important a fortress on the right of their line; and for this purpose a French division, united to the contingent of Baden and the Polish levies, was formed into the tenth corps, and placed under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. It soon amounted to twenty-seven thousand men, and began to observe the fortresses of Dantzic and Colberg; while Napoleon evinced his sense of the dubious nature of the struggle in which he was engaged, by sending for his experienced lieutenant, Massena, from the scene of his easy triumphs amidst the sunny hills of Calabria, to a sterner conflict on the frozen fields of Poland.

40. The repose of the army at Warsaw was no period of rest to the Emperor. Great care was taken to keep alive the spirits of the Poles, and conceal from them the dubious issue of the late conflict; and for this purpose it was announced that almost all the prisoners taken from the Russians had either been marched off for France, or already entered the ranks of the Grand Army; while the eighty pieces of cannon, which they had been forced to leave behind them in their retreat, were ostentatiously placed before the palace of the republic. Orders were at the same time sent to Jerome to press the siege of the fortresses in Silesia which still remained in the hands of the Prussians. The pusillanimous and unaccountable surrenders of Stettin and Cüstrin have already been mentioned (*Ante*, Chap. XLIII. § 71); and in the consequences which immediately flowed from those disgraceful derelictions of duty, was soon made manifest of what vast importance it is that all officers, even in commands apparently not very considerable, should, under all circumstances, adhere to the simple line of duty, instead of entering into capitulations from the supposed pressure of political considerations. The transport of artillery and a siege equipage from the Rhine or the Elbe to the Oder, would have taken a very long period, and prolonged the reduction of the interior line of the Prussian fortresses; but the surrender of Cüstrin to the sum-

mons of a regiment of infantry and two pieces of cannon, enabled Vandamme speedily to surround Glogau with a formidable battering-train, which, before the first parallel was completed, induced its feeble governor to lower his colours.

41. From the vast military stores captured in that town, a battering-train for the reduction of Breslau was immediately obtained, and forwarded along the Oder with such rapidity that, on the 15th December, the trenches before that place, the capital of Silesia, *à cheval* on the Oder, and a fortress of the first order, were opened, and a heavy bombardment kept up upon the town. The defence, however, was somewhat more creditable to the Prussian character, and proved of what inestimable importance it would have been to the monarchy had the French arms been in like manner delayed before the walls of the other fortresses. Twice during its continuance Prince Anhalt, who with a few battalions and a levy of peasants still maintained himself in Upper Silesia, approached the besiegers' lines, and endeavoured to throw succours into the town; but on the first occasion his efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the French and Bavarians, who formed the covering force; and in the last attack he was totally defeated, with the loss of two thousand men. Soon after, a severe frost deprived Breslau of the protection of the wet ditches, and the governor, despairing of being relieved, and seeing the besiegers' succours rapidly and hourly augmenting by the arrival of military stores from Glogau, surrendered with the garrison of six thousand men; the private men being prisoners of war, the officers dismissed on their parole not to serve against France till exchanged. By this acquisition, three hundred pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of all sorts, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

42. This great achievement* made the reduction of the other fortresses in Silesia a matter of comparative ease, by furnishing, close at hand, all the resources necessary for their reduction.

They were almost forgotten, accordingly, and fell without being observed into the hands of the invaders. Brieg surrendered almost as soon as it was invested. Kosel was taken in silence, after a siege of a few days. Napoleon, delighted with these acquisitions, which entirely secured the right flank of his army, and were of the greater importance from the menacing aspect of the force which Austria was collecting on the Bohemian frontier, named Jerome Buonaparte governor of the province of Silesia; and after having drawn all the resources out of its rich cities and powerful fortresses which they were capable of yielding, for the prosecution of operations against Dantzic and the strongholds on the Lower Vistula, despatched Vandamme, with twelve thousand men, to besiege Schweidnitz, Neisse, and Glatz, the only remaining towns in the upper province which still hoisted the Prussian colours.* The reduction of these strong fortresses, which had been the object of several campaigns to the Great Frederick, did not take place for some months afterwards, and was hardly noticed by Europe amidst the whirl of more important events on the Lower Vistula.

43. The task of reducing the fortified towns on the Lower Oder, and between that and the Vistula, was allotted to Marshal Mortier. He took a position, in the middle of December, at Anclam; and, upon his approach, the Swedish forces retired to Stralsund. While in this station he drew his posts round

* As fast as these fortresses in Silesia fell into the hands of Napoleon, they were by his orders totally dismantled, and their fortifications razed to the ground. Their inhabitants were seized with consternation when they beheld these rigorous orders carried into full execution, and anticipated a total separation from the Prussian monarchy, to which they were much attached, from so complete a destruction of the barrier raised with so much care, both against Austria and Russia. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the determination of the French Emperor to reduce Prussia to the rank of a third-rate power; but the policy, with reference to the future interests both of France and Germany, of destroying the chief barrier of both against Muscovite aggression, was extremely doubtful.—MONTVERAN, *Hist. Const. de la Situation de l'Angleterre en 1816*, 147; and DUMAR, xvii. 99, 100.

Colberg, and several skirmishes occurred with the Prussian garrison of that place. Matters remained in that situation till the end of January, when the blockade of that fortress was more closely established, which continued till the conclusion of the campaign. More important operations took place at Dantzic and Graudenz, the siege of both which places was much facilitated by the great military stores taken in the towns of Silesia. They were brought down the Oder to near its mouth, and thence transported by land to the neighbourhood of these fortresses; and with such vigour did Marshal Lefebvre push forward the operations, especially against the former of these towns, that before the end of January considerable progress had been made in the works.

44. On the return of Napoleon to Warsaw, he received detailed accounts of the operations of Marmont in Illyria since the commencement of hostilities in October. For a long period, and during the time when it was understood that a negotiation was on foot between the two governments, a sort of tacit suspension of arms existed between the French marshal and the Russians; but when it was distinctly ascertained that hostilities had been resumed, the flames of war extended to the smiling shores of the Adriatic sea. The Muscovites, strengthened by the arrival of Admiral Siniavin with a powerful squadron, resumed the offensive, and compelled Marmont to abandon the point of Ostro, and fall back on Old Ragusa, where he fortified himself in a strong position in front of the town, and resolved to await the arrival of his flotilla and reinforcements. Encouraged by this retrograde movement, the Russians, six thousand strong, supported by some thousand Montenegrins, advanced to the attack; but they were anticipated by the French general; and after a sharp action, the new levies were dispersed, and the regular troops compelled to take refuge within the walls of Castel Nuovo, after sustaining a loss of six hundred men.

45. At the same period, a courier from Constantinople brought intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia. This was an

event of the very highest importance, promising, as it did, to effect so powerful a diversion in the Russian forces; and Napoleon therefore resolved to improve to the uttermost so auspicious a change by contracting the closest alliance with the Turkish government. Though General Michelson had early gained considerable advantage, and was advancing towards Belgrade, which had fallen into the hands of Czerny George and the insurgent Servians, yet the disasters of the Prussian war had opened the eyes of the cabinet of St Petersburg, when it was too late, to the imprudence of which they had been guilty in engaging at once in two such formidable contests. Accordingly thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons (about twenty-five thousand men) were ordered to advance with all possible rapidity from the plains of Moldavia to the banks of the Bug. Anxious to derive every possible advantage from this great diversion, Napoleon sent instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople, General Sebastiani, to use the greatest efforts to induce the Turkish government to enter vigorously into the contest; while to Marshal Marmont he gave orders to send French officers into all the Ottoman provinces, with orders to do their utmost everywhere to rouse the Mussulman population against the Muscovite invaders.* At the same time,

* These instructions to Marmont are well worthy of attention, both as evincing the views which Napoleon already entertained, in regard to the Ottoman empire, and setting in a clear light his subsequent perfidious conduct in abandoning that power to the ambition of Russia, by the treaty of Tilsit. "A courier, just arrived from Constantinople, has announced that war against Russia is declared: great enthusiasm prevails at that capital; twenty regiments of Janissaries have just set out from its walls for the Danube, and twenty more will speedily follow from Asia. Sixty thousand men are at Hirsova; Pasha Oglou has assembled twenty thousand at Widdin. Send immediately five engineer officers and as many of artillery to Constantinople—and the pashas in every possible way with counsel, provision, and ammunition. It is not unlikely that I may send you with 25,000 men to Widdin, and there you will enter into connection with the Grand Army, of which you would form the extreme right. Twenty-five thousand French, supported by sixty thousand Turks, would soon force the Russians not to leave 30,000

the relations of France with Persia and Turkey were considered of such paramount importance, that they were made the subject of a special message to the senate, which declared—"The Emperor of Persia, tormented, as Poland was for sixty years, by the intrigues of Russia, is animated by the same sentiments as the Turks. He has resolved to march upon the Caucasus to defend his dominions. Who could number the duration of the wars, the number of campaigns, which would be required one day to repair the calamities consequent upon the Russians obtaining possession of Constantinople? Were the tiara of the Greek faith raised again, and extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should see in our own days our provinces attacked by clouds of barbarians; and if, in that tardy struggle, civilised Europe should happen to fall, our culpable indifference would justly excite the reproaches of posterity, and would become a subject of opprobrium in history." Memorable words! when the

men on the Danube, as they have done, but to forward twice that number to defend their own frontiers in that quarter. Send twenty or thirty officers to the pashas, if they demand so many; but the period for the employment of troops is not yet arrived. The Turks may be relied on as faithful allies, because they hate the Russians, therefore be not sparing in your supplies of all sorts to them. An ambassador from Persia as well as Turkey has just been at Warsaw; the court of Isfahan also, as the sworn enemy of Russia, may be relied on as our friend. Our relations with the Eastern powers are now such, that we may look forward *shortly to transporting 40,000 men to the gates of Ispahan, and from thence to the shores of the Indus*:—projects which formerly appeared chimerical are now no longer so, when I receive ambassadors from the Sultan, testifying a serious alarm at the progress of Russia, and the strongest confidence in the protection of France. In these circumstances, send your officers over all the Turkish provinces; they will make known my disposition towards the Grand Seigneur, and that will exalt the general enthusiasm, while at the same time you will be able to acquire for me information which may prove in the highest degree useful. In a word, general, *I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and wish to do it all the good in my power*; let that principle regulate all your actions. I consider the Turkish declaration of war against Russia as the most fortunate circumstance that could possibly have occurred in my present situation."—JOMINI, ii. 347-349.

events which subsequent times have brought about, and the objects of political apprehension in our own time, are taken into view.

46. The residence of the French generals and officers at Warsaw appeared a perfect Elysium after the fatigues and privations to which they had been exposed. The society of that capital is well known to be one of the most agreeable in Europe, from the extraordinary talents and accomplishments of the ladies of rank of which it is composed. No person can have mingled in those delightful circles without perceiving that the Polish women are the most fascinating in Europe. Endowed by nature with an ardent temperament, an affectionate disposition, and an exalted imagination, they have, at the same time, all the grace and coquetry which constitute the charm of Parisian beauty, and yet retain, at least in rural situations, the domestic virtues and simplicity of manner which nurse in infancy the national character of the English people.* Speaking almost every language in Europe with incomparable facility—conversing alternately in French, German, Italian, Russian, and sometimes English, with the accent of a native—versed in the literature and history of all these countries, and yet preferring to them all the ruins of their own wasted land—enthusiastic in their patriotism, and yet extended in their views—with hearts formed in the simplicity of domestic life, minds cultivated during the solitude of rural habitation, and manners polished by the elegance of metropolitan society—they approach as near as imagination can figure to that imaginary standard of perfection which constitutes the object of chivalrous devotion. Melancholy reflection! that the greatest charms of society should be co-existent with the most vicious and destructive national institutions; and that its principal excellencies should have been called forth

* This observation applies to the character of the female part of the Polish rural nobility. Those who have made Warsaw or other great capitals their habitual residence, have too often contracted the vices incident to a polished and corrupted society.

by the miserable and distracted customs which had brought the Polish nation to a premature dissolution ! *

47. If such are the attractions of Warsaw, even to a passing traveller, it may easily be believed what it appeared to the French officers after the rude encounters of Pultusk and Golymin. From all parts of Prussian Poland the great families flocked to her capital, and soon formed a society, in the midst of the horrors of war, which rivalled any in Europe in splendour and attractions. Abandoning themselves without reserve to the delightful prospects which seemed to be opening on their country, the Polish women saw in the French officers the deliverers of Sarmatia, the invincible allies who were to restore their long-lost country, to renew the glories of the Piasts and the Jagellons. A universal enthusiasm prevailed ; fêtes and theatrical amusements succeeded each other in diversified magnificence : and, following the general bent, even the intellectual breast of Napoleon caught the flame, and did homage to charms which, attractive at all times, were, in that moment of exultation, irresistible. A transient but very vehement amour entranced his senses without touching his heart. But these fairy scenes were of short duration ; his pleasures never for a moment interfered with his duties ; he was indefatigable in prepara-

* "It may with truth be said," says Savary, "that the Polish women are fitted to inspire jealousy to the most accomplished ladies in the civilised world : they unite, for the most part, to the manners of the great world a depth of information which is rarely to be seen even among the French women, and which is infinitely superior to what is usually to be met with in the most accomplished urban society. It would appear that, being obliged to pass more than half the year on their estates, they devote themselves to reading and mental cultivation ; and hence in the capitals, where they go to pass the winter, they so frequently appear superior to all their rivals."—SAVARY, iii. 17.

"I did not require to learn," says Duroc, "that the Polish women are the most agreeable in Europe ; but it was not till I arrived in Poland that I became acquainted with the full extent of their charms. The attractions of Warsaw are indescribable. It contains several agreeable circles—one charming"—*Letter of Duroc to Junot*, Dec. 17, 1806 ; D'ABRANTES, ix. 350.

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tions during the short interval of repose ; and war, in its most terrible form, was destined soon to arouse all from this transient period of enchantment.

48. When the French were put into cantonments on the right bank of the Vistula, the situation of the Russian army was such, that it could hardly be said to have a commander. Kamen-skoi retired far to the rear to Grodno, where he went out in his shirt to the streets, and gave unequivocal proofs of mental derangement. Buxhowden commanded his own corps, while Benningsen did the same with his ; and the mutual jealousy of these officers for a time prevented the one from obeying the commands of the other ; but at length the appointment of the latter to the supreme command restored unity to the operations of the army. Fortunately for the Russians, the suspension of hostilities, and the interval of fifteen leagues which separated their cantonments from those of the enemy, prevented them from suffering under this division of council ; and when Benningsen assumed the command, he resolved to carry out the design of Buxhowden, and, instead of allowing the army to repose in its cantonments, commence an offensive movement with the whole army against the French left under Bernadotte and Ney, which had extended itself so far as to menace Königsberg, the second city of the Prussian dominions, and the capital of the old part of the monarchy. Many reasons recommended this course. It was evident that Napoleon would turn to the best account the breathing-time afforded him in winter quarters. His army would be recruited and strengthened, his cavalry remounted, his magazines replenished on the Vistula : the fortresses at its mouth were already observed ; and when the mild season returned in May, there was every reason to fear that he would be as solidly established on the line of that river by the capture of Colberg, Graudenz, and Dantzic, as he was now on the Oder and in Silesia by the reduction of the fortresses of that province. In addition to this, the situation of

Bernadotte and Ney, who had extended their cantonments beyond what was either necessary or prudent, and in such a way as almost to indicate an offensive intention, suggested a hope, that by a rapid movement their corps might be isolated and destroyed before the bulk of the Grand Army, grouped round Warsaw, could advance to their relief.

49. Impressed with these ideas, the Russian army, seventy-five thousand strong, with five hundred pieces of cannon, was everywhere put in motion, crossed the Narew, and marched upon the Bobr. The corps of Benningsen and Buxhowden, so long separated, effected a junction at Bialla on the 14th January: and on the 15th headquarters were established at that place. Essen was left with two divisions on the Narew to mask this forward movement; and there he was soon after joined by the divisions from Moldavia. This great assemblage of force was the more formidable, that it was entirely unknown to the enemy, being completely concealed by the great forest of Johansberg and the numerous chain of lakes, intersected by woods, which lie between Arys in East Prussia, and the banks of the Vistula. Rapidly advancing, after its columns were united, the Russian army moved forward between the lakes of Spirding and Löwentin; and on the 17th headquarters were established at Rhein in East Prussia. Meanwhile the cavalry, consisting of forty squadrons under Prince Gallitzin, pushed on for the Alle, on the roads leading to Königsberg and Bischofstein; and on the other side of that river surprised and defeated the light horse of Marshal Ney, which had advanced in pursuit of Lestocq to Schippenbeil, within ten leagues of Königsberg. Thus on the 20th January, the Russian army, perfectly concentrated, and in admirable order, was grouped in the middle of East Prussia, and was within six marches of the Lower Vistula, where it might either raise the blockade of Dantzic and Graudenz, or fall with a vast superiority of force upon Bernadotte or Ney, still slumbering in undisturbed security in their cantonments.

50. Had Benningsen been aware of the scattered condition of Marshal Ney's corps, he might, by the admission of the French military historians, have destroyed the whole before it could by possibility have been united and put in a condition to give battle. As it was, great numbers of his detached parties were made prisoners, and the conduct of the marshal in first, by his senseless incursions attracting the enemy, and then, by his undue dispersion, exposing himself to their attacks, drew down a severe reproof from Napoleon.* But a glance at the map must be sufficient to show that great and decisive success was at this moment within the grasp of the Russian general; and that if, instead of making a long circuit to reach the head of Marshal Ney's corps, scattered over a space of eighteen leagues, and drive it back upon its line of retreat towards Warsaw, he had boldly thrown himself, three days earlier, upon its flank, he would have separated it from the centre of the army, and driven both it and Bernadotte to a disastrous retreat into the angle formed by the Vistula and the Baltic Sea. The movement of Benningsen to the head of Ney's column, however, having prevented this, he turned his attention to Bernadotte, who had received intelligence of his approach, and had rapidly concentrated his corps from the neighbourhood of Elbing at Mohrunen. Meanwhile the Russian army continued its advance; on the 22d, headquarters were established at Bischofstein, and the Cossacks pushed on to Heilsberg; and on the same day, a severe action took place at Seeberg, from whence the French cavalry, under Colbert, were driven in the direction of Allenstein. Ney, now seriously alarmed, despatched couriers in all directions to collect

* He severely blamed the marshal "for having, by an inconsiderate movement, attracted the enemy, and even endeavoured to engage Marshal Soult, who declined to follow him, in the same expedition. You will immediately resume the winter quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair, the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—DUMAS, xvii. 803.

his scattered divisions, and on the 23d resumed his headquarters at Neidenburg, extending his troops by the left towards Gilgenburg to lend assistance to Bernadotte.

51. Bernadotte, informed by despatches from all quarters of this formidable irruption into his cantonments, was rapidly concentrating his troops at Mohrungen, when Benningsen, with greatly superior forces, fell upon him. The Russian troops, fifteen thousand strong, were posted in rugged ground at Georgenthal, two miles in front of that town. General Makow, with the advanced guard of the Russians, there engaged with the French before sufficient forces had come up; and after a sanguinary conflict, in which the eagle of the 9th French regiment was taken and retaken several times, and finally remained in the hands of the Russians, suffered the penalty of his rashness by being repulsed towards Liebstadt. In this bloody affair both parties had to lament the loss of two thousand men, and the Russian general, Aurepp, was killed. It was the more to be regretted that this premature attack had been made, as Lestocq was at the moment at Wormditt, or five leagues distant on the right; Gallitzin, with five thousand horse, at Reichau, at the same distance on the left; Ostermann Tolstoy at Heiligenbeil, and Sacken at Elditten, all in the immediate neighbourhood; so that, by a concentration of these forces, the whole French corps might with ease have been made prisoners. As it was, Prince Michael Dolgorouki, who had been detached by Prince Gallitzin towards Mohrungen in consequence of the violent fire heard in that direction, fell upon the rear of Bernadotte's corps, penetrated into the town, made several hundred prisoners, and captured all his private baggage, among which, to his eternal disgrace, were found, as in the den of a common freebooter, silver plate, bearing the arms of almost all the states in Germany, ten thousand ducats recently levied for his own private use, and two thousand five hundred for that of his staff, from the town of Elling.

52. The narrow escape, both of Ney

and Bernadotte, from total destruction in consequence of this bold and vigorous enterprise, excited the utmost alarm in the French army. Bernadotte fell back rapidly to Osterode, where he entered into communication with Ney, and from thence towards Thorn on the Lower Vistula, by Straasburg, severely pressed by the Cossacks, who almost totally destroyed his rear-guard, and made many thousand prisoners. Headquarters were advanced by Benningsen on the 26th to Mohrungen, where they remained, from the exhaustion of the troops, till the 2d February. Taking advantage of the aid thus obtained, the brave and active Lestocq succeeded in raising the blockade of Graudenz, the key to the Lower Vistula; and throwing in supplies of ammunition and provisions, which enabled that important fortress to hold out through all the succeeding campaign. The whole French left wing raised their cantonments, and fell back in haste, and with great loss, towards the Lower Vistula; and the alarm, spread as far as Warsaw, gave the most effectual refutation to the false accounts published in the bulletins of the successive defeats of the Russian army.* At the same time intelligence was received of the arrival of the Russian divisions from the army of Moldavia, on the Narew and the Bug, where they effected their junction with General Essen, and raised the enemy's force in that quarter to thirty thousand men.

53. These untoward events made a great impression on the mind of Napoleon, who had never contemplated a renewal of active operations till his reinforcements from the Rhine had

* "In Bernadotte's baggage, taken at Mohrungen, were found curious proofs of the arrangement for stage effect and false intelligence, made by all the officers of the French army, from the Emperor downwards. An order was there found, giving the most minute directions for the reception of Napoleon at Warsaw, with all the stations and crossings where 'Vive l'Empereur!' was to be shouted; and official despatches of all the actions of the campaign in which Bernadotte had been engaged, for publication, and private despatches giving the facts as they really occurred, for the Emperor's secret perusal. These papers are still in the possession of General Benningsen's family."—*WILSON'S Polish Campaign*, 60—*Note*.

arrived at headquarters, and the return of the mild season had enabled him to resume hostilities without the excessive hardships to which his troops during the later stages of the campaign had been exposed. The cold was still extreme: the Vistula and the Narew were charged with enormous blocks of floating ice, which daily threatened to break down the bridges over them; the earth was covered with snow; the heavens exhibited that serene deep-blue aspect which indicated a long continuance of intense frost; magazines there were none in the country which was likely to become the theatre of war; and though the highly cultivated territory of Old Prussia offered as great resources as any of its extent in Europe* for an invading army, yet it was impossible to expect that it could maintain, for any length of time, the enormous masses who would speedily be assembled on its surface. But there was no time for deliberation; matters were pressing; the right of Benningsen was now approaching the Lower Vistula, and in a few days the Russian army would raise the blockade of Dantzic, and, resting on that fortress as a base from whence inexhaustible supplies of all sorts might be obtained by sea, would bid defiance to all his efforts.

54. It was in such a crisis that the extraordinary activity and indefatigable perseverance of Napoleon appeared most conspicuous. Instantly perceiving that active operations must be resumed even at that rude season, he

* The territory of Old Prussia is not naturally more fertile than the adjoining provinces of Poland, but nevertheless it is as rich and cultivated as they are sterile and neglected. On one side of the frontier line are to be seen numerous and opulent cities, smiling well-cultivated fields, comfortable hamlets, and an industrious and contented population; on the other, endless forests of pine, wretched villages, a deplorable agriculture; squalid huts beside a few gorgeous palaces. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the vicious and ruinous political institutions which have prevailed amidst the mingled anarchy, tyranny, and democracy of Old Poland. This difference, so well known to travellers, repeatedly attracted the attention even of the military followers of the French army.—*Snow, Camp. de Russie*, i. 127; and *Jomini*, ii. 354.

despatched orders from the 23d to the 27th January, for the assembling of all his army; and as, with the exception of Bernadotte and Ney, they all lay in cantonments not extending over more than twenty leagues, this was neither a tedious nor a difficult operation. Bernadotte was enjoined to assemble around Osterode, Lefebvre at Thorn to observe Dantzic, Soult at Prasnycz, Davoust at Pultusk, Ney at Neidenburg, Bessières and Murat at Warsaw with the Imperial Guard and cavalry. Though breathing only victory in his proclamations to his troops, he was in reality making every preparation for defeat; Lefebvre received orders to collect all the forces at his disposal, without any regard to the blockade at Dantzic, in order to secure the fortress and bridge of Thorn, the direct line of retreat across the Vistula from the theatre of war, while Lannes was disposed as a reserve on the right, and Augereau on the left bank of that river. On the 27th, orders were given to all the columns to march, and early on the morning of the 30th the Emperor set out from Warsaw.† Soult was directed to march by Willenberg and Passenheim on Allenstein; thither also Ney was to move, by Hohenstein, and Davoust from Pultusk by Ortelburg; Augereau, who had been brought over from the left to the right bank of the Vistula, was to advance to it from Plonsk, by Neidenburg and Hohenstein; Murat was to hasten up with his cavalry, so as to form the advanced guard of Soult; while Bessières, with the Imperial Guard, was to follow in reserve. On the left, Bernadotte was to retreat in the direction of Thorn; while on the extreme right, the corps of Lannes (under the command of Savary) was to take post at Sierock, between the Bug and the Narew, to

† The orders given by Napoleon to all the marshals and chief officers of his army on this trying emergency, may be considered as a masterpiece of military skill and foresight, and deserve especial attention from all who desire to make themselves acquainted either with his extraordinary activity and resources, or with the multiplied cares which, on such an occasion, devolve on a commander-in-chief.—See the whole in *Dumas*, xvii. 330-374; *Pièces Just.*

observe Essen; and Oudinot with his grenadiers was to push on through Warsaw to Ostroleka, where he would be in a position either to assist Savary or the Grand Army. The object of Napoleon in these movements was, that while, by the retreat of his left wing under Bernadotte, he drew on the Russians towards Thorn and the Lower Vistula, he should, by rapidly throwing forward his own right, consisting of four corps and the reserve cavalry, to Allenstein, turn their left flank, and cut off their retreat to the Niemen.

55. Following thus his usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in the rear of the enemy during his advance, Napoleon moved towards Allenstein, where he arrived on the 2d February with the corps of Soult, Angereau, and Ney; while Davoust was at a short distance still further on his right, at Wartenburg. Already he had interposed between Benningsen and Russia; the only line of retreat which lay open to that officer was to the north-east, in the direction of Königsberg and the Niemen. The Russian army was stationed between the Passarge and the Alle, from Guttstadt and Heilsberg on the latter river, to Liebstadt and Wormditt in the neighbourhood of the former; but these movements of Napoleon induced Benningsen to concentrate his divisions and move them to the eastward, in the direction of Spiegelberg and the Alle, on the 1st and 2d of February, in order to preserve his communications with the Russian frontier. The whole troops assembled in order of battle on the following day, in a strong position on the heights of Jonkowo, covering the great road from Allenstein to Liebstadt, its left resting on the village of Mondtken. Napoleon instantly directed Davoust to march from Wartenburg to Spiegelberg with his whole corps, in order to get round the left flank of the Russians; while Soult received orders to force the bridge of Bergfried, over the Alle, in rear of their left flank, by which he would be enabled to debouch upon their line of retreat and communications; and this attack was of such importance, that Davoust

was to support him with two of his divisions.

56. It would have been all over with the Russians if these orders had been carried into full execution without their being aware how completely they were in course of being encircled. But by a fortunate accident the despatches to Bernadotte, announcing the design, and enjoining him to draw Benningsen on towards the Lower Vistula, had previously fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, and made that general aware of his danger. He immediately despatched orders to the officer at Bergfried to hold the bridge to the last extremity, which was so gallantly obeyed, that though Soult assailed it with all his corps, and it was taken and retaken several times, yet it finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The situation of Benningsen, however, was still very critical; he was compelled to fall back to avoid being turned in presence of very superior forces, and by his lateral movement from Mohrunen he had become entirely separated from Lestocq, who was in the most imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed by the superior forces of Bernadotte. Fortunately, however, from the despatches being intercepted, that marshal remained entirely ignorant, both of what was expected from him, and of the great advantages which remained in his power; and Lestocq, without being disquieted, was enabled to check his advance and make preparations for a retreat, which lay open to him from Freistadt, where he had been covering the revictualling of Graudenz, by Deutsch-Eylau, Osterode, and Mohrunen, to Liebstadt; while Benningsen himself, on the night of the 3d, broke up from Jonkowo, and retired in the same direction.

57. By daybreak the French army, headed by Murat with his numerous and terrible dragoons, was in motion to pursue the enemy; and as the Russians had been much retarded during the night by the passage of so many pieces of cannon and waggons through the narrow streets of Jonkowo, the enemy soon came up with their rear-guard. By overwhelming numbers the latter

were at length forced from the bridge of Bergfried by Soult; but they rallied in the villages behind it, and, forming barricades with tumbrils, waggons, and chariots, effectually checked the advance of the enemy until the carriages in the rear had got clear through. They then retired, obstinately contesting every inch of ground, which they did with such effect, that the French lost fifteen hundred men in the pursuit, without inflicting a greater loss on their adversaries. Nor were any cannon or chariots taken—a striking proof of the orderly nature of the retreat, and the heroism with which the rear-guard performed its duty, when it is recollected that Napoleon, with eighty thousand men, thundered in close pursuit: and that, from the state of the roads, the march, which had been ordered upon three lines, could take place on two only. Soult and Davoust continued to manœuvre, in order to turn the Russian left, while Murat and Ney pressed their rear-guard. On the night of the 4th, the Russians retired to Wolfsdorf, where they stood firm next day. But this continued retreat in presence of the enemy was now beginning to be attended with bad effects, both upon the health and spirits of the soldiers. The commissariat in, their army was then wretched; magazines there were none in the country which was now the theatre of war: and the soldiers, when worn out with a night-march over frozen snow, had no means of obtaining subsistence but by prowling about to discover and dig up the little stores which the peasants had buried for the use of their families. The men everywhere lay on the bare ground in intense frost, with no other bed but the snow, and no covering but their great-coats, which were now little better than rags. They were not as yet inured to retire before the enemy; and the murmur against any further retreat was so loud, that Benningsen resolved to fall back only to a chosen field of battle; and, upon examining the map, that of PREUSSISCH-EYLAU was selected for this purpose. No sooner was this announced to the troops than their discontents were appeased; the hardships

of the night-marches were forgotten; and from the joyful looks of the men, it would rather have been supposed they were marching to tranquil winter quarters, than to the most desperate struggle which had occurred in modern times.

58. Severe actions, however, awaited these brave men ere they reached the theatre of final conflict. On the night of the 5th the army moved to Landsberg, where the troops from Heilsberg joined them, notwithstanding a bloody combat with Marshal Davoust. On the following day, the rear-guard, under Bagrathion, posted between Hoff and that town, was assailed with the utmost vehemence by Murat, at the head of the reserve cavalry ten thousand strong, and the principal part of the corps of Soult and Augereau. The approach of these formidable masses, and the imposing appearance of their dragoons, as well as the balls which began to fall from the French batteries, occasioned great confusion among the cannon and carriages in the streets of the town. But with such resolution did the rear-guard maintain their position, that, though they sustained a heavy loss, the enemy were kept at bay till night closed the carnage, and relieved the Russian general from the anxieties consequent on so critical a situation in presence of such enormous forces of the enemy. Two battalions of Russians were trampled under foot in the course of the day or cut down, chiefly by one of their own regiments of horse dashing over them, when broken and flying from Murat's dragoons. Benningsen upon this supported the rear-guard, by several brigades of fresh troops, and the combat continued with various success till night, when both armies bivouacked in presence of each other; that of the French on the heights of Hoff, that of the Russians on those which lie in front of Landsberg, and the little stream of the Stein separating their outposts from each other. In this untoward affair the Russians sustained a loss of two thousand five hundred men, among whom was Prince Gallitzin, whose chivalrous courage had already endeared him to

the army; but the French were weakened by nearly as great a number. During the night the whole army again broke up, and without further molestation reached Eylau at seven the next morning, when it passed through the town, and moved quietly to the appointed ground for the battle on the other side, where it arrived by noon-day.

59. This rapid concentration and retreat of the Russians isolated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and gave too much reason to fear that it might be cut off by the superior forces of Bernadotte and Ney, who were now pressing on it on all sides. But the skilful movements of the Prussian general extricated him from a most perilous situation. On the 5th, he set out from Mohrungen, and his horse encountered the cavalry of Murat near Deppen, while the head of the column of infantry was at the same time charged by Ney, who had crossed the Passarge to intercept his progress near Waltersdorf. The heroic resistance of the advanced guard, only three thousand strong, gave time for the main body to change the line of its march, and escape in the direction of Schloditten; but it proved fatal to itself, as almost the whole were slain or made prisoners, with twelve pieces of cannon. The firm countenance of the cavalry, however, defeated all the efforts of Murat, who in vain charged them repeatedly with six thousand horse; and after baffling all his attacks, they retired leisurely, and in the best order, covering the march of the infantry all the way; crossed the Passarge at Spanden, and arrived on the 7th in safety at Hussenhnen in the neighbourhood of Eylau.

60. Thus, after sustaining incredible hardships, and undergoing serious dangers, the whole Russian army was at length concentrated on one field of battle, and about to measure its strength with the enemy. It was reduced, by the fatigues and losses of this winter campaign, to sixty-five thousand men, assembled around Eylau, to which, if ten thousand be added as Lestocq's division, which might be expected to co-operate in the approaching action, the

whole amount that could be relied on for the shock was seventy-five thousand, with four hundred and sixty pieces of cannon. The French, after deducting the losses of this dreadful warfare, exclusive of Bernadotte, who did not arrive on the ground for two days after, could still bring eighty thousand men into the field, including nearly sixteen thousand horse; but they had not above three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery.* Thus the two armies were nearly equal—the French superiority in numbers, and especially in cavalry, being counterbalanced by the advantage which the Russians had in that important arm, the artillery. Their spirit and courage were at the same level; for if the French could recall with deserved pride the glorious achievements of the campaign, and a long course of almost unbroken victories, the Russians, on their side, had the triumphs of Suwarroff in Turkey, Poland, and the Italian plains, to recall:

* The following is the account given by Dumas of the troops present in arms, in January 1807, under Napoleon on the Vistula:—

| | Infantry and Artillery. | Cavalry. |
|--|-------------------------|----------|
| Imperial Guard under Bessières, | 9,100 | 3,829 |
| Do. under Oudinot, | 6,046 | |
| First corps, Bernadotte, | 18,073 | 950 |
| Second do. Augereau, | 10,000 | |
| Third do. Davoust, | 19,000 | 757 |
| Fourth do. Soult, | 26,329 | 1,495 |
| Fifth do. Lannes, | 16,720 | 1,309 |
| Sixth do. Ney, | 15,168 | 881 |
| Cavalry do. Murat, | 753 | 14,808 |
| Total on the Vistula, | 123,188 | 24,179 |
| Detached, viz., Mortier, in Pomerania, | 15,868 | 1,264 |
| Do. Jerome and Vandamme, in Silesia, | 18,232 | 2,207 |
| Do. Lefebvre, Dantzic, | 23,248 | 547 |
| Do. Dumonceau, Hannover, | 6,898 | 680 |
| Total, | 187,434 | 28,876 |

If from this mass of 113,000 infantry and 24,000 cavalry, there be deducted 19,000 absent, under Bernadotte, 18,000 under Lannes, 6,000 under Oudinot, and 14,000 lost or left behind during the march from Warsaw, there will remain, on their own showing, 90,000 in line at Eylau; and that agrees nearly with Sir Robert Wilson's estimate.—DUMAS, xviii. 592; WILSON, 98. Thiers makes the effective French force at Eylau 74,000 men—*Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 361. The medium of 80,000 is probably very near the mark.

and if the former were impelled by the ardour of a revolution, converted by consummate genius into that of military conquest, the latter were buoyant with the rising energy of an empire whose frontiers had never yet receded before the standards of an enemy.

61. The Russian rear-guard, ten thousand strong, under Bagrathion, was leisurely retiring towards Eylau, and at the distance of about two miles from that village, when it was attacked by the French infantry. The Russians were at first compelled to give way, but the St Petersburg dragoons, whose rout had occasioned such loss to their own comrades on the preceding day, emulous to wipe away their disgrace, assailed the enemy so opportunely in flank, when emerging from the tumult of the charge, that they instantly cut to pieces two battalions, and made prize of their eagles. Disconcerted by this check, the French gave no further molestation to the Russian rear-guard, which retired into Eylau. By a mistake, however, the division destined to occupy that important station evacuated it, along with the rest of the army; and though Benningsen instantly ordered it to be reoccupied by fresh troops, the French had, meanwhile, entered in great numbers, and the assailing division, under Barclay de Tolly, had a rude contest to encounter in endeavouring to regain the lost ground. By vast exertions, however, they at length succeeded in expelling the enemy. The French again returned in greater force; the combat continued with the utmost fury till long after sunset. Fresh reinforcements came up to the Russians: twice Barclay carried the village after dark, by the light of the burning houses, and he was as often expelled by the enthusiastic valour of the French. At length they were driven out of the town, which, from lying in a hollow, and being commanded on the French side, was no longer tenable after the enemy had brought up their heavy artillery. But that gallant commander, with this heroic rear-guard, intrenched himself in the church and churchyard, which stands on an eminence by the road on

issuing from the town on the other side, and there maintained a sanguinary resistance till past ten at night, when he was severely wounded. Then the object of the strife having been gained by the heavy artillery having all arrived by the road of Schloditten, and taken up its position on the field of battle behind the village, the unconquered Russians were withdrawn from the churchyard, which, with its blood-stained graves and corpse-covered slopes, remained in the hands of Napoleon.

62. Never in the history of war did two armies pass a night under more awful and impressive circumstances than the rival hosts that now lay, without tent, or covering, on the spowly expanse of the field of Eylau. The close vicinity of the two armies: the vast multitude assembled in so narrow a space, intent only on mutual destruction; the vital interests to the lives and fortunes of all which were at stake; the wintry wildness of the scene, cheered only by the watch-fires, which threw a partial glow on the snow-clad fields around; the shivering groups who in either army lay round the blazing fires, chilled by girdles of impenetrable ice; the stern resolution of the soldiers in the one array, and the enthusiastic ardour of those in the other; the liberty of Europe now brought to the issue of one dread combat; the glory of Russia and France dependent on the efforts of the mightiest armament that either had yet sent forth, all contributed to impress a feeling of extraordinary solemnity, which reached the most inconsiderate breast, oppressed the mind with a feeling of anxious thought, and kept unclosed many a wearied eyelid in both camps, notwithstanding the extraordinary fatigues of the preceding days. But no sooner did the dawn break, and the quick rattle of musketry from the outposts commence, than these gloomy feelings were dispelled, and all arose from their icy beds with no other feelings but those of joyous confidence and military ardour.

63. The evacuation of Eylau on the preceding night, had led Napoleon to suppose that the enemy were not to

give battle on the succeeding day ; and, overwhelmed, with the extraordinary fatigues he had undergone since leaving Warsaw, during which time he had been daily occupied in business or marching twenty hours out of the twenty-four, he retired to a house in the town, and there, amidst all the horrors of a place carried by assault, fell into a profound sleep. The two armies were within half cannon-shot of each other, and their immense masses disposed in close array on a space not exceeding a league in breadth. The field of battle consisted of an open expanse of unenclosed ground, rising into swells, or small hills, interspersed with many lakes : but as the whole surface was covered with snow, and the water so thoroughly frozen as to bear any weight either of cavalry or artillery, it was everywhere accessible to military operations. The little town of Eylau, situated on a slight eminence and surmounted by a Gothic steeple, was the only salient point of the field. On the slope to its right, looking from the French position, was the churchyard, the scene of so desperate a strife on the preceding day. The ground rose gently in its front, and was interspersed with some small hills, amidst which the dense masses of the Russians were barely visible through the twilight of a wintry day obscured by mist and driving snow. The Russian right, under Toulkoff, lay on either side of Schloditten ; the centre, under Sacken, occupied a cluster of little open hills, intercepted by lakes, in front of Kutschitten ; the left, under Ostmann Tolstoy, rested on Klein-Saugarten and Serpalten ; the advanced guard, ten thousand strong, with its outposts extending almost to the houses of Eylau, was under the command of Bagrathion ; the reserve, in two divisions, was led by Doctoroff. The whole army in front was drawn up in two lines with admirable precision : the reserve, in two close columns behind the centre ; the foot artillery, consisting of four hundred pieces, was disposed along the front of the lines ; the horse artillery, embracing sixty guns, cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, in reserve

behind the centre and wings, in order to support any point which might appear to require assistance. Lestocq, with his division, had not yet come up ; but he had lain at Hussehn, the preceding night, which was only three leagues off, and might be expected to join before the battle was far advanced.

64. The French position, generally speaking, was more elevated than that of the Russians, with the exception of the right, where it was commanded by the heights of Klein-Saugarten. The town of Eylau, however, occupied in force by their troops, was situated in a hollow, so low that the roofs of the houses were below the range of cannon-shot from the Russian position, and the summit of the church steeple, which stands on an eminence, alone was exposed to the destructive storm. Davoust was in rear on the right, and received orders, as soon as he came up, to attack the villages of Klein-Saugarten and Serpalten, occupied by the enemy. The division St Hilaire of Soult's corps was at Rothenen ; between that village and Eylau, Augereau was established, and was destined to advance against the Russian main body and the strong batteries placed opposite : Soult, with his remaining two divisions, occupied Eylau on the left, and was to aid him when he moved forward ; the Imperial Guard and cavalry of Murat were in reserve behind the centre, ready to support any attack which might appear likely to prove unsuccessful. Orders had been despatched to Ney to attack the Russian right as soon as the action was warmly engaged ; and it was hoped he would arrive on the field at least as soon as Lestocq on the other side, upon whose traces he had so long been following. Lannes had been detained by sickness at Pultusk, and his corps, placed under the orders of Savary, afterwards Duke of Rovigo, was observing the Russian forces left on the Bug and the Narew. Napoleon's design, when he saw that the Russians stood firm, and were resolved to give battle, was to turn their left by the corps of Marshal Davoust, and throw

it back on the middle of the army; but, the better to conceal this object, he commenced the action soon after daylight by a violent attack on their right and centre. The Russian cannon played heavily, but rather at hazard, on the hostile masses in front of Eylau; while the French guns replied with fatal effect from their elevated position down upon the enemy, whose lines were exposed from head to foot to the range of their shot.

65. Presently the centre, under Augereau, advanced in mass columns, while St Hilaire's division of Soult's corps, the whole preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, marched with an intrepid step against the Russian left-centre, so as to unite Augereau's with Davoust's attack, and forty guns of the Imperial Guard, posted on an eminence near the church of Eylau, to cover their attack, opened a heavy fire on the great central Russian battery. These troops had not advanced above three hundred yards, driving the Russian *tirailleurs* before them, when the Russian cannon-shot, from two hundred pieces, admirably directed, ploughed through the mass, and so shattered it, that the whole body of Augereau's corps inclined to the left towards Schloditten, to get under the shelter of a detached house which stood in the way. A snow-storm at the same time set in and darkened the atmosphere, so that neither army could see its opponent; but nevertheless, the deadly storm of bullets continued to tear the massy columns of the French, and the cannonade was so violent as to prevent Soult from rendering them any effectual support. A masked battery of seventy-two pieces opened on their front with a tremendous fire of grape. In a quarter of an hour, half of the corps were struck down. Augereau's divisions were already severely shaken by this murderous fire when they were suddenly assailed on one side by the right wing of the Russians, under Touchkoff, and on the other by their reserve and a powerful body of cavalry, under Dectoroff. So thick was the snow-storm, so unexpected the onset,

that the assailants were only a few yards distant, and the long lances of the Cossacks almost touching the French infantry, when they were first discerned. The combat was not of more than a few minutes' duration; the corps, charged at once by foot and horse with the utmost vigour, broke and fled in the wildest disorder back into Eylau, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, who made such havoc, that the whole, above sixteen thousand strong, were, with the exception of fifteen hundred men, taken or destroyed; and Augereau himself, with his two generals of divisions, Desgardens and Heudelet, was desperately wounded.

66. Napoleon was apprised of this disaster by the fugitives who rushed into Eylau; and the snow-storm clearing away at the same time, showed him the Russian right and centre far advanced, with their light troops almost at the edge of the town. He himself was stationed at the church-yard on its eastern side, which had been the scene of such a sanguinary conflict on the preceding night; and already the crash of the enemy's balls on the steeple and walls of the church showed how near danger was approaching. The serried masses of the Old Guard stood firm in and around the cemetery, while the branches of the trees above their heads were constantly renter falling from the enemy's cannon-balls. Presently one of the Russian divisions, following rapidly after the fugitives, entered Eylau by the eastern street, and charged, with loud hurrahs, to the foot of the mount where the Emperor was placed with a battery of the Imperial Guard and his personal escort of a hundred men. Had a regiment of horse been at hand to support the attack, Napoleon must have been made prisoner; for though the last reserve, consisting of six battalions of the Old Guard, was at a short distance, he might have been enveloped before they could come up to his rescue. The fate of Europe then hung by a thread, but in that terrible moment the Emperor's presence of mind did not forsake him: he instantly ordered his little body-



guard, hardly more than a company, to form line, in order to check the enemy's advance, and despatched orders to the Old Guard to attack the column on one flank, while a brigade of Murat's horse charged it on the other.* The Russians, disordered by success, and ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within their grasp, were arrested by the firm countenance of the little band of heroes who formed Napoleon's last resource; and before they could re-form their ranks for a regular conflict, the enemy were upon them on either flank, and almost the whole division was cut to pieces on the spot.†

67. The disorder produced by the repulse of St Hilaire's division, and the almost total destruction of Augereau's corps, however, was such, that the French Emperor was compelled to strain every nerve to repair it. For this purpose he prepared a grand charge by the whole cavalry and Imperial Guard, supported in rear by the divisions of Soult, which occupied Eylau and its vicinity, now stripped of any other defenders. The onset of this enormous mass, mustering fourteen thousand cavalry and twenty-five thousand foot soldiers, supported by two hundred pieces of cannon, was the more formidable, that the thick storm of snow, as favourable now to them as it had before been to the enemy.

* "High on a turf bank the chief was rear'd,
Fearless, and therefore worthy to be fear'd."

LUCAN, *Pharsalia*, v.

† "I never was so much struck with anything in my life," said General Bertrand at St Helena, "as by the Emperor at Eylau at the moment when, alone with some officers of his staff, he was almost trodden under foot by a column of four or five thousand Russians. The Emperor was on foot, and Bertrand gave orders instantly for the horses to be brought forward; the Emperor gave him a reproachful look, and instead ordered a battalion of his Guard, which was at a little distance, to advance. He himself kept his ground as the Russians approached, repeating frequently the words, 'What boldness! what boldness!' At the sight of the grenadiers of his Guard the Russians made a dead pause, the Emperor did not stir, but all around him trembled."—LAS CASES, ii. 151. See also *Relation de la Bataille d'Eylau, par un Témoin Oculaire. Camp. en Prusse et Pologne*, iv. 45.

prevented them from being perceived till they were close upon the first line of the enemy. The shock was irresistible: the front line of the Russians was forced to give ground, and in some places thrown into disorder; their cavalry crushed by the enormous weight of the seventy squadrons which followed the white plume of Murat; and a desperate mêlée ensued, in which prodigious losses were sustained on both sides. The Russian battalions, though broken, did not lay down their arms or fly, but, falling back on such as yet stood firm, or uniting in little knots together, still maintained the combat with the most dogged resolution. Instantly perceiving the extent of the danger, Benningsen, with his whole staff, galloped forward from his station in the rear to the front, and at the same time despatched orders to the whole infantry of the reserve to close their ranks, and advance to the support of their comrades engaged. These brave men, inclining inwards, pressed eagerly on, regardless of the shower of grape and musketry which fell on their advancing ranks, and uniting with the first line, charged home with loud hurrahs upon the enemy. But the onset of the French was at first irresistible. In the shock, the Russian division of Essen was broken, and Murat's horse, pursuing their advantage, swept through several openings, and got as far as the reserve cavalry of Benningsen. Already the last reserve batteries of the centre were discharging grape with the utmost vehemence on the terrible assailants; but no sooner did Platoff, who was in the rear of all, see them approaching with loud cries, and all the tumult of victory, than he gave orders to the Cossacks of the Don to advance. Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge, their long lances in rest, their blood-horses at speed: in an instant the French cuirassiers were broken, pierced through, and scattered. Retreat was impossible through the again closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit; while five hundred and

thirty Cossacks returned, each cased in the shining armour which he had stripped from the dead body of an opponent. At all other points the enemy were, after a desperate struggle, driven back, and several eagles, with fourteen pieces of cannon, remained in the hands of the victors.

68. The battle appeared gained: the French left and centre had been defeated with extraordinary loss; their last reserves, with the exception of part of the Guard, had been engaged, without success; to the cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* and the shouts of enthusiasm with which they commenced the combat, had succeeded a sullen silence along the whole line in front of Eylau; the Russians were several hundred paces in advance of the ground which they occupied in the morning; and a distant cannonade on both sides evinced the exhaustion and fatigue which was mutually felt. Lestocq had not yet arrived, but he was hourly and anxiously expected, and the addition of his fresh and gallant corps would, it was hoped, enable Benningsen to complete the victory. But while all eyes were eagerly turned to their right, where it was expected his standards would first appear, a terrible disaster, well-nigh attended with fatal consequences, took place on the left. Davoust, who was intrusted with the attack which was intended to be the decisive one in that quarter, had long been arrested by the firm countenance of Bagavout and Ostermann Tolstoy; but at length the increasing numbers and vigorous attacks of the French prevailed. Friant, whose division headed the attack, carried Serpalten, and, pushing on beyond it, the village of Klein-Sausgarten fell into his hands. It was again reconquered by the Russians, but finally remained in the possession of their antagonists.

69. Nor was the action less warmly contested at Serpalten. Supported by a battery of thirty pieces of artillery and part of the reserve, Bagavout returned to the charge, and there for long made head against the superior forces of St Hilaire and Morand at the head of one of Soult's and one of Davoust's best divisions. At length the

two lines advanced to within pistol-shot, when the Russians gave way; the cannoneers, bravely resisting, were bayoneted at their guns, and the pieces were taken. They were now reinforced by two regiments which Benningsen sent to their support, and the French, in their turn, were charged in flank by cavalry, broken, and driven back upwards of three hundred yards. But notwithstanding this success at Serpalten, the progress of the enemy at Klein-Sausgarten was so alarming, that the Russians were unable to maintain themselves on the ground they had so gallantly regained. Friant debouched from it in their rear in great strength; and, rapidly continuing his advance from left to right of the Russian position, he had soon passed, driving everything before him, the whole ground occupied by their left wing; the guns so fiercely contested were abandoned by the Russians; and, continuing his triumphant course in their rear, he carried by assault the hamlet of Auklappen, and was making dispositions for the attack of Kutschitten, which had been the headquarters of Benningsen during the preceding night, and lay directly behind the Russian centre. Never was change more sudden; the victorious centre, turned and attacked both in flank and rear, seemed on the point of being driven off the field of battle; already the shouts of victory were heard from Davoust's divisions, and vast volumes of black smoke, blown along the whole Russian centre and right from the flames of Serpalten, evinced in frightful colours the progress of the enemy on their left.

70. The firmness of Benningsen, however, was equal to the emergency. Orders were despatched to the whole left wing to fall back, so as to come nearly at right angles to the centre and right; and although this retrograde movement, performed in presence of a victorious enemy, was necessarily attended with some disorder, yet it was successfully accomplished; and after sustaining considerable loss, the Russian left wing was drawn up, facing outwards, nearly at right angles to the centre, which still retained its advanced

position, midway between the ground occupied by the two armies where the fight began in the morning. As the Russian left drew back to the neighbourhood of the centre, it received the support of the reserves which Benningsen wheeled about to the assistance of the discomfited wing: and although Friant carried Kutschitten, this was the last advantage he gained in that quarter, and the victorious columns of Davoust were at length arrested.

71. The battle was in this critical state, with the French victorious on one wing and the Russians on the centre and the other, but without any decisive advantage to either side, when the corps of Lestocq, so long expected, at length appeared on the extreme Russian right, driving before him the French battalions which were stationed near the village of Altholf. Orders were immediately despatched to him to defile as quickly as possible in the rear of the Russian right, so as to assist in the recapture of Kutschitten behind their centre, where St Hilaire had established himself in so threatening a manner. These directions were rapidly and ably performed. Moving swiftly over the open ground in the rear of the Russian right in three columns, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Kutschitten an hour before it was dark, with seven thousand men, having left two thousand to occupy Altholf, and lost nearly a thousand in the course of the march that morning, which had been a constant fight with Marshal Ney's corps. Dispositions for attacking the village and cutting off the retreat of the enemy were instantly made. A terrible cannonade was kept up on its houses, and the Prussians, under cover of the guns, charging in three columns, carried it with irresistible force, destroying or making prisoners the 51st and one battalion of the 108th regiments, stationed there, with an eagle, and recovering the Russian guns which had been abandoned on the retreat from Serpalten. Not content with this great success, Lestocq immediately re-formed his divisions in line, with the cavalry and Cossacks in rear, and advanced against the

hamlet of Auklappen and the wood adjoining. The division of Friant, wearied by eight hours' fighting, was little in a condition to withstand these fresh troops, flushed by so important an advantage. The combat, however, was terrible: Davoust was there; his troops, though exhausted, were more than double the numbers of the enemy; and he made the utmost effort to maintain his ground. "Here," said the marshal, "is the place where the brave should find a glorious death; the cowards will perish in the deserts of Siberia." Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, Friant was driven out of the wood, after an hour's combat, with the loss of three thousand men; the Russians, by a bold attack of cavalry, regained the smoking walls of Auklappen, and the whole allied line was pressing on in proud array, driving the enemy before them over the open ground between that ruin and Saugarten, when night drew her sable mantle over this scene of blood.

72. The battle was over on the centre and left, and already the French lines were illuminated by the fire of innumerable bivouacs, when both armies were startled by a sharp fire, succeeded by loud shouts, on the extreme right of the Russians, towards Schloditten. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney's corps, which, following fast on the traces of Lestocq, had at nightfall entered Altholf, driving the Prussian detachments which occupied it before him, and had now carried Schloditten and even pushed on to Schmoditten, so as to interrupt the Russian communications with Königsberg. Benningsen immediately ordered the Russian division of Kamenskoi, which had suffered least in the battle, to storm the village, which was executed at ten at night in the most gallant style. The loud cheers of their victorious troops were heard at Eylau; and Napoleon, supposing that a general attack was commencing, for which he was little prepared, gave orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to the position

which he had occupied in front of the wood when the action commenced in the morning, and this terminated the changes of this eventful day.

73. From the mortification, however, of retiring before an enemy in an open field, Napoleon was relieved by the measures adopted by the Russian general. At eleven at night a council of war was held by the generals on horseback, as to the course which the army should pursue. It was strongly represented by Ostermann Tolstoy, the second in command, and Generals Knoring and Lestocq, that at last Buonaparte had been defeated in a pitched battle, and that it would be to the last degree impolitic to destroy the moral effect of such an advantage by retreating before him, and thus giving him a fair pretext for representing it as a victory; that they were ready instantly or next day to follow up their success, and attack the enemy wherever they could find him; and that, at all events, they would pledge their heads that, if the general-in-chief would only stand firm, Napoleon would be driven to a disastrous retreat. Strong as these considerations were, they were overbalanced, in Benningsen's estimation, by still stronger. He knew that his own loss was not less than twenty thousand men; and though he had every reason to believe that the enemy's was still heavier, yet the means of repairing the chasm existed to a greater degree in the hands of Napoleon than his own: Ney, whose corps had suffered comparatively little, had just joined him; Bernadotte, it was to be presumed, would instantly be summoned to headquarters; and these fresh troops might give the enemy the means of cutting him off from Königsberg, in which case, in the total destitution for provisions which prevailed, the most dreadful calamities might be apprehended. Influenced by these considerations, Benningsen, who was ignorant of the enormous magnitude of the losses which the French had sustained, and who, though a gallant veteran, had lost somewhat of the vigour of youth, and had been thirty-six hours on horseback with hardly any nourish-

ment, persevered in his opinion. He accordingly directed the order of march, which began, at midnight, by Mülhausen towards Königsberg, without any molestation from the enemy. They took post at Wottenberg, three leagues in front of that town, where the wearied soldiers, after a struggle of unexampled severity, were at length enabled to taste a few hours of repose.

74. Such was the terrible battle of Eylau, fought in the depth of winter, amidst ice and snow, under circumstances of unexampled horror; the most bloody and obstinately contested that had yet occurred during the war; and in which, if Napoleon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had well-nigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never in modern times had a field of battle been strewn with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians twenty-five thousand had fallen, of whom above seven thousand were already no more: on that of the French upwards of thirty thousand were killed or wounded, and nearly ten thousand had left their colours, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterwards. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced: the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of twelve eagles taken from their antagonists; while the French had captured sixteen of the Russian guns, and fourteen standards. Hardly any prisoners were made on either side during the action; but six thousand of the wounded, most of them in a hopeless state, were left on the field of battle, and fell into the hands of the French.*

* The official accounts of this great battle on both sides are so much interwoven with falsehood as to furnish no clue whatever to the truth. That of Napoleon is distinguished by more than his usual misrepresentation. He states his loss at 1900 killed and 5700 wounded, in all 7600. Judging by his usual practice, which was to avow a loss about a fourth of its real amount, this would imply a loss of 30,000 men. At St Helena he admitted that he lost 18,000; and considering that the Russians acknowledge a loss of above 20,000, that their artillery throughout the day was greatly superior to that of the French, and

75. Never was spectacle so dreadful as that field presented on the following morning. Above fifty thousand men lay in the space of two leagues, weltering in blood. The wounds were, for the most part, of the severest kind, from the extraordinary quantity of cannon-balls which had been discharged during the action, and the close proximity of the contending masses to the deadly batteries, which spread grape at half-musket shot through their ranks. Though stretched on the cold snow, and exposed to the severity of an Arctic winter, the sufferers were burning with thirst, and piteous cries were heard on all sides for water, or assistance to extricate the wounded men from beneath the heaps of slain, or load of horses by which they were crushed. Six thousand of these noble animals encumbered the field, or, maddened with pain, were shrieking aloud amidst the stifled groans of the wounded. Broken gun-carriages, dismounted cannon, fragments of blown-up caissons, scattered balls, lay in wild confusion amidst casques, cuirassiers, and burning handlets, casting a livid light over a field of snow. Subdued by loss of blood, tamed by cold, exhausted by hunger, the foemen lay side by side, amidst the general wreck. The Cossack was to be seen beside the Italian; the gay vine-dresser from the banks of the Garonne lay athwart the stern peasant

that they sustained no loss in any quarter comparable to that of Augereau's corps, which was so completely destroyed that its remains were immediately incorporated with the other corps, and itself disappeared entirely from the Grand Army; it may safely be concluded that this estimate is not exaggerated. "Our loss," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "at Eylau was enormous—Why conceal the truth? The Emperor avowing the truth at Eylau would have appeared to me more truly great than putting forth an official falsehood which no child could believe, more especially if he was nephew or son of Colonel Berné of the 24th regiment of the line, one of the finest in the army, and itself equal almost to a brigade, which was to a man destroyed."—D'ABRANTES, ix. 367. Thiers makes the French loss 10,000 men, a number ridiculously small; the more especially as he admits that the reports of the different corps engaged presented a total of 13,000 or 14,000 wounded more or less severely.—THIERS, *Consulat et l'Empire*, vii. 394, note.

from the plains of the Ukraine. The extremity of suffering had extinguished alike the fiercest and the most generous passions. According to his usual custom, Napoleon in the afternoon rode over this dreadful field, accompanied by his generals and staff, while the still burning piles of Serpanten and Sausgarten sent volumes of black smoke over the scene of death. But the men exhibited none of their wonted enthusiasm; no cries of *Vive l'Empereur!* were heard; the bloody surface echoed only with the cries of suffering or the groans of woe. "The spectacle," said Napoleon in his bulletin, "was fitted to inspire princes with the love of peace, and a horror of war." It is this moment which the genius of Le Gros has selected for the finest and most inspired painting that exists of the Emperor, in that noble work which, amidst the false taste and artificial sentiment of Parisian society, has revived the severe simplicity and chastened feeling of ancient art.*

76. For nine days after the battle, the French remained at Eylau, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and apparently awaiting some pacific overture from the enemy. The only movement of any consequence which was attempted was by Murat, with twelve regiments of cuirassiers, who approached the Russian position in front of Königsberg; but he was defeated by the allied horse, with the loss of four hundred killed and three hundred prisoners. Elated with this success, the Cossacks became daily more enterprising in their incursions. Night and day they gave the enemy no rest in their position; the French foraging parties were cut off; and to such a length was this partisan warfare carried, and so completely did the superiority of the Cossacks in its conduct appear, that during the ten days the Em-

* This admirable painting, the masterpiece of modern French art, is to be seen in the Luxembourg at Paris, standing forth in dark simplicity amidst its unpretentious contemporaries: it is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun or Tempesta, and in grandeur of thought and effect far exceeds any British work of art since the days of Reynolds.

peror remained at Eylau, upwards of fifteen hundred of his cavalry were made prisoners and brought into Königsberg. Meanwhile the relative situation of the two armies was rapidly changing: the Russians, with the great seaport of Königsberg in the rear, were amply supplied with everything, and their wounded carefully nursed in the great hospitals of that city; while the French, still starving on the snows of Eylau, and unable, from the superiority of the Russian horse, to levy requisitions in the surrounding country, were daily reduced to greater straits from want of provisions, and totally destitute of all the accommodations requisite to withstand the rigour of the season.

77. Meanwhile Napoleon, however, was not idle. The day after the battle he issued orders for all the troops in his rear to advance by forced marches to the scene of action. The cuirassiers of Nansouty, which had not been engaged, arrived in consequence two days after. Lefebvre received orders to suspend the blockade of Dantzic, and concentrate his corps at Osterode, in order to form a reserve to the army, and co-operate with Savary, who had the command of Lannes' corps on the Narew. All the bridges on the Lower Vistula, were put in a posture of defence, and Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau. Such, however, had been the havoc in the army, that the Emperor, notwithstanding these great reinforcements, did not venture to renew hostilities, or advance against Königsberg, the prize of victory, where he would have found the best possible winter quarters, and the steeples of which were visible from the heights occupied by his army.* Even the critical position of the Russian army, with its back to the sea and the river Pregel,

* When Napoleon began the battle of Eylau, he never doubted he would be in Königsberg next day. In his proclamation to his soldiers, before the action commenced, he said, "In two days the enemy will cease to exist, and your fatigues will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose." And on the same day Berthier wrote to Josephine— "The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen on the road to Russia; to-morrow Königsberg will receive the Emperor."—Wilson, 113.

where defeat would necessarily prove ruin, could not induce Napoleon to hazard another encounter; and finding that the Russians were not disposed to propose an armistice, he determined himself to take that step. For this purpose General Bertram was sent to Benningsen's outposts, with proposals of peace to the King of Prussia. The Russian general sent him on to Memel, where the latter was, with a letter strongly advising him not to treat, and representing that the fact of Napoleon proposing an armistice after so doubtful a battle, was the best evidence that it was not for the interest of the Allies to grant it. The terms proposed were very different from those offered after the triumph of Jena; there were no more declarations that the house of Brandenburg must resign half its dominions, or that he would make the Prussian nobles so poor that they should be reduced to beg their bread.†

78. Frederick-William, however, was not led to swerve from the path of honour even by this tempting offer. Widely as the language of the French Emperor differed from that which he had formerly employed, and clearly as his present moderation evinced the extent of the losses he had sustained at Eylau, still the existing situation and recent engagements of the Prussian monarch precluded his entering, consistently

† Napoleon's letter to the King of Prussia was in these terms—"I desire to put a period to the misfortunes of your family, and organise as speedily as possible the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediate power is necessary for the tranquillity of Europe. I desire peace with Russia—and, provided the cabinet of St Petersburg has no designs on the Turkish Empire, I see no difficulty in obtaining it. Peace with England is not less essential to all nations; and I shall have no hesitation in sending a minister to Memel to take part in a congress of France, Sweden, England, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey. But as such a congress may last many years, which would not suit the present condition of Prussia, your Majesty therefore will, I am persuaded, be of opinion that I have taken the simplest method, and the one which is most likely to secure the prosperity of your subjects. At all events, I entreat your Majesty to believe in my sincere desire to re-establish amicable relations with so friendly a power as Prussia, and that I wish to do the same with Russia and England."—HARD. ix. 396; SCHÖELL, viii. 37-405.

with national faith, into a separate negotiation. The Emperor of Russia had just given the clearest indication of the heroic firmness with which he was disposed to maintain the contest, by the vigorous campaign which he had commenced in the depth of winter, and the resolution with which he had sustained a sanguinary battle of unexampled severity. The conduct of England, it is true, had been very different from what it had hitherto been during the Revolutionary war, and hardly any assistance had been received either from its arms or its treasures by the Allies, engaged in a contest of life and death on the shores of the Vistula. But this disgraceful and parsimonious disposition had recently relented, and some trifling succours had just been obtained from the British government, which, although unworthy for England to offer, were yet gratefully received, as indicating a disposition on the part of its cabinet to take a more active part in the future stages of the struggle.* Under the influence of these feelings and expectations, the Prussian government, notwithstanding the almost desperate situation of their affairs, and the occupation of nine-tenths of their territories by the enemy's forces, refused to engage in any separate negotiation,—an instance of magnanimous firmness in the extremity of danger which is worthy of the highest admiration, and which went far to wipe away the stain that their former vacillating conduct towards Napoleon had affixed on the Prussian ministers.

79. Foiled in his endeavours to seduce Prussia into a separate accommodation, Napoleon was driven to the painful alternative of a retreat. Orders were given on the 17th for all the corps to fall back, the advanced posts being strengthened, in order to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of what

was going forward, or commencing a pursuit. Eylau was evacuated; six hundred wounded were abandoned to the humanity of the enemy; and the army, retiring by the great road through Landsberg, spread itself into cantonments on the banks of the Passarge, from Hohenstein, where it takes its rise, to Braunsberg, where it falls into the Baltic sea. Bernadotte was on the left on the Passarge, between Braunsberg and Spanden; Soult in the centre, from Zeildorst to Mohrungen; Davoust on the right, between Allenstein and Hohenstein, at the point where the Alle and the Passarge approach most nearly to each other: Ney formed the advanced guard at Guttstadt between the Passarge and the Alle. Headquarters were established at Osterode in the centre of the line, along with the guard and the grenadiers of Oudinot, who had been brought up; the bulk of the army being thus quartered between that place and Wormditt. Lefebvre received orders to return to Thorn, unite with the Polish and Saxon contingents, and resume the siege of Dantzic, the preparations for which had been entirely suspended since the general consternation which followed the battle of Eylau.

80. Benningsen hastened to occupy the country which the enemy had evacuated, and on the 25th February his headquarters were advanced to Landsberg. As the Russian army passed over the bloody fields of Eylau and Hoff, still uncumbered with dead, and strewn with the remains of the desperate contest of which they had recently been the theatre, they felt that they had some reason to claim the advantage in those well-fought fields; and Benningsen issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he now openly claimed the victory.† Napoleon also addressed his soldiers; but though it

* They consisted only of £80,000 in money. A further subsidy of £100,000, and £200,000 worth of arms and ammunition, with the promise of future succours, was furnished by the British government in May following, in return for a solemn renunciation, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, of all claim to the Electorate of Hanover.—*HARD. IX. 597; Ann. Reg. 1807, 23; Parl. Deb. ix. 987.*

† Benningsen said:—"Soldiers! As the enemy was manoeuvring to cut us off from our frontiers, I made my army change its position in order to defeat his projects. The French, deceived by that movement, have fallen into the snare laid for them. The roads by which they followed us are strewn with their dead. They have been led on to the field of Eylau, where your incomparable

was with his usual confidence, yet it was impossible to denoal from the men, or from Europe, that the Grand Army had now for the first time retreated, and that the remains of their comrades on the field of battle had to trust to the humanity of an enemy for their sepulture.* In truth, however, not only the battle, but the objects of the winter campaign, had been equally divided. It was not to draw the French army from the Vistula to the Passarge, a distance of above a hundred miles, that Benningsen had concentrated his troops, and resumed offensive operations in the depth of winter; and it was not to retire from within sight of the steeples of Königsberg to the wretched villages on the latter stream, that Napoleon had fought so desperate a battle at Eylau. The one struck for Dantzic, the other for Königsberg, and both were foiled in their respective objects: fifty thousand men had perished without giving a decisive advantage to either of the combatants.

81. To this period of the Polish war belong the operations of Essen and

valour has shown what Russian heroism is capable. In that battle more than thirty thousand French have found their graves. They have been forced to retire at all points, and to abandon to us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage. Warriors! you have now reposed from your fatigues; forward! let us pursue the enemy, put the finishing-stroke to our glorious deeds, and after having, by fresh victories, given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country."—Dumas, xviii. 67.

* Napoleon's address was as follows:—"Soldiers! we were beginning to taste the sweets of repose in our winter quarters, when the enemy attacked the first corps on the Lower Vistula: we flew to meet him; pursued him, sword in hand, for eighty leagues; he was driven for shelter beneath the cannons of his fortresses, and beyond the Pregol. In the combats of Bergfried, Deppen, Hoff, and the battle of Eylau, we have taken sixty pieces of cannon, sixteen standards; killed, wounded, or taken more than 40,000 Russians; the brave who have fallen on our side have fallen nobly, like true soldiers. Their families shall receive our protection. Having thus defeated the whole projects of the enemy, we will draw near to the Vistula, and re-enter our winter quarters: whoever ventures to disturb our repose shall repent of it—for beyond the Vistula, as beyond the Danube, the depth of winter as in the heat of summer, we shall always be the soldiers of the Grand Army."—Dumas, xviii. 68.

Savary on the Narew and the neighbourhood of Ostrolenka. Savary had occupied that town with a large part of Lannes' corps, who, as already mentioned, was sick; and Essen, having received considerable reinforcements of force from the army of Moldavia, which raised his disposable numbers to twenty thousand men, received orders, early in February, to attack the French in that quarter. The object was to engage their attention, in order to prevent any reinforcements being drawn from that corps to the main army, then advancing to the decisive battle of Eylau. Essen advanced with his corps on each side of the river Narew. That commanded by the Russian general in person on the right bank encountered Savary, who was supported by Suchet with his brilliant division; a rude conflict ensued, in which the Russians were finally worsted. Greater success, however, attended their efforts on the left bank: supported by the fire of fifty pieces of artillery, they drove back the French to the walls of Ostrolenka, and, entering pell-mell with the fugitives, penetrated into the principal square, and were on the point of obtaining decisive success. At this critical moment, Oudinot, who was marching from Warsaw with his division of grenadiers, six thousand strong, to join the Grand Army, arrived with his division of fresh troops, and, uniting with Suchet, who halted in the midst of his pursuit on the right bank to fly to the scene of danger, succeeded, after a bloody encounter in the streets, in driving them into the sand-hills behind the town, where a destructive cannonade was kept up till nightfall. In this affair the Russians lost seven guns and fifteen hundred men, and the French as many; but having succeeded in their object in defending the town, and keeping the communication of the Grand Army open with Warsaw, the latter with reason claimed the victory.

82. The battle of Eylau excited a prodigious sensation in Europe, and brought Napoleon to the very verge of destruction. Had a ministry of more capacity in military combination been then at the head of affairs in England,

there cannot be the smallest doubt that the triumphs of 1813 might have been anticipated by seven years, and the calamities of Europe at once arrested. The first accounts of the battle received through the French bulletins rendered it evident that some disaster had been incurred, and the anxious expectation everywhere excited by this unsatisfactory communication was increased by the long interval which elapsed before the Russian accounts arrived. At length, when, from Benning-sen's report, it appeared that he claimed the victory, and, from the stationary condition of the Russian army in front of Königsberg, and the ultimate retreat of the French to the banks of the Passarge, that these pretensions were not devoid of foundation, the public transport rose to the highest pitch. It was confidently expected that, now that Napoleon had for once been decisively foiled, the Austrians would instantly declare themselves, and their sixty thousand men in observation in Bohemia, be converted into a hundred thousand in activity on the Elbe.* To stimulate and support such a combination, the public voice in England loudly demanded the immediate despatch of a powerful British force to the mouth of the Elbe; and, recollecting the universal exasperation which prevailed in the north of Germany at the French in consequence of the enormous requisitions which they had everywhere levied from the inhabitants, whether warlike or neutral, there cannot be a doubt that the appearance of fifty thousand English soldiers would have been attended with

* "I tremble," says Jomini, speaking in the person of Napoleon, "lest 150,000 of those mediators had appeared on the Elbe, which would have plunged me into the greatest difficulties. I there saw that I had placed myself at the mercy of my enemies. More than once I then regretted having suffered myself to be drawn on into those remote and inhospitable countries, and having received with so much asperity all who sought to portray its danger. The cabinet of Vienna had then a safer and more honourable opportunity of re-establishing its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813, but it had not resolution enough to profit by it, and my firm countenance proved my salvation."—JOMINI, ii. 389.

decisive effects both upon the conduct of Austria and the future issue of the war. Nothing, however, was done; the English ministry, under the direction of Lord Howick, notwithstanding the most urgent entreaties from Russia and Prussia, sent no succours in men or money. The decisive period was allowed to pass by without anything being attempted in support of the common cause, and the British nation, in consequence, had the Peninsular war to go through to regain the vantage-ground which was then within their grasp.†

83. It is the most signal proof of the obstinacy with which the British government, under the direction of Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey), adhered to their ill-timed system of withdrawing altogether from Continental affairs, that they clung to it even after the account of the battle of Eylau had arrived in London, and it was universally seen over Europe that a crisis in Napoleon's fate was at hand. In the end of February 1807, earnest applications were made by the cabinets of St Petersburg and Berlin for the aid of a British auxiliary force to menace the coasts of France and Holland, and land on the shores of Pomerania. The advantage was pointed out of "despatching, without a moment's delay, on board the swiftest ships of Great Britain, a strong British auxiliary land force to co-operate with the army of Gustavus Adolphus, and thereby compel the French to retreat. They were engaged in the siege of Stralsund, and in laying waste that province; and if the British force did not arrive in sufficient time to dislodge them, they might steer for some harbour in the Baltic, from whence their junction with the allied armies could certainly be effected." Lord Howick replied on the 10th March—

† "Repeated and urgent applications were made in February and March 1807 for an English army, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to co-operate with the Swedish forces in Pomerania, but in vain. Some subsidies were granted in April, but no troops sailed from England till July, when they consisted only of 5000 men, who were sent to the island of Rugen."—*Ann. Reg.* 1807, p. 23; LUCCHESINI, ii. 290, 296.

"The approach of spring is doubtless the most favourable period of military operations; but in the present juncture the Allies must not look for any considerable aid from the land force of Great Britain."

84. In proportion to the sanguine hopes which this bloody contest excited in Germany and England, was the gloom and depression which it diffused through all ranks in France. The Parisians were engaged in a vortex of unusual gaiety; balls, theatres, and parties succeeded one another in endless succession, when the news of the battle of Eylau fell at once on their festivities like a thunderbolt. They had learned to distrust the bulletins; they saw clearly that Augereau's divergence had been occasioned by something more than the snow-storm. The funds rapidly fell, and private letters soon circulated, and were eagerly sought after, which gave a true and even exaggerated account of the calamity. Hardly a family in Paris but had to lament the loss of some near relation or intimate friend: the multitude of mourners cast a gloom over the streets; the general consternation suspended all the amusements of the capital. The most exaggerated reports were spread, and found a ready reception by the excited population. One day it was generally credited that Napoleon had fallen back behind the Vistula; the next that a dreadful engagement had taken place, in which he himself, with half his army, had fallen. So far did the universal consternation proceed, that the members of the government began to look after their own interests in the approaching shipwreck; and even the imperial family itself was divided into factions, Josephine openly supporting the pretensions of her son, Eugene, to succeed to the throne, and the Princess Caroline employing all the influence of her charms to secure Junot, governor of Paris, whom she held in silken chains, in the interest of her husband Murat.

85. The general gloom was sensibly increased when the message of Napoleon, dated March 26, to the conserva-

tive senate, announced that a fresh conscription was to be raised of eighty thousand men, in March 1807, for September 1808. This was the third levy which had been called for since the Prussian war began: the first when the contest commenced, the second during the triumph and exultation which followed the victory of Jena, the third amidst the gloom and despondency which succeeded the carnage of Eylau. No words can do justice to the consternation which this third requisition excited amongst all classes, especially those whose children were likely to be reached by the destructive scourge. In vain the bulletins announced that victories were gained with hardly any loss. The terrific demand of three different conscriptions, amounting to no less than *two hundred and forty thousand men, in seven months*, too clearly demonstrated the fearful chasms which sickness and the sword of the enemy had made in their ranks. The number of young men who annually attained the age of eighteen in France, which was the period selected for the conscription, was about two hundred thousand. Thus, in half a year, more than a whole annual generation had been required for a service which experience had now proved to be almost certain destruction. So great was the general apprehension, that the government did not venture to promulgate the order until, by emissaries, and articles in the public journals, the public mind had been in some degree prepared for the shock. When it was announced, Regnault St Jean d'Angely, the orator intrusted with the task, shed tears; and even the obsequious senate could not express their acquiescence by any of the acclamations with which they usually received the imperial mandates. So powerful was the public feeling, so visible and universal the expression of terror in the capital, that it was found necessary to assuage the general grief by a clause, declaring that the new levy was at first to be merely organised as an army of reserve for the defence of the frontier, under veteran generals, members of the con-

servative senate. These promises, however, proved entirely illusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Cantina forks, or the murder of the guerillas in the fields of Spain.

86. Meanwhile the prodigious activity of the Emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organise the new levies, wring the sinews of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depots on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts, for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony, provided for the remounting of the cavalry and the artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions everywhere in Germany,* furnished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who

were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the Emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was in fact making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. By indefatigable exertions, and forcing up every sabre and bayonet from the rear, he was ere long enabled to calculate on eighty thousand combatants ready for action on every point which might be threatened on the Passarge: but this was all he could rely on out of three hundred and thirty thousand French and their allies, who formed, or were marching to reinforce, the Grand Army. No less than sixty thousand were in hospital, or had become marauders, and had never rejoined their colours since the desperate shock at Eylau. All the fortresses on the Rhine and on the Flemish frontier were armed, and put in a posture of defence. The new levy was directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organised into battalions with the coast-guard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and La Vendée. "It is necessary," said he, "that at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surround our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which cover our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation."

87. Neither Napoleon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau. Nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disas-

* The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost incredible extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoleon at this time; and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own acts, indispensable for the equipment of his troops. By an imperial decree, in March 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish—

200,000 pairs of shoes;

50,000 great-coats;

10,000 coats;

37,000 waistcoats.

M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execution of this order, had no alternative but to contract with *English houses* for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the result was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that too at a time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort! A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807, will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources: the magnitude of them almost exceeds belief.—See BOURRIENNE, vii 293, 294.

trous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterwards said to the ministers of the French Emperor, "We can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master;" and such, in truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoleon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the *prestige* of opinion or the fervour of passion, whether democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an unbroken series of triumphs, are indispensable to the existence of such an authority. It has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has perilled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoleon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances. It obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest.* It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoleon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage-ground which he had gained; which was at once the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain except by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin.

88. The Polish winter campaign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the common cause, and, in an especial

manner, to the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balances quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lessebourg would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left, and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right. Whereas, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear—Ney assailed the walls of Magdeburg, Davoust before Stettin, Cüstrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches against two French corps; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks, before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organise the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoleon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula—a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line, when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty.

89. Benningsen's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johansberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland; and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and if executed with more vigour at the moment of attack, would have led to the most important results. His subsequent retreat in presence of the Grand Army, without any serious loss, and the desperate stand he made at Eylau, as well as the skill with which the attacks of Napoleon were baffled on that memorable field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of

* When Lord Ellenborough gave his consent to the second advance of the British to Cabul, in 1841, under Generals Nott and Pollock, he said in his despatches to these gentlemen: "Recollect, a second disaster like that of the Coord-Cabul Pass will lose us our Indian Empire."

that age of glory. Napoleon's advance to Pultusk and Golymin, and subsequently his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg, in the depth of winter, were distinguished by all his usual skill in combination and vigour in execution; but the results were very different from what had attended the turning of the Austrian and Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena. Columns were here cut off, communications threatened, corps planted in the rear, but no tremendous disasters such as had previously been expe-

rienced were sustained; the Russians retreated quickly and fought desperately on every side, and from the hazardous game the assailant suffered nearly as much as the retiring party. A striking proof of what so many other events during the war conspired to demonstrate, that a certain degree of native resolution will often succeed in foiling the greatest military genius, and that it was as much to the want of that essential quality in his opponents, as to his own talents, that the previous triumphs of Napoleon had been owing.

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR FOX'S ADMINISTRATION.

FEB. 1806—MARCH 1807.

1. If history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and calamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military exploit appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national dispositions: Mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, social interests, the abstract sciences, are cultivated; the

violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness; but it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. Selfishness, like a gangrene, then comes to overspread the state, and generosity of feeling, equally with elevation of thought, are lost in the pursuit of private interest. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires; but we shall look in vain in the authors or statesmen of either for the original thought, vigorous expression, or disinterested feeling, which characterised the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoleon.

2. The accession of the Whig ministry to the direction of affairs was an event eminently calculated to afford

full scope for the practical application, to the measures of the legislature, of those ideas of social improvement which the agitation and excitement of the preceding fifteen years had caused to take deep root among a large proportion of the thinking part of the people. The men who had now succeeded to the helm embraced a considerable part of the aristocracy, much of the talent, and still more of the philanthropy of the state. For a long course of years they had been excluded from power; and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attention to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when the leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which revolutionary principles receive when adopted by the highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country.

3. The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system, in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censure which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evident, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoleon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting

which can exist in a free country are altogether unequal to those which are at the command of a despotic one, whether monarchical or democratic, unless in those rare periods of public excitement when the intensity of patriotic feeling supplies the want of powers of compulsion on the part of the executive. Accordingly, throughout the whole war, great difficulty had been experienced by the British government in providing a proper supply of soldiers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment—the jealousy of a free constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom—and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve, in 1803, had not been such as to hold out any inducement for a repetition of the attempt. It had not produced thirty-five thousand effective soldiers, though fifty thousand had been the number voted by parliament, and ordered to be raised. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued—it being thought that in a country where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service, was over might endanger the state, by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment. But the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system, by the introduction of enlistments for a *limited* period of service.

4. It was argued in parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially by Mr Windham—"The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country

contended against another by the general strength of its population; when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel, and when the champion falls the cause is lost. The notion of a levy *en masse* or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened that, when the army was defeated, the contest has been restored by the efforts of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never, perhaps, be made capable of producing much effect in war till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which more than any other two have decided the present fate of the world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries, then irretrievably worsted, a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men burning with patriotic ardour were around the Emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity.

5. "Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, how are they to be obtained? above all, how are we to insure to this country, what unquestionably

it has never had; a never-failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things—choice or force. In the Continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes; and undoubtedly, whenever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry and force them to become soldiers, there can be no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country. Not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes—a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer suffice, that something effectual must be done; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us; but unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed.

6. "Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us, and yet the experience of thirteen years' warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupations of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army? With-

out this, our means of recruiting must be little better than deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price they ask for them; and accordingly, none but the ignorant and thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a height has this arisen, that of late years our only resource has been recruiting boys. Men grown up, even with all the grossness, ignorance, and improvidence incident to the lower orders, are too wary to accept our offers; we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation the weakness and improvidence of youth. The practice of giving bounties is decisive proof of this; whatever is bestowed in that way shows that the service does not stand upon its true footing. Men require no temptation to engage in a profession which has sufficient inducements of its own. Never can the system of supplying the army be considered as resting upon its proper basis till the necessity of bounties shall have ceased, and the calling of a soldier shall be brought to the level with other trades and professions, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is frequently paid for permission to enter.

7. "The great change by which this might, at first sight, appear likely to be effected, is by raising the pay. But independently of the financial embarrassments which any considerable alteration in that respect would produce, there is an invincible objection to such a change in the licentious habits, inconsistent with military discipline, which an undue command of money would generate among the soldiers. Provisions for sickness and old age; pensions for the wounded; honorary distinctions suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party, are much safer recommendations; but, above all, a change in the period of enlistment, from life to a limited time, is the great alteration to which we must look for elevating the attractions of the army. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe except our own, and it is the condition of enter-

ing that large and efficient part of our own forces, now a hundred thousand strong, which is composed of the regular militia. That this system will have the effect of inducing men to enter, is so clear, so certain, so totally incontestable, that it is unnecessary to urge it. There is no man who would not prefer having an option to having none. Our immense armies in India are all raised, and that too without the slightest difficulty, for limited service. A system of rewards for the regular and faithful soldier should also be established; and that severity of discipline which is at present so much an object of terror to all persons of regular habits, should be materially softened. Not that it will, in all probability, ever be possible to dispense entirely with corporal punishment in the army; for there are some turbulent spirits who can only be repressed by the fear of it. But the discipline may be rendered infinitely less rigorous. By this means a better description of men will be induced to enter the army; and the better men you get, the less necessity there will be for severe punishment. By these changes, also, the temptation to desertion will be greatly diminished, the great and alarming frequency of which, of late years, has been mainly owing to high bounties and bad regulations; and in legislating for this matter, it is material to invest courts-martial with a discretionary power to modify the penalty of desertion most materially, or take it away altogether, if it has been committed only in a moment of intoxication, or from the influence of bad example, or the soldier has made amends by returning to his colours.

8. "It is a mistake to argue that the benefits I have proposed to introduce, being for the most part prospective, and to be reaped only at the end of seven or fourteen years, will not influence the inconsiderate description of men who form the great bulk of our common soldiers. That may be true as it relates to the description of men who, under the combined influence of bounties and intoxication on the one hand, and service for life and flogging

on the other, almost exclusively enter our service. But the great benefit which may fairly be expected to result from a measure of the sort now proposed is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless or inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages which the military service holds out. Such considerations may frequently, indeed, have little weight with the young man himself, but will they prove equally unavailing with his relations, arrived at a more advanced period of life, and familiar, from experience, with the difficulty of getting on in every profession? What attracts young men of family into the East India Company's service, notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a lifetime spent in exile, and a climate so deadly that not one in ten survives it? Not present advantages; for the pay, for the first ten years, barely equals the young man's expenses. It is ultimate benefits: the spectacle of nabobs frequently returning with fortunes; the certainty that all who survive will become entitled, after a specified period of service, to pensions, considerable with reference to the rank of life to which they belong. Such considerations may not be so decisive with the lower orders as they are with the higher; but there is no rank to whom the sight of the actual enjoyment of the advantages of a particular profession will not speedily prove an attraction.

9. "To effect these objects, I propose that the term of military service should be divided into three periods—viz. seven, fourteen, and twenty-one years for the infantry, but ten, sixteen, and twenty-five for the artillery and cavalry, in consideration of the additional time requisite to render men efficient in those branches of service. At the end of each of these periods, the soldier is to have right to his discharge. If discharged at the close of the first, he is to have right to exercise his trade or calling in any town of the kingdom; at the end of the second, besides that advantage, to be entitled to a pension for life; at the end of the third, to the

full allowance of Chelsea, which should be valued to 2d., and in some cases to 1s. a-day. If wounded or disabled in the service, to receive the same pension as if he had served out his full time. Desertion to be punished, in the first instance, by the loss of so many years' service; in very aggravated cases only, by corporal infliction. Great exaggeration appears to have prevailed as to the benefits to be derived from the volunteer system. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that such a force could be brought to such a state of efficiency as to be able to cope with regular forces. Essential service may be derived from such a force, but not in the line to which they have at present been directed. With a view to bring them back to their proper sphere, as they were originally constituted in 1793, it would be advisable to reduce their allowances and relax their discipline. Those corps only which are in a rank of life to equip themselves, and are willing to serve without pay, should be retained; the remainder of the population should be loosely trained, under regular officers, to act as irregular troops. It is not by vainly imitating the dress, air, and movements of regular troops, that a volunteer force can ever be brought to render effectual service. These are my fixed ideas; but as I find a volunteer force already existing, it would not be politic at once to reduce it. All I propose, in the mean time, is to reduce the period of drilling from eighty-five days to twenty-six, and make other reductions which will save the nation £857,000 a-year; all future volunteers to receive their pay only, and the trained bands to receive a shilling a-day for fourteen days a-year, but not to be dressed as soldiers, nor drilled and exercised as such. Rank should be taken from the volunteer officers; their holding it is a monstrous injustice to the regular army."

10. To these arguments it was answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr Canning—"At no period of our history has the science, uniformity, and discipline of the British troops been comparable to what it is at this moment;

and for these immense benefits the profession at large are aware we are more indebted to the improvements of the present commander-in-chief, (the Duke of York), than to any other individual in existence. Under his able administration, the army is considerably superior in number to what it ever was at any former period.* The recruiting, as it now exists, is steadily producing sixteen thousand soldiers a-year; and when the act for its future regulation is generally enforced, which is not yet the case, this number may be expected to be greatly increased. Is this a crisis to break up a system producing, and likely to produce, such results? The average tear and wear of the army is about fifteen thousand a-year; so that the present system is not only adequate to the maintenance of its numbers, but likely to lead to its increase. The proposed alteration on the term of service in the army is one of the most momentous that parliament can be called on to discuss; and for this alone all other reasons, that the change, once introduced, is irrevocable. Be it good or be it bad in its results, it cannot be departed from; for when the soldiers have once tasted the sweets of limited, they will never submit to the restraints of unlimited service. Surely, on so vital a subject, and where a false step once taken is irretrievable, it is expedient to proceed with caution, and make the experiment on a small scale, before we organise all our defenders on the new system.

11. "The system of enlisting for a limited period is no novelty; its application on a great and universal scale alone is so. For the three last years our endeavours have been directed, while a superior encouragement was held out to persons entering for general service, to obtain at the same time the utmost possible number of men for limited service in the army—both in the army of reserve, and latterly under the Additional Force Act. If, then,

we have failed in obtaining an adequate supply of men even under a limited scale, both in time and space, how can we expect to obtain that advantage by taking away one of these limitations? If, indeed, we could not, under the present system, obtain an adequate force liable to be detached abroad, there might be a necessity for some change in our system; but when we have one hundred and sixty-five thousand men liable to be sent abroad, and the only check upon so employing them is the necessity of not weakening ourselves too much at home, why should we preclude ourselves from raising, by the present method, such a description of force as experience has proved, in this country at least, is most easily obtained? The expiry of the soldier's term of service must, independent of any casualties, produce a large chasm in the army; and what security have we, that if the whole or the greater part of the army is raised in that way, a great, it may be a fatal, breach may not at some future period occur in our ranks at the very time when their services are most required? What the inconvenience of the soldiers being entitled to their discharge at the end of each period during a war is likely to prove upon experience, may be judged of by recollecting how embarrassing this system some years back was found to be in the militia, notwithstanding the great comparative facility of replacing men when serving at home—an embarrassment so great, that it led as a matter of necessity to the extension of the term of service in that branch of our military system. What reason is there to suppose that the soldiers in the regular army will not be as prone as their brethren in the militia to take advantage of the option of a discharge when their title to demand it arrives? And if so, and this heavy periodical drain be added to the existing casualties of the troops, what chance have we of keeping up a force which even now wants twenty-five thousand men to complete its ranks?

12. It is in vain to refer to foreign states as affording precedents in point; their situation is totally different from

* REGULARS AND MILITIA.

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|-------------------------|---------|
| 1st January 1802, . . . | 242,440 |
| 1st January 1804, . . . | 234,005 |
| 1st March 1806, . . . | 267,554 |

ours. In Russia unlimited service prevails, and the same was the case in Austria during the best days of the monarchy. In 1797 a similar regulation to the one under discussion was passed prospectively for the future, to take effect at the expiration of a certain number of years, but it has not yet, I believe, been acted upon; and if it has, the disasters of Hohenlinden and Ulm afford but little reason to recommend its adoption. Napoleon's soldiers are all raised by the conscription for unlimited service; and although, in the old French monarchy, troops in sufficient numbers were certainly obtained by voluntary enlistment for limited periods, yet the period of service was more extended than that now proposed; and the circumstances of that country, abounding in men, with few colonies to protect, and still fewer manufactories to draw off its superfluous hands, and a strong military spirit in all classes, can afford no precedent for this country, where employment from the prevalence of manufactures is so much more frequent—whose population is by nearly a half less— which is burdened with a vast colonial empire, all parts of which require defence—and where the natural bent of the people is rather to the sea than the land service. Nor is the reference to our East India possessions more fortunate; for the enlistment for a limited period prevailed in the Company's European regiments for a number of years, yet the battalions raised in this way were always weak in numbers and inefficient, and were all reduced on that very account during Lord Cornwallis's first government of India. All the prepossessions of Mr Pitt were in favour of limited service—his opinions on this subject were repeatedly stated to the house. The opinions of a great variety of military men were taken on the subject; but these opinions were so much divided, that he arrived at the conclusion that the inconveniences and risks with which the change would be attended more than counterbalanced its probable advantages.

13. "The proposed changes on the

volunteer force appear to be still more objectionable. Admitting that it is desirable to reduce the great expense of that part of our establishment; allowing that, now that the corps have attained a considerable degree of efficiency, it may be advisable to diminish considerably the number of days in which they are to serve at the public expense, is that any reasons for substituting a tumultuary array, without the dress, discipline, or habits of soldiers, for a body of men qualified not only to act together, but capable, if drafted into the militia or the line, of at once acting with regular soldiers? Will the volunteer corps exist for any length of time under so marked a system of discouragement as it is proposed to impose upon them, without pay, without rank, without public favour? And is this the moment, when the whole military force of the Continent, with the exception of Russia, is in the hands of our enemies, to incur the hazard of substituting, for a voluntary disciplined, a motley array of undisciplined forces, and run the risk of exciting the disaffection of the powerful bands who, at the call of their sovereign, have so nobly come forward for the public defence?

14. "At the commencement of the present war we raised eighty thousand men for the militia, and fifty thousand for the regular army, by the operation of the ballot. That system has its evils; but when it is indispensable in a given time to raise a large force for the public service, there is no alternative. In recognising this right, however, which flows necessarily from the acknowledged title of the sovereign power to call for the assistance, in times of public danger, of all its subjects, parliament has been careful to fence it round with all the safeguards which the exercise of a prerogative so liable to abuse will admit of. It is determined by lot; the person drawn has the option to provide a substitute; and this is the footing upon which the militia stands. A still further limitation exists where the call is made, not upon the individual, but the district; and the district is allowed the option, instead of providing the

man, to pay a fine; and this is the principle on which the Additional Force Bill, at present in operation, which we are now called on to repeal, is founded. But the ballot for the militia is, by the proposed change, to cease on the termination of the war; it then ceases to be a militia, and becomes a part of the regular force raised by the crown. The act proposed to be repealed is producing at the rate of eighteen thousand recruits a-year, besides the men raised by ballot for the militia. Proposing, as the ministers now do, to abandon at once both these resources, are they prepared to show that the new measures will supply this great deficiency? Would it not be expedient first to try the experiment on a small scale, to be assured of its success, before we commit the fortunes of the state to the result of the experiment? It is an old military maxim, not to manœuvre in presence of an enemy; but the measures now in agitation do a great deal worse, for they not only change the composition of your force, but shake the loyalty and submission of the soldiers, in presence of the most formidable military power Europe has ever witnessed."

15. The bill met with a most strenuous opposition, although the early divisions which took place upon it evinced a preponderance in favour of ministers;* but it at length passed both houses by a decided majority, the number in the peers being ninety-seven to forty—giving a majority to ministers of fifty-seven. The clauses regarding the volunteer force, however, were abandoned or modified in the ultimate stages of the discussion, the effect of the bill as to them being limited to a proper restriction of the period of permanent duty. But the great principle of enlisting for a limited service was by its passing introduced into the British army, and has never since been totally abandoned; and, considering the great achievements which it subsequently wrought, and the vast con-

sumption of life which the new system adequately supplied, its introduction is to be regarded as a memorable era in the history of the war.

16. If called upon to decide in favour of one or other of the able arguments urged on the opposite sides of this important question, it might perhaps be no easy matter to say on which the weight of authority and reason preponderated. But experience, the great resolver of political difficulties, has now settled the matter, and proved that Mr Windham rightly appreciated the principles of human nature on this subject, and was warranted in his belief that, without any increase of pay, limited service, with additional encouragements in the way of retiring allowances and privileges, would provide a force perfectly adequate even to the most extensive military operations of Great Britain. From the official returns, it appears that the rate of recruiting rose in a rapid and striking manner after the system of limited service was adopted, and, before the expiration of a year from the time it was first put in force, had largely increased the annual supply of soldiers for the army.† Though variously modified, the same system prevailed during the remainder of the war, at least to a certain extent, with perfect success in every branch of the service; and to its influence, combined with the improved regulations for discipline, pay, and retiring allowances, great part of the glories of the Peninsular campaigns is to be ascribed. On examining the confident opinions expressed by many eminent and respectable military men, on the impossibility of providing an adequate supply of force for the English

† OLD SYSTEM.

| | ANNUITY. |
|---|----------|
| January 1 to July 1, 1805, . . . | 10,928 |
| July 1, 1805, to January 1, 1806, . . . | 9,042 |
| January 1 to July 1, 1806, . . . | 10,783 |
| July 1, 1806, to January 1, 1807, . . . | 6,376 |
| (New system in operation on January 1, 1807.) | |

NEW SYSTEM.

| | ANNUITY. |
|--|----------|
| January 1, to July 1, 1807, . . . | 11,412 |
| July 1, 1807, to January 1, 1808, . . . | 7,784 |
| Rate of recruiting from January 1, to April 1, 1808, . . . | 21,000 |
| Ditto from April 1 to July 1, 1808, . . . | 24,000 |
| Ann. Reg. 1808, 40, 41. | |

* The division which decided the principle of the bill took place on March 14, 1806, when the numbers were—Ayes, 235; Noes, 119: Majority, 116.—Ann. Reg. 1806, p. 54.

army by such a method, it is difficult to avoid the inference, that implicit reliance is not always to be placed on the views of practical men in legislative improvements; that their tenacity to existing institutions is often as great as the proneness of theoretical innovators to perilous change. Little credit is to be given to the most eminent professional persons when they claim for the people of a particular country an exemption from the ordinary principles of human nature; and true political wisdom is to be gathered, not by discarding the lessons of experience, but by extending the basis on which they are founded, and drawing conclusions rather from a general deduction of the history of mankind, than from the limited views, however respectably supported, of particular individuals.

17. To these observations on Mr Windham's military system, however, one exception must be made in regard to that part of his plan which related to the volunteers. There can be no doubt that in this particular he did not display the same knowledge of human nature which was elsewhere conspicuous in his designs. Admitting that the volunteers were very far indeed from being equal to the regular forces—that their cost was exceedingly burdensome, and that they could not be relied on as more than auxiliaries to the army—still in that capacity they were most valuable, and were not only qualified to render some service by themselves, but of incalculable importance as forming a reserve to replenish the ranks of the regular forces. The campaigns of 1812 and 1813 in Russia and Germany demonstrate of what vast service such a force, progressively incorporated with the battalions of the regular army, comes to be in real warfare, when the ranks of the latter are thinned, and how rapidly they acquire the discipline and efficiency of veteran troops. In this view the tumultuary array of Mr Windham, without the clothing, discipline, or organisation of soldiers, could have been of little or no utility. Nor is it of less moment that the volunteer system, by interesting vast multitudes in the occupations, feelings, and hon-

our of soldiers, powerfully contributes to garrison and expand that military ardour in all ranks which is indispensable to great martial achievements. Veteran troops, indeed, may smile when they behold novices in the military art imitating the dress, manners, and habits of soldiers; but the experienced commander, versed in the regulating principles of human exertion, will not deem such aids to patriotic ardour of little importance, and will willingly fan the harmless vanity which makes the young aspirant imagine that his corps has in a few weeks acquired the efficiency of regular forces. Imitation even of the uniform, air, and habit of soldiers, is a powerful principle in transferring the military ardour to the breasts of civilians. Philopœmen judged wisely when he recommended his officers to be sedulously elegant in their habiliments, arms, and appointments. He was well acquainted with human nature who said, that to women and soldiers dress is a matter of no ordinary importance. Many nations have been saved from slavery by the passion for what an inexperienced observer would call mere foppery.

18. In later times, the system of temporary service has been in a great degree superseded in the British army, and nearly all recruits are now enlisted for life. And if weighing the comparative merit of these two opposite systems, it will probably be found that the plan of enlisting men for limited periods is the most advisable in nations in whom the military spirit runs high, or the advantages of the military service are such as to secure at all times an ample supply of young men for the army, and where it is of importance to train as large a portion as possible of the population to the skilful use of arms, in order to form a reserve for the regular force in periods of danger; and that enlistment for life is more applicable to those nations or situations where no national danger is apprehended, and it is the object of government rather to secure a permanent body of disciplined men, subject to no cause of decrease but the ordinary casualties of the service, in the ordinary pacific duties, than spread

far and wide through the nation the passion for glory or the use of arms. A provident administration will always have a system established, capable either of contraction or expansion, which embraces both methods of raising soldiers; and this, for nearly thirty years, has been the case with the British army.

19. Important as the matter thus submitted to parliament in its ultimate consequences undoubtedly was, when it is recollected what a great and glorious part the British army bore in the close of the struggle, it yet yielded in magnitude to the next great subject which the new ministers brought forward for consideration. This was the **ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE**—a measure which, in its remote effects, seems destined to affect the fortunes of half the human race. This great change was not finally completed till the following session of parliament; but the preparatory steps were taken in this, and it belongs properly to the present period of English history, which treats of the measures of the Whig administration.

20. It was urged by Mr Hibbert and the advocates of the West India interest, both in and out of parliament, "The British West India Islands were settled, and have ever been cultivated, under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and these acts of parliament, which have confirmed these plantations in the most perfect assurance that they should continue to receive supplies of negroes from Africa. The agriculture of these colonies cannot be carried on except by means of slave-labour; and the cultivation of their interior, which is indispensable to their security, cannot be promoted if the slave trade be abolished. If this bill shall pass into a law, the very worst effects may be anticipated from the change, not only to the colonies themselves, but to the general interests of the empire. The commerce which the West Indies maintain, is the most important of the whole British dominions. It pays annually in duties to the public treasury upwards of £3,000,000; employs more than sixteen thousand seamen; contributes one-third to the whole

exports, and one-third to the imports; takes off yearly £6,000,000 worth of domestic manufactures; and is pre-eminently distinguished above all others by this important feature, that it is all within ourselves, and not liable, like other foreign trade, to be turned to our disadvantage on a rupture with the power with whom it is conducted. This measure, however, if carried into effect, must in a few years diminish the property vested in the British West India Islands, and open the means of rapidly advancing the progress of rival colonies, to whom the advantages of a full supply of negroes will still remain open. It must forbid the supply of losses to the negro population, which originate in accident or diseases peculiar to the climate, and which the most humane and provident management is unable altogether to prevent; stop the completion of establishments already begun; and altogether prevent the extension of cultivation into the interior of the islands, without which they can never either attain a state of security, or reach the degree of wealth and splendour of which they are susceptible.

21. "The most disastrous effects, both to individuals and the public, may be anticipated from the ultimate consequences of the measure under consideration. Not to mention the confusion and ruin which it must occasion to families; the capital now sunk in cultivation which it must destroy; the calamities attendant on revolt and insurrection which it will in all probability occasion; the emigration it will induce in all who have the means of extricating themselves or their capital from so precarious a situation; the despair and apathy which it will spread through those who have not means of escape; what incalculable evils must it produce among the black population! The abolition of the slave trade is a question which it is at all times perilous to agitate, from the intimate connection which it has in the minds of the negroes with the abolition of slavery itself, and the necessary effect which it must have in perpetuating the discussion of that subject in the mother country, to the total destruction of all security in the planters,

or repose in the minds of the slave population. From the moment that this bill passes, every white man in the West Indies is sleeping on the edge of a volcano, which may at any moment explode and shiver him to atoms. Throwing out of view altogether all considerations of interest, and viewing this merely as a question of humanity, it is impossible to contemplate without the utmost alarm the perils with which it is fraught. The existence of a black power in the neighbourhood of the most important island of the British West Indies, affords a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade. It is impossible to contemplate that volcano without the deepest alarm, nor forget that its horrors were produced by well-meant but ill-judged philanthropy, similar to that which is the prime mover in the present question.

22. "It is a total mistake to suppose that the evils, enormous and deplorable as they are, of Central Africa arise from the slave trade. Those evils are the consequence of the cruel habits and barbarous manners of its inhabitants; they existed for thousands of years before the slave trade was heard of, and will continue for thousands of years after it is extinct. Civilise the interior of that vast continent—humanise the manners of its inhabitants—abolish the savage practice of selling or putting to death captives made in war, and you indeed make a mighty step towards extirpating the evils which we all lament. But as long as these savage customs prevail; as long as the torrid zone is inhabited by a thousand tribes engaged in contests with each other, and with all of whom slavery to prisoners made in war is the only alternative for death, it is hopeless to expect that the stoppage even of the whole vent which the purchase of negroes by Europeans affords, would sensibly affect the general prevalence of the slave traffic. What are the fifty thousand whom they annually transport across the Atlantic, to

the innumerable multitudes who are driven across the Sahara desert, or descend to Egypt for the vast markets of the Mussulman world? But to suppose that the partial stoppage of it in the British dominions, that the prohibition to transport the fifteen thousand negroes who are annually brought to our shores, could have a beneficial effect, is ridiculous. So far from producing such a result, its tendency will be diametrically the reverse: it will drive the slave trade from the superior to the inferior channel: from the great merchants of Liverpool, who have done so much—for their own interest, perhaps, but still done so much—to diminish its horrors, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are as yet totally unskilled in its management, and treat the captives with the utmost barbarity. As our own colonies decline from the stoppage of this supply of labourers, those of the other nations who have not fettered themselves in the same way will augment; the cultivation of sugar for the European market will ultimately pass into other hands, and we shall in the end find that we have cut off the right arm of our commerce and naval strength only to augment the extent and increase the horrors of the slave trade throughout the world."

23. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr Wilberforce, Lord Howick, and Lord Grenville—"A higher principle than considerations of mere expedience—the dictates of justice—require that this infamous traffic should be abolished. Were it merely a question of humanity, we might consider how far we should carry our interference; were the interests of the British empire alone involved, it might possibly be a matter of expedience to stop a little short of total abolition. But in this instance imperious justice requires us to abolish the slave trade. Is it to be endured that robbery is to be permitted on account of its profits? Justice is still the same; and you are called upon, in this measure, not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but to your own planters;

to interfere between them and their otherwise certain destruction; and despite their fears, despite their passions, despite their prejudices, rescue them from impending ruin. This trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in. When it is recollected what guilt has been incurred in tearing the Africans, by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their social ties, their country, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery; when it is considered also that the continuance of this atrocious traffic must inevitably terminate in the ruin of the planters engaged in it, surely no doubt can remain that its instant abolition is called for by every motive of justice and expedience.

24. "Much is said of the impossibility of maintaining the supply of negroes in the West Indies, if the slave trade is abolished. Are we, then, to believe that the Divine precept, 'Increase and multiply,' does not extend to those islands? that the fires of youth, adequate to the maintenance and growth of the human species in all other countries and ages of the world, are there alone, in the midst of plenty, unequal to their destined end? But the fact is adverse to this monstrous supposition; and it is now distinctly proved that the slave colonies are perfectly adequate to maintain their own numbers.* The excess of deaths above births in Jamaica is now only 1-25th per cent; and when it is recollected that the registers of mortality include the deaths among the negroes who are newly arrived and set to work, which always amounts, between those who perish in the harbours and shortly after being set to work, to at least 10 per cent, it is evident that the numbers of settled

Africans are more than maintained by their own increase. Nor is the argument that the importation of negroes is requisite to cultivate the waste lands in the interior of the islands better founded. If the numbers of the Africans increase, it is altogether incredible that their labours should not be adequate to clear the wastes of those diminutive islands. According to the most moderate computation, it would require the slave trade to be continued for two centuries to cultivate the whole interior of Jamaica and Trinidad; and can it be endured that so frightful a traffic as this, fraught as it must be with the tearing of above two millions of Africans from their families and country, should be continued for such a period, for an object which, in one-fourth of the time, might, by the native increase of their numbers in those islands, be attained?†

25. "Let us, then, instantly abolish this infamous traffic; and we may then with confidence look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree the natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection afforded them; and they may gradually be prepared for that character, when the blessings of freedom may be securely extended to them. Throughout all history we shall find that slavery has been eradicated by means of the captives being first transformed into prepal labourers, attached to the soil, and from that gradually ascending to real freedom. We look forward to the period when the negroes of the West India Islands, become labourers rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country which has extended to them these benefits, and when they may be securely

| | | |
|---|---------------|------------------|
| * Excess of deaths above births in Jamaica from | 1698 to 1730, | 34 per cent. |
| | 1730 to 1755, | 24 per cent. |
| | 1755 to 1769, | 14 per cent. |
| | 1769 to 1780, | 8-5th per cent. |
| | 1780 to 1800, | 1-25th per cent. |

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 458.

† It is now completely demonstrated, by an experiment on the greatest scale, that the African race, even when in a state of slavery, is not only able to maintain its own numbers, but rapidly to increase them. In the slave states of America there are 2,200,000 negroes; and from 1790 to 1830, the whites have augmented in the proportion of 80 to 100; but the blacks in that of 112 to 100. The proportion since that time has been rather, though but little, in favour of the increase of the white race.—*Tocqueville's Democracy in America*, li. 346, 346, note; and *Census 1841, America*.

called on to share largely in the defence of those islands, in which at present they are only a source of weakness. The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave trade is, that by closing that supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all their undertakings, we shall *compel* them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their own estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus, not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented, in so far at least as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that, too, on the securest of all foundations—the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed.

26. "It is in vain to argue, that, according to the barbarous customs of Africa, captives made in war are put to death, and that if the outlet of the slave trade is closed, the reproach to humanity arising from the sale of captives will be prevented from taking place. The most recent and intelligent travellers, on the contrary, have informed us, what every consideration on the subject *a priori* would lead us to expect, that the existence of the slave trade is itself, and ever has been, the great bar to the civilisation of the interior of Africa, by the temptation held out to the chiefs on the coast to engage in the traffic of negroes, and the continual encouragement thus afforded to the princes in the interior to carry on constant wars, from the vast profit with which the sale of their captives is attended. It forms, in fact, with a great many of these robber chieftains, a chief branch of revenue. If we would promote, therefore, the great and truly Christian work of civilising Central Africa, we must first commence with abolishing the slave trade, for as long as it continues, the selfishness and rapacity of the native chiefs will never cease to chain its unhappy inhabitants to a life of violence

and rapacity in the powerful, of misery and degradation in the poor. The argument that, if we do not carry on the slave trade, some other nations will, possibly with less commiseration for the sufferings of the captives, if admitted, would shake to their foundation every principle of public and private morality. At that rate every band of robbers might plead in their justification, that if they did not knock down and plunder travellers, other banditti might do the same, and possibly superadd murder to their other atrocities, and therefore the lucrative rapine should not be discontinued. This argument, however, bad as it is, has not even the merit of being founded on fact. If we abolish the slave trade, who is to take it up? The Americans have already preceded us in the race of humanity, and fixed a period in 1808 when the traffic is immediately to cease; and a bill is at present in progress through their legislature, to affix the penalty of death to a violation of this enactment. How are France and Spain to carry it on, when they have hardly a ship on the ocean? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and where is she to get capital to carry it on?

27. "The dangers, so powerfully drawn, as likely to result from this measure, are really to be apprehended, not from it, but from another, with which it has no connection, viz. the immediate emancipation of the negroes. This, it is said, flows necessarily from the step now about to be taken; if you do not follow it up in this manner, you stop short half-way in your own principles; in fact, the ulterior measure, if the first be adopted, cannot be averted. It is to be hoped, indeed, that this great step will, in the end, lead to the abolition of slavery in all our colonies; but not in the way or with the dangers which are anticipated. On the contrary, it is here that another of the great benefits of the measure under consideration is to be found. By the effects of this measure it is to be hoped *slavery will gradually wear out without the intervention of any positive law*, in like manner as it did in

a certain degree in the states of Greece and Rome, and some parts of the states of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom; and as has been permitted with the happiest effects in the colonies of Spain and Portugal. In America, measures for the gradual emancipation of the negroes have been adopted, and nothing could conduce more powerfully to insubordination, than if, by the continuance of the trade, similar steps were not to be induced in the West India Islands, and the slaves there were perpetually tantalised by the sight of the superior comforts of their brethren on the mainland. The dangers apprehended *would indeed be real, if immediate emancipation were to be proposed*, for that would produce horrors similar to those which have happened in St Domingo. But nothing of that kind is in contemplation; on the contrary, it is expressly to exclude them, and to induce that gradual emancipation which is called for, alike by justice to the planters and the interests of the slaves themselves, that the measure under discussion is proposed."

28. The latter arguments, enforced with much eloquence, and supported by the great principles of Christian charity, prevailed with the legislature. By a series of enactments, passed in the course of the session of 1806, the slave trade was restrained within very narrow limits: and at length, in the succeeding session, it was entirely abolished, and the penalty of transportation affixed to every British subject engaged in it. The numbers were, in the Commons, 283 to 16—majority, 267: in the Peers, 100 to 36—majority, 64: and thus was the stain of trafficking in human flesh for ever removed from the British name. Lord Grenville concluded his speech with these eloquent words: "I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that eminent person (Mr Wilberforce), on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life carried into effect—a measure so truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous pros-

perity of his country and the welfare of mankind—a measure which will diffuse happiness among millions now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn."

29. There can be no question that this great step was recommended by every consideration of justice and humanity; nevertheless its effects hitherto have been in the highest degree deplorable. Never was there a more striking example than this subject has afforded in its later stages of the important truth, that mere purity of intention is not sufficient in legislative measures, and that unless human designs are carried into execution with the requisite degree of foresight and wisdom, they often become the sources of the most heart-rending and irremediable calamities. The prophecy of Mr Hibbert and the opponents of the abolition, that the slave trade, instead of ceasing, would only change hands, and at length fall into the management of desperate wretches who would double its horrors, has been too fatally verified, and to an extent even greater than they anticipated. From the returns laid before Parliament, it appears that the slave trade is now *four times* as extensive as it was in 1789, when European philanthropy first interfered in St Domingo in favour of the African race, and twice as great as it was when the efforts of Mr Wilberforce procured its abolition in the British dominions. Great and deplorable as were the sufferings of the captives in crossing the Atlantic, in the large and capacious Liverpool slave-ships, they are as nothing compared to those which have since been, and are still endured by the negroes in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese traders, where several hundred wretches are stowed between decks in a space not three feet high; and in addition to the anguish inseparable from a state of captivity, they are made to endure, for weeks together, horrors like those of the Black-hole of Calcutta. Nearly two hundred thousand captives, chained together in this frightful manner, now annually cross the Atlantic; and they are brought, not to the comparatively

easy life of the British West India Islands, but to the desperate servitude of Cuba or Brazil; in the latter of which several hundred negroes are worked, like animals, in droves together, without a single female among them; and without any attempt to perpetuate their race, they are worn down by their cruel taskmasters to the grave by a lingering process, which on an average terminates their existence in seven years!*

30. This lamentable and heart-rending result of such persevering and enlightened benevolence, however, must not lead us to doubt the soundness or humanity of the principles which Mr Wilberforce so eloquently advocated, or to imagine that the general rules of morality are inapplicable to this ques-

* The number of slaves annually imported into the slave countries of the New World from Africa in 1789, was somewhat under 50,000, of whom about 15,000 crossed in English vessels—now the number is at least 200,000. It appears from the Consular Returns to parliament, that in 1829, 74,653 slaves were embarked for Brazil alone from the African coast, of whom 4579 died in the short passage of one month; and in the first half of 1830 the numbers were no less than 47,256, of whom 8 per cent died on the passage. At the same period 18,000 were annually imported into the Havannah, and at least an equal number into the other slave colonies, making in the year 1830 about 130,000. But these numbers, great as they are, have now received a vast increase from the effects of the British slave emancipation act, passed in 1833. In fifteen months ending January 1835, there sailed from the single port of Havannah 170 slave ships, each capable of containing, on an average, at least 400 persons; the importation of slaves into Cuba is now above 55,000 a-year, while the numbers imported into Brazil, from the stimulus given to slave labour by the anticipated decline of produce in the British Islands consequent on that measure, have increased in nearly the same proportion. Nor is it surprising that, in spite of all the efforts of the British government, and all the vigilance of the British cruisers, this infernal traffic should now advance at this accelerated pace; for such is the demand for slaves, occasioned by the continual decline in the cultivation of sugar in the British West India Islands, under the combined influence of heavy taxation and the emancipation act, that the profit on a single cargo of slaves imported into the Havannah is 180 per cent, and the adventurers cannot be considered as losers if one vessel arrives safe out of three despatched from the coast of Africa.—*Parl. Pap.* 1830, A. 115, 116.

tion, and that here alone in human affairs it is lawful to do evil that good may come of it. The observation, that it was our duty to clear our hands of the iniquity, leaving it to Providence to eradicate the evil in others at the appointed time, was decisive of the justice of the measure; the evident necessity which it imposed on the planters of attending, for their own sakes, to the comforts of the negroes, and providing means for the multiplication of their numbers, was conclusive as to its expedience. It is not the abolition of the slave trade, but the subsequent continuance of ruinous fiscal exactions, and at last the irretrievable step of unqualified emancipation, which have given this deplorable activity to the foreign slave trade. The increase in the foreign slave colonies for the last twenty years, at a time when the British West India Islands were comparatively stationary, has been so rapid, that it is evident some powerful and lasting causes have been at work to occasion it.† These causes are to be found, in a great measure, in the heavy duties on British colonial produce,

† Twelve years ago, the only exports of Puerto-Rico were cattle and coffee, and the only sugar she received was from importation. In 1833 she exported 33,750 tons—more than a sixth of the whole British consumption. The export of the sugar from Cuba was, on an average of 1814, 1815, and 1816, 51,000 tons; in 1833 it had risen to 120,000 tons. In 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average exports of sugar from Brazil were 26,250 tons; in 1833, though a bad year, the exports were 70,970 tons. The increase, since the Emancipation Act passed, has been still greater; but no official accounts of those years have yet been made public. See *Parl. Report* "On the Commercial State of the West Indies," p. 286.

On the other hand, the produce of the British West India Islands, during the same period, has been comparatively stationary. The colonial produce exported from those islands to Great Britain in the year 1812, was 154,200 tons of sugar, and 6,290,000 gallons of rum; in 1830, 143,000; and in 1833, 205,000 tons of sugar, and 7,892,000 gallons of rum, the shipping in the first period was 180,000; in the last, 263,830 tons. The total value of the produce of the islands in the first period was £18,516,000; in the last, including all the colonies gained by the peace of Paris in 1814, only £22,486,000—*FEHRER*, 390; *COLQUHOUN*, 378-381; *PORTER'S Parl. Tables*, 124-126.

amounting at first to 30s., then to 27s., and latterly to 24s., on each hundred-weight of sugar, from which the foreign growers were exempted in the supply of foreign markets. This enormous burden, which, on an average of prices since 1820, has been very nearly seventy-five per cent on that species of produce, has, notwithstanding all their efforts, for the most part, if not entirely, fallen on the producers.* The disastrous effects of these combined measures cannot be better stated than in the words of Lord Sidmouth: "Much good might have been done by regulations on the coast of Africa, in the middle passage, and in the West Indies. But now we have rashly taken the bull by the horns, and while the consequences have been most injurious to our colonies and ourselves, they have in the same degree been beneficial to the maritime strength, commerce, and navigation of other nations, our rivals in peace, and enemies in war; and the

mass of human wretchedness, so far as the slave trade itself is concerned, is not only not diminished, but augmented, in its amount, and frightfully aggravated in its degree and character."

"Inani sapient nomen ferat, equus unguis,
Ultra quam satis est, virtutem qui petat
ipsum."

31. Nor is this all—the precipitate and irretrievable step of emancipation, forced on the legislature by benevolent but incautious and mistaken feeling, has already occasioned so great a decline in the produce of the British West Indies, and excited such general expectations of a still greater and increasing deficiency, that the impulse thereby given to the foreign slave trade to fill up the gap has been unbounded, and, it is to be feared, almost irremediable. Since the disastrous measure of emancipation, the agricultural produce of the British West Indies has declined fully a half; in some branches of produce, fallen to

* There is no opinion more erroneous than that commonly entertained, that the import duties on sugar, like other taxes on consumption, fall on the purchaser. There is always, indeed, a struggle between the producer and consumer, as to who should bear the burden—but it is not always in the power of the former to throw it on the latter. In this instance the attempt has almost totally failed. It appears from the curious table of prices compiled by Mr Colquhoun, that even during the high prices of the years from 1807 to 1812, the West India proprietors paid from a third to a half of the duties on sugar, without being able to lay it on the consumers; the average of what they paid for those years being £1,115,251 per annum. The estimated revenue of these proprietors, during these years, was under £4,000,000; so that, at that period, they paid nearly thirty per cent on their incomes to government. In addition to this, it was proved by the documents laid before the committee of the House of Commons in February 1831, that an annual burden of £1,023,299 was laid on the British West India Islands, in consequence of the enhancement of the price of necessary articles to which they were exposed under the restrictive system. In this way, even under the high prices from 1807 to 1812, they were paying at least fifty per cent on their incomes in taxation; and as the price, since that time, of their produce has fallen at least two-thirds, with a reduction of only a ninth (3s.) on the import duty, it may be safely concluded, that, since 1820, the West India proprietors have paid, directly and indirectly, at least seventy-five per cent on their income to government; and in the years when prices were

low, at least a hundred per cent. Nothing more is required to explain the distressed condition of these colonies, even before the emancipation bill was passed, which at once, without any equivalent, confiscated at least sixty per cent of their remaining property. The value of slaves was estimated by Colquhoun, in 1812, at £55 a-head; but in 1833, when the act passed, it had risen to at least £75 overhead, notwithstanding the change in the value of money; and the compensation-money (£29,000,000 on 534,000 slaves) will not, after all deductions are made, yield £25 a-head, or more than thirty-three per cent to the proprietors. Few such instances of the destruction of property by fiscal and legislative enactments are to be found in the history of mankind.—PERRIN, 304 and 307; Colquhoun, 59, 325; and *Commons' Reports on West India Affairs*, 7th February, 1831.

It is frequently said that the increase in the produce of these colonies, since the peace, is a proof that their alleged distresses are either unfounded or exaggerated. This is a complete mistake; the planters had no other way to meet the enormous fiscal burdens laid upon them, since a diminution in the cost of production was out of the question, after the abolition of the slave trade, but by making the utmost exertions to augment its quantity; and thence the increase of colonial produce, which, by perpetuating the lowness of price, rendered it totally impossible for them to lay the enormous import duty, now one hundred per cent, on the consumers. Like a man sunk in a bottomless bog, all the efforts they could make for their extrication tended only to land them deeper and more irretrievably in the mire.

a third of its former amount; and such is the indolence of the black population, and their general disinclination to steady and combined industry, that cultivation is in general carried on in these islands at a loss; and the time is, it is to be feared, not far distant, when

it will be totally abandoned, and these noble colonies be consigned to total ruin.*

32. It is in these measures that the real cause of the lamentable increase in the foreign slave trade is to be found: it is the multitude who forced on these

* The following table shows the decline of colonial produce exported from Jamaica under the first year of the Emancipation Act:—

| Years. | Sugar. | | Rum. | | Coffee. | |
|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|---------|------------|
| | Cwts. | Hogsheads. | Punchons. | Gallons. | Casks. | lb. |
| 1834 | 1,525,154 | 79,465 | 30,676 | 3,189,940 | 22,384 | 17,859,277 |
| 1835 | 1,319,023 | 68,087 | 27,038 | 2,660,087 | 13,405 | 10,489,292 |
| Decrease, | 206,131 | 11,378 | 3,638 | 529,262 | 8,989 | 7,869,985 |

Taking an average of these various sorts of produce, it is evident that, notwithstanding an uncommonly fine season, and the vigorous exertions of the stipendiary magistrates, the produce of the island fell off in one year nearly a fourth of its total amount! The parliament of Jamaica, in their address to the governor of the island on August 10, 1835, observed—"There never was a finer season or more promising appearance of crops; but, nevertheless, the crop is greatly deficient, and many British ships have in consequence returned with half cargoes, some with none at all. Our decided opinion is, that each succeeding crop will progressively become worse. In a few cases the apprentices do work for wages: but the opposite disposition so immeasurably preponderates, that no dependence whatever can be placed on voluntary labour. Knowing, as we do, the prevailing reluctance of the negroes to work of any kind, the thefts, negligences, and outrages of every sort which are becoming of frequent occurrence; seeing large portions of our neglected cane-fields overrun with weeds, and a still larger extent of our pasture-lands returning to a state of nature; seeing, in fact, desolation already overspreading the very face of the land, it is impossible for us, without abandoning the evidence of our senses, to entertain favourable anticipations, or divest ourselves of the painful conviction, that the progressive and rapid deterioration of property will continue to keep pace with the apprenticeship, and that the termination thereof must, unless strong preventive measures are applied, complete the ruin of the colony." Making every allowance for the passions and exaggerations of a tropical climate, the statement here made is too strongly borne out by the decrease in the official returns, and the example of the result of corresponding measures in St Domingo, to leave a doubt that they are, in the main at least, founded in truth.

The following table exhibits the official returns of the exports of the West India Islands for the last fifteen years:—

| Years. | Sugar. | Molasses. | Rum. | Coffee. | Cocoa. | Pimento. | Shipping. | Ships. |
|--------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| | Cwts. | Cwts. | Gallons. | lbs. | lbs. | lbs. | Tons. | |
| 1827 | 3,551,218 | 392,441 | 5,620,174 | 29,419,598 | 549,688 | 2,225,943 | 243,731 | 872 |
| 1828 | 4,013,636 | 508,085 | 6,307,294 | 29,987,078 | 454,909 | 2,247,593 | 272,800 | 1,013 |
| 1829 | 4,152,614 | 390,626 | 6,634,759 | 26,911,785 | 684,917 | 3,585,694 | 263,328 | 956 |
| 1830 | 3,912,623 | 249,420 | 6,752,799 | 27,460,421 | 711,913 | 3,489,318 | 263,872 | 911 |
| 1831 | 4,113,800 | 323,306 | 7,844,157 | 20,030,802 | 1,491,947 | 4,801,355 | 249,079 | 904 |
| 1832 | 3,773,436 | 558,698 | 4,713,609 | 24,678,920 | 618,215 | 1,366,183 | 229,117 | 828 |
| 1833 | 3,646,204 | 686,793 | 5,109,975 | 19,008,575 | 2,134,809 | 4,470,255 | 248,578 | 911 |
| 1834 | 3,343,976 | 650,366 | 5,112,399 | 22,081,489 | 1,360,325 | 1,399,402 | 246,695 | 918 |
| 1835 | 3,524,209 | 607,495 | 5,458,317 | 14,855,470 | 439,467 | 2,536,358 | 235,179 | 878 |
| 1836 | 3,601,791 | 526,535 | 4,865,168 | 18,903,426 | 1,612,304 | 3,320,978 | 237,022 | 900 |
| 1837 | 3,306,775 | 572,657 | 4,418,349 | 15,577,888 | 1,847,145 | 2,026,129 | 226,468 | 865 |
| 1838† | 3,520,676 | 638,907 | 4,641,210 | 17,538,655 | 2,149,637 | 892,974 | 235,195 | 878 |
| 1839 | 2,824,372 | 474,307 | 4,021,820 | 11,485,075 | 959,641 | 1,071,570 | 196,715 | 748 |
| 1840 | 2,214,764 | 421,141 | 3,780,979 | 12,797,039 | 2,374,301 | 999,068 | 181,731 | 697 |
| 1841 | 2,151,217 | 430,221 | 2,770,161 | 9,927,689 | 2,920,298 | 797,758 | 174,975 | 677 |

* Emancipation Act.

† Termination of Apprenticeship.

—PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, III. 424, 425.

Nor has the effect of this most disastrous measure been less detrimental on the exports of Great Britain to the West Indies. These, as a matter of course, have declined with the

measures, who have frustrated all the benevolent efforts of Mr Wilberforce and Mr Fox, and rendered the abolition of the slave trade in the British dominions the remote and innocent cause of boundless misfortunes to the negro race. The British slaves, since the slave trade was abolished, had become fully equal to the wants of the colonies; their numbers, without any extraneous addition, were on the increase; their condition was comfortable and prosperous beyond that of any peasantry in Europe; and large numbers were annually purchasing their freedom from the produce of their own industry. Here, then, was a stationary negro population, rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent feudal serfs of Europe, and from which they might, in like manner, have been emancipated singly, as they acquired property, which all had the means of earning, without either risk to themselves, injury to their masters, or increase to the demand for foreign slave labour. But now all these admirable effects of the abolition of the slave trade have been completely frustrated, and the humane but deluded inhabitants of Great Britain are burdened with twenty millions, to ruin, in the end, their own planters, consign to barbarism their own negroes, cut off a principal branch of their naval strength, and double the slave trade in extent,* and quadruple it in horrors, throughout the world. A more striking instance never was exhibited of the necessity of attending, in political changes, not only to benevolent intentions, but to prudent conduct; and of the fatal effect of those institutions which, by giving the inhabitants of a particular part of the empire an undue share in the general administration,† or admitting off in the produce of the West Indies, and the diminished ability of its inhabitants to pay for the produce of this country, as the following table demonstrates:—

BRITISH EXPORTS TO WEST INDIES FROM 1820 TO 1844.

| | | | |
|-----------------|------------|-----------------|------------|
| 1820, | £3,612,065 | 1837, | £3,456,745 |
| 1830, | 2,338,448 | 1838, | 3,393,441 |
| 1831, | 2,581,959 | 1839, | 3,986,598 |
| 1832, | 2,439,808 | 1840, | 3,574,970 |
| 1833, | 2,597,589 | 1841, | 2,604,004 |
| 1834, | 2,680,024 | 1842, | 2,591,425 |
| 1835, | 3,187,540 | 1843, | 2,497,671 |
| 1836, | 3,786,453 | 1844, | 2,451,471 |

—*FOSTER'S Parl. Tables*, xii. 102.

Such has been the effect upon the prices of all sorts of colonial produce, of this great decline in the production of the British West India Islands, that the annual consumption of sugar in Great Britain has declined since 1832 from 24 lbs. a-head to 16 lbs.; while, for this diminished quantity of 16 lbs., the price paid by the nation has been £8,000,000 annually more than it formerly was for the larger quantity of 24 lbs.—that is, the nation pays annually twice the amount nearly of the income-tax more than it formerly did for two thirds only of the former supply! At the same time, the effect of the measure, on the admission of its warmest advocates, has been to double the slave trade over the globe, and increase its horrors in a still greater proportion! The history of mankind fortunately affords few similar examples of the disastrous effects of ignorant zeal and misguided philanthropy.—*Parl. Deb.* June 9, 1843. *Customs Return, Kingston, Jamaica*, 22d August 1835; and *Address of Assembly*, August 10, 1835.

* The number of slaves now annually carried across the Atlantic, is double what it was when Wilberforce and Clarkson commenced their philanthropic labours.—*POWELL Buxton on the Foreign Slave Trade*, p. 72.

† The British ministry who, in 1834, passed the measures of slave emancipation, are now answerable for these consequences; on the contrary, they deserve the highest credit for the courage they displayed, in opposition to the wishes of many of their supporters, in carrying through the great grant of twenty millions to the planters—a relief so reasonable and extensive, that hitherto, at least, it has almost entirely, to the persons who received it, prevented the natural consequences of the emancipation from being fully felt. The torrent of public feeling was irresistible; all they could do was to moderate its effects, which, by the protracted period of apprenticeship, and the grant to the slave-owners, was done to a very great degree. The English people must answer for the measure, be its ultimate effects on themselves and the negro race good or bad. The reflection suggested is—What is the character of national institutions which permit a measure, likely to be attended with such cruel and disastrous consequences, to be forced against their will on a reluctant government?

ting the torrent of public feeling to sway directly the measures of government, too often destroy prosperity the most extensive, and occasion calamities the most unbounded.

• An important change in the British system of finance was also made by the same administration, which, although not brought forward till the spring of 1807, may be fitly considered now, in order not to interrupt the narrative of the important military events which at that period occurred on the continent of Europe.

33. The foundation of this plan, which was brought forward by Lord Henry Petty,* on the 29th January 1807, was, that the time had now arrived when it had become expedient to make a provision for a permanent state of warfare; that the bad success of all former coalitions had demonstrated the slender foundation on which any hopes of overthrowing the military power of France on the continent of Europe must rest, while the hostile disposition and immense power of Napoleon gave little hope that any durable accommodation could be entered into with him. "All nations," said his lordship, "that still preserve the shadow even of their independence, have their eyes fixed on us as the only means of regaining the freedom they have lost. It becomes the government of Great Britain, seeing the proud eminence on which they are placed, to take an enlarged view of their whole situation, and to direct their attention to that future which, notwithstanding the signal deliverance they have hitherto obtained, seems still pregnant with evil. Our present permanent revenue is above £32,000,000 a-year, being more than three times what it was at the close of the American War; and there can be no doubt that means might be found in additional taxes to pay the interest of loans for several years to come. But looking, as it is now our duty to do, to a protracted contest, it has become indispensable to combine present measures with such a regard for the future, as may give us a

* Afterwards Lord Lansdowne, a distinguished member of the Whig cabinet of 1830.

reasonable prospect of being enabled to maintain it for a very long period.

34. "In considering our resources, the two great objects of attention are the sinking fund and the system of raising the supplies as much as possible within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of war taxes. • The first of these is a durable monument of Mr Pitt's wisdom: it had the support of his illustrious political opponent, Mr Fox; and, however widely these two great men were divided on most other subjects, it at least received that weight of authority which arises from their entire coincidence of approbation. When this system was commenced in 1786, the sinking-fund was only £1,238th part of the debt; whereas it is now 1-63d of the whole debt, and 1-42d of the unredeemed portion: a result at once striking and satisfactory, more especially when it is recollected that it has been obtained in twenty years, whereof fourteen have been years of war. The war taxes, which have been raised to their present amount chiefly by the operation of the heavy direct taxes, were, first, the treble assessed taxes introduced by Mr Pitt, and more lately the property tax, which has been substituted in its room. The experience of the last year has amply demonstrated the expedience of the augmentation of that impost to ten per cent, which it was our painful duty to propose last year; for under its operation the war taxes have now reached £21,000,000 a-year, and the sinking-fund amounts to £8,390,000 annually.

35. "In the present state of the country, our war expenses cannot be calculated at less than thirty-two millions annually. To provide for this, independent of additional war taxes, which are now so heavy that we are not warranted in calculating on any considerable addition to their amount as likely to prove permanently productive, is the problem we have now to solve. To effect this, it is proposed in this and the three following years to raise a loan of £12,000,000; for the fourth year, or 1810, £14,000,000; and for the ten succeeding years, if the war

should last so long, £16,000,000 annually. In each successive year in which these loans shall be raised, it is proposed to appropriate so much of the war taxes as will amount to ten per cent on the sum so raised. Out of this ten per cent the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking-fund to provide for the redemption of the capital. When the funds are at 60, or interest at three per cent, such a system will extinguish each loan in fourteen years after it was contracted. The moment this is done, the war taxes impledged for the redemption of that loan should be repealed. Thus, as the loan of £12,000,000 will, on this supposition, be paid off by 1821, the £1,200,000 a-year of war taxes now pledged to its redemption will in that year be remitted. Upon examining this system, it will be found that it may be carried on for seven years, viz. from 1807 to 1814, without impledging any part of the income-tax; so that, if peace is then concluded, the whole income-tax may, without violating any part of the present system, be at once remitted—a most desirable object, as that is a burden which nothing but the last necessity should induce us to perpetuate beyond the continuance of hostilities.

36. "As, however, the ten per cent on the loan annually contracted is in this manner to be taken from the war taxes, means must be provided to supply that deficiency, which, if the war continues for a long tract of years, will, from the progressive growth of those burdens on the war taxes, become very considerable. To provide for this deficiency, it is proposed to raise in each year a small supplementary loan, intended to meet the sum abstracted for the charges of the principal loan from the public treasury; and this supplementary loan is to be borrowed on Mr Pitt's principle of providing by fresh taxes, laid on in the indirect form, or by the falling in of annuities, for the interest of the debt, and one per cent more to create a fund for its redemption. The loan so required this year will, from the excess of the war

taxes above the war expenditure, be only £200,000; the annual charges of which on this principle, will be only £18,338: and as annuities to the amount of £15,000 will fall in this year, it will not be necessary, either for the principal or supplementary loan, to lay on any new taxes at present. Taking an average so as to diffuse the burden created by these supplementary loans as equally as possible over future years, and setting off against them the sums which will be gained annually by the falling in of annuities, the result is, that it will only be necessary to raise, in the seven years immediately subsequent to 1810, £298,000 annually by new taxes; a sum incredibly small, when it is recollected that we are now in the fifth year of a renewed war, the most costly and momentous in which the country ever was engaged.

37. "Under the present system, with regard to the public debt framed upon the acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, no relief whatever will be experienced from the public burdens till a very distant period, probably from 1834 to 1844; and during the later years of the operation of the sinking-fund, it will throw such immense sums, not less than forty millions annually, loose upon the country, as cannot fail to produce a most prejudicial effect upon the money market, while the sudden remission of taxes to the amount of £30,000,000 a-year would produce effects upon artisans, manufacturers, and holders of property of every description, which it is impossible to contemplate without the most serious alarm. In every point of view, therefore, it seems to be highly desirable to render the sinking-fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present power, and diffusing over a greater number of years those extensive effects, which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last year of its operation. The arrangements prepared with this view are founded on the superior advantage of applying to the redemption of debt a sinking-fund of five per cent on the actual money capital, instead of one per cent on the nominal capital, or

amount of stock. This is to be the system applied to the loans of the first ten years; and in return for this advantage, it is proposed that when the present sinking-fund shall have so far increased as to exceed in its amount the interest of the debt then unredeemed, such surplus shall be at the disposal of parliament. By this means a larger sum will be annually applied to the sinking-fund from henceforward than could have been obtained under the old system; the whole loans contracted in future during the war will be redeemed within forty-five years from the date of their creation; and this without violating any of the provisions of the act 1792, establishing the present sinking-fund. Parliament, during the years of its final and greatest operation, will be enabled to administer a very great relief to the public necessities, and obviate all the dangers with which an undue rapidity in the defrayment of the debt would otherwise be attended.*

38. In opposition to these able arguments, it was urged by Lord Castlereagh, Mr Canning, and Mr Perceval—"This plan of finance proposes gradually to mortgage for fourteen years the whole of the war taxes for the interest of loans in war—a decided departure from all our former principles, which were to preserve religiously the distinction between war and permanent taxes, and which would, if carried into effect for any considerable time, deprive the nation of almost all the benefit to which it is entitled to look upon the termination of hostilities. The new plan, moreover, will require loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were adhered to. At the end of twenty years it appears, from the calculations laid before parliament, that this excess

will amount to the enormous sum of £126,000,000. The whole machinery of the new plan is cumbersome and complicated: the additional charges arising from that circumstance will amount to a very considerable sum. The ways and means intended to prevent the imposition of new taxes in future—viz. the expired annuities, together with the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt—are equally applicable *pro tanto* to mitigate their increase, under any other mode of raising loans that may be decided on; and their application in this way would be more advantageous than in the other, inasmuch as it is better to avoid contracting debt than to gain relief by a remission of taxation.

39. "It is futile to say that the public necessities compel us to have recourse to the perilous system of mortgaging the war taxes for the interest of future loans. It is here that the great danger of the new system consists: it is in breaking down the old and sacred barrier between the war and peace expenses, that the seeds of inextricable confusion to our finances in future are to be found. It is quite possible, as appears from the authentic calculations before parliament, to obtain the eleven millions a-year required for the deficiency of the war taxes below the war charges, without mortgaging these taxes, without the immense loans required under the new system, and without any material or unbearable addition to the public burdens. The mode in which this great object is to be attained is, by resolving that, when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking-fund in such year, instead of making provision for the interest of such loan in the taxes, the same shall be provided for out of the interest receivable on the amount of stock redeemed by the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt in that year. Any excess of national expenditure above the thirty-two millions to be fixed as the average amount of war expenditure, to be provided for in the usual manner. The data laid before parliament prove,

* The speech of Lord Henry Petty on this occasion is well worthy of the attention of all who wish to make themselves masters of the subject of the British finances during the Revolutionary war. It is the most distinct, luminous, and statesmanlike exposition on the subject which is to be found in the whole range of the parliamentary debates after the death of Mr Pitt.

that under this plan, in fourteen years of war, one hundred and ten millions less will be borrowed than under that proposed by the chancellor of the exchequer,* and though doubtless the sinking-fund will be greatly impaired, yet, after making allowance for its restricted operation from the charge of future loans on its amount, the total debt at the expiration of that period will be upwards of forty millions above that now proposed.

40. "Great evils both to the stockholders and the country must arise from the adoption of the new plan, in consequence of the enormous and inordinate loans, amounting before the close of the new plan to not less than forty or fifty millions of stock annually, which must be contracted. Such immense loans must tend powerfully to lower the value of the public securities, lead to an extensive and undue increase of the circulating medium, and a rapid depreciation in the value of money, attended with the most prejudicial effects upon many branches of industry, and a general insecurity on the part of the holders of property. Above all, the principle of placing at the disposal of parliament the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed, is calculated to lead to a much more extensive diversion of that fund from its destined purpose, than the system which Mr Pitt had established; inasmuch as the latter only proposed to derive aid from the sinking-fund during the war, and

only to the precise extent of the interest of the sum redeemed within the year, leaving the fund undiminished extent to operate upon the public debt on the return of peace; whereas the former places the surplus of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, absolutely, and unreservedly at the disposal of parliament, in peace as in war, without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802 shall be redeemed within forty-five years from that period. It is easy to foresee that such a power of appropriating a large part of the sinking-fund will be too powerful a temptation for the virtue of future governments to resist; and that the practical result will be, that *that noble institution will be irretrievably mutilated*, and the nation lose the whole benefit of the immense sacrifices for the benefit of posterity which it has made during the whole continuance of the present contest. The equivalent proposed to the fundholders of an additional five per cent sinking-fund on the war loans, is entirely deceptive; inasmuch as the depreciation of their property which must ensue from the improvident accumulation of loans in the market, with their necessary concomitant, an extensive and undue paper currency, must much more than compensate any additional value which it might acquire from this augmentation of the means of its liquidation."

41. The budget for the year 1807† was based on the new plan of finance; it included a loan of only £12,000,000, which was contracted on very advantageous terms, and the whole expendi-

* LORD H. PETTY'S PLAN.

| | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| War loans for fourteen years, | £270,000,000 |
| Supplementary loans for do., | 94,200,000 |

| | |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| | £314,200,000 |
| War taxes rendered permanent, | 401,231,000 |
| Unredeemed debt in 1820, at | |
| end of same time, | 9,180,000 |
| New taxes imposed, | 2,051,000 |
| New loans in 1820, | 32,000,000 |
| Sinking-fund in 1820, | 17,744,021 |

LORD CASTLEBROUGH'S PLAN.

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--------------|
| War loans, £11,000,000 a-year for | |
| 14 years, | £154,000,000 |
| Debt unredeemed at end of 1820, | 358,000,000 |
| War taxes rendered permanent, | none. |
| New taxes imposed, | 2,547,000 |
| New loan in 1820, | 11,000,000 |
| Sinking-fund in 1820, | 49,180,896 |

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 1014.

† The budget for 1807 was stated by Lord Henry Petty as follows:—

| | SUPPLY. |
|--------------------------------|-------------|
| Navy, | £16,997,837 |
| Army—Ordinary, | 15,465,811 |
| Extraordinaries arising, | 4,833,710 |
| Ordnance, | 3,743,715 |
| Miscellaneous, | 1,860,000 |
| Vote of credit, | 3,000,000 |
| Interest of exchequer bills, | 1,200,000 |
| Loyalty loan, | 350,000 |
| Deficiency of malt-tax, 1805, | 200,000 |
| For Great Britain and Ireland, | 47,150,573 |
| Deduct 2-17ths for Ireland, | 5,543,677 |

Expenditure of Great Britain, £41,004,896

ture was calculated on that system of making preparations for a long and protracted struggle, which the disastrous issue of the Prussian war gave too much reason to apprehend awaited the country.

42. The debates on Lord Henry Petty's able plan of finance are of little moment at this time, abandoned as his system soon was amidst the necessities and changes of future years; but the views brought forward on both sides were an essential deviation from the great principle of Mr Pitt's financial policy, and presaged the approach of times when the provident policy, so long upheld by his unshaken foresight, was to be abandoned with the common consent of both the great parties alternately intrusted with the administration of affairs. Mr Pitt's principle was to provide the interest of each loan annually contracted, and the one per cent destined for the extinction of its principal, by means of indirect taxes which thereafter formed part of the permanent revenue of the country till the debt was extinguished. But both Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh seem to have imagined that the time had now arrived when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise any increased revenue in this form; and accordingly the plans of both were characterised by the great and decisive step of providing for the charges of future debt, not by indirect and permanent taxes, but by other means imposing no additional *present* burden on the country, but of course, for that very reason, trenching on its *ultimate* resources. The former proposed to do this by mortgaging the war taxes for the charges of all the debt which might hereafter be contracted, and rendering the amount of those taxes thus mortgaged a permanent part of the peace revenue; the

| WAYS AND MEANS. | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Land and malt, | £2,750,000 |
| Surplus of Consolidated Fund, | 3,500,000 |
| War taxes, | 19,800,000 |
| Lottery, | 320,000 |
| Vote of credit, | 2,000,000 |
| Loan, | 12,000,000 |
| Surplus of 1805, | 171,000 |
| | £41,541,000 |

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 1075.

latter, by leaving untouched the war taxes, but appropriating to the interest of future loans part of the present sinking-fund, and thereby impairing to a proportionate extent its efficiency on the return of peace. Both implied a deviation from the cardinal point of Mr Pitt's system, the providing for the discharge of the interest of all debts out of *indirect taxes religiously set apart for that purpose*. And it is remarkable, as an example how much the fortunes and destinies of a state are often determined by the character and life of a single master-spirit, that this vast change, fraught, as experience has since proved it to have been, with the ruin of our financial prospects, and our probable ultimate subjugation, was simultaneously proposed by the leaders of both Whigs and Tories, as soon as that great statesman and his illustrious rival were laid in their graves.

43. Had the period arrived when it was totally impossible to provide for the charges of new loans by progressive additions to the peace revenue, this change, however prejudicial, would not have been a matter of regret more than any other unavoidable calamity. But experience has now sufficiently demonstrated, that this was very far indeed from being the case; for, down to the very end of the war, new taxes were imposed to an extent that, *a priori*, would have been thought impossible. In the years 1813 and 1814, the sums annually raised by taxation exceeded seventy millions a-year. As it was, therefore, the discussions which ensued on the rival finance projects of Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh unnecessarily gave the first and shock to the firm and provident system of Mr Pitt's finance, by breaking down the barrier which had hitherto kept the funds destined for the discharge of the debt sacred from the avidity and shortsighted desires of the people, and accustoming them to regard both the revenue set apart for that purpose, and the war taxes during peace, as a fund to which they might have recourse to relieve the war pressure of the moment.

44. Of the two, if it had become necessary to make choice of one or other,

the system of Lord Henry Petty was the most manly and statesmanlike with reference to domestic administration, inasmuch as it was not calculated to trench upon the sinking-fund, until it had become equal to the loans annually contracted, by which means the increase of the amount of the whole debt, after that period, would have been rendered impossible; and proposed, in the mean time, to pledge the war taxes for the interest and charges of the sums borrowed. Whereas that of Lord Castlereagh proposed at once to lay violent hands upon the sinking-fund for the charges of all future loans, and yet give the nation the full benefit of the remission of all the war taxes on the return of peace. The former system, however, though well adapted to a state of uniform and long-continued hostility, was totally unsuitable to the varying circumstances and fleeting changes which were likely to ensue in the course of the contest in which the nation was actually engaged; and by encouraging a morbid sensitiveness to any extraordinary advances at a particular time beyond what the general system warranted, was too likely to occasion the loss of the fairest opportunities of bringing it to a successful issue. Of this unhappy tendency the issue of the war in Poland, starved out, as we shall presently see it was, by an ill-judged economy on the part of Great Britain, afforded a memorable example. And in the habit acquired by the nation in these discussions to regard the sinking-fund, not as a sacred deposit set apart, like the life-insurance of an individual, for the benefit of posterity, but as a resource which might be instantly rendered available for present necessities, is to be found the remote cause of the great change of 1813 in our financial policy, and the total departure from any regular system for the redemption of the public debt—a change which is perhaps to be regarded as the greatest evil entailed upon the nation by the renowned embarrassments and democratic ascendancy of later times.

45. Long as the preceding summary of the principal domestic measures of

the Whig administration has been, it will not in all probability be regretted by the reflecting reader. It is not as the record of mere events, but of thoughts and the progress of opinion, that history is valuable; and, independent of the importance of the changes which have been discussed upon the future history of the empire, they are in an especial manner worthy of attention, as embodying the principal domestic designs of the great party which, after so long a seclusion from office, at that period held the reins of power; and which, besides the acknowledged ability of its leaders, embraced a large portion of the thought and learning of the state. And upon an attentive consideration of these measures, it must be obvious to the candid reader that they were founded on just principles, and directed to important ends; that humanity and benevolence breathed in their spirit, and wisdom and foresight regulated their execution. Above all, they were characterised, equally with the measures of Mr Pitt, by that regard for the future, and resolution to submit to present evils for the sake of ultimate advantage, which is the mainspring of all that is really great or good, both in individuals and nations. On comparing the statesmanlike measures of the Whigs at that period in England, with the frantic innovations which tore society in pieces in France at the commencement of the Revolution, or which have been urged by the Chartists and Socialists in later times in Great Britain, the difference appears prodigious, and is highly deserving of attention. Thence may be learned both the important tendency of free institutions to modify those ardent aspirations after equality which, when generally diffused, are, of all other political passions, the most fatal to the cause of freedom, and the wide difference between the chastened efforts of a liberal spirit, when guided by aristocratic power, and modifying, not governing, the measures of government—and the wild excesses or atrocious crimes, destructive at once to present and future generations, which spring from the sur-

render of the actual direction of affairs to the immediate control or the passions of the people.

46. It remains to detail, with a very different measure of encomium, the principal foreign transactions of the Whig administration, from the period when the Prussian war commenced on the continent of Europe.

It has been already mentioned how Sir Home Popham, without authority from the British government, proceeded from the Cape of Good Hope to Buenos Ayres with a small military force, and how disastrous this expedition ultimately was. But the general transports of joy at the brilliant prospects which this acquisition was supposed to open to British commerce, were so excessive, that government, while they very properly brought Sir Home to a court-martial for his unauthorised proceeding, which in March 1807 reprimanded him for his conduct, had not firmness enough to withstand the general wish that an expedition should be sent to the river La Plata, to wipe away the disgrace which had there been incurred by the British arms, and annex such lucrative dependencies to the British crown. No sooner, accordingly, had it become evident, from the failure of the negotiations for peace at Paris, that a protracted struggle was to be apprehended, than a reinforcement of three thousand men was sent to the British troops in that quarter, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On arriving at the Rio de la Plata, he found the remnant of the English force cooped up in Maldonado, with hardly any provisions, and daily exposed to the insults of the accomplished horsemen of that country. Deeming that town unfit for being rendered a depot and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video—a fortified seaport, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great difficulties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood; but, on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were encountered. The defences of the place were found to be much stronger than had been expected;

the whole powder in the fleet was almost blown away in the first five days' firing; intrenching tools were wanting; and four thousand regular troops, with twenty pieces of cannon, a force fully equal to that of the besiegers, were rapidly approaching to raise the siege. In these critical circumstances Auchmuty resolved to hazard an assault, though the breach could as yet scarcely be called practicable; and orders were issued for the attack an hour before daybreak. Owing to the darkness of the night the head of the column missed the breach, and remained under the ramparts for twenty minutes exposed to a heavy fire, every shot of which told in their dense ranks. As the day dawned, however, it was discovered by Captain Renny, of the 40th regiment, who fell gloriously as he mounted it: the troops, emulating his bright example, rushed in with irresistible violence, cleared the streets of all the cannon which had been placed to enfilade them, and made prisoners all the enemy who attempted any resistance. In this glorious storm, the loss of the British was about six hundred, but twice that number of the enemy fell, and two thousand were made prisoners, besides a thousand who escaped in boats; so that the numbers of the garrison at first had been greater than that of the besieging force.

47. It would have been well for the British arms, if their attempts on South America had terminated here; but the discomfiture of Sir Home Popham's expedition to the Rio de la Plata, unhappily led both the government and the nation to conceive, that the honour of the British arms was implicated in regaining the ground they had lost in that quarter. With this view an additional expedition, under the command of General Craufurd, consisting of four thousand two hundred men, which had been sent out in the end of October 1806, destined originally to effect the conquest of Chili, on the other side of Cape Horn, was, when news arrived of the expulsion of the English from Buenos Ayres, ordered to stop short, and attempt the reconquest of that important city. General Craufurd, agree-

ably to these orders, made sail for the Rio de la Plata, and effected a junction with Sir Samuel Auchmuty at Monte Video in the beginning of June. As the united force now amounted to above nine thousand men, it was deemed advisable to make an immediate attempt on Buenos Ayres; and, in pursuance of express directions from government, the command of the force for this purpose was given to General Whitelocke.* That officer arrived at Monte Video on the 9th May, and preparations were immediately made for the proposed enterprise.

48. The force which set out on this expedition consisted of seven thousand eight hundred effective men, with eighteen pieces of field artillery. After several fatiguing marches, the whole reached Reduction, a village about nine miles from Buenos Ayres, and having manœuvred so as to deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage, succeeded in crossing the river, with very little loss, at Passo Chico. The army having been assembled on the right bank, orders were given for a general attack on the town. Great preparations for defence had been made by the inhabitants; above two hundred pieces of cannon were disposed, in advantageous situations, in the principal streets, and fifteen thousand armed men were stationed on the flat roofs of the houses, to pour their destructive volleys on the columns who might advance to the attack. The measures of the English general, so far from being calculated to meet this danger, the magnitude of which is well known to all experienced military men, betrayed a fatal and overweening contempt for his opponents. The different columns of attack were directed to advance by the principal streets to the great square near the river Plata; but, by an inconceivable over-

sight, they were not allowed to load their pieces, and no firing was permitted till they had reached the final place of their destination. The consequence was, that those brave men were exposed, as they advanced through the long streets leading to the great square, without the possibility of returning it, to a destructive shower of musketry, hand-grenades, and stones from the tops of the houses, all of which were flat and covered with an armed and enthusiastic population; while strong barricades were drawn at intervals across the streets, guarded by a plentiful array of heavy artillery.

49. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, however, the formidable nature of which was so fatally experienced by the royal guard of Charles X. in the streets of Paris in 1830, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, by a vigorous attack on the right, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. General Whitelocke himself had gained possession of an advanced post in the centre, and the Recedencia, a commanding station on the left, had also fallen into the hands of the British. But these advantages were dearly purchased; and in other quarters the plunging fire to which the troops were exposed, without the possibility of returning it, had proved so destructive, that three regiments had been compelled to lay down their arms, and the attacking force was weakened by the loss of twenty-five hundred men. On the following morning the Spanish general, Linières, offered to restore all the prisoners who had been taken, on condition that the British forces should withdraw altogether from Monte Video, and all the settlements which they held on the Rio de la Plata. Such was the consternation produced by the disasters of the preceding day, and such the difficulties with which the further prosecution of the enterprise appeared to be attended, that, notwithstanding the brilliant success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the capture of so large a portion of the enemy's artillery, these terms were agreed to, and a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole Brit-

* "As it has been thought advisable," said Mr Windham in his official orders, "that an officer of high rank, as well as talent and judgment, should be sent to take the command of his Majesty's forces in South America, it was his Majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of General Whitelocke."—*Mr Windham's Instructions to General Whitelocke*, 5th March 1807; *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 216.

ish troops were withdrawn from the river Plata, was signed on the following day.

50. The public indignation knew no bounds when the calamitous issue of this expedition was made known in Great Britain; and the outcry was the more vehement, from the glorious successes at Monte Video having inspired the people with an unreasonably low opinion of the South American forces. So violent was the clamour, that government, in order to appease it, were compelled to bring General Whitelocke to trial; and the court-martial which investigated the charges brought against him in January 1809, sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from his Majesty's service. No opinion, however, can be formed of the real merits of the case from this decision, whatever may have been the respectability of the officers composing it; for such was the happy ignorance which then generally prevailed in Great Britain on military subjects, that the members of the court-martial required to be told what the right bank of a river in military language means; and such is frequently the vehemence and unreasonableness of the public mind in England, on such occasions, that the strength of scarcely any intellect is equal to withstanding the torrent. The examples, also, of Saragossa, Gerona, and Paris have, since that time, abundantly demonstrated that the resistance of an insurgent population, in barricaded streets and on the roofs of stone houses, is often extremely formidable, even to powerful bodies of disciplined troops.

51. But on a calm retrospect of these transactions, at this distance of time, it cannot be denied that an energetic and skilful general might, in all probability, have extricated the British army, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, from this ill-concerted enterprise. The order to traverse the streets with muskets unloaded, after a desperate resistance was prepared and foreseen, though expressly approved of by the court-martial, seems hardly reconcilable to any rule of military policy or common sense; and above all, the

omission to take advantage of the great success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the powerful train of artillery which he had captured, if not to achieve success, at least to avert dishonour, must justly be considered as a matter of reproach to the British general. Much allowance must, however, be made for the critical situation of an inexperienced officer, plunged, in his first essay in a separate command, in difficulties under which the intellects of Marmont and Lefebvre subsequently reeled. But the same excuse cannot be made for the government, which selected for so important a service an officer unknown to fame, when many others had proved their capacity even in the comparatively inconsiderable military operations in which England had hitherto been engaged.* But this weight of secret parliamentary influence is the inherent bane of a free constitution; it appeared afterwards, on a still greater scale, on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, and continued to paralyse all the military operations of England, till the commanding genius of Wellington burst through the trammels, and fixed the flickering light of its glory in a star of unquenchable lustre.

52. In other colonial transactions, the British arms during this administration were more prosperous. Curaçoa, early in the year, was taken, with hardly any resistance, by a squadron of frigates under the command of Captain Brisbane; the advantages of sharing in British commerce, and obtaining the protection of the British flag, having now disposed the planters, in all the colonial possessions of other states, to range themselves under its banners. Soon after, a regular constitution was

* The appointment of General Whitelocke over the head of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the hero of Monte Video, appears the strongest confirmation of these remarks, but in reality it is not so; for that town was stormed on Feb. 2, and General Whitelocke's appointment is dated March 5, in the same year: so that the one was not known when the other took place. It is the overlooking too many officers who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, India, and at Maida, which forms the real reproach to the British government on this occasion.

proclaimed in Hayti, by which slavery was for ever abolished; property and persons were placed under the safeguard of the law; the first magistrate of the republic was declared the generalissimo of its forces by sea and land; and a code established, breathing a spirit of wisdom, philanthropy, and moderation. The establishment of such a republican government, coming so soon after the heroic resistance which the negroes had opposed to the attempt at their subjugation by Napoleon, would have been a subject of the highest interest, and deserving of the warmest sympathy of every friend to humanity, were it not that experience has since abundantly proved, what historical information might even then have too clearly led the well-informed to anticipate, that all such attempts at the regeneration of mankind by sudden changes, are not only delusive, but pernicious; that to give to savages the liberty and institutions of civilisation, is to consign them to immediate suffering and ultimate slavery; and that every attempt to transfer at once into one age or nation the institutions of another, is as hopeless a task as to expect in the nursery-seedling the strength and solidity of the aged oak, or in the buoyancy and irreflexion of childhood the steadiness and perseverance of maturer years.

53. This untoward expedition to the shores of the La Plata was not the only one which brought disgrace upon the arms of England at this period—enterprises equally unfortunate took place both on the shores of the Bosphorus and the banks of the Nile. It has been already mentioned, that Russia had unhappily selected the moment when the Prussian war, if not actually commenced, was at least obviously approaching, to invade the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia by the army of General Michelson, and we have noticed the disastrous effect which that distraction of force had upon the issue of the contest on the Vistula. This irruption, however ill-timed or imprudent, when so serious a war nearer home awaited the Russian forces, was not, however, unjustifiable; on the

contrary, it was provoked by the ambition of the French government, and the intrigues of their ambassador at Constantinople, which, by precipitating the Divan into a breach of the existing treaty with the court of Russia, gave to that power too plausible a ground for resuming its long-cherished schemes of ambition on the banks of the Danube.

54. By the treaty of Jassy, which terminated the bloody and disastrous war which the Turks had long waged with the might of Muscovy and the genius of Suwarroff, it had been covenanted that the hospodars, or governors, of Wallachia and Moldavia should not be dismissed from their high functions for the space of seven years; and, by the supplementary treaty of 24th September 1802, it had been expressly stipulated, in addition, that they should not be removed without the consent of Russia. No sooner, however, had it become evident to Napoleon that a war was impending with Prussia and Russia, than he despatched a firm and skilful ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to do everything in his power to produce a rupture between the Turks and Russians, and in this manner effect a powerful diversion to the Muscovite forces on the banks of the Danube. This diplomatic agent was General Sebastiani, a military officer of great experience, and whose subtle and penetrating genius, formerly nourished in a cloister, and since matured amid the experience of camps, was admirably adapted for the mingled acuteness and resolution required in the mission with which he was now intrusted. His secret instructions were, in the first instance, to endeavour to procure the dismissal from the government of these provinces of the Princes Ipsilanti and Morusi, who were in the interest of Russia, and place in their stead princes of the rival families of Suzzo and Callimachi, who it was known would incline to the French alliance.

55. When Sebastiani arrived at the Turkish capital, in August 1806, he found matters in a situation extremely favourable to the attainment of these

objects. The Sultaun, in his attempts to introduce the European tactics and discipline into his armies, of the need of which the recent wars with Russia had afforded repeated and fatal experience, and of which a detailed account will be given in a future chapter, had become embarrassed with very serious difficulties. He found himself obstinately resisted not only by the proud and disorderly bands of the Janizaries, but by that powerful party in all the Ottoman provinces who were attached to their national and religious institutions, and regarded the introduction of European customs, whether into the army or the state, as the first step to national ruin. In this extremity, he gladly embraced the proffered council and assistance of the French ambassador, who represented a power which naturally connected itself with the innovating party in every other state, and whose powerful armaments, already stationed in Dalmatia, promised the only effectual aid which could be looked for from the European nations against the Turkish malcontents, whom it was well known Russia was disposed to support. The difficulty arising from the necessity, in terms of the treaty, of consulting Russia in regard to the removal of the obnoxious hospodars, was strongly felt; but the art of Sebastiani prevailed over every difficulty. At a private conference with the Sultaun in person, he succeeded in persuading that unsuspecting sovereign that the clause in the convention of 1802 applied only to the removal of the waiwodes on the ground of maladministration in their respective provinces, but could not extend to a case where it was called for by the general interests of the empire; and that the present was an instance of the latter description, from the notorious intrigues of those princes with the hereditary enemies of the Ottoman faith: and, in pursuance of these representations, a hattîscheriff appeared on the 30th August, dismissing the reigning hospodars, and appointing Princes Suzzo and Callimachi in their room.

56. This decisive step was taken by the Sublime Porte not only without the

concurrence of Russia, but without the knowledge of any members of the diplomatic body at Constantinople; and as its immediate effect in producing a rupture between the Divan and the court of St Petersburg was distinctly foreseen, the effect produced by its promulgation was very great. The Russian ambassador, M. Italinski, loudly complained of the infraction of the treaty, in which he was powerfully supported by Mr Arbuthnot, the minister of Great Britain, who openly threatened an immediate attack on the Turkish capital from the fleets of their respective sovereigns. Sebastiani, however, skillfully availed himself of the advantages which the course of events gave him, to secure and increase the French influence with the Divan. No sooner, therefore, did intelligence arrive of the refusal of the Russian government to ratify the treaty concluded by d'Oubril at Paris, than he renewed his efforts, and, representing the cause of France as now identified with that of the Sublime Porte, loudly demanded that the Bosphorus should be closed to Russian vessels of war or transports, and announced that any continuation or renewal of alliance with England or Russia would be considered as a declaration of war against the French Emperor. These remonstrances proved successful; and a few days afterwards a Russian brig, which presented itself at the mouth of the Bosphorus, was denied admission. These measures irritated so violently the Russian ambassador, that he embarked on board the English frigate Canopus, and threatened instantly to leave the harbour, if the dismissed hospodars were not forthwith reinstated in their possessions. In these efforts he was powerfully seconded by Mr Wellesley Pole, who, in the absence of Mr Arbuthnot, detained by fever at Buyuckdere, presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced, that if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes. Intimidated by this bold language, as well as the

haughty air of the person who used it, and secretly aware of the weakness of the defences of the capital on that side, the counsellors of Selim recommended a temporary concession to the demands of the allied powers; the hospodars were reinstated in their governments, and ample promises made to the Russian ambassador of satisfaction for all his demands. But these conciliatory measures were only intended to gain time; and in a secret conference with Sebastiani, the Sultaun informed that minister that he had only yielded to the storm till he was in a condition to brave it, and that his policy, as well as his inclinations, inseparably united him with the Emperor Napoleon.

57. Matters were now, to all appearance, accommodated between the Divan and the cabinet of St Petersburg; but the great distance between the two capitals brought on a rupture when all cases of irritation had ceased, at the point where their interests came into collision. As soon as intelligence of the dismissal of the hospodars reached the Russian cabinet, they despatched orders to General Michelson, whenever his preparations were completed, to enter the Turkish territory; and when intelligence was received of their being reinstated on the 15th October, which did not arrive at the Russian capital till the beginning of November, it was too late to prevent the fulfilment of the previous orders and the commencement of hostilities. Michelson accordingly entered Moldavia on the 23d November, and having once drawn the sword, the cabinet of St Petersburg had not sufficient confidence in the sincerity of this forced submission on the part of the Sublime Porte, to restore it to its sheath; or possibly they were not sorry of an opportunity of extending themselves towards the Danube, and advancing their permanent schemes of conquest towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the restoration of the hospodars, therefore, their armies continued to advance, driving the Turks before them, to the no small confusion of M. Italinaki, who had uniformly declared, both in public and private, that, as soon as that event was

known at St Petersburg, their march would be countermanded.

58. Sebastiani, meanwhile, made the best use of this now unjustifiable invasion, as well as of the consternation produced by the victories of Napoleon in Prussia, to increase the French influence with the Divan. He strongly represented that this was the time, when Russia was already hard pressed by the victorious arms of the French Emperor on the Vistula, to throw their weight into the scale, and regain, in a single successful campaign, the influence and possessions which had been wrested from them by their inveterate enemies during more than a century of previous misfortunes. Persuaded by such plausible arguments, and irritated at the continued stay of the Russian troops in the principalities, after the causes which had justified their entrance into them had ceased, the hesitation of the Divan was at length overcome, and war was formally declared against Russia in the end of the year. To protect the Muscovite ambassador from the fury of the Mussulmans, which was now fully aroused, the Sultaun stationed a guard of janizaries over his palace. Mr Arbuthnot strongly remonstrated against his being sent, according to previous custom, to the Seven Towers. General Sebastiani had the generosity to employ his powerful influence for the same purpose; and, by their united influence, this barbarous practice was discontinued, and M. Italinaki was permitted to embark on board the English frigate *Canopus*, by which he was soon after conveyed into Italy. Less humane, however, towards his own satraps than towards the ambassadors of his enemies, the Sultaun despatched his messengers with the bowstring to Prince Ipsilanti; but that nobleman, in whom energy of mind supplied the want of bodily strength, succeeded in throwing down the executioners after they had got hold of his person, and had the good fortune to escape into Russia.

59. Though war was thus resolved on, the Porte was far from being in a condition at the moment to oppose any effectual resistance to the powerful

army of General Michelson, which had entered the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Forty thousand Russian troops, amply provided with every necessary, were irresistible. Moldavia was speedily overrun; the victorious bands, following up their success, entered Wallachia; a tumultuary force which the Pasha of Boudchouck had raised to arrest their progress was defeated; and Bucharest, the capital of the latter province, and a city containing eighty thousand inhabitants, fell into their hands. Before the end of the year, and before war had been formally declared on either side, they were already masters of all the territory to the north of the Danube; and their outposts, preparing to cross that river, were in communication with Czerni George, the chief of Servia, who had revolted from the Grand Seignior, defeated his forces in several encounters, and was at this time engaged in the siege of the important fortress of Belgrade.

60. The rapidity and magnitude of these successes, however, was the occasion of no small disquietude to the court of St Petersburg. They had now felt the weight of the French troops on the Vistula; their arms had retired from doubtful and well-debated fields at Golymin and Pultusk; and they had become sensible of the imprudence of engaging at the same time in another contest, and dispersing on the banks of the Danube the troops so imperiously required for the defence of their own frontier. Already an order had been despatched to recall four divisions to support the extreme left of the army in Poland, whose arrival and operations under Essen, against Savary at Ostrolenka, have already been noticed. But this was not sufficient; their diminished forces on the Danube might be exposed to serious danger from the efforts, and now fully aroused national spirit, of the Turks; and as the duration of the contest with France could not be foreseen, it was of the utmost moment to deprive the Emperor Napoleon of that powerful co-operation which he was likely to derive from the war so imprudently

lighted up on the southern frontier of the empire. The naval forces of England appeared to be precisely calculated to effect this object; and as they were cruising at no great distance in the Aegean Sea, it was hoped that a vigorous demonstration, against Constantinople might at once terminate the contest in that quarter. Application was made to the British government for this purpose; and the cabinet of St James's, however unwilling, under the direction of Mr Fox's successors, to engage in any military enterprises in conjunction with the Continental powers, was not averse to the employment of its naval forces in support of the common cause. They felt the necessity of doing something, after the refusal of both subsidies and land forces to Russia, to convince that power of the sincerity of its desire with its appropriate weapons to maintain the contest. Instructions, therefore, were given to Sir John Duckworth, who at the close of the year was cruising off Ferrol with four ships of the line, to proceed forthwith to the mouth of the Dardanelles, where Admiral Louis was already stationed with three line-of-battle ships and four frigates; and his orders were to force the passage of these celebrated straits, and compel the Turks, by the threat of an immediate bombardment, into a relinquishment of the French, and adoption of the Russian and English alliance.

61. The Hellespont or Dardanelles, which, from the days of Homer and the war of Troy to these times, has been the theatre of the most important operations in which the fates of Europe and Asia were concerned, is formed by the narrow strait through which the waters of the Black Sea discharge themselves from the lesser expanse of Marmora into the Méditerranean. Its breadth varies from one to three miles; but its course, which is very winding, amounts to nearly thirty; and the many, projecting headlands which advance into the stream, afford the most favourable stations for the erection of batteries. Its banks are less precipitous and beautiful than those of the Bosphorus—which is the appellation

bestowed on the still more bold and romantic channel which unites the Sea of Marmora to the Euxine—but they possess, both from historical association and natural variety, the highest interest; and few persons who have received even the rudiments of education can thread their devious way through the winding channel and smiling steeps, which resemble the shores of an inland lake rather than the boundary of two continents, without recurring in imagination to the exploits of Ajax and Achilles, whose tombs still stand at the entrance of the strait; the loves of Hero and Leander, yet fresh in the songs of the boatmen; the memorable contests of which it was the theatre during the Byzantine empire, the glowing picture by Gibbon of the Latin Crusade, the inimitable pictures by Lamartine of its romantic scenes, and the thrilling verses of Lord Byron on its classic shores.

62. The fortifications of these important straits, the real gates of Constantinople, had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The Castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, still stood in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage; but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside. The efforts of Sebastiani, seconded by the spirit of the Turks, whose religious enthusiasm was now fully awakened, had endeavoured in vain to attract the attention of the Divan to the danger which threatened them in this quarter. True to the Mussulman principle of foreseeing nothing, and judging only of the future by the past, they bent their whole attention to the war on the Danube, and despatched all their disposable forces to arrest the progress of the Servians and Czerui George, when a redoubtable enemy threatened them with destruction at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Duly informed of these circumstances, Mr Arbuthnot was no sooner apprised of the arrival of Sir John Duckworth off Tenedos, than he

delivered the ultimatum of Great Britain, which was the immediate dismissal of M. Sebastiani, the accession of Turkey to the alliance of Russia and Great Britain, and the opening of the Dardanelles to the vessels of Russia. These offers were peremptorily declined, and their refusal accompanied by a significant hint from General Sebastiani, that the Berlin decree, recently received at the Turkish capital, required the immediate arrest of all British subjects in all the territories of the allies of France, and that *Turkey was one of these allies*. Deeming his stay at Constantinople no longer secure, Mr Arbuthnot, under colour of going to dine with Admiral Louis, who in the Endymion frigate lay off Seraglio Point, withdrew from Constantinople, having first recommended his family to the care of General Sebastiani. That general honourably discharged the trust, but he was too skilful not to turn to the best advantage so unlooked-for an occurrence in his favour, and war was immediately declared by the Divan against Great Britain.

63. Hitherto everything had seconded beyond his most sanguine expectations the efforts of the French ambassador, but he was unable to persuade the Turkish government to take the requisite measures of precaution against this new enemy who had arisen. In vain he urged them instantly to put in repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles; in vain he predicted an immediate formidable attack from the fleet of England. Nothing was done to give additional security to the strait; and the Divan, persuaded that the only serious danger lay on the side of the Danube, continued to send all their disposable troops in that direction. Meanwhile the squadrons of Sir John Duckworth and Admiral Louis having effected a junction off Tenedos, their united forces amounted to eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb-vessels; but, the Ajax of seventy-four guns having unfortunately been destroyed by fire at this critical time, the squadron was reduced to seven line-of-battle ships. With these, however, the British admiral re-

solved to force the passage. Having taken his measures with much skill, he advanced with his ships in single file at moderate intervals, and with a fair wind, on the morning of the 19th February, entered the straits.

64. So completely were the Turks taken by surprise, that a feeble desultory fire alone was opened upon the ships as they passed the first batteries, to which the English did not deign to reply. But when they reached the Castles of Europe and Asia, where the straits are little more than a mile broad, a tremendous cannonade assailed them on both sides, and enormous balls, weighing seven and eight hundred-weight, began to pass through the rigging. The British sailors, however, meanwhile were not idle; deliberately aiming their guns, as the ships slowly and majestically moved through the narrow channel, they kept up an incessant discharge to the right and left, with such effect that the Turkish cannoners, little accustomed to the rapid fire and accurate aim of modern times, and terrified at the crash of the shot on the battlements around them, took to flight. Following up his triumphant course, the English admiral attacked and burnt the line-of-battle ship bearing the flag of the Capitan Pasha, lying at anchor in the straits; Sir Sidney Smith, the second in command, compelled four frigates to surrender, which were immediately after committed to the flames; a fifth, after an obstinate resistance, shared the same fate; and a brig, which with difficulty escaped from the conflagration, had scarcely announced the alarming tidings at Constantinople, when the British fleet, with all sails set, was seen proudly advancing, and cast anchor off the Isle of Princes, within three leagues of Seraglio Point.

65. No words can adequately paint the terror which prevailed in Constantinople, when the increasing sound of the approaching cannonade too surely announced that the defences of the straits had been forced; and shortly after, the distant light of the conflagration gave token of the rapid destruction of the fleet. This was much increased

when a message was received from Admiral Duckworth, half an hour after his arrival, which, after recapitulating all the instances of fidelity to the Turkish alliance which England had so long afforded, concluded by the declaration that if, in twenty-four hours, the demands of Great Britain were not acceded to, he would be reduced to the painful necessity of commencing hostilities. The capital was totally defenceless, not ten guns being mounted on the sea batteries; and a furious crowd was already assembled in the streets, demanding the heads of the Reis Effendi and General Sebastiani, the authors of all the public calamities. The consternation was universal; the danger, from having been never anticipated, was now felt with stunning force; and the Divan, having been assembled in the first moments of alarm, sent an intimation to General Sebastiani that no defence remained to the capital; that submission was a matter of necessity; and that, as the people regarded him as the author of all their misfortunes, his life was no longer in safety, and he would do well instantly to leave the capital.*

66. But his answer was worthy of the great and gallant nation which he represented. Receiving the messenger of the Sultaun in full dress, surrounded by all his suite, he immediately replied—"My personal danger cannot for an instant occupy my attention, when the maintenance of the French alliance and the independence of the Ottoman empire are at stake. I will not quit Constantinople, and I confidently expect a new decision, more worthy of Sultaun Selim and the Turkish nation. Tell your powerful monarch, that he should not for a moment think of descending from the high rank where the glorious deeds of his ancestors have placed him, by surrendering to a few

* The author has been informed by Sir Stratford Canning, the well-known and able British diplomatist at Constantinople, that it is currently stated in the East that Sebastiani was at first disposed to submit, and that it was the Spanish ambassador's remonstrances which awakened him to the energetic conduct which has shed such a lustre around his name.

English vessels' a city containing nine hundred thousand souls, and abundantly provided with magazines and ammunition. Your ramparts are not yet armed, but that may soon be done; you have weapons enough—use them with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to a part of the town—granted; but without the assistance of a land army, it could not take possession of the capital, even if you were to open your gates. You sustain every year the ravages of accidental conflagration, and the more serious calamities of the plague; and do you now scruple at incurring the risk of inferior losses in defence of your capital, your country, your holy religion?

67. This noble reply produced a great effect upon the Divan; and it was resolved that, before submitting, they should at least try whether, by gaining time in parleying, they could not in some degree complete their preparations. Sebastiani accordingly dictated a note in answer to the communication from the English admiral, in which the Sultaun professed an anxious desire to re-establish amicable relations with the British government, and announced his appointment of Allett-Effendi for the purpose of conducting the negotiation. The unsuspecting English Admiral, who, from the illness of Mr Arbuthnot, was intrusted with the negotiation, was no match for the wily French general in the arts of diplomacy, and fell into the snare. The British ultimatum was sent ashore the following morning, which consisted in the professions of cession of their fleet to England, the dismissal of Sebastiani, and the re-establishment of amicable relations with Russia and the British government. Half an hour only was allowed to the Divan, after the receipt and translation of this note, to deliberate and reply. Had this vigorous resolution been acted upon, it must have led to immediate submission: for the batteries were not yet armed; the fleet, the arsenal, the Seraglio, and great part of the town, lay exposed to the fire of the English squadron; and during the

terror produced by a bombardment, the greater part of the capital, which is chiefly built of wood, must have been reduced to ashes.

68. Unfortunately, instead of doing this, Sir John Duckworth, impressed with the belief that the Sultaun was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, and that the desired objects might be obtained without the horrors of a conflagration, or an irreparable breach with the Ottoman empire, imprudently gave time, and suffered himself to be drawn into a negotiation. Day after day elapsed in the mere exchange of notes and diplomatic communications; and meanwhile the spirit of the Mussulmans, now raised to the highest pitch, was indefatigably employed in organising the means of defence. The direction of the whole was intrusted to General Sebastiani, for whom a magnificent tent was erected in the gardens of the Seraglio, and who communicated to the ardent multitude the organisation and arrangement which long warlike experience had given to the officers of Napoleon. Men and women, grey hairs, young hands, the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, were to be seen promiscuously labouring together at the fortifications. Forgetting, in the general transport, the time-worn lines of religious distinction, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs set the first example of cordial acquiescence in the orders of government. Selim himself repeatedly visited the works; his commands were obeyed by two hundred thousand men, animated by religious and patriotic ardour to the greatest degree; while the French engineers, who had been sent by Marmont to aid in the war with the Russians, communicated to the busy multitude the inestimable advantages of scientific direction and experienced skill. Under such auspices, the defences of the harbour were speedily armed and strengthened; the naval arsenal furnished inexhaustible resources; in three days three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the batteries—at the end of a week their number was increased to a thousand; temporary parapets were everywhere

formed with gabions and fascines, where regular defences were wanting; the tower of *Leander* was armed with heavy artillery; a hundred gun-boats were drawn across the mouth of the Golden Horn; twelve line-of-battle ships within stood apparently ready for action; fire-ships were prepared, and numerous furnaces with red-hot shot kept constantly heated to carry into the British fleet the conflagration with which it menaced the Turkish capital.*

69. Although the English officers perceived, by means of their telescopes, the preparations which were going forward, and though the peril to the fleet was hourly increasing from the long continuance of a south-west wind, which rendered it impossible to pass the straits, yet nothing was done adequate to the emergency. The ships, indeed, were brought nearer to the Seraglio, and every effort made to bring the enemy, by negotiation, to an accommodation; but the pride of the Mussulmans, now fully aroused, would not have permitted the government to come to terms, even if they had been so inclined; and the influence of Sebastiani was successfully exerted to protract the conferences till the preparations were so far completed as to enable them to bid defiance to the enemy. The time when decisive success might have been attained had been allowed to pass away. Four days after the English fleet appeared off Constantinople, the coasts were so completely armed with artillery, as to render an attack eminently hazardous; in a week it was totally hopeless. The object of the expedition having failed, nothing remained but to provide for the safety of the fleet: but this was now no easy matter; for, during the week lost in negotiation, the batteries of the Dardanelles had all been armed, and the Castles of Europe and Asia, so strengthened as to render it an extremely hazardous matter to attempt

the passage. To complete the difficulties of the English admiral, the wind, which generally blows at Constantinople from the north-east, continued, ever after his arrival, fixed in the south-west, so as to render it totally impossible for him to retrace his steps.

70. At length on the 1st March, a breeze having sprung up from the Black Sea, all sails were spread, and the fleet re-entered the perilous straits. But it was not without difficulty, and with considerable hazard, that the passage was effected. A heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries; the headlands on either side presented a continued line of smoke; the roar of artillery was incessant; and enormous stone balls, some of them weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, threatened at one stroke to sink the largest ships. One of these massy projectiles carried away the main-mast of the *Windsor Castle*, which bore the admiral's flag; another penetrated the poop of the *Standard*, and killed and wounded sixty men. At length the fleet cleared the straits, and cast anchor off Tenedos, in such a situation as to blockade the Dardanelles, having sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men in this audacious expedition, which, though it proved unsuccessful from the errors attending its execution in the department of diplomacy, was both boldly conceived and ably executed, so far as the forcing the passage was concerned. It produced a very great impression in Europe, by revealing the secret weakness of the Ottoman empire, and demonstrating how easily an adequate maritime force, by thus bursting through its defences, and aiming a stroke at once at the vitals of the state, could subdue the strength of Islamism, and compel the submission of a power before which, in former times, all the monarchies of Europe had trembled.

71. After the departure of the English fleet, all amicable relations were, of course, suspended with the Turkish government; the preparations of the Sultan to strengthen the batteries both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles continued with undiminished

* The number of guns mounted on the batteries in six days was 917 pieces of cannon and 200 mortars—an instance of vigour and rapidity in preparing the means of defence perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world.—HARD. xi. 486; *Pieces Just.*

activity; and the influence of General Sebastiani with the Divan became unbounded. The case, however, with which the British fleet had surmounted all the defences of Constantinople, and the imminent risk which he had run of being deprived, by one blow, of the powerful aid of Turkey, gave the utmost uneasiness to Napoleon; and he despatched, without delay, orders both to Marmont in Illyria, and Eugene in Italy, to forward instantly a number of able officers, among whom were Colonel Haxo of the engineers, and Colonel Foy of the artillery, to co-operate in the strengthening of the defences of Constantinople. Six hundred men were directed to be forthwith put at the disposal of the Grand Seignior, and authority given for the transmission of five thousand, with abundant supplies in money and ammunition, if required. These reinforcements, however, were not required; for though the English fleet was shortly after joined by the Russian squadron, under Admiral Sinavin, yet they had too recently experienced the dangers of the straits to venture a second time into them, more especially after their defences had been so materially strengthened, as they soon were, by the operations of the French engineers. Contenting themselves, therefore, with taking possession of Lemnos and Tenedos for the service of their fleet, they established a close blockade of the entrance to the straits from the Archipelago; and as a similar precaution was adopted at the mouth of the Bosphorus, the supply of the capital by water-carriage on both sides was interrupted, and before long a very great dearth of provisions was experienced.

72. The Turkish government made the utmost efforts to man their squadron, but this was no easy matter, as the blockade deprived them of all intercourse with the Greeks, who constituted almost exclusively the nautical portion of their population. At length, however, the scarcity became so great that serious commotions took place in the capital; and the government having, by extraordinary severity, forced an adequate number of hands on board

the fleet, the Capitan Pasha ventured to leave the protection of the forts in the Dardanelles, and give battle to the Russian fleet. But the result was what might have been expected from a contest between an inexperienced body of men, for the most part unacquainted with naval affairs, and recently torn from civil occupations, and a squadron manned by seamen who yield to none in Europe in the resolution with which they stand to their guns.* Though the Turks fought with great gallantry, they could not withstand the superior skill and more rapid fire of their antagonists: four of their ships were early in the day drifted out of the line, and the unskilful crews were unable, or unwilling, to bring them again into fire; the remainder, after this great loss, were surrounded, and in great part destroyed. Four ships of the line were taken with the victor-admiral, three were burned, and the shattered remnant driven for shelter under the cannon of the Dardanelles. So overbearing did the pressure of the Russians at sea now become, that it threatened the utmost dangers to the Ottoman government; when the blockade of the capital was raised, and a temporary respite obtained by the treaty of Tilsit, which, as will immediately appear, established a short and falacious truce between these irreconcilable enemies.

73. Not content with this attack on the Turkish capital, the British government, at the same time effected a descent on the coasts of Egypt. Deeming the opportunity favourable for regaining possession of that important country, which was still warmly coveted by Napoleon, and the cession of which into the feeble hands of the Mussulmans had been long a subject of regret, the British government resolved to send an expedition to the shores of the Nile, at the same time that it threatened with bombardment the Turkish capital. The land troops, under the command of General Mackenzie, set sail from Messina on the 6th of March, and landed near Rosetta on the 18th. Alexandria

* "Lay your ship alongside a Frenchman," said Nelson, "but try to out-manceuvre a Russian or a Dane."

speedily capitulated; Damietta was also occupied without resistance; and General Fraser was detached with two thousand five hundred men to effect the reduction of Rosetta, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile, and the possession of which was deemed essential to the regular supply of Alexandria with provisions. This place, however, held out; and as immediate succour was expected from the Mamelukes, Colonel Macleod was stationed with seven hundred men at El Hammud, in order to facilitate their junction with the besieging force. This detachment was speedily surrounded by an overwhelming body of Turkish horse, and after a gallant resistance, which repelled the attacks of their numerous squadrons till the whole ammunition was exhausted, entirely cut off. The promised Mamelukes never made their appearance; and General Stewart, severely weakened by so great a loss, with difficulty made good his retreat, fighting all the way, to Alexandria, where he arrived with a thousand fewer men than he had set out.

74. The fortifications of that place, however, enabled the British to bid defiance to their desultory opponents; and it was soon found that the apprehensions of scarcity which had prompted this ill fated expedition to Rosetta were entirely chimerical, as provisions speedily became more abundant than ever. But the British government, in which an important change at this time took place, became sensible of the impolicy of longer retaining this acquisition at a crisis when every nerve required to be exerted to protect their shores from the forces of Napoleon. It was with lively satisfaction, therefore, that they heard of the conclusion of a convention in autumn, by which it was stipulated that all the British prisoners in the hands of the Turks should be released, and Alexandria surrendered to the latter; in virtue of which arrangement the English troops set sail from the mouth of the Nile in the end of September, and were brought to Gibraltar, where they were stationed, ere long co-operating in covering the retreat of the royal family of Portugal

from the Tagus, and ultimately taking a share in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns.

75. The public dissatisfaction arising from these repeated defeats was so strong, that it seriously shook the stability of the ministry, and produced a very general impression, even among that portion of the community who had hitherto supported them, that, however well qualified to direct the state during a period of profound peace, and when ample leisure was to be had for carrying into effect their projected reforms, they were not calculated for the existing crisis, in which these pacific ameliorations were of comparatively little consequence, and when what was imperatively called for was the capacity of warlike combination. But room was not afforded for this growing discontent to manifest itself in the usual way, so as to affect the fortunes of the administration, from another event at this time, which brought them into collision with the religious feelings of the sovereign, and ultimately led to their retirement from office.

76. It has been already mentioned that the general question of Catholic emancipation was brought forward in the session of 1804, and supported with all the weight and eloquence of the Whig party, (*Ante*, Chap. XXXIX. § 16). The ministerial leaders felt the necessity of making some effort, when in power, to redeem the pledges which they had so freely given when on the Opposition benches. Lord Grenville, in particular, who had formed part of the administration which resigned in 1801, in consequence of the declared repugnance of the sovereign to those concessions to the Catholics which Mr Pitt then deemed essential to the security of the country, considered himself called upon by every consideration, both of public policy and private honour, again to press them upon the legislature. In consequence of these impressions, Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey) moved, on the 5th of March, for leave to bring in a bill which should enable persons of every religious persuasion to serve in the army and navy, without any other condition but that

of taking an oath specified in the bill, which was repugnant to no religious opinions. By the existing law, a Catholic in Great Britain could not rise to the rank even of a subaltern, in consequence of the necessity of officers of every grade taking the Test Oath; while in Ireland, under an act passed in the Irish parliament in 1793, persons of that religious persuasion were permitted to rise to any situation in the army, excepting commander-in-chief of the forces, master-general of the ordnance, or general of the staff.

77 "Was it prudent," said Lord Howick, "when we were contending with so powerful an enemy, to prevent, in this manner, a large portion of the population of the Country from concurring in the common defence? What can be more anomalous than that in one united empire so great a discrepancy should prevail, as that on one side of St George's Channel a Catholic may rise to the highest rank in the army, but on the other he cannot hold even an ensign's commission? It was declared in 1793, when this restriction was removed by the Irish parliament, by his Majesty's ministers in both houses, that in two months they would grant a similar indulgence to persons of the Romish persuasion in Great Britain; but this had never yet been done, and this monstrous inconsistency continued to disgrace the laws of the United Kingdom. It may fairly be admitted that the principle of this relaxation applies equally to dissenters of every description, and that it must lead to a general admission of persons of every religious persuasion to the army and navy; but where is the danger of such liberality? The proposed measure only enables the sovereign to appoint such persons to offices of high importance. It does not compel him to do so; their appointment would still depend on the executive government, which would naturally avoid any dangerous or improper exercise of its authority: and would, on the contrary, be enabled to take advantage, in the common defence, of the whole population of the country, without any of those restrictions which

now, with a large proportion, damped the spirit or soured the affections."

78. On the other hand, it was strongly contended by Mr Perceval,—"The objections to this measure, strong as they are, are not so insuperable as to the system of which it forms a part, which originates in a laxity of principle on matters of religion, which is daily increasing, and threatens in its ultimate results to involve all our institutions in destruction. If it is desirable to preserve anything in our ancient and venerable establishments, it is indispensable to make a stand at the outset against any innovations in so essential a particular. This measure is, in truth, a partial repeal of the Test Act; if passed, it must at no distant period lead to the total repeal of that act, and with it to the downfall of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. The advocates of the Catholics argue as if their measures were calculated to support toleration, whereas, in reality, and in their ultimate effects, they are calculated to destroy that great national blessing, by subverting the Protestant establishment, by which toleration has been always both professed and practised, and reinstating the Romish, by which it has been as uniformly repudiated. From the arguments that are advanced at the present day, one would be inclined to imagine that there was no such thing as truth or falsehood in religion; that all creeds were equally conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind; and that, provided only the existing heats and dissensions on the subject could be allayed, it mattered not to what religious tenets either a government or a people inclined. True toleration is indeed an inestimable blessing, but it consists in permitting to every man the free exercise of his religion, not in putting into the hands of the professors of a hostile creed the means of overturning what they will never cease to regard as a pestilent heresy, and resuming from its present Protestant possessors the lost patrimony of St Peter in these islands.

79. "In point of law, it is incorrect to say, that a Catholic who has obtained a commission in Ireland is liable to

any penalties: the Mutiny Act authorises the King to require in any part of his dominions the services of every man in his army, and this is of itself a practical repeal of the disability affecting Catholics; for no man can be compelled to do what would subject him to a penalty. The argument that all offices should be thrown open to persons of all religious persuasions, is inconsistent with the British constitution as settled in 1688, which is root and branch a Protestant establishment. If pushed to its legitimate length, it would throw open all offices, even the Crown itself, to Catholic aspirants: what then becomes of the Act of Settlement, or the right of the house of Hanover to the throne? If this is to be the policy of our country, there is but one thing to be done—to do everything to transfer the church lands in Ireland to the Catholics, re-establish the Catholic faith, and call over the Pretender to the throne of these realms. These are the great and dazzling objects which the Romish party have in view; it was to exclude them that all the restrictions were imposed by our ancestors on the persons professing that faith; it is to gain them that all these minor concessions are demanded by their adherents, their advances are only the more dangerous that they are gradual, unperceived, and veiled under the colour of philanthropy. The Catholics already enjoy everything which toleration can demand; to ask more is to demand weapons to be used against ourselves. The consequences of a storm are little to be apprehended; it is the gradual approaches which are really dangerous. If parliament goes on allowing this

* Subsequent events, more particularly the fierce agitation for repeal in 1843, after Catholic emancipation had been conceded, and the miserable attempt at rebellion in 1848, have rendered these early debates and predictions on the effects of concession to the Catholics in the highest degree curious and interesting. Without pronouncing any decided opinion on a subject on which the light of experience is only now beginning to shine upon the world, it is the duty of the historian to urge the discussions on this subject on the attentive consideration of every candid inquirer, either into political wisdom or historic truth. So far back as 1803, Lord Redesdale wrote to government from Dublin:—"The present

accumulation, it will ultimately have that extorted from its weakness which its wisdom would be desirous to withhold."*

80. The second reading of this interesting bill was adjourned from time to time, without the nation being either alive to its importance, or aware of the quarter in which obstacles to its progress existed. But on the 24th March, it was suddenly announced in the newspapers that ministers had been dismissed; and two nights after, Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, and Lord Howick in the House of Commons, gave a full statement of the circumstances which had led to so unlooked-for a change. The draft of the bill, as usual in all matters of importance, had been submitted to his Majesty for his consideration; and it contained a recital of the Irish Act, which opened the army to Catholics for every grade, with the exception of the offices of master-general of the ordnance, commander-in-chief of the forces, and general of the staff; and then provided that the services of the Catholics should be received without any restriction, and on the condition only of taking the oath of allegiance. On this bill being proposed, the King manifested considerable objections to it; but these were at length so far overcome by the representation that the measure was a necessary consequence of the acts of 1793 and the union, so far as Ireland was concerned, that ministers were authorised to bring in the bill, and communications were made to the heads of the Catholics in Ireland, that they were to be admitted to every situation in the army, without exception. The King, however,

rebellion is a *beginning only*, that I cannot doubt. All the actors have been puppets worked by persons behind the scenes. You must immediately arm us with a suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. But you must do more; you must renew the martial law, or pass some other bill to enable the military to act with greater promptitude if the Lord-lieutenant shall see fit. We have done all we can, but armed rebellion must be met by arms. It is as necessary to destroy the influence of the terror of the rebels over the people's minds, as to meet them in the field."—**LORD REDSDALE** to **MR ADAMINGTON**, July 26, 1803. **PELLEW'S** *Edinburgh*, ii. 209.

had laboured under some misapprehension as to the extent and tendency of the measure which was to be brought forward, and believed that it was not intended to enlarge the facilities of admission created by the act 1793 for Ireland, but only to make that act the general law of the empire; for no sooner was its import explained in the debate which occurred on the first reading in the House of Commons, of which an abstract has already been given, than he intimated to the government that he had invincible objections to the proposed change.*

81. After some ineffectual attempts at a compromise, ministers, finding the King resolute, determined to withdraw the bill altogether, and intimated this decision to his Majesty, accompanied, however, with the conditions, that they should not be precluded from stating their opinions on the general policy of the measure in parliament, and that they should be at liberty, from time to time, to bring the matter again under his Majesty's consideration. The answer of the King, after expressing regret at the difference of opinion which had arisen, rejected these conditions as in-

* Lord Sidmouth stated in the House of Lords, "That he (Lord Sidmouth) had stated to his Majesty, that he had been induced to concur in the proposed measure, as a necessary consequence of the Irish Act of 1793, from the consideration of which, combined with the act of union, it appeared to him there was no alternative but either the repeal of the Irish Act, or the adoption of the measure. His Majesty then declared that he would not consent to any new concession, but that in consequence of the Irish Act, and of it alone, he would take the proposition of the cabinet into further consideration. The answer stated was, that "however painful his Majesty had found it to reconcile to his feelings, the removal of objections which might have the most distant reference to a question which had already been the subject of such frequent and distressing discussion, he would not, under the circumstances so earnestly pressed, prevent his ministers from submitting to the consideration of parliament the propriety of inserting the proposed clauses in the Mutiny Bill." While, however, the King so far reluctantly conceded, he thought it necessary to declare that he could not go one step further: and he trusted this proof of his forbearance would secure him from being at a future period distressed by any further proposals connected with the question."—*PELLER'S Life of Sidmouth*, ii. 455, 456.

consistent with the fundamental principle of the constitution, that the acts of government are to be held as those of the responsible ministers, and that the adoption or rejection of no measure is to be laid upon his Majesty; and as not less at variance with the fundamental basis of the Act of Settlement, which is rested on the exclusion of Catholics from the highest offices in the realm. His Majesty therefore required a written pledge from ministers that they would propose no further concessions to the Catholics. This pledge ministers, on their side, considered as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of a free constitution, which is, that the king can do no wrong, and that the responsibility of all public measures must rest with his advisers, and equally repugnant to that progressive change in human affairs which might at no distant period render a repetition of the proposal a matter of necessity. They therefore declined, though in the most respectful terms, to give the proposed pledge, and the consequence was, that the King, in gracious terms, sent them an intimation that their services were no longer required; and on the same day the Duke of Portland, Lord Hawkesbury, and Mr Perceval, received the royal commands to form a new administration. The King was perfectly firm on this occasion: he himself said he regarded his crown at stake in the question at issue.†

82. Parliament, after this unexpected event, was adjourned till the 8th April, and on that day the new ministers took their seats. The change of administration, of course, formed the first and most anxious subject of debate; and

† "The King considers the struggle as for his throne; and he told me but yesterday, when I took the great seal, that he did so consider it, that he must be the Protestant king of a Protestant country, or no king. He is remarkably well, firm as a lion, placid, and quick beyond example in any moment of his life. The late ministers are satisfied that the King, whose state of mind they were always doubting, has more sense and understanding than all the ministers put together: they leave him with a full conviction of that fact."—*LORD ELTON to Rev. Dr SWIRE*, April 1, 1807; *CAMPBELL'S Lives of the Chancellors*, vii. 207.

the interest of the country was excited to the highest degree, by the arguments which were urged for and against that important and unwonted exercise of the royal prerogative.* On the side of the former ministers, it was urged by Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Howick:—"The true question at issue is, whether or not it would have been constitutionally justifiable, or rather would not have been a high crime and misdemeanour, for any minister to have subscribed a written pledge that he would never in future bring a particular measure or set of measures under his Majesty's consideration. If any statesman could be found base enough to give such a pledge, he would deserve to lose his head, and the House would be guilty of a direliction of its duty, if it did not impeach a minister who so far forgot his duty to the country. This is a matter in which the interests of the crown were more at stake than even those of the people: for if the precedent is once to be allowed, that a minister is at liberty to surrender his own private judgment to the will of the reigning sovereign, it is impossible that the legal fiction, that the king can do no wrong, can any longer be maintained, and the great constitutional

* The new cabinet stood thus:—

CABINET

Earl Camden, President of the Council.
 Lord Eldon, Chancellor.
 Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal.
 Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance.
 Earl Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade.
 Lord Hawkesbury, Home Secretary.
 Mr Canning, Foreign Secretary.
 Lord Castlereagh, War and Colonial Secretary.
 Mr Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duchy of Lancaster.

NOT IN THE CABINET.

Mr Robert Dundas, President of the Board of Control.
 Mr George Rose, President of the Board of Trade.
 Sir James Pulteney, Secretary at War.
 Sir Vicary Gibbs, Attorney-General.
 Sir Thomas Plummer, Solicitor-General.
 Duke of Richmond, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.
 —*Parl. Deb.* ix. 111.

principle, that the acts of the king are those of his responsible advisers, will be at an end. Who could, in such a view, set bounds to the dangerous encroachments of unknown and irresponsible advisers upon the deliberations of government, or say how far the ostensible ministers might be thwarted and overruled by unknown and secret influence, which might totally stop the action of a constitutional government? The danger of the measure which has been adopted is only rendered the greater by the announcement now openly made, that in this, the most important step perhaps taken in his whole reign, his Majesty had no advisers. The constitution recognises no such doctrine; the advisers of the King throughout must be held to be those who have succeeded to his councils. There is no desire to bring the sovereign to the bar of the House of Commons; it is the new ministers who are really the subjects of deliberation. The late administration was dismissed because they refused to bind themselves by a specific pledge never to renew the subject of Catholic concession; a new ministry have succeeded them; they must be held therefore to have given that pledge; and it is for the house to say, whether such a direliction of public duty is not utterly at variance with every principle of constitutional freedom."

83. On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Eldon, Mr Perceval, and Mr Canning:—"The question on which the imprudent zeal of the late administration has brought them into collision with the religious scruples and political wisdom of the sovereign is not one of trivial moment, in which the monarch may be expected to abide by the judgment of his constitutional advisers. It lies, on the contrary, at the foot of the whole constitution; it constitutes one of the foundations *non tangenda non movenda*, on which the entire fabric of our Protestant liberties has been reared. The present question regards the transference of the sword to Catholic hands; the same question on which Charles I. erected his standard at Nottingham—the intrusting the direction of the military force to a

party necessary and permanently inimical to our Protestant constitution, both in church and state. It is absurd to suppose this concession would do anything towards satisfying the Catholics—it would only lead them to make fresh demands, and empower them to urge them with additional weight; and the consequence of the measure could be nothing else, in the end, but to bring Catholic bishops into the House of Lords. Was it surprising that the King paused on the threshold of such a question, striking, as it evidently did, at the root of the tenure by which his own family held their right to the throne?

84. "In demanding a pledge that such a proposal should not be renewed, he acted without any adviser, upon the unaided dictates of his own masculine understanding, aided by the conscientious scruples of his unsophisticated heart. All the talent of the cabinet could not blind him to the evident and inevitable, though possibly remote, consequences of such a fatal precedent as was now sought to be forced upon him. It is a palpable mistake to say he drew back in the later stages of the negotiation from what he had previously agreed to: he first gave a reluctant consent to the extension of the Irish Act of 1793 to Great Britain, in the firm belief that this was all that was required of him,—so the proposed measure was explained to and understood by him; and that he was not singular in this belief is proved by the fact, that the Irish Secretary had his doubts upon it, and that the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question as to the second reading of the bill, said there was no particular reason for the Irish members being present on that occasion, as they were already acquainted with the measure. Three cabinet ministers, viz. the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Ellenborough, refused to concur in the measure, when they understood how far it was to be carried; the Chancellor was not even summoned to the council at which it was to be discussed, though he was in a peculiar manner the keeper of the king's conscience; and even the

person who was commissioned to procure the King's consent to the measure did not understand the extent to which it was to be carried.

85. "Having thus been misled, whether designedly or inadvertently it mattered not, in so vital a particular by his ministers, was it surprising that the King should have required from them a pledge that they would not again harass him on the same subject? Undoubtedly no minister should give a pledge to fetter the exercise of his own judgment on future occasions; but that was not here required; for if circumstances in future might render a renewal of the measure necessary, they might at once resign. The King regarded this measure as a violation of his coronation oath, as destructive to the Protestant church in Ireland, and as likely in its ultimate effects to endanger our whole Protestant constitution. Unquestionably it was to be regretted that on any occasion the private opinion of the sovereign should be brought forward apart from that of his constitutional advisers; but for this evil those must answer who, by forcing on a rash and unnecessary measure, compelled him to rely on his own judgment alone. And it is some consolation to reflect, that, in proportion as the sovereign has made more constitutionally responsible in his own person, he must become better known to his people; and the soundness of judgment, promptness and vivacity of intellect, which have enabled him to bear up alone against the united weight of the cabinet, have only evinced, in the more striking manner, how worthy he is to fill the throne which his family attained by the principle he has now so manfully defended." Upon a division, there appeared two hundred and fifty-eight for the new ministers, and two hundred and twenty-six for the old—leaving a majority of thirty-two for the existing government.*

86. This majority, though sufficient

* In 1829, when the Catholic Relief Bill was introduced by Sir Robert Peel, Lord Eldon said in parliament—"If I had a voice that would resound to the remotest corner of the empire, I would re-echo the principle, that if ever a Roman Catholic is permitted to

to enable ministers to conduct the public business during the remainder of that session, was not adequate to carry on the government during the arduous crisis which awaited them in the administration of foreign affairs. They resolved, therefore, to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of parliament; and the event decisively proved that the King had not miscalculated the loyalty and religious feeling of the English people in this trying emergency. Parliament was prorogued on the 27th April, and soon after dissolved by royal proclamation. The utmost efforts were made by both parties on this occasion to augment their respective forces; to the usual heats and excitement of a general election were superadded the extraordinary passions arising from the recent dismissal of an administration from office, and consequent elevation of another in their stead. All the usual means of exciting popular enthusiasm were resorted to without scruple on both sides. The venality and corruption of the Tories, alleged to be so strikingly evinced in their recent elevation of Lord Melville, after the stain consequent on the 10th report of the commissioners, were the subject of loud declamation from the Whigs; the scandalous attempt to force the King's conscience, and induce a popish tyranny on the land, yet wet with the blood of the Protestant martyrs, was as vehemently re-echoed from the other. "No Popery," "No Popery," were the war-cries of the respective parties; and amidst banners, shouts, and universal excitement, the people were called on to exercise the most important rights of free citizens. To the honour of the empire, however, this great contest was conducted without bloodshed or disorder in any quar-

tern part of the legislature of this country, or to hold any of the great offices of government, from that moment the sun of Great Britain is set for ever. (A laugh.) My opinions may be received with contempt and derision; opprobrium may be heaped upon their author; but they shall not be stifled; and whatever calamities may befall the nation, it shall be known that there was one Englishman who boldly strove to avert them.

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ter; and the result decisively proved that, in taking his stand upon the inviolate maintenance of the Protestant constitution, the King had a great majority of all classes throughout the empire on his side. Almost all the counties and chief cities of Great Britain returned members in the interest of the new ministry; defeat after defeat, in every quarter, told the Whigs how far they had miscalculated the spirit of the age; and on the first division in the ensuing parliament they were overthrown by a great majority in both houses — that in the Peers being ninety-seven, in the Commons no less than one hundred and ninety-five.*

87. Though this important step of the King in dismissing the ministry was adopted on his own private judgment, and from the strength of his native resolution alone, yet it had the effect of bringing into a prominent place in his councils a man of great capacity, who held for nearly twenty years afterwards the important situation of chancellor, and whose powerful mind communicated its impress to the policy of government during the most momentous period of British history. John Scott, afterwards Lord Eldon, was born at Newcastle-on-Tyne, on 4th June 1751. He was the eighth son of William Scott, a respectable trader engaged in the coal business in that city; and his elder brother William, afterwards Lord Stowell, had been born on 17th September 1745, at Haworth, near the same town. Thus the same family had the singular good fortune of giving birth to the two greatest lawyers in their respective departments, and not the least remarkable men of their day. Their father not having been in affluent circumstances, they were sent to the Royal Grammar-school, a chari-

* The numbers were—

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----|
| In the Peers, for the Whigs, | 67 |
| ... for the Tories, | 164 |
| Majority, | 97 |
| In the Commons, for the Whigs, | 155 |
| ... for the Tories, | 350 |
| Majority, | 195 |

—Ann. Reg. 1807, 238-239.

table establishment in Newcastle, to which the sons of burgesses in that town were entitled, free of cost. John Scott there met a boy of equally obscure parentage — Cuthbert Collingwood, afterwards Lord Collingwood, the worthy companion of Nelson and St Vincent in the brightest days of England's glory. From such humble origin did the future rulers and statesmen of England at that period take their rise!

88. William Scott, the elder brother, early evinced such extraordinary abilities, that, at the age of sixteen, his parents were induced to put him forward as a candidate for a scholarship at Oxford, for the diocese of Durham, which he obtained in 1761. This laid the foundation of the fortunes both of himself and his younger brother John, who at the age of sixteen followed him to that celebrated seat of learning in 1766. William Scott soon obtained a fellowship, and gave lectures, which were much admired, on public law. John Scott took his degree in 1772, made a runaway marriage in the same year, which imposed on him the necessity of exertion, and in 1774 and 1775 gave lectures on law as deputy for Robert Chambers, professor of law, for which he was glad to receive £60 a-year. In 1775 he was called to the bar; and although he experienced the usual amount of disappointment which almost invariably, in that profession, precedes eminence, yet such was the vigour of his mind, and the unconquerable perseverance of his character, that it soon became evident to his friends that opportunity only was wanting to make him rise to the highest eminence. The opportunity came earlier to him than it does to many others with equal powers and anxiety to do well. After four years of severe labour and no progress, he fortunately obtained an opportunity of being heard in a question of disputed succession* in which his learning ultimately prevailed with Lord Chancellor Thurlow, though the decision had been adverse in the court

below. That case made his fortune. He was soon after taken into the great case of the Clitheroes election, before a committee of the House of Commons, and, from the admirable appearance he made there, rapidly rose to the head of his profession. His secret for doing so was energetically expressed by himself in a few words, "To live like a hermit, and work like a horse," — a rule which will probably insure success, even to ordinary abilities, in other professions besides the bar. In 1783 he received a silk gown from the coalition administration, and in the same year was elected member of parliament for Weobly. In 1788 he was appointed solicitor-general, and knighted. In 1793 he was elevated to the rank of attorney-general, and in that capacity conducted the memorable treason trials of Hardy and Horne Tooke in the succeeding year. Finally, in 1801, on the resignation of Lord Loughborough, he was appointed Lord Chancellor by the title of Lord Eldon.

89. Lord Eldon enjoyed a larger share of the confidence of George III. and the great majority of the royal family, than any other minister after the death of Mr Pitt; and his views influenced in a material degree the conduct of that monarch on many important occasions, and on none more than in the stand he made against the Catholic claims in 1806. Similarity of character, identity of principles, was the cause of this strong prepossession and daily increasing influence. Lord Eldon was in the cabinet what the king was on the throne. Both were thoroughly English in their ideas and character. They had the virtues equally with the failings, the excellencies and the defects of that temperament. Moral courage, fearless determination in council, was the grand characteristic of both. Neither had very extensive information out of the circle of their professional habits, (if such a word can fitly be applied to a sovereign), but both had a large share of that strong good sense, practical sagacity, and clear perception, which so often, in the real business of life, obtain the mastery both of knowledge, genius,

* *Ackroyd v. Smithson*; *Brown's Chancery Cases*, i. 505.

and accomplishments. "Church and King" was Eldon's motto, and adherence to the constitution in all points his ruling principle. He was the last of the sturdy old patriots of former and more quiescent days, and stands forth in history as the "ultimus Romanorum"—the latest relic of a race which, by their firmness and resolution, created the British empire. As a lawyer, his learning was unbounded, his understanding sound, his memory prodigious; and although the strength of his conscientious feelings in deciding cases in the court of last resort often led to distressing delays, yet his judgments, when they were pronounced, were almost always right, and have attained a weight which belongs to none others in Westminster Hall.

90. On reviewing the external measures of the Whig administration, it is impossible to deny that their removal from office at that period was a fortunate event for the British empire in its ultimate results, and proved eminently favourable to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Notwithstanding all their talent—and they had a splendid array of it in their ranks,—notwithstanding all their philanthropy—and their domestic measures were generally dictated by its spirit;—they could not at that period have long maintained the confidence of the English people; and their unfortunate shipwreck on the Catholic question only accelerated a catastrophe already prepared by many concurrent causes. External disaster, the reproaches of our allies, the unbroken progress of our enemies, must ere long have occasioned their fall. The time was not suited, the national temper not then adapted, for those domestic reforms on which the wishes of their partisans had long been set, and which in pacific times were calculated to have excited so powerful a popular feeling in their favour. The active and ruling portion of the nation had grown up to manhood during the war with France; the perils, the glories, the necessities of that struggle were universally felt; the military spirit had spread, with the general arming of the people, to a de-

gree hitherto unparalleled in the British Islands. Vigour in the prosecution of the contest was then indispensably necessary to obtain general support; capacity for warlike combination the one thing needful for lasting popularity. In these particulars the Whig ministry, notwithstanding all their talents, were eminently deficient; and the part they had taken throughout the contest disqualified them from conducting it to a successful issue. They had so uniformly opposed the war with France, that they were by no means equally impressed, as the nation was, either with its dangers or its inevitable character: they had so strenuously on every occasion deprecated the system of coalitions, that they could hardly, in consistency with their former principles, take a suitable part in that great confederacy by which alone its overgrown strength could be reduced. Their system of warfare, accordingly, was in every respect adverse to that which the nation then desired,—founded upon a secession from all alliances, when the people passionately desired to share in the dangers and glories of a Continental struggle; calculated upon a defensive system for a long course of years, when the now aroused spirit of the empire deemed it practicable, by a vigorous and concentrated effort, to bring the contest at once to a successful termination.

91. The foreign disasters, which attended their military and naval enterprises in all parts of the world, profoundly affected the British people, more impatient than any in Europe both of the expense of warlike preparation and of defeat in warlike adventure. The capitulation at Buenos Ayres, the flight from Constantinople, the catastrophe in Egypt, succeeding one another in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly that they occurred on the theatres of our greatest triumphs by land and sea, or blasted hopes the most extravagant of commercial advantage. And yet it is now abundantly evident that defeat on the shores of the La Plata and the banks of the Nile was more to be desired than victory; and that no

calamity could have been so great as the successful issue of these expeditions. They were conceived in the most inconsiderate manner, and aimed at objects which, if gained, must have paralysed the strength of the empire. At the moment when the armies of Napoleon were crossing the Thuringian forests, ten thousand English soldiers embarked for South America: when the scales of war hung even on the fields of Poland, five thousand men were sent to certain destruction amidst the cavalry of Egypt. Their united force, if thrown into the scale at Eylau, might have driven the French Emperor to a disastrous retreat across the Rhine, and induced, seven years before they occurred, the glories of Leipsic and Waterloo. What could be more impolitic than, after Russia had given such decisive proof of its extraordinary resolution and devotion to the cause of Europe, in February 1807, to send out a miserable little expedition to Alexandria in March following, too large for piracy, too small for conquest, and the success of which could have no other effect but that of riveting the hostility of Turkey to Russia and its allies, and thereby securing to Napoleon the inestimable advantage of a powerful diversion on the side of the Danube? What more impolitic than, when the finances of that great power were exhausted by the extraordinary expenses of the contest, to refuse to the Emperor not only a subsidy, but even the British guarantee to a loan which he was desirous of contracting in the British dominions, unless accompanied by the cession of custom-house duties in Russia in security?—dealing thus with the greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was perilling his very crown in what was our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief.*

92. The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for contracting the closest alliance with the Russian government—for the instant advance of loans to any amount, and the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This

was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoleon had drawn him into a situation full of peril. For the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle; and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitation of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and, by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French Emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals to his repeated and most earnest applications for assistance, and saw the land force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the hazardous conflict in which he was now exclusively engaged?*

* "In the foreign office," said Mr Canning, when minister of foreign affairs in 1807, "are to be found not one but twenty letters from the Marquis of Douglas, ambassador at St Petersburg, intimating in the strongest terms, that unless effectual aid was sent to the Emperor of Russia, he would abandon the contest." Ample proof of this exists in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid before parliament. On 28th November 1806, the Marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, from St Petersburg—"General Budberg lately told me that his imperial majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coast of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his imperial majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in

93. To these general censures on the foreign policy of England at this juncture, an exception must be made in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was ably conceived and vigorously entered upon. The stroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart of her adversary; the fire of Duckworth's broadsides was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylan; if successful, they would have added forty thousand men to the Russian standards. This object was so important that it completely vindicates the expedition; the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the

disposal of the British admiral was not such as to have rendered victory a matter of certainty. As it was, however, it was adequate to the object; and this bold and well-conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sebastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British admiral, who, however gallant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those

England." On 18th December 1806, he again wrote—"At court this morning his imperial majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expediency of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On 2d January 1807—"I have again heard the strongest complaints that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January 14th—"I must not conceal from your lordships that the silence of his majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France, has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." On January 26th—"Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February 4th—"During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February 15th—"I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain, to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances, and urgent calls for aid, the British government did nothing; they declined to guarantee the loan of six millions, which was indispensable to the equipment of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On January 13th, Lord Howick wrote—"In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his majesty feels it to be his duty to preserve as much as possible the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in his-

tory an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony; "husbanding," as Mr Canning afterwards said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of the military then lying idle in the British Islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of eighty thousand men in the British Islands. Her military force, Jan. 1807, was as follows:—

| REGULARS. | |
|--|---------|
| Cavalry at home, | 20,041 |
| Infantry ditto, | 61,447 |
| Total ditto, | 81,488 |
| Infantry abroad, | 92,114 |
| Cavalry ditto, | 6,274 |
| Total, | 180,876 |
| MILITIA | |
| In Great Britain, | 53,810 |
| In Ireland, | 24,180 |
| Total, | 77,990 |
| VOLUNTEERS | |
| Infantry, | 254,544 |
| Cavalry, | 26,342 |
| Artillery, | 9,420 |
| Total, | 289,306 |
| Total in arms in British Isles—of whom 81,488 were regulars, | |
| | 448,784 |

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1809 England had above seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.—*Parl. Paper*, July 18, 1807; *Parl. Deb.* ix. 111, Appendix.

precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

94. After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expeditions, and the severe mortification which their failure occasioned to the British people, had a favourable effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric characters of his maritime expeditions; but they were important, in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowed by the grandeur and extent of his Continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and Continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources against

the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disaster and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic, as well as unworthy of its resources, for so great a nation to waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue: the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired, and that general longing after military renown was felt which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular War, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.

APPENDIX

CHAPTER XXXIX.

NOTE A, p. 5.

THIS state-paper, the most remarkable in the whole Revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the narrative of the text :—

“From the report of Prince Czartoriski, and the confidential communications received from the cabinet of St Petersburg, his Majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the Emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The King, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the Emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability, to take a part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependent.

“With these designs the first point is, to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coalesced powers.

“It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the Emperor, with which those of the King are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads :—1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution, and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandisement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

“The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the Emperor and King would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to

unite to Great Britain and Russia, the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal, as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

"The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish as much as possible their ancient rights, and to secure the wellbeing of their inhabitants: but in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that wellbeing is mainly dependent.

"It follows from this principle, that if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed, that they cannot be re-established, or because they are so situated, that their independence could only be nominal, and equally incompatible with their own security, or that of Europe in general. Happily the greater number stand in the first predicament. If the arms of the Allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Piacenza, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France; the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family; and the last measures of Genoa, and some of the other Italian states, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the Allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyse the force which, as much as possible, should be concentrated in the hands of the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the house of Austria: it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the states on the left bank of the Rhine; they have been detached from the Empire, and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, noways repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality, to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident that, after all the blood which has been shed, there exist no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute

in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause, unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his Majesty is clearly of opinion, that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Prussia in a similar situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those ends, the Ligurian Republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the European powers should mutually guarantee each others' possessions. Such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as seems possible to suppress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandisement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution."—SCHÖELL, vii 59; JOMINI, *Vie de Napoléon*, i. 471, 478.

In all these varied projects, there is not a syllable either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable; and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interest of the people in the territories to be disposed of, and the general safety of Europe, required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

NOTE B, p. 6.

FINANCIAL DETAILS OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1805.

INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

| <i>Extraordinary.</i> | |
|----------------------------------|-------------|
| Malt and personal estate duties, | £2,750,000 |
| War taxes, | 8,300,000 |
| New war do., | 1,150,000 |
| Carry forward, | £12,200,000 |

HISTORY OF EUROPE

| | | |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Expenditure forward | £12,200,000 | |
| Property tax | 6,300,000 | |
| Surplus consolidated fund | 4,000,000 | |
| Lottery | 300,000 | |
| Surplus 1804 | 1,172,000 | |
| Grants to Ireland | 20,000,000 | |
| | <hr/> | £48,992,000 |

| | | |
|-------------------------|------------|------------|
| <i>Permanent</i> | | |
| Customs | 8,357,000 | |
| Excise | 20,804,000 | |
| Stamp duty | 3,354,000 | |
| Land and assessed taxes | 5,309,000 | |
| Post office | 924,000 | |
| Pensions and salaries | 49,000 | |
| Do. | 61,000 | |
| Smaller taxes | 32,000 | |
| | <hr/> | 38,690,000 |

Deduct for customs and excise, 30,390,000

Total extraordinary and permanent income, £174,362,000

EXPENDITURE, GREAT BRITAIN

Extraordinary Charges

| | | |
|---------------|-------------|------------|
| Navy | £15,035,000 | |
| Army | 18,616,000 | |
| Ordnance | 4,846,000 | |
| Miscellaneous | 6,400,000 | |
| | <hr/> | 44,947,000 |

Permanent Charges

| | | |
|------------------|-------------|------------|
| Interest of debt | £19,190,000 | |
| Sinking fund | 6,335,000 | |
| Civil list, &c. | 1,330,000 | |
| Other payments | 727,000 | |
| | <hr/> | 27,382,000 |

Total extraordinary and permanent charges, exclusive of Ireland, £72,329,000

—*Parliamentary Debates* in 1805, 594, and Appendix, 230, *Annual Register*, 1805, 594, App to Chronicle

END OF VOL VI

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